I am sorry but only the 72 ID was brought to the Rzhev area (subzow) in september.I'm talking about October and November
Oh well, precision is always a good thing. But I am nevertheless sorry if I have interpreted the drift of your argument wrongly.Qvist,
I can see I will have to be more careful with my language when debating you in the future.
Right. That is indeed a different issue. But unlike what would have been the case if the AOK 6 divisions were of a particularly high calibre, this factor is already reflected in the loss figures. Thus it does not affect the issue of the strength of the Ostheer growing despite the stalingrad losses. As I understood your argument, it was that the Stalingrad losses were somehow more critical than the numbers alone suggest. And, the divisions who were full strength in June were no longer any such thing in September or November, to say nothing of February, when they were lost.Perhaps "outstanding divisions" was an overstatement of the 6th army. Let me instead say "full strength" divisions. The fact remains that AGS was the only portion of the Eastern Front that had it's divisions brought up to almost full material strength in anticipation of Operation Blau. Since no major offensives were to be carried out by AGN and AGC, they received correspondingly fewer reinforcements and in many cases the divisions were well below establishment in the summer of 1942. This was not the case with the 6th army.
As far as hastily assembled..... You are taking that term out of context, or at least not in the way I intended it. Formations like the 6th Panzer were completely up to strength and carefully reassembled in France (actually it was overstrength, although it's 150 Pz III's suffered greatly against T34s on the Aksai river). But they were "hastily assembled" and quickly thrown into battle upon arriving in the East and therefore wasted their strength by being given tasks beyond their means. The divisions thrown into the battle along the Chir are also examples of this. Several were completely destroyed in an attempt to stop greatly superior Russian forces (this was a sad necessity in order to prevent the Russians from quickly advancing on Rostov).
Yes, but this is a different issue from the development of German strength.Only when Manstein was allowed to give ground and "carefully assemble" divisions for his counterstroke that recaptured Kharkov, were the Germans really effective at this time in the South.
Yes, but this basically is just to say that the German Army was not large enough or strong enough to achieve its tasks from 1943 on. I do not disagree with this, but again, why is Stalingrad in particular the critical point in this development, the specific occurrence the Germans could not afford? Why not the even greater losses the Ostheer suffered in the summer of 1941? Or in the summer of 1943? Or the 29 divisions disbanded or destroyed in late 1943, if we are to be caught up in the number of divisions, which I think your argument here is to an excessive degree - it is in many ways a deceptive measure of strength.Finally, I stated there were enough divisions to "barely" hold the tide in 1943. That is borne out by what transpired along those fronts. There were no substantial front collapses by either AGN or AGC in 1943. Orel fell in the summer and Smolensk in the fall, but the Army groups gave ground grudgingly and at an enormous cost in casualties to the Red Army. AGN gave up very little ground until January 1944. The losses outlined by Glantz in "The Battle of Leningrad" show how greatly the Russians suffered around Mga without having almost anything to show for their efforts in 1943...in spite of fighting a German Army that was very near the breaking point in each of the battles south of Lake Ladoga.
Could these army groups have used more divisions? Of course they could, especially if they ever hoped to regain the offensive initiative. But with the new German committment into Italy and their defensive requirements in Yugoslavia, France and Norway, these divisions were simply not available. Still they managed to scrape by with what they had, unlike the Manstein after Kursk, who could do little more than throw temporary roadblocks in front of the surging Russians (with an odd victory like the one at Zhitomir).
I fail to see the significance in this context of where Soviet advances in 1943 occurred? The Germans continually distributed and redistributed their forces among different sectors of the front as needed, and except in the very short term, the stalingrad losses affected the northern and central sectors of the front as much as the southern. The profile of soviet advances naturally reflect primarily where the Red Army chose to deploy its resources. While I generally agree with you, one thing to consider is that a 'leaner' (read: attrited badly) division generates far more firepower per man than one at full strength. Basically, what happens is that all the rifles get discarded and everyone ends up carrying a MG-42. Until the MGs and other support weapons (mortars, IGs, arty, etc) start running short of men - which takes quite a while - the overall FP of the div is hardly effected. (This is part of the reason the Germans were able to hold so long in fornt of Moscow in '41/'42 and in Normandy in '44, for example)Alk wrote:Part of the issue with these new divisions is that, as Manstein and numerous others convincingly argue, they were formed to a large extent by starving exisitng divisions of replacement men and material. Since combat troops suffer the most attrition, many divisions were tail heavy, while their fighting head was very small. It would have been much better in almost everyone's opinion other than Hitler, Goring and Himler (the later two having their own personal armies) to concentrate on having a smaller number of experienced full strength divisions, that new recruits could be integrated into, rather than a larger number of divisions of which only a relatively small percentage were completely fit for combat. These tended to consume resources and space on vital road arteries, while having only limited combat power.
