The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Manstein in his "Lost Victories", pages 61 - 62, expressed his opinion about the German Campaign in Poland:

"The enemy's losses in blood were undoubtedly very high indeed, for he had fought with great gallantry and had shown a grim determination to hold out in even the most hopeless situations. [...]
Before long the Polish campaign was being described as the blitzkrieg - the "lighting war". Indeed, as far as its speed of execution and the outcome were concerned, it did constitute something almost unique until the German offensive in the west produced a similar development on an even bigger scale.
In order to assess it fairly, however, one must bear in mind what was said in a previous chapter about Poland's prospects in this war.
In point of fact the Germans were bound to win this campaign by virtue of their superiority and their infinitely more favourable starting conditions, provided that two stipulations were fulfilled.
One was that the German command accepted a very high degree of risk in the west in order to have the necessary superiority in the east.
The other was that the Western Powers did not in any way exploit this risk to render timely aid to the Poles.
There cannot be any doubt that things might have turned out very differently had the Wester Powers taken the offensive in the west at the earliest possible moment. This would, of course, have presupposed the existence of a Polish command with a rather greater sense of reality - a command which, instead of scattering all its resources from the outset in an effort to cling on to what could not be held, would have concentrated its forces at the crucial points and fought systematically for the time needed to confront the Germans with the dilema of a real war on two fronts. The bravery with which the Polish troops fought right up to the end would have been an adequate guarantee of their ability to hold on until the Allies reached the Rhine and forced the German command seriously to consider calling off the campaign in Poland."

[Othon]

Mr. Domen.

You are from Poland as I suppose so I fully understand your attitude but try to understand mine - Polish campaign really was not any important event to entire Second Wold Word outcome. It was simply easily won by Germans short operation. German casualties were quite low. I know there are some thesis propagated now in Poland it was the Soviet Union who finally helped III Reich to defeat still battle-capable Poland. However entire campaign was decisively won by Germans before 17th September. Polish Army organized resistance was broken, it stayed without its own aerial support and ammo/POL fresh resources, Polish HQ had no control over its troops, major industrial and urban centers were conquered or surrounded, no real help from Western Allies materialized, so called Romanian Bridgehead never really existed except some shadowy plans. Still free Polish territories on the East were populated by hostile national minorities - especially Ukrainians - that is why Abwehr created several armed formations from Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists activists to trigger uprising there. Supposedly allied Romanian Government did not dare to support Polish Army with war materials transit being under strong German diplomatic pressure. Also German Army was not out of ammo and fuel at that time as opposed to present Polish beliefs. Without Soviet support Germany would conquer rest of Poland in a few weeks but not any longer.

[kon]

The territory of Poland from three parties has been surrounded by Germany, the superiority of German army is absolute, therefore there is especially nothing to discuss there. One week of war and Poland kaput

[Othon]

Of course Poland's geostrategic situation was tragic as the war started. For that reason bulk of Polish Navy (three most modern destroyers) escaped to England even before war's beginning as being useless stuff against Kriegsmarine. I think German generals would have been a complete idiots if they had not won this war. In fact Poland did not "kaput" after a week but I would say entire Polish war plan was in ruins at that point and no other "Plan B" existed except purely unrealistic Romanian Bridgehead concept. Polish HQ evacuated or escaped if you wish from Warsaw assaulted by German 4th PzDiv in those days and thus finally lost control over war operations because unrestrained by antique Polish Air Forces (no new fighter types introduced since 1933!) Luftwaffe airstrikes paralyzed Poland's communication and transportation systems in a few days. Polish armies and division fought separately on its own since then.

Well, Poland had no contingency plans for war with Germany until beginning of 1939. They were preparing only to wage war against the USSR all the time. Besides Polish intra-war military budget was ill-suited - large standing army wasted colossal in Polish scale funds for manning and provisioning purposes so money still lacked for technical modernization and rearmament programs. Those are main but often underestimated reasons why quickly "reversed" Polish Army was in many ways unable to put successful resistance against Germany.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Also German Army was not out of ammo and fuel at that time as opposed to present Polish beliefs.

These are not any present Polish believes but info from - for example - Muller-Hillebrand "Das Heer, 1933 - 1945".

This data is very old, not present, and German, not Polish.

I know there are some thesis propagated now in Poland it was the Soviet Union who finally helped III Reich to defeat still battle-capable Poland. However entire campaign was decisively won by Germans before 17th September.

I assume that you are not able to present the Order of Battle of the standing Polish Army on 17.09.1939?

I also assume that you are not able to present any precise numbers concerning your claim?

So you have nothing to support your theory?

For example balance of Polish infantry divisions by 17.09.1939 was the following:

DP - Infantry Division
BP - Infantry Brigade

1. Dispersed, forced to surrender / captured or destroyed by 17.09.1939 - 10:

3 DP - 11.09.1939 (capitulation of the Radom pocket) -> since 13.09.1939 reorganized as 3 BP
7 DP - 05.09.1939 -> remnants joined Army "Prusy" and were destroyed
9 DP - 05.09.1939 - around 30% in uniform group were rescued and kept fighting
12 DP - 11.09.1939 (capitulation of the Radom pocket) -> 17.09.1939 during reconstruction in Kowel
18 DP - 13.09.1939 (Andrzejewo) - around 15 - 20% were rescued in several groups
19 DP - dispersed between 08.09.1939 and 13.09.1939 -> since 13.09.1939 reorganized as 19 BP
21 DP - 16.09.1939 (Oleszyce) - around 25% were rescued in uniform group and kept fighting
22 DP - 10.09.1939 - around 25% were rescued in uniform group and kept fighting
29 DP - dispersed between 08.09.1939 and 13.09.1939 -> since 13.09.1939 reorganized as 29 BP
36 DP - 11.09.1939 (capitulation of the Radom pocket) -> 17.09.1939 during reconstruction in Kowel

Total reorganized into Infantry Brigades - three (3 BP, 19 BP, 29 BP)
Total partially rescued - three (9 DP, 22 DP, 21 DP)
Total being during reconstruction - two (12 DP, 36 DP)
Total irretrievably lost - two (7 DP, 18 DP)

2. New formed divisions and infantry brigades - 2:

60 DP (Dywizja "Kobryń")
13 BP

3. New formed uniform groupings of an infantry division strength - 1:

Grupa Operacyjna "Włodzimierz"

4. New infantry divisions and brigades being during reconstruction - 1:

Infantry Division no. 13 (in Równe)

5. Divisions units of which were fighting separately (in different units) since 01.09.1939, never forming entirety - 1 + part of units of the second one:

45 DP
part of units of 44 DP

6. Battle of Bzura - 8 divisions + grouping of ninth one:

4 DP
14 DP
15 DP
16 DP
17 DP
25 DP
26 DP
27 DP

Grouping of 9 DP

7. Modlin - 4:

8 DP - 35 field guns, at least 11000 soldiers, 7 tankettes
2 DP - 27 field guns, around 8000 - 8500 soldiers
28 DP - 20 field guns, 13000 - 13500 soldiers, armoured train no. 15
30 DP - 21 field guns, 11500 - 12500 soldiers

8. Warsaw - 3:

5 DP
20 DP - over 13000 - 13500 soldiers
44 DP (vast majority of forces)

9. Near Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula river - 1:

13 DP

10. South-Eastern Poland (Fronts: Northern, Central, Southern) - 13 Infantry Divisions + 1 grouping of a division strength + 4 Infantry Brigades + groupings of two Infantry Divisions + 3 being reconstructed or new formed divisions:

1 DP
6 DP
10 DP
11 DP
23 DP
24 DP
33 DP
35 DP
38 DP
39 DP
41 DP
55 DP
60 DP (Dywizja "Kobryń") - new formed

GO "Włodzimierz"

3 BP
13 BP
19 BP
29 BP

Grouping of 21 DP
Grouping of 22 DP

being reconstructed in Kowel 12 DP
being reconstructed in Kowel 36 DP
new formed DP no. 13 (another one) in Równe

I know there are some thesis propagated now in Poland it was the Soviet Union who finally helped III Reich to defeat still battle-capable Poland.

Maybe it would be good for you to check out some statistics - here you are:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&t=151663

it stayed without its own aerial support and ammo

This is also not true. Poland had got ammo stocks for two months of war.

If it comes to aerial support - major part of Polish combat (fighter and bomber) Air Force was evacuated to Romania on 17.09.1939 - after the Soviet Invasion and due to the Soviet Invasion. I can provide you exact number of planes which was evacuated to Romania by type.

