Summer 1942

[tigre]

Hi to all, a little inquiry for those experts in the eastern front / Operation Blue.

Troops of the Southwestern Front withdrew in heavy fighting on the Voronezh and Stalingrad axes in the summer of 1942 under the onslaught of superior enemy forces. To counter the advancing enemy the VGK [Supreme High Command] Headquarters took urgent steps to build defensive lines on approaches to Stalingrad and to concentrate necessary forces and means.

Among these forces was the 203d Rifle Division, which set up a defense along the line of the Don River in the vicinity of the stanitsa of Veshenskaya. Moved urgently to the vicinity of the stanitsa of Yelanskaya on the night of 21/22 August together with other combined units of 63d Army in connection with the situation which had become complicated, the division made an assault crossing of the Don and fought its first battle successfully.

The personnel were inspired by the successful assault crossing of a major water obstacle on improvised means, seizure of a base of operations, and the first prisoners, major trophies and the weapons, ammunition, clothing and rations captured in depots at the farmsteads of Pleshakovskiy, Nizhniy, Krivskiy and Verkhniy Krivskiy. The base of operations was widened to 12 km in frontage and 13 km in depth. Repeated enemy counterattacks were repulsed successfully by the division's subunits and units. Rifle battalions commanded by senior lieutenants N. F. Buzyurgin and Z. A. Aliyev, who demonstrated good combat schooling, steadfastness, determination and proficiency in the fighting, achieved great successes in the fighting to capture, widen and hold the base of operations.

The article above mentioned is a review of the book "Idem v nastupleniye" (We're Heading into the Offensive) (War Memoirs) by HSU Maj Gen (Ret) G. S. Zdanovich, Voyenizdat, 1980, 182 pages] and I would like to know, if possible of course, which was / were the German Unit/s involved in the engagement related in the review and a brief account from the German side. Thanks in advance and regards. Tigre.

[Stephan]

Interesting. Jelly good work by them!
What I wonder. A mere rifle division helds a front 12 km wide during attacks and counterattacks, helding its own reserves and second line. The german forces cant have been big or well organized.

I mean, 10-12 km is usual for a division to held on a rather peaceful front terrain. No?

And why didnt the sovjets send in massive reinforments to use the succesfull break-through?

Bad planning or they knew there would be soon a german counterthrust - perhaps enclosing i a bag the whole pocket??

More easy to withdraw 1 rifle division then 6...

[Lars]

I haven´t my books here or an atlas but mightn´t it have been against the Hungarian Honved (army)?

[Qvist]

This is a little strange. SW Front was dissolved in late july, and only re-established in October.

cheers

[tigre]

Hello to all interested.

Sometime ago I've posted a question about this topic, now after a few research I'm back to resume the tread.

A brief history: In the middle of June, the 7th Reserve Army was to move up to the Stalingrad area (Document 4), while the 5th Army was to move up to the eastern bank of the Don River (Document 5), where they were ordered to take up and prepare the defenses. Later on 10 July, the 7th and 5th Reserve Armies were renamed, respectively, the 62d and 63d Armies, while the 1st Reserve Army became the 64th Army, with the order to move from the Tula area to Stalingrad (Document 9).


Document No 4
From the Directive of Hq SHC of 4 June 1942 to the commander of the 7th Reserve Army on the occupying of defensive perimeters at Stalingrad.
Hq SHC orders:
1. The 7th Reserve Army with the arrival of the divisions in the concentration area is to take up good tactical perimeters on the Stalingrad defensive perimeter along the line Lugovaya Proleyka, Ilovlinskaya, Kachalinskaya, Kalach, Nizhnyaya Chirskaya and to the southeast with the task of strongly covering the Stalingrad area from the sectors Frolovo—Ilovlinskaya, Perelazovskiy—Kachalinskaya, Chernyshevskaya—Kalach, Morozovskiy—Nizhnyaya Chirskaya. In accord with this, the entire defensive perimeter is to be reconnoitered as well as its rear perimeters up to the Volga River and a plan is to be drawn up for defending the perimeter by the army's forces.
The defensive works on the Stalingrad defensive perimeter destroyed over the winter and by the spring flooding of the rivers are to be rebuilt in the immediate future. Simultaneously, the army should be ready to destroy any enemy airborne landing in the event of the landing of the latter in the army's concentration areas.
2. From the first days of the concentration of the divisions, in all units planned combat and political training of the soldiers, commanders and small subunits is to commence, placing special emphasis on the tactical teamwork of the platoon, company and battalion as well as on (the training.—Ed.) of outstanding machine gunners, mortar troops, artillery troops, tank hunters, submachine gunners and scouts....
Hq SHC
I. Stalin A. Vasileyskiy


