The Myth Of A French Offensive In 1939

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

And by 5 September, the Germans were across the Vistula

Heh, technically correct. But let's take a look where exactly were the Germans across the Vistula on 05.09.1939:

Only in these two places:

[Artur Szulc]

As I see it, the problem is not that the French did not lift a finger to help the Poles, but that they lied about it, prior to the German invasion of Poland and during.

The Kasprzycki-Gamelin Convention signed in may 1939 gave Poles false hopes. And did not general Ironside comment the convention by saying that the French are fooling the Poles, since the French had no intentions to help Poland military in the first phase of the war.

On the 8 of September Gamelin received a message from Rydz-Smigly, the Polish High Commander, in which he asked the Frenchmen what kind of actions the French military had taken. The answer was full of lies. Gamelin wrote back that more than half of the formations in the north-west was engaged in heavy fighting, that the Germans was defending themselfs hard, but still the French army advanced. Gamelin also wrote that German POW`s told that new German units was sent to the combat area. The Frenchmen added that the airforce was co-operating with the groundforces and that a larger part of the Luftwaffe was engaged against the French.

I mean, WTF? (Sorry for this)

So, the problem was not French inactivity, but that they lied to a allied country, Poland.

Best regards,

Chili

[Bronsky]

And by 5 September, the Germans were across the Vistula

Heh, technically correct. But let's take a look where exactly were the Germans across the Vistula on 05.09.1939:

Only in these two places:

...which was still very bad knews given how the bulk of the Polish army had been deployed for a cordon defense.

Maps from the West Point WWII Atlas, those put online by Wikipedia and http://historicalresources.files.wordpr ... r-1939.jpg saved me the trouble to upload them, the whole range is also available at militay.com and a couple other places)



This shows that the two crosses in your map correspond to armies Cracow and Pomorze being shattered.



This shows the southern part of the Polish front in tatters and Warsaw in serious trouble by 5 September.

To reiterate: I'm not saying Poland had already collapsed by then, but it quickly - and I do mean very quickly - became clear that the situation on the ground was going very badly for the Poles. No-one had expected Poland to hold out for long against Germany, but after the first few days it became clear that Polish days were numbered and that number wasn't going to be high.


Regarding the previous question about Allied shipments, the Poles weren't idiots and they hadn't waited for August to ask for military equipment. The Allies - in that particular case, the French - were the ones responsible for the late shipments, the main reason being that their own deliveries were running way behind schedule. As the situation between Poland and Germany was rapidly deteriorating, a couple of emergency shipments were despatched, much of the contents arriving too late (e.g.tanks to Romania).

[Bronsky]

As I see it, the problem is not that the French did not lift a finger to help the Poles, but that they lied about it, prior to the German invasion of Poland and during.

There is no question that they lied to the Poles. They did lift a finger, though not much more than that.

The Kasprzycki-Gamelin Convention signed in may 1939 gave Poles false hopes. And did not general Ironside comment the convention by saying that the French are fooling the Poles, since the French had no intentions to help Poland military in the first phase of the war.

I don't remember that comment - which doesn't mean I don't believe you, of course - but... so what? Britain itself wasn't exactly bending over backward telling the Poles that they were doomed. The British had extended a guarantee to Poland at a time when their best war plans included having all of two divisions in France by the end of the first month of hostilities.

So everybody was lying to everybody else, and the only reason why the Poles were prepared to believe such promises was that they were desperate, just like the French seriously discussed the possibility of US belligerency in June 1940, based on comments by the US ambassador that were hinting at far more than Roosevelt was prepared to deliver. In both cases, the hard reality wasn't exactly a state secret but desperate people will grasp at straws.

On the 8 of September Gamelin received a message from Rydz-Smigly, the Polish High Commander, in which he asked the Frenchmen what kind of actions the French military had taken. The answer was full of lies.

At that point, the French position was that Poland was beyond rescue and the only thing they could offer was comforting words. Given my own rather low opinion of Gamelin, I'd tend to attribute his action to mere selfishness i.e. get the Poles off his back.

