German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

[Don Juan]

I only ask as you point to British theory calling for the tank as a battle winning weapon, Britain quite simply had not produced suitable vehicles to apply this kind of theory in practice. They had heavy and slow tanks suitable for defence and infantry support and fast tanks without suitable armament. It was only once the Grant had been introduced in 1942 that they had good enough firepower to compete. Crusader was part of the learning curve for British and dominion forces I don't think they were inept just led by inexperience.

I'm not sure that the 2 pounder on the Crusader was inherently unsuitable, it's just that the Director of Artillery didn't feel the need to provide it with a useful suite of ammunition (especially APCBC and HE), and indeed appears to have resisted doing so even when the need became apparent. Although the HE content of the 2 pounder would have been relatively small, a cruiser tank could generally carry over 100 rounds, and fire them at approx 20 per minute aimed shots.

The main problem with Cruiser tanks conceptually, as I see it, was that they were too advanced a concept for the technology available in the late 1930's. There was no way that the Crusader could have been a reliable tank as the British Army understood it, as the limits of its suspension meant that it could not carry a large enough hull to mount a large engine like the Liberty and also internally fit the hefty air cleaners the swept volume of the engine required. The cruiser tank concept therefore innately necessitated a very high standard of maintenance, which was something that the Eighth Army would not, and probably could not provide.

[Sheldrake]

I only ask as you point to British theory calling for the tank as a battle winning weapon, Britain quite simply had not produced suitable vehicles to apply this kind of theory in practice. They had heavy and slow tanks suitable for defence and infantry support and fast tanks without suitable armament. It was only once the Grant had been introduced in 1942 that they had good enough firepower to compete. Crusader was part of the learning curve for British and dominion forces I don't think they were inept just led by inexperience.

I'm not sure that the 2 pounder on the Crusader was inherently unsuitable, it's just that the Director of Artillery didn't feel the need to provide it with a useful suite of ammunition (especially APCBC and HE), and indeed appears to have resisted doing so even when the need became apparent. Although the HE content of the 2 pounder would have been relatively small, a cruiser tank could generally carry over 100 rounds, and fire them at approx 20 per minute aimed shots.

The main problem with Cruiser tanks conceptually, as I see it, was that they were too advanced a concept for the technology available in the late 1930's. There was no way that the Crusader could have been a reliable tank as the British Army understood it, as the limits of its suspension meant that it could not carry a large enough hull to mount a large engine like the Liberty and also internally fit the hefty air cleaners the swept volume of the engine required. The cruiser tank concept therefore innately necessitated a very high standard of maintenance, which was something that the Eighth Army would not, and probably could not provide.

The re is a factual error in your statement. The Director Royal Artillery had no say in the armament of the equipments of the Royal ARMOURED Corps. In 1941 the Commander Home Forces, General Alanbrooke (a gunner) took a very close interest in esuring that artillery equipment including the AA guns had an Anti-tank capability.

I don't think there was any problem with the cruiser concept. This has become the dominant post ww2 desing.

The problem's were in the vehicles produced by the design and manufacturing processes adopted. In ww2 the capacity of the motor industry was converted to manufacture aircraft. AFVs were below aircraft in the priorities. In any event the British motor industry was not noted for reliability. Worse still AFV manufacture was given to the railway engineering indusrtry. A tank is not a railway locomotive.

[Don Juan]

The re is a factual error in your statement. The Director Royal Artillery had no say in the armament of the equipments of the Royal ARMOURED Corps. In 1941 the Commander Home Forces, General Alanbrooke (a gunner) took a very close interest in esuring that artillery equipment including the AA guns had an Anti-tank capability.

I don't think there was any problem with the cruiser concept. This has become the dominant post ww2 desing.

The problem's were in the vehicles produced by the design and manufacturing processes adopted. In ww2 the capacity of the motor industry was converted to manufacture aircraft. AFVs were below aircraft in the priorities. In any event the British motor industry was not noted for reliability. Worse still AFV manufacture was given to the railway engineering indusrtry. A tank is not a railway locomotive.

