They seem to be somewhat suspect, like most Soviet reports about this operation.
Glantz made the following quote, following his exhaustive research of the battle
"The overall Soviet casualty toll, however, was at least 10-fold greater that the total German loss of around 40,000 men."
He also stated that the Russians lost 1700 tanks, or more than they committed to Operation Uranus.
It's interesting that these total losses (although many were wounded and returned to action) significantly exceeded German casualties at Stalingrad. While the Stalingrad losses proved fatal (in my opinion) to the Germans, the Russians simply shrugged off their Mars' losses and attacked in even larger numbers the following summer.
Defeat of Operation Mars
How do you reckon the Stalingrad losses were fatal to the Germans though? They coincided with a period of very heavy reinforcement of the East, and in actual fact the Ostheer grew in strength during the spring of 1943 compared the previous autumn and winter. Of course, their strength would have been greater still had they not lost 300,000 men in Stalingrad. But Stalingrad is frequently spoken of as a cataclysmic event, a clear break in German strength levels. There is absolutely no trace of this in the German strength figures, who in fact peak roughly six months after the Stalingrad battle. The Germans WERE able to absorb the Stalingrad losses, even in the short term. The real back-breaker was the summer battles in 1943, from which they never did recover strength-wise.It's interesting that these total losses (although many were wounded and returned to action) significantly exceeded German casualties at Stalingrad. While the Stalingrad losses proved fatal (in my opinion) to the Germans, the Russians simply shrugged off their Mars' losses and attacked in even larger numbers the following summer.
cheers
Kunikov - the opposite is the case. If these figures are both on a similar basis (The Stalingrad one being quoted from Krivosheev) they include only forces engaged at the beginning of the operation, and omit forces transferred to the Fronts during the course of it. As such, they must be taken to both considerably understate the number of troops actually involved in the operation, and also they are not strictly speaking a good basis for comparison, as one operation may have received a larger or smaller force addition underway than the other. Indeed, this is obvious from the fact that several of the operations quoted by Krivosheev has casualty figures that considerably exceed the strength figures given for the operation (f.e., Sevastopol, Kiev, Smolensk).Although I again think that the numbers represent the entire Soviet forces and not those that did engage the Germans, but again only my thoughts, wish I had the time to do more detailed research.
Beyond this, I see no reason why these figugres would encompass a force scope greater than what is relevant. Krivosheev certainly has not just added up the strength of all the Fronts involved - in several cases, he is including just parts of Fronts for specific periods of time in his operations strength figures.
cheers
IIRC, the Soviet "History of the Second World War" gives some 1,890,000 Soviet soldiers in total (probably including those in the military district and not subordinated to the fronts) in the Moscow area against the same number as mentioned in "Slaughterhouse" (1,143,000) in the Stalingrad area."Slaughterhouse: Encyclopedia of the Eastern Front" on page 31 has a brief description of both operations. Mars included 817,000 men, 2,352 tanks while operation Uranus included 1,143,000 men, twice as many divisions as operation Mars, and 3,500 tanks. And I haven't checked the details, but already Mars can be seen to have been the smaller of the two operations. Although I again think that the numbers represent the entire Soviet forces and not those that did engage the Germans, but again only my thoughts, wish I had the time to do more detailed research.
Regards,
Michate
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PanzerKing
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That number includes STAVKA reserve and the Moscow fortified area.Michate wrote:IIRC, the Soviet "History of the Second World War" gives some 1,890,000 Soviet soldiers in total (probably including those in the military district and not subordinated to the fronts) in the Moscow area against the same number as mentioned in "Slaughterhouse" (1,143,000) in the Stalingrad area."Slaughterhouse: Encyclopedia of the Eastern Front" on page 31 has a brief description of both operations. Mars included 817,000 men, 2,352 tanks while operation Uranus included 1,143,000 men, twice as many divisions as operation Mars, and 3,500 tanks. And I haven't checked the details, but already Mars can be seen to have been the smaller of the two operations. Although I again think that the numbers represent the entire Soviet forces and not those that did engage the Germans, but again only my thoughts, wish I had the time to do more detailed research.
Regards,
Michate
Kunikov, thanks for the info. Do you happen to have a breakdown of the figures for fronts, Stavka reserves etc. for the end of 1942?That number includes STAVKA reserve and the Moscow fortified area.