It is true that Poland stayed without its own aerial support during the second phase of the Polish campaign. But Poland stayed without its own aerial support only temporarily, because Polish Air Force was being moved to new airports in the Romanian Bridgehead. This movement ended on 15.09.1939 / 16.09.1939 - and since these days (until the Soviet Invasion) Polish Air Force was active again.

And here some info about some parts of the Polish Air Force on 17.09.1939:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8&start=30

Polish HQ had no control over its troops

Polish HQ had limited control (not "no control") over its troops - because of very limited communication - only during its evacuation from Warsaw to new bases.

During this period general Rómmel - commander of the Defense of Warsaw - and his HQ were replacing the Main HQ and Rydz-Smigly.

When the Main HQ finally reached the final base in Stanisławów (in Romanian Bridgehead), it regained control over the Polish Army - although some communication problems of course remained (but where it was impossible to communicate by radio or telephone, planes or couriers were being used).

and no other "Plan B" existed except purely unrealistic Romanian Bridgehead concept.

Why do you think that Romanian Bridgehead concept was purely unrealistic?

In my opinion, until the Soviet Invasion of Poland there existed a real chance of establishing successful defense in the Romanian Bridgehead - and I can present a lot of arguments supporting this theory.

Are you able to present arguments supporting your claim that this concept was "purely unrealistic"?

no real help from Western Allies materialized

What about allied supplies across the Black Sea and Romania?

What about French actions in the Western Front, which were in fact stopped not by the Abbeville Conference on 14.09.1939 - but by the Soviet Invasion on 17.09.1939?

German casualties were quite low.

German men losses in Poland were higher than during the whole "Operation Zitadelle" - so certainly not quite low - but you are right that they weren't substantial enough to seriously reduce combat ability of German man power.

But German losses in tanks in Poland were very heavy, and certainly combat ability of German Panzer power was very significantly reduced during the first 17 days of the campaign.

For example 10. Panzer-Division had got only 50% of its tanks operational on 17.09.1939.

Panzer-Division "Kempf" lost the vast majority (almost 80%) of its tanks by 17.09.1939. Only small part of its tanks remained operational on 17.09.1939.

1. Panzer-Division was defeated on 16.09.1939 during the battle of Kiernozia, big part of its tanks were encircled or knocked out and it lost huge percent of its combat ability for at least several days. In total this division lost at least 85 of its tanks written off - far bigger amount was knocked out during the campaign and not operational on 17.09.1939.

Panzer-Regiment 35. had got only 58 - 60 tanks operational on 17.09.1939 and Panzer-Regiment 36. - even fewer. Moreover, on 17.09.1939 Panzer-Regiment 36. was encircled and dispersed by Polish forces in the Kampinoska Forest - it was rescued not until 19.09.1939 by Panzer-Regiment 35. supported by some other units.

2. Panzer-Division had got only around 100 - 115 tanks operational on 17.09.1939.

5. Panzer-Division had got less than 55 - 60% of its initial amount of tanks operational on 15.09.1939.

4. Leichte-Division had got only around 20 - 25 both tanks and Panzerspahwagen operational on 17.09.1939 - and major part of these AFVs was knocked out or destroyed on 18.09.1939 during the Polish armoured attack (carried out by Warszawska Armoured - Motorized Brigade) on Tomaszów Lubelski.

1. Leichte-Division lost at least 94 tanks written off (according to Jentz - according to Bade more: over 100 tanks, I don't remember the exact number) - but in this case the majority of these casualties were suffered after 17.09.1939 (and before 21.09.1939). Certainly much more tanks were knocked out and not operational.

Guderian's 3. Panzer-Division had got circa 50% of its tanks not operational or written off by 17.09.1939.

Etc., etc.

I am able to provide reliable sources for each of these numbers & facts, if only you want.

German Panzer forces were in such a poor condition after 17 days of the Polish campaign, that they needed a long break for repairing vehicles to start their advance once again. But there was a big problem - shortage of spare parts necessary to repair AFVs.

PS:

Now I am quite busy, but after 12.05.2009 I will have a lot of time for discussion here.

[Othon]

These are not any present Polish believes but info from - for example - Muller-Hillebrand "Das Heer, 1933 - 1945".

This data is very old, not present, and German, not Polish.

Of course there are another data about this issue. Look at link below:

http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/GermAmmoPoland.html

It seems Wehrmacht ammo reserves in September 1939 was lowered by several per cent on average.

I know there are some thesis propagated now in Poland it was the Soviet Union who finally helped III Reich to defeat still battle-capable Poland. However entire campaign was decisively won by Germans before 17th September.

I assume that you are not able to present the Order of Battle of the standing Polish Army on 17.09.1939?

I also assume that you are not able to present any precise numbers concerning your claim?

So you have nothing to support your theory?

I think you should look at German OdeB, OKH situational map for 17th September first and later confront this data with your list of crushed, exhausted, isolated or even fully encircled Polish divisions (Bzura, Warsaw, Modlin pockets) without unified command and control, no air support and military industrial base already captured by Germans. I think conclusion is obvious.

and no other "Plan B" existed except purely unrealistic Romanian Bridgehead concept.

Why do you think that Romanian Bridgehead concept was purely unrealistic?

In my opinion, until the Soviet Invasion of Poland there existed a real chance of establishing successful defense in the Romanian Bridgehead - and I can present a lot of arguments supporting this theory.

Are you able to present arguments supporting your claim that this concept was "purely unrealistic"?

I suggest you to answer a few questions about Romanian Bridgehead:

- What Polish troops were already in place?

- Were any real fortifications present on this area?

- How many mentioned by you Polish divisions could reach Bridgehead without German counteraction or could defeat German units blocking their move?

- How serious were their losses suffered up to 16th September?

- What about their ammunition supplies?

- What about unlimited Luftwaffe air superiority in this context?

Besides I completely do not understand what are you talking about:

- Polish air forces were to evacuate to airfields in Romanian Bridgehead??? - tell us what airfields, how much aerial ammo and POL reserves were accessible there and how much time would Luftwaffe need to destroy these airbases situated on very narrow Bridgehead area? Even if this all were possible, about fifty remaining Polish antique fighters altogether with thirty bombers could do nothing against almost entire Luftwaffe onslaught against "Bridgehead Fortress".

- Polish HQ regained control over its army??? - after HQ evacuation from Warsaw normal control were never regained. Temporary HQ in Brest was unprepared lacking communication assets. Later German attacks forced Polish HQ to move southward in the Romanian border direction. Pure improvisation started at this moment. Also there were no intermediate level of command (fronts, army groups) established before the war i.e. Polish HQ had to command single armies or even divisions in the field. Next thing is that Polish high level military communication was based on cable and telegraph civilian network destroyed by German air forces very quickly. And last but not least: speed of German attack turned outdated Polish C3I system into complete failure.

no real help from Western Allies materialized

What about allied supplies across the Black Sea and Romania?

What about French actions in the Western Front, which were in fact stopped not by the Abbeville Conference on 14.09.1939 - but by the Soviet Invasion on 17.09.1939?

I mentioned real help, not some propaganda and unimportant moves. As I mentioned earlier Romania would not allow any military transit to Poland fearing German reaction. In fact huge Western powers' land offensive didn't happen because they knew very well before September 15th that Poland already lost the war. They also knew very well about Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact which means Soviet intervention was possible in such military situation. So Allied offensive was senseless. Moreover I think such offensive would be a failure because Germany had about a million already mobilized soldiers defending 500 km wide front backed by Siegfried Line of course. In sum Allied HQ made a right decision.

German casualties were quite low.

German losses in tanks were very heavy.

Firstly, term "casualties" means MIA/KIA/WIA, not material losses. In Polish campaign Germans lost about 16000 KIA/MIA soldiers. In comparison Polish Army casualties were 70000 soldiers killed. Probably 130000 Polish civilians also perished.

Secondly as for material losses: Luftwaffe lost about 10% (~250 planes) of its numerical strength assigned to war with Poland. In this number only 6% (~160 planes) were battle losses. I assume Germany overall aviation strength was about 2500 military planes. Also German tank losses were about 10-20% of initial Panzerwaffe strength.

German Panzer forces were in such a poor condition after 17 days of the Polish campaign, that they needed a long break for repairing vehicles to start their advance once again.

You are kidding, aren't you?