Document No 5
From the Directive of Hq SHC of 7 June 1942 to the commander of the 5th Reserve Army on the occupying of the perimeter along the eastern bank of the Don River
Hq SHC orders:
1. The 5th Reserve Army, with the arrival of the divisions in the concentration area, with a portion of the forces is to take up good tactical perimeters along the eastern bank of the Don River on the front of Novaya Kalitva, and Novaya Grigoryevskaya with the task of solidly covering the sectors Boguchar—Kalach—Uryupinsk; Chertkovo—Novo-Annenskiy; Nizhne-Gorbatovo—Mikhaylovskiy—Frolovo.
The defensive perimeters along the eastern bank of the Don River to the depth of the army area are to be reconnoitered and an army defensive plan is to be drawn up.
Simultaneously, the army should be ready to destroy any enemy airborne party in the event of the landing of the latter in the army's concentration areas.
2. From the first days of the concentration of the divisions, in all units planned combat and political training of the soldiers, commanders and small subunits is to commence, with particular emphasis on the tactical teamwork of the platoon, company, battalion and on (training.—Ed.) outstanding machine gunners, mortar troops, artillery troops, tank hunters, submachine gunners and scouts....
Upon authorization of Hq SHC
A. Vasilevskiy

Document No 9
From the Directive of Hq SHC of 9 July 1942 on the renaming of the reserve armies Hq SHC has ordered:
From 1200 hours of 10 July, to rename: the 7th Reserve Army as the 62d Army; the 5th Reserve Army as the 63d Army and the 1st Reserve Army as the 64th Army.
Upon authorization of Hq SHC
Chief of the General Staff Vasilevskiy

Document No 11
From the Directive of Hq SHC of 12 July 1942 on the creation of the Stalingrad Front Hq SHC orders:
1. In the aim of facilitating control over the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts from a single center, the 28th, 38th, 57th and 9th Armies of the Southwestern Front effective at 0600 hours on 12 July are to become part of the Southern Front.
2. The Southwestern Front is to be renamed the Stalingrad Front. The Military Council of the Southwestern Front with the front headquarters is to immediately move to Stalingrad, having included in the Stalingrad Front the 63d Army (the former 5th Reserve Army), the 62d Army (the former 7th Reserve Army), the 64th Army (the former 1st Reserve Army) and the 21st Army....
3. ...The task of the Stalingrad Front, with the forces of the 62d and 64th Armies, 2 naval rifle brigades, 18 artillery-machine gun "urovskiy" battalions, and the cadets of 8 schools arriving from the Northern Caucasus, to firmly occupy the Stalingrad defensive perimeter to the west of the Don River and under no conditions permit the enemy to break through to the east of this line toward Stalingrad. The forces of the 63d Army are to defend the eastern shore of the Don River in the sector occupied by it and under no conditions allow the enemy to cross the Don. The 21st Army is to move into the area of Serafimovich and to the east of it on the northern bank of the Don River, with its right flank abutting the flank of the 63d Army and the left flank the flank of the 62d Army with the task in no instance of permitting the enemy

Source Docs 4, 5, 9 and 11 - BATTLE OF STALINGRAD: PREPARATORY PHASE DOCUMENTS
Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 26 Jul 82) pp 27-31
[Documents pertaining to the preparatory phase of the Battle of Stalingrad prepared for publication by Maj Gen V. Gurkin: "On the Eve of the Battle of Stalingrad"].