But I must disagree that the problem was Gamelin lying. Certainly, from the Polish point of view the problem was lack of a second front in the west, not Gamelin's lies. If Gamelin had lied just as much but with the whole French army hurling itself at German defenses at the time, we would be discussing French tactical incompetence, not arguing whether France betrayed its ally or not

[Artur Szulc]

Bronsky,

So everybody was lying to everybody else, and the only reason why the Poles were prepared to believe such promises was that they were desperate, just like the French seriously discussed the possibility of US belligerency in June 1940, based on comments by the US ambassador that were hinting at far more than Roosevelt was prepared to deliver. In both cases, the hard reality wasn't exactly a state secret but desperate people will grasp at straws.

I agree.

At that point, the French position was that Poland was beyond rescue and the only thing they could offer was comforting words.

Of course the French thought that the situation in Poland was beyond rescue, the French saw what they wanted to see. What they needed to see to remain passive. But France was already at war with Germany and should have acted despite whatever situation in Poland. After the 3 of september the question was no longer to rescue Poland but to defeat Germany.

But I must disagree that the problem was Gamelin lying. Certainly, from the Polish point of view the problem was lack of a second front in the west, not Gamelin's lies.

If in fact the French army would have hurled it self against the Germans, then there wouldnt be a problem with Gamelin lies, I agree but isnt that obvious?

Cheers,

Chili

[ljadw]

To defend the attitude of France,one can say the following :Why did France (and Brittain !) made a treaty with Poland ? To help Poland if it was attacked by Germany ? NO It was to prevent Hitler to attack Poland .When Hitler attacked,thinking the treaties were only bluff ,what could France do ? There were two possibilities:to do nothing or to attack ALONE ,without aid from Brittain ,and it would be very costly(the theory that the German frontier with France was undefended has been debunked )and no one in France was willing to risk a new Somme to help a country,of which most did not care and of which most were thinking that it was not indispensable for the survival of France (the French public was convinced that they were safe behind the Maginot Line ).
What could Brittain do ? Nothing :they had no army to send to the continent .
In fact Brittain nor France had the intention to risk ten thousands of casualties to help-liberate Poland .They did nothing when Hitler attacked Poland,they did nothing when Poland was defeated :it would be to costly . They were hoping that Germany would collapse due to the pressure of an economic war,war without casualties .

[michael mills]

They were hoping that Germany would collapse due to the pressure of an economic war,war without casualties .

Yes, that is 100% correct.

Britain and France also saw Poland as playing a role similar to that of a punching bag. They thought that Poland would absorb all the force of German military power, and keep that military power occupied for a number of months, in the course of which the German armed forces would be subject to a good deal of attrition, as a result of which Germany's ability to use that force in the West would be much reduced.

Furthermore, although Britain and France knew that Poland would be defeated in the end, they calculated (before the German-Soviet Pact was announced) that once German troops occupied all of Poland they would end up confronting a hostile Soviet Union, and war between Germany and the Soviet Union might very well break out, or at the very least Germany would need to keep the bulk of its forces on the Polish-Soviet frontier in order to counter any Soviet attack.

The British and French calculation was that all the above factors would prevent a German attack in the west, giving them the window of opportunity to blockade Germany, and defeat it by economic deprivation, the same way it had been defeated in 1918.

Chamberlain's own belief was that once Germany found itself in the position of being blockaded by Britain and France, and facing a hostile Soviet Union in the East, the National Socialist regime would collapse or be overthrown, and be replaced by a conservative regime that would negotiate a German surrender. In fact, Chamberlain believed that Hitler was a sick man and could well die soon; he expected to outlive him, even though Hitler was 20 years younger.

In the event, all the British and French calculations were blown out of the water by the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which removed any immediate threat to Germany from Soviet pressure.

[Bronsky]

British and French strategy was initially to deter Germany from attacking another country by guaranteeing the next likely targets. Remember: Poland wasn't the only country to receive such a guarantee, it just happened to be the one that Hitler set his sights on.