I would say that they were essentially very similar in outlook to the divisions who arrived in the East in the winter and spring of 1942, and who constituted at least the bulk of the divisions lost in Stalingrad. The majority were in both cases 300-series infantry divisions, raised originally for less demanding duties and then upgraded for service in the East, supplemented by a smattering of experienced divisions that had been transferred to France for refreshement earlier in the campaign and now returned. For example, 15., 23., 106. and 167. ID, who had been on the EF until late spring the year before, and returned in the late winter 1943. 17.ID had left the East during the same period, and returned in late spring 1943. Also in early 42, some of the many divisions arriving were experienced units, but not to any greater degree than in the spring of 43. One important difference was the addition of the Luftwaffe Field divisions in late 1942 and early 1943. Another notable difference was that while the Panzer Divisions arriving in the east in early 1942 were all newly raised formations (22., 23., 24.PzD), the divisions arriving in early 1943 were all experienced (7.PzD, II-SS PzK). Also, in marked contrast to the spring of 42, no Panzer divisions were withdrawn from the East (in 42, 6., 7. and 10.PzD, plus the three SS divisions later in the year) - though of course, a number of Panzer Divisions were lost in Stalingrad.I knew that a large number of divisions were moved East in 1943 and in sheer numbers were slightly larger in 1943 than in 1942, in spite of the loss of the divisions in the Stalingrad cauldron. Also German industry produced roughly double the number of heavy weapons in 1943 as opposed to 1942. However, while you say that the Stalingrad divisions were not "outstanding", I'm wondering how you would term these new arrivals, many of which were new formations without considerable combat experience?
No, of course, as said it was a major blow. But so was losing more than half a million experienced soldiers in June-September 1941, what? Granted, many of those returned after recuperation unlike the Stalingrad casualties, but they are nevertheless very much comparable. Both the Germans and their opponents had to overcome setbacks as bad or worse several times, and as bad as the Stalingrad debacle was for the Germans in terms of losses, it would be a considerable exaggeration to picture it as something that stands out particularly dramatically in the general picture of the German losses in the East. It was, for example, no more than roughly 20% of the German combat losses in 1943.I understand that the divisions trapped in Stalingrad were somewhat weakened by November, but they still numbered almost 300,000 troops. The complete loss of such an experienced group of soldiers is not easy to overcome. The other aspect of Stalingrad is the loss of 3 allied armies. Neither the Italians, the Hungarians or the Romanians were ever to play a significant part in fighting in the East after this. As the collapse of these armies had a great deal to do with Germany's inability to rescue the 6th army, their loss should arguably be added to the German tally. I understand that they were on the whole not reliable troops, but the certainly could have been used for partisan warfare or to adequately man narrow divisional frontages if their anti-tank weaponry would have upgraded.
There is something in all of this, but I also think these are all factors that tend to be overemphasised as well as exaggerated (I would not imply that you are doing this, and are not neccessarily arguing against you in the following). It seems to be well established that the quality of the replacements arriving by this time was not as high as previously, but sometimes people speak as if the Ostheer prior to Barbarossa consisted of a wholly different breed of men, so that any losses were more or less irreplacable by definition. The image of the pre-22 June men as inherently and neccessarily “the best” and their wanton demise before the gates of Moscow to be replaced by lesser men as a main explanation of why the tide turned in the East is one that I find intellectually unsatisfying, to put it gently. The SS siphoning off recruits, manpower being wasted in Luftwaffe divisions or too many new divisions being formed were all factors with an impact, but their impact are after all limited.I however think that by this time the rot had set into the German army to the extent that they were past the point of acheiving brilliant victories. Too many of their best soldiers were dead, the result to a large extent of the winter lunge towards Moscow and ill advised splitting of Army Group A & B and the strategic disaster that this led to. Too many of their best new recruits were now being channeled into SS divisions instead of becoming NCOs or junior offiicers in existing divisions. Or luftwaffe men with excellent physical qualities (young physcially fit, educated) were being almost completely wasted by being formed into Luftwaffe field divisions. Experienced panzer divisions were at times deprived of replacement tanks so that new, inexperienced formations could be created, which inevitably suffered heavy casualties as they became acclamated to the realities of warfare on the Eastern Front.
Hi JonWhile I generally agree with you, one thing to consider is that a 'leaner' (read: attrited badly) division generates far more firepower per man than one at full strength. Basically, what happens is that all the rifles get discarded and everyone ends up carrying a MG-42. Until the MGs and other support weapons (mortars, IGs, arty, etc) start running short of men - which takes quite a while - the overall FP of the div is hardly effected. (This is part of the reason the Germans were able to hold so long in fornt of Moscow in '41/'42 and in Normandy in '44, for example)
The same effect occurred when whole bns were stripped out of the standard div org: the same amount of regimental and divisional assets now had to support fewer bns, meaning each bn got proportionately more support.