The Axis troops that were involved in this action were those of the Italian XXXV Army Corps (the old CSIR) under Gral Messe. The Soviet counter-offensive around Serafimovich (63 Army and 21 Army), was carried out over the sector of the Italian division "Sforzesca". The Axis troops that counter-attacked the bridgehead were division "Celere" (Italian), Legion Croata Autotransportabile (under Italian rule), 79 ID (German) and 22 PzD (German).

Maps sources: http://www.battlefront.co.nz/Article.asp?ArticleID=24 and http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com

Perhaps some Italian forum mate can shed more light with regards to this battle.

Best regards. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello folks, just a little question. In this context took place the charge of the Italian cavalry (Saboya Regiment of Cavalry) at Isbuscenkij on Aug 23/24 1942?. TIA. Regards. Tigre.

[oricchi]

Tigre,
the answer is yes,
the Savoia regiment manouvre is depectied in the first picture that you posted.

Ottavio

[tigre]

Thank you very much Ottavio; something about the legione Croata Autotransportabile. Cheers. tigre.

[oricchi]

Legione Croata action, with reference to the august 1942 fighting, is mentioned in some detail by two books about the Pasubio division.

Luoni, V.
La Pasubio sul fronte russo
Roma : Edizioni dell'Ateneo & Bizzarri, 1977

Marsetic, A.
Dall'Adige al Don - Il 79 reggimento fanteria nella campagna di Russia
Mursia

[tigre]

Thank you very much for answering oricchi, but gee, is so hard to get those books here. Have a nice day. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello folks, I'll try to add some articles dealing with this subject.....feel free to help me.

"On the Stabilizing of the Defensive Front in the Southern Strategic Sector During the Summer of 1942".

The difficulty of stabilizing the southern wing of the strategic defensive front was that the basic reserves of Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] had been formed to the north of the Middle Don, that is, away from the axis of operations by the shock groupings of German troops. With the enemy's capture of the basic main rail lines running to the south, the bringing up of men and equipment from the center of the nation to the Caucasus was further complicated. There were only two routes left: along the Volga and the Caspian Sea and through the regions of Central Asia.

Hq SHC promptly ascertained that the enemy was intending to develop the offensive along two major axes, the Stalingrad and the Caucasian, in the aim of cutting off the south of the nation from the center of the USSR, to capture the Caucasus with its basic sources of oil and the oil refining industry.

Hq SHC initially intended to stabilize the defensive front on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front within the large arc of the Don. For this, on 12 July, it established two lines (see the diagram1): the first from Veshenskaya, through Millerovo to Rostov which should defend the Southern Front with the 28th, 38th, 57th and 9th Armies which had been turned over to it from the Southwestern Front which had been abolished on 12 July; the 2d from Voronezh along the Upper and Middle Don and then along the Stalingrad line and the lower courses of the Don. Its defenses were entrusted to the Bryansk, the newly created Voronezh (7 July) and Stalingrad (12 July) Fronts to the 51st Army of the Northern Caucasus Front and the troops of the Southern Front.

The plan of Hq SHC to form a deep strategic defense within the large arc of the Don was not carried out. The armies transferred to the Southern Front were unable to occupy the first defensive line since their pullback was late in starting and the enemy tank corps, having resumed the offensive on 13 July from the region of Kantemirovka to the south, reached their rear, forcing them to retreat not to the east, but rather toward the Lower Don. Because of this, the necessary time could not be gained to organize and prepare the defenses in the southern line.

The sector along the lower courses of the Don was the weakest link in the new defensive front. For taking up the defenses along the line from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the Sal River (180 km), the 51st Army had just four just-reformed divisions. The defensive zone of the Southern Front consisted of around 150 km, however in the retreat its armies suffered substantial losses.