Ziemke/Bauer, "Moscow to Stalingrad give the total strength of the active fronts as 6.5 million at the time, quoting the "History of the Second World War" and provide a comment that figure likely does not include Stavka reserves. Unfortunately the respective volume of mentioned work is the single one missing from my home library, so I cannot check.
Regards,
Michate
I was sent an article about Mars which I'm just getting to know, I'll skim it and see if I can find anything of use. But, if you give me a month and front, I can look through the OoB I have for the Red Army.Michate wrote:Kunikov, thanks for the info. Do you happen to have a breakdown of the figures for fronts, Stavka reserves etc. for the end of 1942?That number includes STAVKA reserve and the Moscow fortified area.
Ziemke/Bauer, "Moscow to Stalingrad give the total strength of the active fronts as 6.5 million at the time, quoting the "History of the Second World War" and provide a comment that figure likely does not include Stavka reserves. Unfortunately the respective volume of mentioned work is the single one missing from my home library, so I cannot check.
Regards,
Michate
Well, first I'd like to ask this, during October and November how many German divisions were moved to the vicinity of Army Group center? The article says 16, does that sound about right? Now, the numbers the article gives for those involved in the operation are around 500,000 men, interestingly enough when the Soviet "History of the Second World War" gives its numbers, it counts STAVKA reserves and the Moscow fortified region, but the same is not done for the Stalingrad operation, which omits 2 armies and the entire STAVKA reserve. The article says that in all 3 armies, each from the Kalinin and Western Front took part in the operation, plus two mechanized groups and a cavalry corps, and the 3rd shock army as well, which totalled around half a million men. The Germans were apparently given the information from Soviet 'informers' or through 'radio games' about the assault and told to plan for the Rzhev area, movement in the Rzhev area was done out in the open by the Soviets, unlike in the Stalingrad area, etc. I'd also like to know if during the first two days of the Stalingrad offensive starting November 19th and continuing into November 20th, were any German units alerted to move from other areas to help in the area? The article made it seem as if the Germans expected a diversionary operation in the south and did nothing, until 2 days later when the 11th Army with Manstein were made to move to Rostov to organize Army Group Don, but couldn't get there until the 24th because of bad weather and then moving there by train which took 3 days, the day after is when the offensive against Rzhev was to start. As for the losses, the author says 180-200,000 is the most he would give includin around 800 tanks. Any questions? No real data provided for the number of men in each army, and losses are only given for one army, the 31st, with 58,524 which bore some of the heaviest losses, around a third of the total. That's the best I can do for now, hope it is helpful. 
If the figure refers to the strength of active fronts, then by definition it does not include forces from the stavka reserve.Ziemke/Bauer, "Moscow to Stalingrad give the total strength of the active fronts as 6.5 million at the time, quoting the "History of the Second World War" and provide a comment that figure likely does not include Stavka reserves.
cheers
Qvist,
Good points about German strength, and it peaking after Stalingrad.
There are several reasons why I think Stalingrad was decisive however, and was the root cause of the casualties you mention that were fatal to the German army in the battles during the summer of 1943.
First it was alway quality combined with sufficient quantity that was responsible for the German army successes in WWII. While they had full-strength divisions adequately supported by the luftwaffe, either advancing or holding a front-line in sufficient depth, they were extremely difficult to beat. The German qualitative advantage, which began slipping due to extremely heavy losses among the junior officer and NCO ranks in 1941, suffered a huge blow with the loss of 22 outstanding divisions at Stalingrad. Several other divisions were decimated or destroyed as well trying to patch the huge hole in the front caused by the Stalingrad disaster and the collaspe of the remainder of the Don front. This could not be made up by forming 17 Luftwaffe divisions, and throwing various other hastily assembled formations into the fray in a piecemeal fashion on the Eastern Front. While German strength may have been marginally larger in 1943, the quality and morale of it's units was slipping. Meanwhile, Soviet strength was expanding much more rapidly. The Red Army in July 1943 was infinitely better equipped and trained than it was in 1942, as well as being considerably larger (over 500 infantry divisions by the end of 1943, as well as over 200 mechanized brigades).
In 1943, there were enough divisions left in AGN and AGC to hold the tide, barely, but in the South the picture, especially after Kursk, was far different. With Hitler still stubbornly demanding that the Kuban be held, as well as the Dneiper Bend area and the Nikolpol bridgehead, there simply were not enough divisions to adequately defend his front line. The story of AGS and Field Marshal Manstein after July 1943, was of him constantly shifting his mobile forces from one location to another in a vain attempt to stop the multi-headed hydra that the Red Army had become.