At this point I quote opinion presented by widely acknowledged Polish historian and Polish Campaign researcher prof. Marian Zgorniak in one of his interviews:

"Twierdzenie, że w połowie września ofensywa niemiecka traciła rozpęd, że Niemcy ponieśli wielkie straty, a armia polska miała pełne szanse utrzymać "przedmoście rumuńskie", jest równie trudne do obrony jak Polska w 1939."

What translates to English:

"Claiming that in the middle of September German offensive slowed down, Germany suffered huge losses, Polish Army had a full chance to defend Romanian Bridgehead are equally hard to defend like Poland in 1939."

Soviet intervention only accelerated already foregone fall of Poland, not caused it per se.

Cheers!

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Also there were no intermediate level of command (fronts, army groups) established before the war i.e. Polish HQ had to command single armies or even divisions in the field.

On 10.09.1939 Southern, Northern and Central Fronts (Army Groups) were created.

Next thing is that Polish high level military communication was based on cable and telegraph civilian network destroyed by German air forces very quickly.

Low level military communication was based on cable and telephone / telegraph.

High level communication was of course based on radio and air communication.

Of course there are another data about this issue. Look at link below:

It is an internet source.

He claims that he used Hahn as his source. I have got Hahn's publication. I know that he provides numbers of ammo usage. But on which page does he allegedly provide numbers of production and stocks?

Another thing is that Hahn is not a reliable source of information - you can see it by simply checking out some other figures from his book (I was already writing about it for example in the "Poland 1939: KIA German officers" thread).

And - by the way - this one is completely different (and does not even cover usage for the whole campaign):

http://www.panzerworld.net/fallweiss

As I mentioned earlier Romania would not allow any military transit to Poland fearing German reaction.

Romania had got an agreement signed with Poland and certainly would allow such transit.

Moreover - it actually allowed such transit because Allied ships were already on their way and first transports were reaching Romanian ports. So I don't believe that Poland and Allies sent their ships to Poland without consulting it with Romania before.

Yet on 16.09.1939 Polish side sent their representatives to Romania to receive these transports.

In Polish campaign Germans lost about 16000 KIA/MIA soldiers.

Heer - 16843 KIA + 320 MIA = 17163 (source: Bundes Archiv - Militar Archiv in Freiburg, RH 7/653 and RH 3/134)
Luftwaffe - 326 KIA + 98 MIA = 424 (source: "Wojna Obronna Polski 1939", T. Jurga "Obrona Polski 1939")
Kriegsmarine - 77 KIA + 3 MIA = 80 (source: Hahn, "Waffen und Geheimewaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 - 1945")

Number of WIA of Heer - estimated around 17163 x 2 = 34326 (and very similar number is also confirmed by "Wojna Obronna Polski 1939", pages 850 - 851)
Number of WIA of Luftwaffe was 361
Number of WIA of Kriegsmarine was 115

Additionally it would be a very correct estimation that on 17.09.1939 around 5,000 German soldiers were in Polish captivity.

Total Wehrmacht: 17667 KIA + 34802 WIA = 52469 + 5,000 POWs = 57469

These losses are higher than German losses during the whole "Operation Zitadelle" - in which their enemy had got much more guns, much more firepower, better fortifications, much more mines and enormous amounts of tanks.

Additionally Slovakian army lost 37 KIA and 11 MIA = 48. Plus 114 WIA = 162.

In comparison Polish Army casualties were 70000 soldiers killed.

It is a very wrong comparision.

According to the record data in all cemeteries there are 67177 Polish soldiers who lost their lives during the Defensive War of 1939 buried. Indeed - almost 70,000.

But according to calculations of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from October of 1944 around 7,500 of them were killed or murdered by the Soviet Army. Additionally around 12,500 - 13,500 were wounded in combats against the Red Army.

So around 60,000 were killed or murdered (according to this book - http://www.sehepunkte.de/2006/10/8940.html - around 3,000 were murdered after taken prisoner) by German and Slovakian Armies + saboteurs of all kinds.

Secondly as for material losses: Luftwaffe lost about 10% (~250 planes) of its numerical strength assigned to war with Poland.

You forgot that not only destroyed but also damaged planes were excluded from combat at least for the long time.

If including both destroyed and damaged - and this is the correct way of counting casualties for the campaign which lasted for around one month - casualties were circa 600 planes.

Also German tank losses were about 10-20% of initial Panzerwaffe strength.

You are kidding, aren't you?

Write offs were between at least 25 and 15 percent of the initial strange (Jentz provides incomplete data - 419 tanks written off - and this very incomplete data results in 15% - while factual write offs were at least 674 tanks).

Once again - you count only write offs (Totalausfalle), while real casualties (all tanks which were not operational at the end of the Panzerwaffe operations in Poland) were much higher - at least around 50% of the initial Panzer strength.

As I wrote - I can provide source for every of the figures given above.

Soviet intervention only accelerated already foregone fall of Poland, not caused it per se.

First of all - I agree that the Soviet intervention accelerated the fall of Poland. In my opinion - it accelerated it much (at least for one month).

On the other hand - if the fall of Poland had already been foregone or not, it would have depended only on the Allied moves and results of these moves.

If the USSR hadn't invaded Poland and France had carried out a major offensive, everything could happen.

In fact huge Western powers' land offensive didn't happen because they knew very well before September 15th that Poland already lost the war.

How do you know that?

Have you read original French (not English) protocols from the Abbeville Conference? Rather not.

Btw - why did French ambassador in Poland - Louis Faury - say on 16.09.1939 to the chef of Polish Main HQ - Stachiewicz - that the French main offensive is going to be started on 21.09.1939 and that he is optimistic if it comes to the Polish plan of further defense in the Romanian Bridgehead?

They also knew very well about Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact which means Soviet intervention was possible in such military situation.

Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was just a non-agression pact and everybody knew about it. But there was a top secret protocol attached to this pact - and who knew about this protocol except Russians and Germans? England?

I have heard such speculations before. Some said that only England knew (and did not inform France), some that both France and England knew.

But I would like to know one thing - what are the sources for such statements?

So Allied offensive was senseless.

After the Soviet Invasion of Poland and escape of the Polish HQ to Romania - certainly.

Moreover I think such offensive would be a failure because Germany had about a million already mobilized soldiers defending 500 km wide front backed by Siegfried Line of course.

It is very probable that such offensive would have been a failure.

But it is also very probable that it would have forced the Germans to stop their offensive operations in Poland and only hold what they had already conquered.

I think you should look at German OdeB, OKH situational map for 17th September first

I have already done it.

And I came to the conclusion that in South-Eastern Poland Germany did not have such a great superiority like on many other parts of the frontline (especcialy at the Bzura).

They simply did not have enough forces there to quickly and successfully bring operations in that area to an end.

Reality showed it - by the way.

Guderian was repulsed by Polish 33. and 41. Infantry Divisions near Sawin and stopped by GO "Polesie" near Kobryn.

4. Leichte-Division was repulsed near Włodzimierz Wołynski by GO "Włodzimierz Wolynski".

Polish 3rd Mountain Brigade recaptured Stary Sambor on 16.09.1939.

Near Lemberg Germans were almost not advancing at all since 12.09.1939.

As a matter of fact after 12.09.1939 in any part of the frontline Germans did not have any significant terrain progress. And they wanted to have it (German plans of the offensive against the Romanian Bridgehead clearly show it).

This was partially caused by the fact that Germans withdrew huge part of their forces to the Bzura region - due to the Polish offensive at the Bzura, which caused very hard situation of the German 8. Army.

That's why I consider the Polish offensive operation at the Bzura as the Polish operational success - it had got significant influence on the course of events on the other parts of the German eastern front.

bout fifty remaining Polish antique fighters altogether with thirty bombers

Much more.

Your numbers cover only the two biggest units - Fighter (Poscigowa) Brigade and Bomber Brigade.

could do nothing against almost entire Luftwaffe onslaught against "Bridgehead Fortress".

By that time (17.09.1939) the big majority of Luftwaffe forces were involved at the Bzura or over Warsaw / Modlin.

I suggest you to answer a few questions about Romanian Bridgehead:

Don't worry, I will precisely answer all of these questions. But to do this right, I need much more time than I recently have got. So I will do this in the future. I hope that few weeks is not too long to wait for you.

Cheers!
Peter

[Othon]

Also there were no intermediate level of command (fronts, army groups) established before the war i.e. Polish HQ had to command single armies or even divisions in the field.

On 10.09.1939 Southern, Northern and Central Fronts (Army Groups) were created.

Yes, however it was too late. At that moment no strategic concept was possible to achieve using this fronts.