Thus, just 54,000 men remained in the 37th, 12th and 18th Armies. The 9th Army was particularly weakened and it had just 1,113 men, 1 light machine gun, 9 guns and 32 mortars. It was not possible to shift troops to reinforce the Caucasian sector in a short period of time since the rail line from Stalingrad to Tikhoretskaya in the middle of July was still threatened by enemy capture. As a result, the enemy, having created a many-fold superiority on the left flank of the 51st Army and to the east of Rostov, broke through the defenses on the Lower Don and was rushing toward the Caucasus.

In anticipating the possibility of a Nazi breakthrough to the Caucasus, Hq SHC even in the autumn of 1941 had issued an order to prepare the defenses. This instructed the Transcaucasian Front by 30 July 1942 to take up the defensive along the Terek River and the Main Caucasian Range. However, the engineer work on the lines remained uncompleted. The length of the southern sector of the strategic front now reached 2,400 km, that is, 1,600 km more than at the start of the campaign. Because of this, in July-August there were many sectors not occupied by troops.

Source: Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 18-24.

It follows. Regards. Tigre.

[Qvist]

Hq SHC initially intended to stabilize the defensive front on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front within the large arc of the Don. For this, on 12 July, it established two lines (see the diagram1): the first from Veshenskaya, through Millerovo to Rostov which should defend the Southern Front with the 28th, 38th, 57th and 9th Armies which had been turned over to it from the Southwestern Front which had been abolished on 12 July; the 2d from Voronezh along the Upper and Middle Don and then along the Stalingrad line and the lower courses of the Don. Its defenses were entrusted to the Bryansk, the newly created Voronezh (7 July) and Stalingrad (12 July) Fronts to the 51st Army of the Northern Caucasus Front and the troops of the Southern Front.

The sector along the lower courses of the Don was the weakest link in the new defensive front. For taking up the defenses along the line from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the Sal River (180 km), the 51st Army had just four just-reformed divisions. The defensive zone of the Southern Front consisted of around 150 km, however in the retreat its armies suffered substantial losses.

Thus, just 54,000 men remained in the 37th, 12th and 18th Armies. The 9th Army was particularly weakened and it had just 1,113 men, 1 light machine gun, 9 guns and 32 mortars. It was not possible to shift troops to reinforce the Caucasian sector in a short period of time since the rail line from Stalingrad to Tikhoretskaya in the middle of July was still threatened by enemy capture. As a result, the enemy, having created a many-fold superiority on the left flank of the 51st Army and to the east of Rostov, broke through the defenses on the Lower Don and was rushing toward the Caucasus.

As is so frequently and irritatingly the case, the information given in this article is so vague that it is in practice impossible to verify both the impression given of Soviet strength and the statement that a "many-fold" superiority existed. It is, f.e. not clear which point in time the strength 54,000 in the three referred armies refer to, or the one for 9A. From the narrative it seems likely to refer to the time of the German crossing of the Don at Rostov and elsewhere, ie, around 20 July. If so, the strengths quoted either give no impression at all of the overall Soviet strength along the Caucasus front, or the claim that they could not be quickly reinforced is completely wrong, because on 25 July SF fielded 300,000 men (Krivosheev). As for the claim that a "many-fold" German superiority existed, the article defines neither a point in time or a clear sector, and does not give any meaningful Soviet or German data to support it. It certainly was not the case along the Caucasus Front as a whole, as AOK 17 and PzAOK1 had a pretty stable combined Iststärke of around 350,000 in July and August. If 51A had by the 25th been incorporated in SF (which I do not know) and we assume that the four other armies listed is supposed to represent the full strength of SF apart from that army, the article indicates a strength that is at most one third of the figure Krivosheev states for SF on the 25th. It is possible that the strengths quoted refer to bayonets (ie, infantry combat strengths), but if so, the German strengths must of course be seen on a similar footing, which means perhaps 100-120,000 men. That does not work out to a many-fold superiority either.