There is no factual error in my statement. There is a fault in your ability to read correctly.

I did not refer to the Director Royal Artillery, I referred to the Director of Artillery, Major General E.M. Clarke, at the Ministry of Supply. It was he who made recommendations to the General Staff as to what tank and anti-tank ammunition should be adopted, and who was resistant for various reasons to expand the suite of ammunition for the 2 pounder.

Your opinions on tanks generally are not worth commenting on.

[Sheldrake]

I stand corrected.

However, I very much doubt that a 40mm HE round would have tipped the balance in a battle between British armour and German Anti tank guns. I am with General Clarke on this.

The Eighth Army did have plentiful access to 40mm HE, and the Bofors LAA guns in the Support groups with which to fire them. If 40mm HE was the answer to the tactical problem, we might have expected some practical commander to combine LAA with armour. However, at the time the British seems to have been more interested in AP rounds for the Bofors LAA than in throwing 40mm HE from a tank.

While I recognise that my own opinions on tanks may be unworthy of comment, I am intrigued to learn what would have been better than Cruiser tanks for British armour in the Western Desert.

[Sheldrake]

PS there was a role for infantry even in the desert. At the very least someone had to guard the Laagers and protect recovery teams and hold the ground occupied by anti-tank weapons.

None of which relates to being able form a combined arms team in battle, and I somehow doubt the guard the Laagers (e.g. 4 Armoured Brigade leaguer when it was overrun was not protected by an infantry screen) and the protection of recovery teams stories (how would infantry do that against e.g. an armoured car patrol, which was probably the biggest risk?). In any case, they wouldn't require the volume of infantry that was put in harms way during CRUSADER.

Someone had to assault the dugouts in the boxes. Furthermore the Desert War was decided at El Alemein which was an infantry and artillery dominated battle

Which I did mention. Attacking or defending a fortified position is a completely different story from mobile warfare.

One actual battle role was as part of the smaller columns. But again, you need very few men for that, certainly not whole brigades of them. The gun/infantry ratio in these was very high.

Following this logic we could arrive at a conclusion that infantry were simply a liability in the Western Desert.

However the majority of troops on both sides were infantrymen. It wasn't just the British who had far more infantry formations than armour. The majority of the Italian army was in infantry formations. The DAK included a motorised infantry division 90th Light along with the two panzer divisions, which themselves had more infantry, recce and engineer than armoured battalions.

So why so many useless mouths to feed and move? I suspect the reasons is because the need to contemplate or undertake an "assault on a prepared position" was quite a common feature iof Desert warfare. Much of the operational level planning concerned the breach or capture of fortified positions - The ports of Tobruk and Bardia and the many fortified boxes, used by both sides.

Francis Tuker, who commanded 4th Indian Division wrote "Patterns of War" in the 1950s in which he argued that the linear warfare of the two world wars was an aberration. He argued that Warfare had always been about manoeuvres around fortresses, assaults and sieges.

The main role of the infantry was to man the fortresses which studded the battlefield. These influenced the battle regardless of whether they were attacked or not.

[sitalkes]

If infantry were so important, then would not the British infantry tank doctrine be a war-winner?

[Urmel]

Following this logic we could arrive at a conclusion that infantry were simply a liability in the Western Desert.

If you want to have a serious discussion, that's fine. If you want to build up straw men you can argue against, that's also fine, it's a free forum. But don't expect me to respond then. At the moment you are doing the latter.

[Sheldrake]

Following this logic we could arrive at a conclusion that infantry were simply a liability in the Western Desert.

If you want to have a serious discussion, that's fine. If you want to build up straw men you can argue against, that's also fine, it's a free forum. But don't expect me to respond then. At the moment you are doing the latter.

Not sure how to respond to this. This was an extension to argument you advanced.