In late July 1943, Manstein had 29 Infantry and 13 Pz or motorized divisions to man 650 miles of front. He was faced by 109 infantry divisions and 36 armored formations (with 55 additional infantry divisions, and 20 armored formations arriving over the next 2 months).
In spite of him doing everything possible to hold back the Red Army he simply didn't have the strength to do so, because the German Army did not have the troops available to form strong defensive positions with quality formations. With 22 more divisions, he may have had a chance.
Germany had to do everything perfectly in order to have any chance of beating of the Russians. They suffered a huge blow in front of Moscow in December 1941, but it wasn't quite fatal. Enormous Soviet losses in their poorly designed winter counterattacks, combined with their disasters in the Crimea and near Kharkov, helped restore the balance of forces and allow the Germans to once again go on the offensive in the summer of 1942. Still, after the losses the previous year, they were only able to do so by putting allied divisions in what they considered non-threatened portions of the front line. Then with the total destruction of their allies' armies, along with the loss of the 6th army, only one thing could have given the Germans a fighting chance against the now stronger and more mobile Russians; a much shorter front line. Hitler's directives forbidding tactical withdrawls prevented this from happening.
The additional troops you speak of would still have come East after Stalingrad, but without the German losses at Stalingrad, they would have been gradually integrated into a much stronger and more cohesive German Army, especially in the South. Only with the first quality divisions of the 6th army and 4th Panzerarmy, could the Germans have hoped to stem the rising tide of Soviet power. Even with them, the best they could have hoped for was a draw.
This discussion about Operation Mars, and Glantz's description of what an elite German army with reasonable divisional frontages and adequate mobile reserves could accomplish is the best argument I could put forth as to why the loss of the German Armies at Stalingrad was a death blow.
Good points about German strength, and it peaking after Stalingrad.
There are several reasons why I think Stalingrad was decisive however, and was the root cause of the casualties you mention that were fatal to the German army in the battles during the summer of 1943.
First it was alway quality combined with sufficient quantity that was responsible for the German army successes in WWII. While they had full-strength divisions adequately supported by the luftwaffe, either advancing or holding a front-line in sufficient depth, they were extremely difficult to beat. The German qualitative advantage, which began slipping due to extremely heavy losses among the junior officer and NCO ranks in 1941, suffered a huge blow with the loss of 22 outstanding divisions at Stalingrad. Several other divisions were decimated or destroyed as well trying to patch the huge hole in the front caused by the Stalingrad disaster and the collaspe of the remainder of the Don front. This could not be made up by forming 17 Luftwaffe divisions, and throwing various other hastily assembled formations into the fray in a piecemeal fashion on the Eastern Front. While German strength may have been marginally larger in 1943, the quality and morale of it's units was slipping. Meanwhile, Soviet strength was expanding much more rapidly. The Red Army in July 1943 was infinitely better equipped and trained than it was in 1942, as well as being considerably larger (over 500 infantry divisions by the end of 1943, as well as over 200 mechanized brigades).
In 1943, there were enough divisions left in AGN and AGC to hold the tide, barely, but in the South the picture, especially after Kursk, was far different. With Hitler still stubbornly demanding that the Kuban be held, as well as the Dneiper Bend area and the Nikolpol bridgehead, there simply were not enough divisions to adequately defend his front line. The story of AGS and Field Marshal Manstein after July 1943, was of him constantly shifting his mobile forces from one location to another in a vain attempt to stop the multi-headed hydra that the Red Army had become.
In late July 1943, Manstein had 29 Infantry and 13 Pz or motorized divisions to man 650 miles of front. He was faced by 109 infantry divisions and 36 armored formations (with 55 additional infantry divisions, and 20 armored formations arriving over the next 2 months).
In spite of him doing everything possible to hold back the Red Army he simply didn't have the strength to do so, because the German Army did not have the troops available to form strong defensive positions with quality formations. With 22 more divisions, he may have had a chance.