Of course, this really only matters defensively. Offensively a div needs to have more warm bodies to push forward. So, one could say that Hitlers policy was quite correct - starve defensive formations, and let them rely on their higher FP/man to hold the line, while fresh, full-strength units take the offensive.
*shrug* Don't know that I agree with that approach, but it does have a certain logic, beyond "Himmler and Goering wanted larger personal armies".
To a certain extent yes, provided that's what you want to do (and many have). I prefer to use it as the basis for analysis rather than as illustration for it. Also, if you tailor statistics, so can others - and it will be just as easy to demolish the argument made. this is not the case as long as statistics are utilised in a more meaningful way without simply using the snippets that serve the chosen purpose - they do clearly suggest certain things and rule out others.Still, I don't completely agree with all your conclusions, although they are certainly supported by statistics and logic (both statistics and logic can almost always be tailored to support a particular point of view however).
Ah, but this presupposes exactly what I am denying in my main conclusion - that the outcome of the war in the East still rested significantly in German hands at this point.Since you are very well versed on the Eastern Front during WWII, and since you stated that Stalingrad was not necessarily the death blow to the German army, please discuss what you would have done if you were the supreme commander of German forces in the late Spring of 1943 onward, to alter the outcome of the War in the East (others can chip in their opinions as well).
I think that it did not - and that the main (as opposed to sole) reason for this was not the loss of 6th Army at Stalingrad, but rather the development of the Red Army to the fighting instrument it was (in terms of structure and size) by the summer of 1943.1. The russian manpower advantage was arguably greater than 5:3 at this point, even if you do not count the Stavka reserve. Soviet fronts strength through 2nd quarter 1943 averaged 6,459,800 against an Ostheer average of 2.8-2.9 million men. But it depends of course on whether or not you include the finnish front and German allies.You are faced with the following situation:
1. The Russians now have at least a 5:3 manpower advantage, and it will continue to grow.
2. Your allies in the East have essentially been wiped out.
3. The Russsians are producing roughly 3X as many tanks as the Germans, and 5X artillery and mortars.
4. The Russians are getting increasingly substantial help from the Western Allies, making their armies better fed, better clothed, more mobile, and with better communications capabilities than they would have been otherwise.
5. The Russians have clearly learned from the Germans and from their own blunders. Their tactical and strategic expertise is growing by the day.
4. There were between 40 and 50 divisions in France and the low countries at this point, not a couple of dozen.Looking at your overall situation....
1. You have to prepare for the imminent allied invasion of Southern Europe, probably Italy, and need to find a couple of dozen divisions available to counter it.
2. You have to continue to defend the Balkans with a number of divisions in order to keep allied air power away from Ploesti, and to prevent a allied landing in the Balkans which could have disastrous strategic consequences.
3. You have to continue to defend Norway with several divisions to insure the flow of iron ore to the Reich.
4. You have to defend the French coast with a couple of dozen divisions in case the Allies attempt a 1943 landing. You know that you must double or triple your troops and defenses in France in the next year to have any hope of defeating a landing there.
5. You have to keep at least least half your air force in the West to counter the allied bombing offensive over W. Europe and to protect the rest of the continent from the allies.
6. You have to build huge numbers of heavy anti-aircraft guns to attempt to stop this offensive, and protect your people.
7. You are continuing to launch about a submarine a day, in spite of enormous manufacturing costs involved and the now (after May 1943) very limited returns.
8. You are laying the groundwork for a gigantic terror-weapon campaign against the West, which will result in thousands of V1 and V2's manufactured at the expense of other war materials.
Well, this is IMO very arguable. I think the operations in 1943 strongly contradict the notion of the Germans possessing sufficient strength for a successful strategic defensive in the East. Traditionally, the explanation offered here has been that the Germans were so badly bled at Kursk that they lost this capacity (which they would otherwise have possessed). However, with what is now known about the Kursk losses, this view must IMO clearly be discarded - the Kursk losses cannot explain the consequent inability to stem to Soviet tide. This suggests that the soviet advances reflect the general strength relation in the East rather than any single strategic mistake, and leaves us with only the adoption of a different defensive strategy as the sole remaining variable in order to change the outcome. We do know from events that the Germans did not have the depth of forces to implement a rigid, linear type of defense successfully (unlike f.e. at Rzhev or n the North during the previous year) - this is after all what they attempted, and it did not succeed. Regarding flexible, mobile defence - who knows? I think it probably at least would not have had worse results. But with a considerable part of the Ostheer in no real state for this kind of warfare, with an opponent better led and equipped than before, more mobile than before and with an unprecedented and growing force superiority, I do not see this as something that would have been likely to have produced a very different result.3. As these battles, and especially Manstein's counteroffensive during the previous winter show, the Germans still hold a tactical superiority (especially in mobile warfare) over their opponents. You know that the Russians will continue to get stronger and smarter, but just maybe, if you don't squander your divisions needlessly, and have a front line of manageable length and depth, there could possibly still be hope.