Next thing is that Polish high level military communication was based on cable and telegraph civilian network destroyed by German air forces very quickly.

Low level military communication was based on cable and telephone / telegraph.

High level communication was of course based on radio and air communication.

No. Low level communication was very insufficient because Polish Army had very little radio sets. High level comm was essentially based on civilian postal and railway network destroyed by German air strikes at the war beginning. If you wish I can quote proper book but I do not posses it at this moment.

Of course there are another data about this issue. Look at link below:

It is an internet source.

He claims that he used Hahn as his source. I have got Hahn's publication. I know that he provides numbers of ammo usage. But on which page does he allegedly provide numbers of production and stocks?

Another thing is that Hahn is not a reliable source of information - you can see it by simply checking out some other figures from his book (I was already writing about it for example in the "Poland 1939: KIA German officers" thread).

And - by the way - this one is completely different (and does not even cover usage for the whole campaign):

http://www.panzerworld.net/fallweiss

As I can see you undermine awkward sources of data. However I believe Hahn's ammunition data. One can note they are in complete contrast to your beliefs about "German Army without ammo" in the middle of September and what is more important they are backed by reality, too. Note Germans had plenty of ammo intensively bombing Polish troops during battle of Bzura and later carpet bombing Warsaw in late September. Well, in October during battle of Kock Polish troops capitulated because of...lack of ammunition!

As I mentioned earlier Romania would not allow any military transit to Poland fearing German reaction.

Romania had got an agreement signed with Poland and certainly would allow such transit.

Moreover - it actually allowed such transit because Allied ships were already on their way and first transports were reaching Romanian ports. So I don't believe that Poland and Allies sent their ships to Poland without consulting it with Romania before.

Yet on 16.09.1939 Polish side sent their representatives to Romania to receive these transports.

Oh, Romania had even defense treaty with Poland! However this document proved to be empty piece of paper because German diplomatic and military pressure persuaded Romanians not to help Poland even indirectly. Romanians simply feared German intervention or bombardment of their country which would be quite rationale move to stop flow of war materials into Poland. Additionally Romanians maybe much more feared Soviets being without any hope for real Western support! In such geopolitical environment Romanian Government was powerless.

In Polish campaign Germans lost about 16000 KIA/MIA soldiers.

Heer - 16843 KIA + 320 MIA = 17163 (source: Bundes Archiv - Militar Archiv in Freiburg, RH 7/653 and RH 3/134)
Luftwaffe - 326 KIA + 98 MIA = 424 (source: "Wojna Obronna Polski 1939", T. Jurga "Obrona Polski 1939")
Kriegsmarine - 77 KIA + 3 MIA = 80 (source: Hahn, "Waffen und Geheimewaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 - 1945")

Number of WIA of Heer - estimated around 17163 x 2 = 34326 (and very similar number is also confirmed by "Wojna Obronna Polski 1939", pages 850 - 851)
Number of WIA of Luftwaffe was 361
Number of WIA of Kriegsmarine was 115

Additionally it would be a very correct estimation that on 17.09.1939 around 5,000 German soldiers were in Polish captivity.

Total Wehrmacht: 17667 KIA + 34802 WIA = 52469 + 5,000 POWs = 57469

Thanks for backing my data! As I wrote earlier from memory (I mean only KIA/MIA soldiers by the way) "about 16000" Germans killed is quite precise value here.

These losses are higher than German losses during the whole "Operation Zitadelle" - in which their enemy had got much more guns, much more firepower, better fortifications, much more mines and enormous amounts of tanks.

Note you compare one battle with entire war. In fact comparing Eastern Front to any other World War II campaign is senseless in my opinion.

In comparison Polish Army casualties were 70000 soldiers killed.

It is a very wrong comparision.

According to the record data in all cemeteries there are 67177 Polish soldiers who lost their lives during the Defensive War of 1939 buried. Indeed - almost 70,000.

But according to calculations of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from October of 1944 around 7,500 of them were killed or murdered by the Soviet Army. Additionally around 12,500 - 13,500 were wounded in combats against the Red Army.

So around 60,000 were killed or murdered (according to this book - http://www.sehepunkte.de/2006/10/8940.html - around 3,000 were murdered after taken prisoner) by German and Slovakian Armies + saboteurs of all kinds.

My data are correct according to official sources you quoted first. Including murdered soldiers did not change obviously unequal casualties ratio. Moreover vast majority of Polish KIA/MIA soldiers died before 17th September because later Polish resistance quickly disappeared.

Secondly as for material losses: Luftwaffe lost about 10% (~250 planes) of its numerical strength assigned to war with Poland.

You forgot that not only destroyed but also damaged planes were excluded from combat at least for the long time.

If including both destroyed and damaged - and this is the correct way of counting casualties for the campaign which lasted for around one month - casualties were circa 600 planes.

According to M. Emmerling series of books "Luftwaffe over Poland" all planes counted as not severely damaged (i.e. in 1%-59% damage range) were recovered. So his data taken from BAMA archives state circa 260 planes were lost on the Polish front.

Also German tank losses were about 10-20% of initial Panzerwaffe strength.

Write offs were between at least 25 and 15 percent of the initial strange (Jentz provides incomplete data - 419 tanks written off - and this very incomplete data results in 15% - while factual write offs were at least 674 tanks).

Once again - you count only write offs (Totalausfalle), while real casualties (all tanks which were not operational at the end of the Panzerwaffe operations in Poland) were much higher - at least around 50% of the initial Panzer strength.

As I wrote - I can provide source for every of the figures given above.

Once again: German real tank losses (written-off tanks) were even lower - 236 units. I must add Germany used against Poland about 2500 tanks. So your astronomical numbers of German tanks lost in Poland are vastly exaggregated in similar way as for Luftwaffe losses.

Soviet intervention only accelerated already foregone fall of Poland, not caused it per se.

First of all - I agree that the Soviet intervention accelerated the fall of Poland. In my opinion - it accelerated it much (at least for one month).

On the other hand - if the fall of Poland had already been foregone or not, it would have depended only on the Allied moves and results of these moves.

If the USSR hadn't invaded Poland and France had carried out a major offensive, everything could happen.

First of all I appreciate you agree Romanian Bridgehead idea was not suitable concept and entire campaign was lost without Soviet intervention. That point I'd like to prove here.

In fact huge Western powers' land offensive didn't happen because they knew very well before September 15th that Poland already lost the war.

How do you know that?

Have you read original French (not English) protocols from the Abbeville Conference? Rather not.

However you rather don't know Allied Powers knew about Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact at that time. Additionally they had first hand info about military situation in Poland from French military attache. So I do not get your point: "France invades Germany while Soviets do not invade Poland". Such combination was simply impossible in this military-political situation.

Btw - why did French ambassador in Poland - Louis Faury - say on 16.09.1939 to the chef of Polish Main HQ - Stachiewicz - that the French main offensive is going to be started on 21.09.1939 and that he is optimistic if it comes to the Polish plan of further defense in the Romanian Bridgehead?

Don't you think French ambassador cheated Polish general with unknown reasons? Wasn't it a part of French plan to outster Mosciciki-Rydz-Beck ruling triumvirate on the Sikorski favor?

Anyway such military action was impossible because French authorities already decided against it much earlier.

They also knew very well about Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact which means Soviet intervention was possible in such military situation.

Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was just a non-agression pact and everybody knew about it. But there was a top secret protocol attached to this pact - and who knew about this protocol except Russians and Germans? England?

I have heard such speculations before. Some said that only England knew (and did not inform France), some that both France and England knew.

But I would like to know one thing - what are the sources for such statements?

It is very well known fact! German diplomat Hans von Herwarth who assisted in signing German-Soviet pact transferred its secret protocol to Americans and they surely informed Britons.

Moreover I think such offensive would be a failure because Germany had about a million already mobilized soldiers defending 500 km wide front backed by Siegfried Line of course.

It is very probable that such offensive would have been a failure.

But it is also very probable that it would have forced the Germans to stop their offensive operations in Poland and only hold what they had already conquered.

Not at all! Germany cleverly divided its forces on both fronts: on the West they concentrated only infantry divisions and most of fighter aviation taking defensive posture. Those forces were enough to stop French offensive for a time period needed to crush Poland and transfer strike units from the East to the West. Moreover French Army was not prepared at all for offensive war. They had outdated strategy, Maginot Line, no modern strike aviation...Hitler knew about all that for sure. Certainly only one thing could stop Hitler from invading Poland - fear of Soviet military aid to Poland. In that context Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was essential even without Soviet intervention! It assured Germany there would be no very serious war in September.