Germany had to do everything perfectly in order to have any chance of beating of the Russians. They suffered a huge blow in front of Moscow in December 1941, but it wasn't quite fatal. Enormous Soviet losses in their poorly designed winter counterattacks, combined with their disasters in the Crimea and near Kharkov, helped restore the balance of forces and allow the Germans to once again go on the offensive in the summer of 1942. Still, after the losses the previous year, they were only able to do so by putting allied divisions in what they considered non-threatened portions of the front line. Then with the total destruction of their allies' armies, along with the loss of the 6th army, only one thing could have given the Germans a fighting chance against the now stronger and more mobile Russians; a much shorter front line. Hitler's directives forbidding tactical withdrawls prevented this from happening.
The additional troops you speak of would still have come East after Stalingrad, but without the German losses at Stalingrad, they would have been gradually integrated into a much stronger and more cohesive German Army, especially in the South. Only with the first quality divisions of the 6th army and 4th Panzerarmy, could the Germans have hoped to stem the rising tide of Soviet power. Even with them, the best they could have hoped for was a draw.
This discussion about Operation Mars, and Glantz's description of what an elite German army with reasonable divisional frontages and adequate mobile reserves could accomplish is the best argument I could put forth as to why the loss of the German Armies at Stalingrad was a death blow.
Hi Alk, sorry, but the "22 outstanding divisions" at Stalingrad is in my opinion an obvious myth. The Stalingrad divisions did not possess any particularly distinguished character - on the contrary, a very large proportion of them were new divisions who had arrived in the east in 1942. Many of these were 300-series infantry divisions, who tended to draw widespread adverse comment for their performance at this stage. If what you're worried about is the loss of pre-41 manpower, Stalingrad isn't where you are going to find most of it. Also, I think it is too simplistic in itself to make such a distinction.First it was alway quality combined with sufficient quantity that was responsible for the German army successes in WWII. While they had full-strength divisions adequately supported by the luftwaffe, either advancing or holding a front-line in sufficient depth, they were extremely difficult to beat. The German qualitative advantage, which began slipping due to extremely heavy losses among the junior officer and NCO ranks in 1941, suffered a huge blow with the loss of 22 outstanding divisions at Stalingrad.
Well, the divisions arriving in the East after stalingrad cannot IMO be described as "hastily assembled". More on this later.Several other divisions were decimated or destroyed as well trying to patch the huge hole in the front caused by the Stalingrad disaster and the collaspe of the remainder of the Don front. This could not be made up by forming 17 Luftwaffe divisions, and throwing various other hastily assembled formations into the fray in a piecemeal fashion on the Eastern Front. While German strength may have been marginally larger in 1943, the quality and morale of it's units was slipping.
No, there were not enough divisions - but the reason for that is in the main not the stalingrad losses.In 1943, there were enough divisions left in AGN and AGC to hold the tide, barely, but in the South the picture, especially after Kursk, was far different. With Hitler still stubbornly demanding that the Kuban be held, as well as the Dneiper Bend area and the Nikolpol bridgehead, there simply were not enough divisions to adequately defend his front line. The story of AGS and Field Marshal Manstein after July 1943, was of him constantly shifting his mobile forces from one location to another in a vain attempt to stop the multi-headed hydra that the Red Army had become.
cheers
Konikov,
See the answere of Andreas and me higher in this topic.
I only know that 337 ID was send extra to the Rzhev sailant and arrived in december.
So that makes 5 extra divisions and not 16!!!
If you are certain about the 16 divisions i like to know the names of these divisions, please!
Regards
Erik
No, it is not right. Only a few divisions were send there to help against the Russian breaktrough.Well, first I'd like to ask this, during October and November how many German divisions were moved to the vicinity of Army Group center? The article says 16, does that sound about right?
See the answere of Andreas and me higher in this topic.
I only know that 337 ID was send extra to the Rzhev sailant and arrived in december.
So that makes 5 extra divisions and not 16!!!
If you are certain about the 16 divisions i like to know the names of these divisions, please!
Regards
Erik
Please read what I wrote once more, I'm talking about October and November, before the start of the operation, not when it was in progress.Erik k. wrote:Konikov,
No, it is not right. Only a few divisions were send there to help against the Russian breaktrough.Well, first I'd like to ask this, during October and November how many German divisions were moved to the vicinity of Army Group center? The article says 16, does that sound about right?
See the answere of Andreas and me higher in this topic.
I only know that 337 ID was send extra to the Rzhev sailant and arrived in december.
So that makes 5 extra divisions and not 16!!!
If you are certain about the 16 divisions i like to know the names of these divisions, please!
Regards
Erik