Hi Alk
I knew that a large number of divisions were moved East in 1943 and in sheer numbers were slightly larger in 1943 than in 1942, in spite of the loss of the divisions in the Stalingrad cauldron. Also German industry produced roughly double the number of heavy weapons in 1943 as opposed to 1942. However, while you say that the Stalingrad divisions were not "outstanding", I'm wondering how you would term these new arrivals, many of which were new formations without considerable combat experience?
I would say that they were essentially very similar in outlook to the divisions who arrived in the East in the winter and spring of 1942, and who constituted at least the bulk of the divisions lost in Stalingrad. The majority were in both cases 300-series infantry divisions, raised originally for less demanding duties and then upgraded for service in the East, supplemented by a smattering of experienced divisions that had been transferred to France for refreshement earlier in the campaign and now returned. For example, 15., 23., 106. and 167. ID, who had been on the EF until late spring the year before, and returned in the late winter 1943. 17.ID had left the East during the same period, and returned in late spring 1943. Also in early 42, some of the many divisions arriving were experienced units, but not to any greater degree than in the spring of 43. One important difference was the addition of the Luftwaffe Field divisions in late 1942 and early 1943. Another notable difference was that while the Panzer Divisions arriving in the east in early 1942 were all newly raised formations (22., 23., 24.PzD), the divisions arriving in early 1943 were all experienced (7.PzD, II-SS PzK). Also, in marked contrast to the spring of 42, no Panzer divisions were withdrawn from the East (in 42, 6., 7. and 10.PzD, plus the three SS divisions later in the year) - though of course, a number of Panzer Divisions were lost in Stalingrad.
I understand that the divisions trapped in Stalingrad were somewhat weakened by November, but they still numbered almost 300,000 troops. The complete loss of such an experienced group of soldiers is not easy to overcome. The other aspect of Stalingrad is the loss of 3 allied armies. Neither the Italians, the Hungarians or the Romanians were ever to play a significant part in fighting in the East after this. As the collapse of these armies had a great deal to do with Germany's inability to rescue the 6th army, their loss should arguably be added to the German tally. I understand that they were on the whole not reliable troops, but the certainly could have been used for partisan warfare or to adequately man narrow divisional frontages if their anti-tank weaponry would have upgraded.
No, of course, as said it was a major blow. But so was losing more than half a million experienced soldiers in June-September 1941, what? Granted, many of those returned after recuperation unlike the Stalingrad casualties, but they are nevertheless very much comparable. Both the Germans and their opponents had to overcome setbacks as bad or worse several times, and as bad as the Stalingrad debacle was for the Germans in terms of losses, it would be a considerable exaggeration to picture it as something that stands out particularly dramatically in the general picture of the German losses in the East. It was, for example, no more than roughly 20% of the German combat losses in 1943.
The allied losses, seen within the context of their respective war efforts, stands out much, much more dramatically - in both the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian case, the Stalingrad losses constitute a very major part of their overall losses through the war. This is
not the case on the German side.
I however think that by this time the rot had set into the German army to the extent that they were past the point of acheiving brilliant victories. Too many of their best soldiers were dead, the result to a large extent of the winter lunge towards Moscow and ill advised splitting of Army Group A & B and the strategic disaster that this led to. Too many of their best new recruits were now being channeled into SS divisions instead of becoming NCOs or junior offiicers in existing divisions. Or luftwaffe men with excellent physical qualities (young physcially fit, educated) were being almost completely wasted by being formed into Luftwaffe field divisions. Experienced panzer divisions were at times deprived of replacement tanks so that new, inexperienced formations could be created, which inevitably suffered heavy casualties as they became acclamated to the realities of warfare on the Eastern Front.
There is something in all of this, but I also think these are all factors that tend to be overemphasised as well as exaggerated (I would not imply that you are doing this, and are not neccessarily arguing against you in the following). It seems to be well established that the quality of the replacements arriving by this time was not as high as previously, but sometimes people speak as if the Ostheer prior to Barbarossa consisted of a wholly different breed of men, so that any losses were more or less irreplacable by definition. The image of the pre-22 June men as inherently and neccessarily “the best” and their wanton demise before the gates of Moscow to be replaced by lesser men as a main explanation of why the tide turned in the East is one that I find intellectually unsatisfying, to put it gently. The SS siphoning off recruits, manpower being wasted in Luftwaffe divisions or too many new divisions being formed were all factors with an impact, but their impact are after all limited.
As far as I can understand, the explanation for the shift in initiative and what I agree was a state of affairs where there was no longer any real possibility for the Ostheer to succeed can most plausibly be sought not in any change in the German army, but rather in the development of the Red Army. The period from November 1942 to the start of the German summer offensive in 1943 can with justification be described as the period where the Red Army "came of age", in both quantitative and organisational terms. Strength- wise, this is the period when the Red army achieved the sort of force levels it would maintain through the rest of the war (with Fronts strengths of more than 6 million men), and it was also the period when it regained mobile offensive power in organisational terms with the introduction of the Tank Armies. By the summer of 1943, the Germans were facing an opponent that was muchstronger than he had been a year before, and with much more extensive capabilities. In my opinion, it seems more or less obvious to me that this had a far more fundamental impact upon the war in the East than any changes in the capabilities of the German army during the period.
Would they have done better with the sort of flexible defence advoctade by Manstein? No-one can tell today, though it seems perhaps unlikely that they could have fared much worse.
cheers