I suggest you to answer a few questions about Romanian Bridgehead:

Don't worry, I will precisely answer all of these questions. But to do this right, I need much more time than I recently have got. So I will do this in the future. I hope that few weeks is not too long to wait for you.

I shall wait!

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Oh, Romania had even defense treaty with Poland!

Romania had got a defense treaty with Poland only in case of the Soviet Invasion - not in case of the German Invasion.

In case of the German Invasion Romania was only obligated to retain "friendly neutrality" and to let Allied supplies by.

However this document proved to be empty piece of paper because German diplomatic and military pressure persuaded Romanians not to help Poland even indirectly.

Ok, but what are your sources for this statement?

Note you compare one battle with entire war.

Operation Zitadelle was fought between armies of similar size and even bigger strength than in Polenfeldzug and lasted for similar time.

And Polenfeldzug was not entire war, but only one campaign.

In fact comparing Eastern Front to any other World War II campaign is senseless in my opinion.

The only major difference was that the Eastern Front was fought on much bigger scale and that there were much more city battles than on every other fronts counted together.

Including murdered soldiers did not change obviously unequal casualties ratio.

3:1 is not an unequal casualties ratio if the enemy had got such a great firepower, technical and numerical superiority.

See casualties ratio on Okinawa - for example.

Moreover vast majority of Polish KIA/MIA soldiers died before 17th September because later Polish resistance quickly disappeared.

According to the officer list which we created (I also participated in creating it) in the thread "Poland 1939: KIA German officers" - around 68% of these officers were KIA before 17.09.1939.

So I assume that both Poland and Germany suffered around 70 - 65% of their fatal casualties before 17.09.1939.

If it comes to Poland - as 100% I of course assume circa 60,000 KIA, because additional 7,500 were killed by the Soviets and all of them died after 17.09.1939.

Not at all! Germany cleverly divided its forces on both fronts: on the West they concentrated only infantry divisions and most of fighter aviation taking defensive posture. Those forces were enough to stop French offensive for a time period needed to crush Poland and transfer strike units from the East to the West. Moreover French Army was not prepared at all for offensive war. They had outdated strategy, Maginot Line, no modern strike aviation...Hitler knew about all that for sure. Certainly only one thing could stop Hitler from invading Poland - fear of Soviet military aid to Poland. In that context Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was essential even without Soviet intervention! It assured Germany there would be no very serious war in September.

Read what Manstein wrote, please (see above).

Manstein wrote, that if the French offensive had endangered the Rhine line, Germany would have been forced to stop the "Case White" and "Case White 5 September" (also called "Case White II") operations and move major part of their forces to the Western Front to repulse the French offensive.

Moreover, on 10.09.1939 Hitler demanded from his generals the following information:

"What is the shortest possible line along which the smallest possible forces will be able to insure against the remaining Polish territory, if the rest of the Eastern Poland is not going to be captured by our forces."

Which clearly shows that he was afraid of the French offensive in the West.

Additionally they had first hand info about military situation in Poland from French military attache.

I know. This attache was Louis Faury.

And do you know what did he say on 16.09.1939? I will quote him:

On 16.09.1939 French attache in Poland, Louis Faury, said to general Wacław Stachiewicz (chef of Polish Main HQ):

"I evaluate Polish preparations to the defense in the Romanian Bridgehead well, as having big chances for realization. I will send a proper report to Paris to inform them about it."

Source: Cz. Grzelak, H. Stańczyk, "Kampania polska 1939 roku", page 243.

German diplomat Hans von Herwarth who assisted in signing German-Soviet pact transferred its secret protocol to Americans and they surely informed Britons.

So you claim that Britons knew about it, but France did not know, right?

But still I would like to see the sources.

However you rather don't know Allied Powers knew about Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact at that time.

So who exactly knew. Only the USA, the USA + Britain, or the USA + Britain + France ???

Don't you think French ambassador cheated Polish general with unknown reasons? Wasn't it a part of French plan to outster Mosciciki-Rydz-Beck ruling triumvirate on the Sikorski favor?

It could have been, but I don't have any reliable bases to think so.

Anyway - maybe some of our French fellows would be able to tell us more about it. What information did Louis Faury sent to Paris on 16.09.1939? Did he really send the same information which he told Stachiewicz that he would sent?

Anyway such military action was impossible because French authorities already decided against it much earlier.

Source, please, source!

Here is the 12-pages long discussion above the Abbeville Conference - with many quotations - and nobody was so radical in his claims at the end of this discussion as you are here!:

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=1 ... &start=250

According to M. Emmerling series of books "Luftwaffe over Poland" all planes counted as not severely damaged (i.e. in 1%-59% damage range) were recovered.

And according to Jerzy Cynk many of these planes were not recovered.

But it doesn't matter who is right - the fact is that even if these planes were recovered, they were all recovered after the end of the Polish campaign.

So they were not available for the German operations during the campaign.

So Germany had got circa 600 planes fewer than on 01.09.1939.

First of all I appreciate you agree Romanian Bridgehead idea was not suitable concept and entire campaign was lost without Soviet intervention. That point I'd like to prove here.

I do not agree that the Romanian Bridgehead idea was a not suitable concept. I never wrote anything like that. In my opinion it was a suitable concept.

And the campaign wasn't lost - but it was too be lost - since the very first moment. Even on 31.08.1939 it was to be lost.

But it is a great difference between "it was lost" and "it was to be lost in the future".

High level comm was essentially based on civilian postal and railway network destroyed by German air strikes at the war beginning. If you wish I can quote proper book but I do not posses it at this moment.

I can also quote sources which say that the high level commands (like for example Main HQ of the Polish Army) were using radio stations which had got long range.

However I believe Hahn's ammunition data.

But I cannot find this data anywhere in his book.

I only managed to find the ammunition usage data - not the ammunition stocks / production data for September 1939.

Once again: German real tank losses (written-off tanks) were even lower - 236 units. I must add Germany used against Poland about 2500 tanks.

Germany used over 2700 tanks in Poland, not 2500.

Written off were at least 419 (but this data - from Jentz - is incomplete) - and up to at least 674 (which is a more correct number). But real casualties were much higher. As I wrote - on 17.09.1939 German Army had got only around 50% of their Panzers in Poland still operational.

It seems that you have problems with distinguishing between tank casualties (all knocked out and not operational tanks) and tanks completely destroyed (written off):

So I will show you:

These are most probably written off tanks - all photos from Poland 1939:



























--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And these tanks were most probably not written off - all photos from Poland 1939:

































































Mines:

So your astronomical numbers of German tanks lost in Poland are vastly exaggregated in similar way as for Luftwaffe losses.

Once again - I can back-up each of my numbers for "astronomical German tank losses" in Poland in 1939 with reliable sources, if only you want me to do it.

[Othon]

Unfortunately I do not have time to answer your post in detail. Yet do you really think images of several destroyed or damaged German tanks can prove your claim about 50% German tanks losses in Poland?

I am very skeptical reading your data about Luftwaffe and Panzerwaffe losses. After Polish Campaign Polish pilots claimed about 150 German planes (so called Bajan List) shot down while German archives gave us 40-50 such planes destroyed in the air. Polish author Cynk is highly questioned by Emmerling because he did not research BAMA archives. Your information about "much more than" 50 fighters and 30 bombers remaining in Polish Air Forces are incorrect. Even mentioned Cynk gave exactly those plane numbers evacuated to Romania 17th September along with their losses since 1th September equals about 300 planes (100 destroyed in the air, 25 destroyed on the ground, 120 written-of due to crashes and other non-combat events, 20 sabotaged by their own crews, 35 shot down by Polish air defense) while Polish air forces had 400 planes at the war's start.

See you later.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Yet do you really think images of several destroyed or damaged German tanks can prove your claim about 50% German tanks losses in Poland?