That particular strategy was, as Michael wrote, blown out of the water with the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Still, Chamberlain believed that the Soviet Union wasn't that big a deal (rotten structure, well known fact, old chap) so the Allied strategy remained to fight Germany if it attacked Poland.

Neither Britain nor France expected Poland to last for very long, on the other hand they expected to win the war - though NOT necessarily with Soviet help - and restore Poland in the end. Note that this is exactly what happened in 1919, and still pretty much what happened again in 1945 (except of course that this wasn't the same Poland).

So the strategic assumption - that the fate of Poland would be decided elsewhere, therefore whatever happened there was no big deal militarily - was quite correct. The big Allied mistake lay in overestimating their ability to withstand a German attack, not in their attitude with regard to Poland IMO (note that I'm arguing strategy here, not good manners).

The #1 Allied fear was a surprise German attack breaking through France before Allied potential was mobilized. So if we stay with the Poland as punching ball analogy, the part that country played was keeping Germany busy while the Allies mobilized. Whatever casualties the Germans might suffer would be bonus. Except for the fact that Poland fell much earlier than planned - and here, I disagree with Chili : given the speed of the German advance, there was no helping the Poles - the essential goals of Allied strategy had been met: if or when Germany attacked, it would face a large and fully-mobilized force.

Allied strategy during the Phoney War revolved around blockading Germany while holding against its anticipated attack. By the end of the Phoney War, some in the Allied side were beginning to doubt the effectiveness of the blockade, but the basic strategy remained the same: wait at least a year until Britain could put a decent army in the field and the Allied rearmament programs had been completed (so a decent French air force, modern tank forces etc), meanwhile the Wehrmacht would hopefully grow weaker from the blockade, then roll the Germans back. The situation was very much like 1918: the Germans had a temporary advantage, but time was on the Allied side so if they could just hold on a few months they would prevail in the end.

We can debate the validity of these assumptions of course (preferrably elsewhere as they hardly concern Poland), but they are what Allied strategic planning was based on. Soviet help was seen as desirable if it came for free, but by no means important or even necessary. It is with Cold War-imparted hindsight that we've come to consider the USSR as the second major superpower, in 1939-40 the prevailing view was nothing of the sort.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Maps from the West Point WWII Atlas

This shows that the two crosses in your map correspond to armies Cracow and Pomorze being shattered.

Army "Cracow" was not shattered yet, it started withdrawal from Silesia. And unfortunately these American maps you posted are not very accurate. For example - they don't show the Northern Front, which on 17.09.1939 consisted of many divisions. It seems that maps are based on German sources only, thus they don't present positions / strength / numbers of Polish forces accurately. Another example - Robert Kennedy claims 12 Polish divisions and 3 cavalry brigades trapped inside the Bzura pocket, while in fact there were only 8 divisions and 2 cavalry brigades there.

German sources were not very accurate in estimating enemy forces during the Polish Campaign. For example when on 11.09.1939 one Polish infantry regiment recaptured the town of Mszczonow from German hands, Germans thought that around 5 - 6 Polish divisions carried out that counterattack (source - history of Inf.Rgt.74 by Wasner).

During the battle of Bzura there was an episode when German forces were attacked by part of one Polish cavalry rgt. from the Cavalry Group of gen. Abraham. Germans reported being attacked by 2 divisions and 2 brigades.

Another example is the case of 8. Inf.Div. - according to some German sources it was under attacks of the entire Polish army when it lost some ground to the Poles, in fact it was under attacks of 1 very decimated division and a cavalry group, which fought against German 68. Inf.Div. at the same time (and mainly against 68. division).

If it comes to Army "Pomorze" - yes, many German sources claim it being destroyed by 05.09.1939 in the Corridor. Same German sources then claim it being destroyed once again during the battle of Bzura. I wrote something about casualties of Army "Pomorze" during combats in the Corridor in the thread "With the 3 Pz Div through Poland".

