Stephan wrote:Yuri proves the weaponry was up to date along the standards, or even better - as they had get extra support by soviet artillery.
Excellent, and it should be so and not less. It is very wise to give some extras for your new ally!
But. The fighting reports talks about losses and severe lack of ammo from almost all units.
This is of course a proof of heavy fightings. But perhaps also a witness of way too little ammo for a heavy fighting?? Or perhaps, their routines for forwarding reserve ammo during fight wasnt yet OK...
And thus, perhaps it is from here the both myth has come: they had not enough with ammo, and thus had the feeling of helpness.
With time, perhaps only half of the rifles and guns had some ammo left - presumately the best shooters get what was left - and the saying only half of the soldiers had a rifle was borne...
The other myth talking about some subunits putting a weak fight may also be explained by the lack of ammo.
What do you think? Is this hypothesis plausible?
Well, let's look, how all was actually.
According to the report of an army headquarters of 33-rd army from 10/10/1943 this army had the following forces
(look below the first and the second a picture).
From the specified forces three rifle divisions should participate in offensive operation (officer/sergeant/private/total):
- 43-n RD on right flank - 635/ 1,049/ 3,640/ 5,324;
- 290-n RD on the left flank - 602/ 939/ 2,946/ 4,489;
- 222-n RD in the second echelon (for 290-th RD) - 667/ 1,114/ 3,381/ 5,162;
Total in Russian rifle divisions: 1,904/ 3,102/ 9,969/ 14,975;
In the center, as is known, there came 1-n the Polish Infantry Division - 1,031/ 2,702/ 8,411/ 12,144
However in 17.00 October, 13 commanding 33-rd Army general - colonel GORDOV has commanded to crumple from front and to remove in rear 1-th Polish Infantry Division «
as not capable to conduct battles against Germans ». At night with 13 for October, 14 the Polish Infantry division has replaced Russian 164-n RD - 598/ 905/ 3,080/ 4,583
Others rifle divisions 33-th Army in operations did not participate.
Did not participate in operations and tank units of army.
On the other hand all artillery and mortar regiments have been involved in operations 33-th Army and as the attached 5-th Artillery Division.
Except for it 33-n the Army has received from commanding Western front for strengthening:
- One artillery division - 5-n Artillery Division;
- Two mobile corps - 5-th Mechanized Corps and 6-th Guards Cavalry Corps.
Mobile troops intended for development of success. These corps engaging to action only after infantry formations have created break in defense of the opponent.
All artillery of 33-rd Army, namely, all brigades of 5-th artillery division, all own artillery regiments of 33-rd Army and all artillery regiments of infantry divisions 12/10/1943 at 9 o'clock 20 minutes have opened fire on positions of the opponent. Artillery preparation of attack proceeded during 1 hour of 40 minutes.
After the ending of artillery preparation some artillery units were attached to infantry divisions. For example, 1-st Polish Infantry Division there was added 67-n Howitzer Brigade (1039-th and 1211-th Howitzer Artillery Regiments) from structure of 5-th Artillery Division. Added artillery units operated under orders of corresponding commanders rifle (infantry) of divisions.
Other artillery units should support actions of infantry divisions. In particular, for support of 1-st Polish Infantry Division have been appointed 18-n Artillery Brigade (494-th and 538-th Artillery Regiments) and 307-th mortar a regiment.
However, not only infantry regiments of 1-st Polish Infantry division have received such impressive help on the part of artillery. Regiments of Russian rifle divisions as had the corresponding help from artillery.
Pay attention to that site where operated 12,144 inexperienced Poles general - colonel GORDOV has put 4,583 Russian which had wide experience of struggle.
However it yet all.
On October, 14 on this site Germans have thrown in addition units 252 ID, 18 ID (mot.) and 25 ID (mot.). Not looking, on it Russian 164-n RD has grasped a boundary of 1,5 kms southwest PUNITSCHE and has reflected all counterattacks of Germans.
From this it is visible, that 164-n RD, having 4,583 person, operated with the big effect, than 1-n Polish Infantry Division having 12,144 person.
Concerning absence ostensibly an ammunition.
On the divisional base of 1-st Polish Infantry Division an ammunition were available in enough.
Problems was not that, ostensibly, there was no ammunition.
The problem was in absence of fuel for motor transport which should provide delivery of an ammunition for units of a division.
The matter is that the commander 1 PID the general Berling has ordered to transfer all fuel for refuelling motor vehicles of an anti-tank battalion (divisional) and motor vehicles of other fighting units.
As a result of it automobile company could not bring up an ammunition from divisional base up to a place of operations.
The divisional base of 1-st PID has remained in area of a former presence of this formation is 68 kilometers from that area where units conducted operations.
However it does not mean, that units of 1-st Polish Infantry Division had no ammunition. It is absolutely not true.
In the Berling’s report it is clearly specified, that in the morning of 12/10/43 units of 1-st Polish division had on 1 (one) unit of fire rifle cartridges and on 1,5 units of fire of artillery shells.
Hence, units of 1-st Polish Infantry Division could conduct fights during five days at normal fighting activity or two days at heavy fights.
According to the fighting report of a staff of 1-st PID from 13/10/1943 on 17.00 (there is a signature of the chief of staff Lagodzinsky) units of 1-st Polish Infantry Division had 0,8 units of fire of artillery shells and 0,6 units of fire a rifle (PPD*PPSh) cartridges(patrons).
From the Lagodzinsky’s message it is visible, that units of 1-st Polish Infantry Division spent for one and a half day 0,7 units of fire of the artillery shells and 0,4 units of fire the rifle cartridges (without taking into account that they have received in addition for this period).
Thus, on October, 12 and 13 intensity of operations was a little above the average a level.