My sources for this "claim" - as you called it - are not images but:

- Memories of Obstlt. Eberbach - "Sturmfahrt auf Warschau" and "Die Vernichtungsschlacht an der Bzura"
- H. Schaufler, "So Lebten und Starben Sie: Das Buch vom Panzer-Regiment 35", pages 15 – 22
- Detlev von Plato, "Die Geschichte der 5 Panzerdivision 1938 bis 1945"
- Thomas Jentz, "Panzertruppen - The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force: 1933 - 1942", pages 104, 134 and 141
- Collective work, "Wojna Obronna Polski 1939", pages 850 and 851
- T. Jurga, W. Karbowski, "Armia Modlin 1939"
- Kenneth Macksey, "Guderian", pages 88 and 92
- Lexikon der Wehrmacht - "Panzer-Regiment 8" and "Panzer-Regiment 7"
- Christoph Avender, "World War II day by day" - "Daily reports" and "Gliederungen"
- Accounts of Leutnant Bade - Zugführer in 2. Kompanie of Pz.Rgt.23 (1. Leichte-Division)
- Piotr Saja, "Armia Lublin 1939"
- Rajmund Szubański, "Polska broń pancerna 1939"

+ some other sources, which I can also list, if you want

After Polish Campaign Polish pilots claimed about 150 German planes (so called Bajan List) shot down while German archives gave us 40-50 such planes destroyed in the air.

Even Emmerling gives more than 50 German planes shot down by enemy planes if I remember correctly.

Bajan List mentions only around 100 granted air victories for September of 1939, not 150.

Jerzy Pawlak in his book "Polskie eskadry w Wojnie Obronnej 1939" claimed 150 planes shot down by Polish pilots - because he was writing his book together with "relations of pilots" on which he was later basing his claims...

And this "German data" is Emmerling - who sees accidents everywhere. In Polish forum dws there were already many proofs that some cases described by Emmerling as accidents, were in fact planes shot down by the enemy.

such planes destroyed in the air.

So those planes which were shot down by AA defense were not "destroyed in the air"?

Even Emmerling says that Polish AA defense was efficient and shot down at least almost 150 German aircraft.

Polish author Cynk is highly questioned by Emmerling because he did not research BAMA archives.

And Emmerling did not research Polish primary sources at all - so?

But if it comes to Cynk:

I suppose that Cynk did not have access to German archives - Germans used to defend access to their archives like lions yet a dozen or so years ago - at least for Polish historians.

while Polish air forces had 400 planes at the war's start.

400 planes just in first line combat units, without combat reserves.

What about replacements and reinforcements during the campaign, as well as technical reserves.

I have got quite detailed data concerning number of planes evacuated to Romania / Hungary, number of planes destroyed or captured by the Soviet Army, number of planes destroyed or captured by Germans on 17.09.1939 or later.

Cheers!

[Othon]

Well, Mr. Domen.

As for your counting of German losses I must say I have read thread about that on Polish DWS forum where you also vastly contributed. Here you are a link:

http://dws.kei.pl/phpbb3/viewtopic.php? ... 5f4e94db40

So I do not want to repeat here arguments made there by your adversaries. I can only say your counting methodology was criticized by some of them in several points (repaired tanks question, illicit losses generalization etc.). That is why you get such high German tank losses. Interested people should familiarize themselves with linked above thread if they speak Polish of course.

Even Emmerling gives more than 50 German planes shot down by enemy planes if I remember correctly.

Lately Emmerling narrowed this number to about 40-50 German planes shot down by Polish aircrafts.

Bajan List mentions only around 100 granted air victories for September of 1939, not 150.

More precisely Bajan List includes: 126 "certain" victories, 10 "probable" victories and 12 damaged planes. However this is not list of shot down German planes but claimed victories! Now Bajan List is practically seen as unreliable source. I suppose Pietrzak's book data are based on this list or similar sort of sources. Anyway real losses are three times smaller than Polish claims. That is very instructive lesson and applicable to other losses, too.

And this "German data" is Emmerling - who sees accidents everywhere. In Polish forum dws there were already many proofs that some cases described by Emmerling as accidents, were in fact planes shot down by the enemy.

I am sure "German data" are most reliable in description of German losses, don't you think? Besides those accidents would not enlarge German overall loses in September Campaign calculated as 10% of "Luftwaffe Ost" initial forces. You should come to terms with obvious fact that Luftwaffe was not severely beaten by Polish forces at all. In contrary Polish aviation lost 75% forces in two weeks and half. in fact it ceased to exist as a viable military force. Moreover aviation units ground infrastructure (mobile workshops, POL, ammo trucks etc.) also almost disappeared in this chaos.

I suppose that Cynk did not have access to German archives - Germans used to defend access to their archives like lions yet a dozen or so years ago - at least for Polish historians.

Really? Having watched who read this archives before Emmerling stated something quite opposite.

So those planes which were shot down by AA defense were not "destroyed in the air"?

Even Emmerling says that Polish AA defense was efficient and shot down at least almost 150 German aircraft.

What I mean was they were destroyed in the air by Polish planes, sorry! You are right Polish AAA was more efficient but not to such a degree. According to Emmerling Polish land based air defense assets shot down about 100 German planes.

400 planes just in first line combat units, without combat reserves.

What about replacements and reinforcements during the campaign, as well as technical reserves.

Yes, however Polish Air Force war replacements included only 38 combat planes according to Cynk. Strategic reserves were mostly destroyed on the ground during first Luftwaffe air raids on Polish airbases.

I have got quite detailed data concerning number of planes evacuated to Romania / Hungary, number of planes destroyed or captured by the Soviet Army, number of planes destroyed or captured by Germans on 17.09.1939 or later.

Great! I have them also thus I can save your time and post them now. On 17th September strength of regular Polish air units evacuated to Romania was 97 combat planes (49 fighters, 30 bombers, 18 observation planes). Additionally Polish training and reserve planes also flew to Romania. All in all there were 141 Polish military planes in that country (40 P.11a/c, 14 P.7, 31 PZL.23, 27 PZL.37, 11 RWD 14, 17 R.XIII, 1 Potez 25) and 120 training, civilian, sport planes including 51 RWD 8, 28 RWD 13, 11 RWD 17. One can note all of these fighters and bombers were very outdated except PZL.37.

Certainly it was omnipotent force which could have stopped Luftwaffe over "Bridgehead Fortress" if Soviets had not come-in!

Cheers!

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Certainly it was omnipotent force which could have stopped Luftwaffe over "Bridgehead Fortress" if Soviets had not come-in!

The most important role of the Polish Air Force in that time - and that's why I am underlining that it was existing and was ready for its duties on 16.09.1939 - was not stopping Luftwaffe, but reconnaissance, communication and lifting morale of ground forces (simply by its activity and existence).

I have never claimed that Polish Air Force could have stopped Luftwaffe. But it could have continued to put up the resistance and to complete tasks listed above - if not the Soviet Invasion.

More precisely Bajan List includes: 126 "certain" victories, 10 "probable" victories and 12 damaged planes. However this is not list of shot down German planes but claimed victories! Now Bajan List is practically seen as unreliable source. I suppose Pietrzak's book data are based on this list or similar sort of sources.

Here is a very nice compilation of granted (by the Polish side) victories (not claims) for September of 1939:

http://www.mysliwcy.pl/

Wrzesień 1939 -> Bilans

Anyway real losses are three times smaller than Polish claims. That is very instructive lesson and applicable to other losses, too.

If you read Polish dws forum, you should also read this thread:

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=5 ... =Emmerling

Where Mr. Marius Emmerling was personally participating in discussion about his books.

I also recommend Mysliwcy forum (Marius was also present there):

http://www.mysliwcy.pl/forum/index.php?ustaw=

As I wrote - some cases described by Emmerling as accidents were in fact caused by enemy action.

So I do not want to repeat here arguments made there by your adversaries. I can only say your counting methodology was criticized by some of them in several points (repaired tanks question, illicit losses generalization etc.). That is why you get such high German tank losses. Interested people should familiarize themselves with linked above thread if they speak Polish of course.

Well, I guess that in the end my arguments finally won there.

That is why you get such high German tank losses.

I get such losses from the sources given above - and I'm shure that I am interpreting info from these sources correctly - unlike some others.

Really? Having watched who read this archives before Emmerling stated something quite opposite.

Who had read them before Emmerling?

Great! I have them also thus I can save your time and post them now.

To this you must add planes captured or destroyed by the Red Army and captured or destroyed by Germans on 17.09.1939 or later. If you want I can provide some figures concerning this.

Strategic reserves were mostly destroyed on the ground during first Luftwaffe air raids on Polish airbases.

So what was captured by the Red Army? Ghost-planes?!

Have you seen figures for the Ukrainian Front alone? I have posted the link to them above.

According to Emmerling Polish land based air defense assets shot down about 100 German planes.

I know what is according to Emmerling. I have even talked with him on forums. It is more than 100 planes.

Lately Emmerling narrowed

Oh, so he is narrowing and extending his data? I didn't know about that!

So when he has a good day, he is extending, and when he has a bad day, he is narrowing, right? :roll:

I am sure "German data" are most reliable in description of German losses, don't you think?