This map shows situation in the evening on 06.09.1939:

but it quickly - and I do mean very quickly - became clear that the situation on the ground was going very badly for the Poles.

Situation was going very badly for the Poles by the end of the first week, here I agree. However, in May 1940 situation was also going very badly for the French by the end of the first week, yet the British allies didn't abandon them.

This shows the southern part of the Polish front in tatters and Warsaw in serious trouble by 5 September.

Warsaw was in serious trouble after 07.09.1939, when Germans defeated divisions of Northern Grouping of Army "Prusy" during the battle of Piotrkow Trybunalski - Tomaszow Mazowiecki, opening their way to Warsaw:

(Good article):

http://translate.google.pl/translate?hl ... ybunalskim

---------------------

Situation of Armies "Krakow" and "Karpaty" on 05.09.1939 / 06.09.1939:

[Bronsky]

Army "Cracow" was not shattered yet, it started withdrawal from Silesia. And unfortunately these American maps you posted are not very accurate. For example - they don't show the Northern Front, which on 17.09.1939 consisted of many divisions.

Thank you very much for your maps, most interesting. I don't think they change the gist of my argument, however, which was that even before the French offensive started, the Poles were already in serious trouble and the Allies would know that. They would have inflated claims of victory from OKW communiqués on one hand, and Polish admissions that they were in full retreat on the other, plus the known fact that the corridor was completely German.

So things were very bad, and worse than anticipated.

Situation was going very badly for the Poles by the end of the first week, here I agree. However, in May 1940 situation was also going very badly for the French by the end of the first week, yet the British allies didn't abandon them.

The main reason why the British didn't was that they were already there! So things were going exceedingly badly for the French and the British. The French had lost the battle 3-4 days after it started, though outside observers wouldn't have been able to tell until a few more days. The extent of the Polish disaster was more quickly apparent, that doesn't mean Poland collapsed more quickly.

For the record, I believe the French should have planned for a limited offensive, taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the war in Poland to score some small gains. Worst case, it would gain them some battlefield experience, best case they could interdict the Saar coal mines.

On the other hand, given their historical mobilization plans and the German forces arrayed against them, I don't think that they would have made much headway had Gamelin been replaced by Napoleon overnight. Nor do I think that this was a shifty plot aimed at the Poles. I'm editing out discussion of the Polish campaign which can take place elsewhere (but later, as far as I'm concerned).

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

Could we have some preferably primary sources that indicate the following is more than just your opinion:

Britain and France also saw Poland as playing a role similar to that of a punching bag. They thought that Poland would absorb all the force of German military power, and keep that military power occupied for a number of months, in the course of which the German armed forces would be subject to a good deal of attrition, as a result of which Germany's ability to use that force in the West would be much reduced.

Furthermore, although Britain and France knew that Poland would be defeated in the end, they calculated (before the German-Soviet Pact was announced) that once German troops occupied all of Poland they would end up confronting a hostile Soviet Union, and war between Germany and the Soviet Union might very well break out, or at the very least Germany would need to keep the bulk of its forces on the Polish-Soviet frontier in order to counter any Soviet attack.


You are right that the British and French anticipated a prolonged period of blockade to weaken Germany (so did Hitler). This was because France could produce only half as many conscripts a year as Germany and it was intended to wait until there was a substantial British army on the continent to share the burden before taking the offensive against a Germany starved of strategic materials. This was expected to be in 1941.

The need to guarantee Poland disrupted this strategy as it necessitated the French taking the offensive within two weeks, not two years. In the event, Poland went down so fast that the French did not have time to launch the promised offensive while it could still significantly help the Poles. Where they missed out was failing to grasp the opportunity to move up to the Rhine while the bulk of German forces were in Poland. This would have radically changed German prospects for a successful offensive in 1940.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Tim Smith]

Situation was going very badly for the Poles by the end of the first week, here I agree. However, in May 1940 situation was also going very badly for the French by the end of the first week, yet the British allies didn't abandon them.