The German armies also incurred fairly notable losses already in July (especially AOK17), which would also suggest that they were being opposed by relatively strong Soviet forces.

cheers

[tigre]

Hello Qvist, I'm glad about your message, it's means that the Forum fullfilled its mission, is working!!!. First, take in account that this article obviously has a bias (it was written in the soviet era) so I think we should not expect a beatiful document with accurate statistics or data; instead we should find and post here as many as we can in order to find out the truth (more or less) like a mine owner filter tons of rocks just to find a nugget of gold. I invite you to all to do that. Cheers and welcome to the struggle for real numbers and data. Tigre.

[Art]

As is so frequently and irritatingly the case, the information given in this article is so vague that it is in practice impossible to verify both the impression given of Soviet strength and the statement that a "many-fold" superiority existed. It is, f.e. not clear which point in time the strength 54,000 in the three referred armies refer to, or the one for 9A.

May be this will be helpful as a more detailed information about the soviet strength:
"Soviet forces covering the Caucasian direction on 25th July held the following positions: along the left bank of Don from Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the river the forces of South Front under command of lieutenant general R.Y.Malinovxky held the line. The overall width of the defense sector of the front was 320 km. On the right wing of the front from Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to Konstantinovskaya in the sector of 170 km width 51th Army held the defence. This army was engaged in combat against enemy groups, which seized small bridgehead in the area of Tzimlyanskaya and Nikolaevskaya. The Army had 4 rifle and 1 cavalry division, total 40 thousands men. 37th Army of major general P.M. Kozlov withdrawn behind Don, held the line on the southern bank of Don from Konstantinovskaya to Bogaevskaya in the sector of 65 km width. The Army numbered 17 thousands men. 12th Army under command of A.A. Grechko with 3 rifle divisions, having 17 thousands men, defended the positions of 40 km wifth from Belyanino to Kzeterinka. 18th Army of major general F.V. Kamkov with 3 rifle divisions and 1 rifle brigade, wich numbered onlu 20 thousands men, was engaged in defensive fightings in the sector of 50 km width from Kizeterinka to the mouth of Don. 56th Army commanded by major general A.I. Ryzhov had 5 rifle divisions and 3 rofle brigades with the total strength of 18 thousands. This army after fierce defensive fighting near Rostov was withdrawn in the second echelon. 24th (major general V.N. Martzinkevich) and 9th ) major general F.A. Parkhomenko) Armies with remanants of 11 rifle divisions were not able to participate in battles and were withdrawn behind Sr.Egorlyk river fro replenishment. Thus, the frontline 0f 320 km were defended only by 5 weak armies of Soth Front, wich numbered 112 thousands men"
from "The Battle for Caucasus" by A.A. Grechko
Note that Grechko gives the same 54 thousands for the strength of 37th, 12th and 18th Armies.

If 51A had by the 25th been incorporated in SF (which I do not know)

It was on 25th July. However, the army opposed the troops of 4 Pz. A, wich ypu don't take inito account.

It is possible that the strengths quoted refer to bayonets (ie, infantry combat strengths)

In this context it is either the total strength or the strength of combat units, the latter is the most likely. 18 thousands bayonets is to much for 3 fifle divisions even if they were fully manned.

or the claim that they could not be quickly reinforced is completely wrong,

The claim is corect. They indeed couldn't.

on 25 July SF fielded 300,000 men (Krivosheev).

I wouldn't take Krivosheev's figures as 100% reliable, although he tends to underestimate the strength rather than to overestimate. As concerns the difference betwen the strength of the armies, it could resulted first from the difference between the combat strength and the total strength and second from the existence of units directly subordinated to the front. For example, there was an Air Army subordinated to the front (note that if you want to include it in the calculation then you must include also the LF froces to the German strength). Then the front had 8th Engeneer Army, wich was designed for construction of defensive fortification. I don't know what was the situation in summer 1942, but half a year before Soviet Engeneer Armies were armed mainly with shovels. Thus, hardly the Army was of any combat value. There was a bunch of other service, rear, replacement etc. units in the front. What is important the total strength doesn't necessary gives you the measure of the strength of combat units, because the ratio between them is not constant and tends to be shifted when the escpecially heavy losses were suffered by the combat units as it was the case with South Front.

[tigre]

Hello Art, thanks for sharing it with us. All the best. Tigre.