Luftwaffe data is usually reliable if it comes to number of their losses.

It is however not always reliable if it comes to reasons of these casualties (e.g. combat or non-combat, AA defense or fighters, enemy or accident).

Why? - because archives are basing on relations of soldiers, sometimes even second or third-hand relations.

I recommend you reading for example this piece of info from Polish DWS forum - it concerns the Gnyś's victories (Emmerling in his book assumed that Gnyś did not achieve these victories - which turns out to be 100% not true):

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=5 ... B#p1349948

Witam, zaciekawił mnie watek dot. ppor ( pchor) W. Gnysia.
Dodam jednak, że czytałem i Emmerlinga i Pawlaka i Kurowskiego i raprt tzw. Komisji płk. Bajana ( we fragmentach, i relacje innych oficerów, w tym np. W. Króla z tej samej eskadry.
Na podstawie różnych relacji, ocen, meldunków oraz przypuszczeń ( w tym uwag i wątpliwości podnoszonych powyżej) rysuje mi się taki obraz sytuacji:]

Otóż pchor W.Gnyś kilka minut po godz. 6.00 dnia 01.09. startował jako boczny ( wraz ze st.szer. Arabskim) jako boczny kpt.Medweckiego, d-cy III/2 Dywizjonu Myśliwskiego. Kpt .Medwecki zestrzelony został przez pilota Ju-87 podczas startu. Gnyś i Arabski uciekli na boki.
Pchor. Gnyś, zgodnie z wcześniejszymi rozkazami poleciał samotnie w rejon Chrzanów - Olkusz.
Leciał na wysokości około 600-800 m, w chmurach. Pułap chmur wynosił tego ranka około 150-200m, nad ziemią unosiła się jeszcze poranna mgła. W okolicy Olkusza Gnyś zaczął schodzić niżej, usiłując zorientować się w terenie.
Wychodząc z chmur na wysokości około 150 m zauważył poniżej, niemal tuż nad ziemią dwa lecące blisko siebie Dorniery Do-17 - w odległości około 200 m, poniżej swego samolotu.
Pchor. Gnyś otworzył ogień oddając serię do samolotu lecącego z prawej, po czym zawrotem uciekł w chmury, gdyż znalazł się w ogniu tylnych strzelców z obu samolotów i bał sie podejśc samotnie bliżej. Przed wejściem w chmury zaobserwował, że w ostrzelanym przez niego bombowcu zapalił się lewy silnik.
Całe zdarzenie trwało kilka, najwyżej kilkanaście sekund.
Po wylądowaniu Gnyś zameldował kpt. W.Jasionowskiemu uszkodzenie niemieckiego bombowca. Po meldunkach wojsk lądowych, wg których bombowiec rozbił się pod Chrzanowem, pchor. W.Gnysiowi zaliczono zestrzelenie Do-17.
Sam fakt zestrzelenia, na podstawie meldunku pchor. Gnysia, popartego meldunkami wojsk naziemnych i poparty meldunkiem kpt. Jasionowskiego, nigdy nie budził zastrzeżeń ani kolegów Gnysia z Dywizjonu, ani Komisji Historycznej.

A teraz, co podaje M.Emmerling:
Owe dwa Do-17 zderzyły się w powietrzu, ponieważ samolot z prawej strony oberwał w lewy silnik i w niekontrolowany sposób wpadł na samolot lecący po lewej. Uszkodzenie silnika przypisano polskiej art.plot., albo kaemów wojsk lądowych, jednakże brak relacji bezpośrednich.
Emmerling powołuje się tu na relację z trzeciej ręki - mianowicie obserwatora samolotu innego klucza tej eskadry, który zdarzenie zna z opowiadań załogi trzeciego samolotu tamtego klucza. Jednakże relacja ta sprowadza się do tego, iż rankiem 01.09. eskadra ( i cała grupa) leciała nad cel ( Kraków) dość nisko 5-10-15 m, potem nabrali wysokości, lecz z uwagi na nisko stojące chmury wracali na pułapie około 50 m. Bombowce wracały w szyku kluczy, po trzy maszyny, lecz z uwagi na chmury i mgły, powodujące ograniczoną widoczność - w szyku dość rozproszonym, po kilkaset metrów klucz od klucza, nie widząc się wzajemnie. Również maszyny poszczególnych kluczy leciały w dość luźnej formacji, tracąc się nawzajem z oczu w mgle i chmurach. Z ziemi raz po raz obserwowali silny ogień polskich oddziałów.

Ale samo zdarzenie zauważył jedynie kątem oka obserwator ( przedni strzelec) trzeciej maszyny owego feralnego klucza, która leciała w pewnej odległości z boku i z tyłu za pozostałą dwójką.
Przy ograniczonej widoczności obserwator ten zauważył, iż w prowadzącej maszynie pali się lewy silnik i w kilka sekund później wpada na maszynę z lewej, po czym obie rozbijają się o ziemię. Pozostali członkowie tamtej załogi mogli już zauważyć tylko płonące na ziemi kadłuby bombowców.

Wobec częstego podczas akcji i momentami dość gęstego ognia plot z ziemi obserwator ten wysnuł wniosek, iż przyczyną zapalenia silnika w prowadzącym Do-17 była albo artyleria, albo ogień km.

Rzecz w tym, że nie ma tu żadnej pewności, a jedynie przypuszczenie, a samolotu pchor. Gnysia mógł nie zauważyć ( Gnyś ostro odszedł w górę, w chmury, a uwagę obserwatora trzeciej maszyny przykuł raczej płomień spod pokrywy silnika prowadzącego, a potem zderzenie.

Stąd też relacja pchor. W. Gnysia, korelująca z relacją niemieckiego obserwatora, jest bardzo prawdopodobna, i może zostać uznana za wiarygodną.

Z powyższego opisu wynika bowiem, iż trafił w lewy silnik jednego z dwóch bombowców, po czym dwa niemieckie samoloty zderzyły się w powietrzu.

Natomiast co do trzech tomów "Luftwaffe..." M.Emmerlinga, które przeczytałem - ciekawe dla mnie są relacje lotników, dokumenty, lecz jedynie pod względem, rzekłbym pamiętnikarskim. Niestety, bez większej i szerszej analizy tych relacji, bez konfrontacji z dokumentami, a zatem i bez większej ( to moje zdanie!) wartości historycznej. Nie o to jednak - tak mi sie zdaje - w tej książce chodzi, raczej o przedstawienie polskiemu czytelnikowi innego całkiem punktu widzenia. I niech sam sobie skonfrontuje...

Natomiast co do przedmowy wydawcy w T.I "Jagdflieger"- jest to żenujące po prostu, na szczęście anonimowy tu jeszcze z nazwiska wydawca ujawnia się w t.II "Kampfflieger" już całkiem rzeczowo i rozsądnie...

Pozdrawiam
Sam Emmerling nie analizuje na ogół przedstawianych realacji i dokumentów, nie konfrontuje ich czasami ze sobą,

Moreover - both of destroyed German planes should be classified as Gnys's victories - not only one! - because both of these losses resulted from Gnys's action, not only the one which was directly hit by his bullets!

See you later!

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

This map is showing situation in South-Eastern Poland in the morning on 17.09.1939:

Scale 1 : 4 000 000



Legend:

Blue points - major or important localities

DP / ID = Infantry Division
D - Division
BK = Cavalry Brigade
B = Brigade
BP = Infantry Brigade
G = Mountain / Gebirgs
Pz = Armoured / Panzer
L = Light Panzer / Leichte Panzer
M = Motorized

Thick red line - Polish military cover & lines of military posts (usually along rivers)

Polish Great Units (WJ) and other most important units:

ND + Polish flag = Main Headquarters of the Polish Army (in Kolomyja)

BK W - BK Wolkowysk
SUW - Suwalska BK
POD - Podlaska BK

60 - 60 DP
DB - Infantry Division Brzoza (later 50 DP)

M - Mazowiecka BK
N - Nowogródzka BK
KR - Kresowa BK
W - Wołyńska BK
KBZ - Kombinowana BK Zakrzewskiego
1 - 1 DP
10 - 10 DP
41 - 41 DP
33 - 33 DP
39 - 39 DP
3 B - 3 BP
13 B - 13 BP
19 B - 19 BP
29 B - 29 BP

GO SZ - Group Szack
12 - 12 DP (during reconstruction)
36 - 36 DP (during reconstruction)