The main reason why the British didn't was that they were already there! So things were going exceedingly badly for the French and the British. The French had lost the battle 3-4 days after it started, though outside observers wouldn't have been able to tell until a few more days.

In the peaceful 1920's, the British government fondly imagined that Britain would provide naval and air power to back up France's land power, in the event of a future European war - so no BEF would be sent to France at all.

Had the British followed that plan in 1939-40, and given the British Army only half or less of the resources it got historically (using them to build up the RAF instead) it is very unlikely that Britain would have agreed to send even one or two divisions to France a week after the German attack on May 10 1940.

Then we'd be talking about how Britain abandoned France.....

[Carl Schwamberger]

In the peaceful 1920's, the British government fondly imagined that Britain would provide naval and air power to back up France's land power, in the event of a future European war - so no BEF would be sent to France at all.

Had the British followed that plan in 1939-40, and given the British Army only half or less of the resources it got historically (using them to build up the RAF instead) it is very unlikely that Britain would have agreed to send even one or two divisions to France a week after the German attack on May 10 1940.

Then we'd be talking about how Britain abandoned France.....

Uh..? ... What if the British had sent a BEF like in WWI? .... Impossible I say, their cadre was too small to build and field six or seven combat ready divisions. In any case politcal considerations would never allow such a deployment as in 1914. And, if such a BEF had been sent it would have simply been a handover of 100,000+ PoW to the Germans. There is absolutely no way a BEF deployed deep into Belgium could have escaped the debacle of the French armies left wing. The decision to retreat to the coast would never have been made in time by the slow witted British generals, such a Brit force never would have had the motorization to race the panzers to the coast. And, what would the few who reached the coast have found when the got there? A few cargo ships and destroyers sinking under the Luftwaffes bombs? Sorry miracles dont happen in the 20th Century. There is just not enough fairy dust in the universe to overcome the sillyness in a WWII BEF concept.

[Tim Smith]

In the peaceful 1920's, the British government fondly imagined that Britain would provide naval and air power to back up France's land power, in the event of a future European war - so no BEF would be sent to France at all.

Had the British followed that plan in 1939-40, and given the British Army only half or less of the resources it got historically (using them to build up the RAF instead) it is very unlikely that Britain would have agreed to send even one or two divisions to France a week after the German attack on May 10 1940.

Then we'd be talking about how Britain abandoned France.....

Uh..? ... What if the British had sent a BEF like in WWI? .... Impossible I say, their cadre was too small to build and field six or seven combat ready divisions. In any case politcal considerations would never allow such a deployment as in 1914. And, if such a BEF had been sent it would have simply been a handover of 100,000+ PoW to the Germans. There is absolutely no way a BEF deployed deep into Belgium could have escaped the debacle of the French armies left wing. The decision to retreat to the coast would never have been made in time by the slow witted British generals, such a Brit force never would have had the motorization to race the panzers to the coast. And, what would the few who reached the coast have found when the got there? A few cargo ships and destroyers sinking under the Luftwaffes bombs? Sorry miracles dont happen in the 20th Century. There is just not enough fairy dust in the universe to overcome the sillyness in a WWII BEF concept.

You've misread my post.

I'm saying: What if the British had NOT sent the BEF to Europe - NO British troops on the Continent at all in 1939-40? And speculating that had that happened, some Frenchmen would now feel about Britain's strategy what some Poles feel about France's strategy in 1939.

[Gooner1]

In the peaceful 1920's, the British government fondly imagined that Britain would provide naval and air power to back up France's land power, in the event of a future European war - so no BEF would be sent to France at all.

I don't recall reading anything like that. The RAF was probably fondly imagining war with France though ...

Had the British followed that plan in 1939-40, and given the British Army only half or less of the resources it got historically (using them to build up the RAF instead) it is very unlikely that Britain would have agreed to send even one or two divisions to France a week after the German attack on May 10 1940.

Then we'd be talking about how Britain abandoned France.....

It may be unlikely that France would give a guarantee to Poland in that event. And then we'd be talking about how France abandoned Poland, oh.