If the infantry had no place in the Desert war battles, then it is valid to question why the generals on each side chose include so much infantry in their armies. This emerges directly from the argument you made that very little infantry was needed to protect anti-tank guns or guard leaguers. A jock column was typically a battery of guns and a company of infantry, but there were three - four times as many companies as batteries. What did they think the rest of the infantry there to do? How did the British envisage the SA or NZ divisions operating in Op Crusader? What was the infantry of the DAK expected to achieve in the Gazala Battles?

I think the answer lies in the significance of the "fortresses" which were the only geographic features of any tactical value. Tuker commented on the pattern of the desert war resembling warfare of pre C19th eras when warfare consisted of field armies and fortresses. There can be no discussion of C18th doctine without mention of fortifications and sieges. Desert war doctrine is about assaults on fortified positions as well as tank battles. We tend to have a fascination with technology and tend to focus on the armoured warfare and ignore the dull business of tommy winkling fritz out of his slit trenches.

Another way to look at formations in the desert is to consider the operational threat they posed. A formation of tanks and guns can roam the desert, and brass up any unfortified enemy, but without the infantry to storm a fortress the operation is merely a raid. An infantry division on the move is a threat to change the shape of the battlefield, whether their target is the relief of Tobruk or the reduction of a square mile of nothing at Bir Hacheim. Without the infantry the desert warfare is merely expensive jousting.

Returning to the thread topic. Were there any differences in the doctrine used for defending or assaulting fortified positions?

[Urmel]

The extension is a strawman. Read my posts. I do outline the roles they could play.

[Brevity]

First, there was no such thing like a "pure" infantry in the desert, we're talking about combined-arms groups with tons of supporting weapons.

That said, there was plenty to do for the infantry. Holding static lines (eg. frontier line and ring around Tobruk) alone required 6 divisions or so.

Germans typically employed infantry to follow the tanks and mop up the captured area. Totensonntag turned out to be a mass suicide but in several other cases (22 and 30 Nov, 1 and 15 Dec 1941) this actually worked well, with just 2 battalions involved or less.

Various operations undertaken by DAK in Crusader purely with infantry were invariably a failure, which suggests that the method was wrong. In comparison to the tanks, the infantry certainly lacked the striking power. The New Zealand Division did succeed in linking with Tobruk, but it took a few days of very bloody battles (breaking thru successive battalion-size strongpoints) and a single Panzer Division could have achieved the same in one day with only small losses.

On the other hand , the infantry was capable of defending the area, and was in position to deal crippling losses to the tanks, even if it was ultimately overrun. Certainly, the sacrifice of 3 Commonwealth Infantry Brigades (5 SA, 4 and 6 NZ) in late 1941 won the battle and they inflicted more damage than all British tanks combined.

The key was to compel the enemy to actually attack. How to do that? Well one guy that had some clue was Norrie, who "took the sensible view that he should proceed at the outset to occupy ground too vital for the enemy to ignore". In that he was right and it's unfortunate that British didn't begin the battle with overrunning approaches to Tobruk with even more infantry!

TLDR The sad conclusion is that infantry was best used as a cannon fodder, to be smashed by tanks, but not before taking out some of them.

[Urmel]

That said, there was plenty to do for the infantry. Holding static lines (eg. frontier line and ring around Tobruk) alone required 6 divisions or so.

1.3 divisions on the Allied side. Being generous, the equivalent of 2 divisions on the Axis side (Italian divisions counting as 1.5 Brigades, roughly). So far from 6 divisions. Given its length, the Tobruk encirclement ring was actually quite lightly covered by infantry. There was a bucketload of artillery though.

Germans typically employed infantry to follow the tanks and mop up the captured area. Totensonntag turned out to be a mass suicide but in several other cases (22 and 30 Nov, 1 and 15 Dec 1941) this actually worked well, with just 2 battalions involved or less.

I think the infantry was neither here nor there on 1 December and 15 December. What was different in these battles was that there was far more artillery, especially heavy artillery present on 1 December, and that the defender had been severely attrited. The artillery and the tanks combined to beat the infantry and artillery on Zaafran. In the case of the Buffs being overrun, it was a well executed envelopment attack relying again primarily on tanks and guns.

