Mediterranean Campaign Best Live Action Exercise for Allies

[merdiolu]

More I look Mediterranean more I am convinced that it was a necessary campaign and beyond that. In 1940 when major fighting ennded in Western Europe and British Army evacuated from Dunkirk they were still short of necessary experience , training. They lost all of their equipment. And US Army did not even exist beyond 100.000 men. Any attempt to return Europe was bound to fail between 1940-1942 because neither British / Commonweath Army nor US Army were as experienced , trained and drilled as Germans. There was no planning , or logistical preparation for a such undertaking in this period. Any time they attempted with half baked preparation with insufficent forces like they did in Balkans in 1942 or Dieppe in 1942 it ended up with defeat. Allies needed a battlefield where they found out what worked and what did not from a quick but hard , brutal , Darwinian way without any vital risk to Grand Strategy of Allies ( Contrary to belief I think Panzer Armee Africa was never strong to conquer Egypt or Middle East nor was properly supplied. OKW priorities were elsewhere ) while tying as much Axis troops as possible. North Africa and Eastern Africa provided this perfectly. Campaign in Egypt and Libya made British/Commonwealth Armed Forces to realize their shortcomings , incompatent commanders , faulty weapons and equipment and create necessary tactical/strategic skill to defeat Germans on battlefield. Same with US Army. Defeat of 2nd US Corps in Kasserine Pass was probably benefit Allies more in long term. Unskilled commanders were sacked , proper air/land support doctrines were created and amphibious land experiences/skills were developed to a greater degree with TORCH , HUSKY and AVALANCHE.

In this way sticking and clearing North Africa and then carrying war to Italian mainland benefitted Allies cause more than grand strategy. While protecting their powerbase in Med. and causing as much discomfort as possible for Axis , Allied troops and commanders honed their skills from amateurism to skilled warriors who defeated Germans in Normandy in 1944. Otherwise US Army commanded Lloyd Fredenhall or British Army under the command of Neill Ritchie might had tried to invade France in 1942 with Honey tanks , insufficent air support and green untested troops without proper logistical support and amphibious landing confidence. (imagine the outcome) So can we conclude that Erwin Rommel and his Afrikakorps or Albert Kesselring were best trainers for Allies ?

Waiting your comments....

[Carl Schwamberger]

My first thought is of the artillery tactics of the Brit 8th Army digressing from the improved techniques of the previous 1938 - 1940 improvements into what might be described as a mess. Despite battlefield experience the Commowealth or British commanders were dispersing command & control and scattering artillery fires in penny packets. That came to a end & effective artillery fires returned when Monty brought some new leaders from the UK & insisted on a return to the methods based on the experince of the French campaign and subsequent tests in the UK. Had the Brits went with the 'African Experince' Parnhams system of networked communications, common survey, and a balance between centralization & decentralizatized techniques not been had.

On the US Army side only seven divisions had accquired any combat experince in the ETO by 5 June 1945. For Operation Neptune only two combat experienced divisions were used, and for Op. Overlord exactly five out of fifty plus had any combat experience. Neither of the US corps commanders involved in Op. Neptune had any experience in the ETO. Collins had a couple months worth fighting the Japanese. and Patch a bit more of the same. Bradley had all of two months actual experience in combat ops in the Med. Patton actually had less.

Reviewing recommended changes from the US Army experience in Africa one can find such winners as endorsing the substitution of towed cannon for self propelled in the tanks destroyer corps. A change that proved worthless later. Also the folks back at AGF in the US thought the African experience validated the tank destroyer doctrine, a highly erroneous conclusion that was fortunatly rejected as US Army leaders in France accquired experince.

I could keep going on for quite a while. the examples of correct conclusions & beneficial changes from the African experience in the US Army were well balanced by those which were in error, or not understood and the necessary changes made.

Perhaps the worst was the idea that predictions for infantry casualties were valid and a increase in training of infantry replacements not made. That error persisted through the Italian campaigns into 1944 with the US Army failing to act on the clear data or lesson in the infantry losses of 1943-44 in the Africa/Mediterraian theatre.

Hypothetically the Africa experince should have greatly improved the US and Commonwealth armies, but the actual benefits are thinner than claimed. The Axis seem to have learned more than their enemies from that theatre, tho there are some glaring deficiencies on that side as well. Considering the stratigic dead end of the African battlefield I'm skeptical the leassons actually learned were worth the cost. The blood and treasure would have been better spent on more important fronts.

[merdiolu]

My first thought is of the artillery tactics of the Brit 8th Army digressing from the improved techniques of the previous 1938 - 1940 improvements into what might be described as a mess. Despite battlefield experience the Commowealth or British commanders were dispersing command & control and scattering artillery fires in penny packets. That came to a end & effective artillery fires returned when Monty brought some new leaders from the UK & insisted on a return to the methods based on the experince of the French campaign and subsequent tests in the UK. Had the Brits went with the 'African Experince' Parnhams system of networked communications, common survey, and a balance between centralization & decentralizatized techniques not been had.