WBPM - Warszawska Armoured - Motorized Brigade
23 - 23 DP
55 - 55 DP
6 - 6 DP
GF - Fortification Group Slask
K - Krakowska BK
S - Group Sandomierz
T - Group of lt col Trzebunia

GO W - Operational Group Wlodzimierz Wolynski

Zgr Pz - Armoured Grouping in Luck

13 - 13 DP (during reconstruction)

11 - 11 DP
24 - 24 DP
38 - 38 DP

10 B - 10 Motorized Brigade
35 - 35 DP
GG - Group Grodno
GŻ - Group Zolkiew

GS - Group Stryj
3 BG - 3 Mountain Brigade
B KOP K - Karpacka ON Brigade
GD - Group Drohobycz

21 bPz - 21 Light Tanks Battalion

German Great Units (WJ) and other most important units:

G - Brigade Goldap
23 - 23 ID
L - Brigade Loetzen
21 - 21 ID
206 - 206 ID

2 M - 2 Motorized Division
10 Pz - 10 Panzer Division
20 M - 20 Motorized Division
3 Pz - 3 Panzer Division

4 L - 4 Leichte Panzer Division (forces divided into two groups)
2 Pz - 2 Panzer Division (forces divided into two groups)
14 - 14 ID
4 - 4 ID
68 - 68 ID
27 - 27 ID
8 - 8 ID
28 - 28 ID
45 - 45 ID
44 - 44 ID
7 - 7 ID (forces divided into two groups)
1 G - 1 Gebirgs Division
57 - 57 ID (forces divided into two groups)
SS G - remnants of SS Germania
2 G - 2 Gebirgs Division
5 Pz - 5 Panzer Division
56 - 56 ID

[Othon]

Mr Domen.

As I see you cannot negate my data about poor state of Polish Air Forces in 17th September. It is quite funny when you order me to read forum discussions with M. Emmerling. In fact he stated exactly what I claimed above in those discussions. Who should read them first though?

To end discussion about Polish air forces I can prove Poland practically lost its air forces and air defense forces after one week of fighting. This is plain and simple implication from Emmerling's books data. Here you are those data I summarized myself:

- German bombers battle losses before 8th September - 76% of overall losses
- German bombers air victories before 8th September - 73% overall victories
- German fighters battle losses before 8th September- 60% of overall losses
- German fighters air victories before 8th September - 70% overall victories

[Source: Compiled from M. Emmerling "Luftwaffe nad Polską" vol.1 pp. 197-203, vol. 2 pp. 303-308]

Truth is simple: After 8th September Luftwaffe was losing over Poland 1,5 combat planes daily on average! It means complete air superiority was established and Polish resistance in the air ceased to exist.

Of course you can produce fantastic theories how many Polish planes Soviets captured after 17th September but note before the war Poland had about 2000 planes but vast majority of them were sport, civilian, communication, auxiliary etc. platforms. Those types were also captured by Soviet and Germans. Simply Polish air forces had very little replacements in combat platforms category - they were mostly destroyed by air raids on Polish peacetime airfields or captured later.

In sum Polish Army in 17th September was without any air cover but facing enemy possessing enormous air power of 2500 military planes constantly replenished by factory production. Do you really think any Polish ground forces would have any chance in any battle then? I am sure Battle of Bzura is a final prove here. I suppose you can dispute other things but I will write about it below.

Let's look at your OdeB of both sides as for 17th September. I must say you have used another very questionable statistical trick. All Polish divisions listed above did not have its peacetime strength (circa 16500 soldiers in infantry division) but much, much less! Besides their ammo - especially artillery ammo - stocks were very depleted and production plants located in Central Industrial Region (COP) altogether with important mobilization bases already seized by Germans. In reality their quantitative strength was 30-50% of nominal levels. In practical terms most Polish divisions numbered 2000-5000 soldiers. All of mobilized at 1th September divisions were destroyed or severely beaten before 17th September. Now I give you an overall Polish-German real force comparison on the area eastward of Vistula and San rivers:

- Polish forces: 140 battalions with real manning levels reduced to 50-70 full strength battalions, 540 guns and mortars, 160 AT-guns, 70 tanks.

- German forces: 230 battalions mainly suffered minimal losses so far, 2300 guns and mortars, 1400 AT-guns, 900 tanks.

[Source: "Wojna obronna Polski 1939" Wyd. MON 1979, p. 644]

Additionally Polish forces were placed in several separate areas divided and even encircled by German armored spearheads. In short no Polish troop grouping could reach Romanian Bridgehead. So called Bridgehead was an area of 15000 square km equals 4% of pre-war Polish territory. Might that small piece of soil become some Polish Piedmont???
I don't think so!

Now let's look at another German ammunition stockpiles data if Hahn's data are not reliable:

[type - stockpiled until 1th Septebember - used in Poland]

1. Artillery shells:

- 20 mm - 84000000 - 19970000 (23%)
- 37 mm - 24700000 - 2040000 (8,2%)
- 75 mm - 3300000 - 560000 (17%)
- 105 mm - 16150000 - 1408000 (9%)
- 155 mm - 3100000 - 296560 (9,5%)
- 81 mm mortars - 1900000 - 486585 (26%)

2. Aerial bombs:

- 10 kg - 1500000 - 98800 (6,5%)
- 50 kg - 700000 - 289000 (41%)
- 250 kg - 47300 - 16050 (34%)
- 500 kg - 9500 - 1650 (17,5%)

As we can see Germans used about 15% artillery shells and 25% bombs against Poland. All above data come from German report about ammo usage during 1.09-31.10.1939 period which is microfilmed and accessible in Polish archives. [Source MiD WiH, T-77, r 13.]

That is why Polish defense on bridgehead was impossible and more general fall of Poland was at that time certain! In addition to all above I only quote facts and data from people very well informed about contemporary military-political situation:

- Romanian help to Bridgehead Fortress - 31.08.1939 German ambassador to Romania Fabricius reported to Berlin that Romanian Prime Minister Calinecu assured Germany about Romanian full neutrality and explained Polish-Romanian alliance is not directed against Germany. In September he was also interested in common border with Germany and buying former Polish weapons. After Calinecu's assassination minister Gefencu acknowledged all that and assured that Polish authorities will be interned. Thus nobody can believe in Romanian agreement on allied military transit to Poland. [Source: dossiers, telegrams and reports from III Reich Embassy in Romania handed over OKW - MiD WIH , T-77, r, 602, kl. 1786 336, 338, 343, 349, 360, 400]

- general Carton de Wiart (British military attache in Poland) wrote about Bridgehead concept - "Desperate context of these orders was obvious and was consequence of fact that troops which had to move to the Bridgehead area stayed 200 miles away, behind enemy lines. It was a race with time doomed to failure." [Source: "Sprawozdanie dowódcy brytyjskiej misji wojskowej przy Naczelnym Dowództwie polskim" - MiD WIH II/1/46, p. 11]

- general Dabkowski stated: "HQ in Kolomyja had almost no communication with its armies. Lack of communication applied even to another part of Supreme Commander's Staff in Wlodzimierz Wolynski". [Source: archiwalna relacja gen. Dabkowskiego]

- Wladyslaw Steblik (author of book about Krakow Army which should have strengthen Bridgehead's defense) - "Army's situation [in 18th September] was tragic. It resembled situation of man captured in fishing net and beaten in stomach but despite all of that trying to breach the wall with his head." [Source: W. Steblik "Armia Kraków 1939" p. 571]

- in-place troops constitutes mixture of older reservists, territorial defense forces, border guard, police etc. They were partially organized in two battle groups: "Stryj" and "Dniestr". Stryj-group strength was about one infantry division equivalent but without heavy weapons at all. Dniestr-group would be even weaker but its creation was not finished. Initial Polish HQ plan of bridgehead defense called for 8 infantry divisions and 2 heavy artillery regiments to be needed.

- bridgehead's area was populated mainly by nationalistic Ukrainian minority which had already begun partisan activity against Polish forces there possibly under Abwehr's guidance. Polish troops were engaged in fighting in Zydaczew, Mokolajow, Piaseczno. Therefore this territory was de facto very unsafe haven for Polish forces. [Source: Dalecki "Próba zorganizowania przyczółka rumuńskiego" p. 7]


All in all Poland was already decisively defeated by Germans alone and no Polish Piedmont concept could reverse this bad situation. Soviet intervention did not change outcome of Polish-German war by any means. This is only some myth widely propagated now in Poland...

Having said that I decided to end this discussion as apparently pointless.