Various operations undertaken by DAK in Crusader purely with infantry were invariably a failure, which suggests that the method was wrong. In comparison to the tanks, the infantry certainly lacked the striking power.

Not sure about various. I'd probably start the sentence with 'All' instead of 'Various'.

The New Zealand Division did succeed in linking with Tobruk, but it took a few days of very bloody battles (breaking thru successive battalion-size strongpoints) and a single Panzer Division could have achieved the same in one day with only small losses.

That's rather my point. Also, the New Zealanders brought tank support and attacked infantry which, albeit dug in and therefore more difficult to dislodge, was not supported by tanks.

On the other hand , the infantry was capable of defending the area, and was in position to deal crippling losses to the tanks, even if it was ultimately overrun. Certainly, the sacrifice of 3 Commonwealth Infantry Brigades (5 SA, 4 and 6 NZ) in late 1941 won the battle and they inflicted more damage than all British tanks combined.

I think that is a complete misreading of two things. 1) the infantry in all three cases you mention was clearly not capable of defending an area, they were overrun in half a day (5 S.A.) or two-three days (4/6 N.Z.). 2) It wasn't the infantry that dealt the crippling losses to the tanks. It was the guns. The infantry was neither here nor there. As a thought experiment, imagine Totensonntag with no South African infantry, only guns, or with only a battalion. Would the Germans have fared much better?

The key was to compel the enemy to actually attack. How to do that? Well one guy that had some clue was Norrie, who "took the sensible view that he should proceed at the outset to occupy ground too vital for the enemy to ignore". In that he was right and it's unfortunate that British didn't begin the battle with overrunning approaches to Tobruk with even more infantry!

If they had done that, they would simply have increased their casualty figures by the amount of additional infantry they threw in. If your proposition were that it's unfortunate that British didn't begin the battle with overrunning approaches to Tobruk with a concentrated tank force, supported by additional artillery borrowed from the New Zealanders, you would have a case.

TLDR The sad conclusion is that infantry was best used as a cannon fodder, to be smashed by tanks, but not before taking out some of them.

[/quote]

You're too generous. Infantry hardly took out any tanks. Guns did.

My point remains that infantry had a role in holding static positions with strong gun support, and until relieved by a mobile force. They also had a role in manning smaller columns, and for mopping up. My contention is that they were not needed in the numbers they were present on the mobile battlefield (and as I said, the German analysis of CRUSADER agrees with me), and that there wasn't really a role for them in the mobile battle (they did of course have a key role in attacking static positions).

[Brevity]

That said, there was plenty to do for the infantry. Holding static lines (eg. frontier line and ring around Tobruk) alone required 6 divisions or so.

1.3 divisions on the Allied side. Being generous, the equivalent of 2 divisions on the Axis side (Italian divisions counting as 1.5 Brigades, roughly). So far from 6 divisions. Given its length, the Tobruk encirclement ring was actually quite lightly covered by infantry. There was a bucketload of artillery though.

Umm, infantry was mandatory to hold the front, but only for the side currently forced into defense! British only had 1.3 because Egypt was in no way threatened. I've recounted Axis number and I correct it to 5, counting Italian Division as 0.66 (6 battalions), but note that it was not enough! The frontier line was too short.

Same thing happens in 1942. Rommel holds Gazala front with minor battle groups (few battalions), while British, forced into defense, have 3.3 Divisions in trenches alone and it was not enough.

Germans typically employed infantry to follow the tanks and mop up the captured area. Totensonntag turned out to be a mass suicide but in several other cases (22 and 30 Nov, 1 and 15 Dec 1941) this actually worked well, with just 2 battalions involved or less.

I think the infantry was neither here nor there on 1 December and 15 December. What was different in these battles was that there was far more artillery, especially heavy artillery present on 1 December, and that the defender had been severely attrited. The artillery and the tanks combined to beat the infantry and artillery on Zaafran. In the case of the Buffs being overrun, it was a well executed envelopment attack relying again primarily on tanks and guns.