Actually Montgomery did more than that. When he took over command of Eighth Army in August 1942 he disbanded experiments like Jock colums (which were temporary stopgaps anyway ) and ended brigade style piecemental attacks. Every time Eighth Army screwed up in its attacks either against Cauldron during Gazala battle or First Battle of Alamein especially British armour attacked one brigade at a time , piecementally in different spots and without the support of other arms or supporting other arms especially infantry. Montgomery gave instructions to fight in division sized units at least , concrate their firepower and attacks. Although British armour continued to charge blindly like cavalry in Napoleonic Wars they also learned to support infantry and cover artillery after August 1942. He also brought up commanders like Freddie de Guingand or Brian Horrocks whom he could manage and work with to have a firm hand on commanding the battle and execution of his orders. That was severely lacking under leadership of Ritchie or Auchinleck. (as Montgomery said "no more bellyaching")

As for US Army some very good divisional and corps commanders proved their worth and tested their skills in North Africa while bad ones were singled out. Terry Allen , Ernie Harmon , James Gavin , Lucian Truscott and Matthew Ridgway were good divisional commanders and all of them served in Mediterranean and probably gained some experience there first. Ones like Lloyd Fredenhall , Neill Ritchie or Kenneth Anderson were taken out. Clark was also seen with his limits and glory seeking and left in Italian Front. I agree that some wrong tactical conclusions were drawn by US Army after Tunisian Campaign. But as I said some valuable lessons like air-land cooperation , joint staff planning and amphibious warfare were gained too.

[EKB]

On the US Army side only seven divisions had accquired any combat experince in the ETO by 5 June 1945. For Operation Neptune only two combat experienced divisions were used, and for Op. Overlord exactly five out of fifty plus had any combat experience. Neither of the US corps commanders involved in Op. Neptune had any experience in the ETO. Collins had a couple months worth fighting the Japanese. and Patch a bit more of the same. Bradley had all of two months actual experience in combat ops in the Med. Patton actually had less.

General Corlett of XIX Corps played a major role in previous landings at Kiska and Kwajalein. He was transferred from the Pacific to England in April 1944, ostensibly for his knowledge of amphibious warfare. However, when Corlett was asked to give formal advice based on past experience, British and American officers in the U.K. replied with opinions to the effect that island landings had no bearing on making a forced entry to France. The D-Day planners were not pleased to hear Corlett describe the LCA and LCVP as outdated technology, or his contention that the Army should have investigated employment of the LTV (Alligator) in the first wave assault companies.

Reviewing recommended changes from the US Army experience in Africa one can find such winners as endorsing the substitution of towed cannon for self propelled in the tanks destroyer corps. A change that proved worthless later. Also the folks back at AGF in the US thought the African experience validated the tank destroyer doctrine, a highly erroneous conclusion that was fortunatly rejected as US Army leaders in France accquired experince.

I don't think this is remarkable because German officers made similar false predictions and planning errors with regards to the deployment of their own tanks, tank destroyers and towed anti-tank guns. They were ultimately used in much the same manner as American types.

According to Harry Yeide, the pre-invasion training exercises proved that towed Tank Destroyer battalions were impractical for beach assaults and adjustments were made before D-Day. In May 1944 the AGF asked the ETO commanders if they wanted M-36 Tank Destroyers under development by the Ordnance Department, and the response was, essentially, "no thanks, we don't need them." By that time the only towed battalion in Italy was converting to the M-18 Hellcat, and only one towed battalion was slated for the initial landings in Normandy.

[Dili]

It was penny packets and jock columns that made possible Compass victory. So it is understandable that they remained attached to it.

[Aber]

Considering the stratigic dead end of the African battlefield I'm skeptical the leassons actually learned were worth the cost.

IMHO the biggest lesson was the realisation of the seriousness of war - effectively until Kasserine the US had a 'peace-time army' and learned it needed to toughen up, eg Truscott training his divsion in rapid marches to get them fit, but IIRC his targets were still lower than the British Army.

[canambridge]

Approximately 20 Allied divisions were eventually deployed in Italy. One overlooked factor is that logistical concerns may have prevented use of these divisions in North West Europe. The supply problems of NWE have been well chronicled and were not solved until the beginning of December 1944. And those supply problems would have been worse without the port of Marseilles, a Mediterranean port seized from the Med.
The Germans matched the Allies with their own 20 divisions, including, for much of the campaign, two panzer, five panzer grenadier and two FJ divisions as well as better than average infantry formations. Consider the impact if these troops had been available to OB West while SHAEF had to find a way to make do with less.

[merdiolu]

Approximately 20 Allied divisions were eventually deployed in Italy. One overlooked factor is that logistical concerns may have prevented use of these divisions in North West Europe. The supply problems of NWE have been well chronicled and were not solved until the beginning of December 1944. And those supply problems would have been worse without the port of Marseilles, a Mediterranean port seized from the Med.
The Germans matched the Allies with their own 20 divisions, including, for much of the campaign, two panzer, five panzer grenadier and two FJ divisions as well as better than average infantry formations. Consider the impact if these troops had been available to OB West while SHAEF had to find a way to make do with less.

Gerd Von Rundstedt actually verified this fact when he was interrogatted by Allies after the war. He said "I have no idea why we continued to hold in Italy. What was our benefit I couldn't figure out. My best units were sucked to Italy."