Infantry was there in both cases (apparently M.G.2 and K15). I do not disagree their role was minor, but they mopped up the area and took over the defense, freeing up the tanks. The losses of M.G.2 on 1 Dec were 16 killed and 37 wounded, which is to be compared against hundreds of prisoners taken (Fd Rgt smashed and inf Bn captured). Let's assume it was typical. Losing 50 men to eliminate enemy infantry battalion isn't a bad trade, at all.

[Urmel]

That said, there was plenty to do for the infantry. Holding static lines (eg. frontier line and ring around Tobruk) alone required 6 divisions or so.

1.3 divisions on the Allied side. Being generous, the equivalent of 2 divisions on the Axis side (Italian divisions counting as 1.5 Brigades, roughly). So far from 6 divisions. Given its length, the Tobruk encirclement ring was actually quite lightly covered by infantry. There was a bucketload of artillery though.

Umm, infantry was mandatory to hold the front, but only for the side currently forced into defense! British only had 1.3 because Egypt was in no way threatened. I've recounted Axis number and I correct it to 5, counting Italian Division as 0.66 (6 battalions), but note that it was not enough! The frontier line was too short.

Brescia, Pavia, Bologna, Trento. 4x0.66 = 2.64 The frontier line also wasn't too short, unless you wanted to extend it to Tobruk there would always be a gap.

Same thing happens in 1942. Rommel holds Gazala front with minor battle groups (few battalions), while British, forced into defense, have 3.3 Divisions in trenches alone and it was not enough.

Your conclusion is wrong. It was too much, not 'not enough'. The Gazala line did not fail because of a lack of infantry, it failed because of a lack or lack of competence of the mobile forces. If the armoured divisions had had their act together, the line could have been held with far less infantry.

Germans typically employed infantry to follow the tanks and mop up the captured area. Totensonntag turned out to be a mass suicide but in several other cases (22 and 30 Nov, 1 and 15 Dec 1941) this actually worked well, with just 2 battalions involved or less.

I think the infantry was neither here nor there on 1 December and 15 December. What was different in these battles was that there was far more artillery, especially heavy artillery present on 1 December, and that the defender had been severely attrited. The artillery and the tanks combined to beat the infantry and artillery on Zaafran. In the case of the Buffs being overrun, it was a well executed envelopment attack relying again primarily on tanks and guns.

Infantry was there in both cases (apparently M.G.2 and K15). I do not disagree their role was minor, but they mopped up the area and took over the defense, freeing up the tanks. The losses of M.G.2 on 1 Dec were 16 killed and 37 wounded, which is to be compared against hundreds of prisoners taken (Fd Rgt smashed and inf Bn captured). Let's assume it was typical. Losing 50 men to eliminate enemy infantry battalion isn't a bad trade, at all.

But the infantry did not smash the field regiment and the infantry. In any case, it rather makes my point that the role in battle was very limited. By all means add 'mopping up a defeated enemy' to 'small columns' and 'holding a defensive line'. They're still not the queen of the battlefield.

[Brevity]

On the other hand , the infantry was capable of defending the area, and was in position to deal crippling losses to the tanks, even if it was ultimately overrun. Certainly, the sacrifice of 3 Commonwealth Infantry Brigades (5 SA, 4 and 6 NZ) in late 1941 won the battle and they inflicted more damage than all British tanks combined.

I think that is a complete misreading of two things. 1) the infantry in all three cases you mention was clearly not capable of defending an area, they were overrun in half a day (5 S.A.) or two-three days (4/6 N.Z.).

Each one of these cases includes massive attacks of all German tanks with all the support including siege artillery, each barely succeeded and with heavy losses. Yes the guns did all the damage, but they didn't operate on their own, right? The guns were an integral part of infantry divisions.

You're too generous. Infantry hardly took out any tanks. Guns did.
2) It wasn't the infantry that dealt the crippling losses to the tanks. It was the guns. The infantry was neither here nor there. As a thought experiment, imagine Totensonntag with no South African infantry, only guns, or with only a battalion. Would the Germans have fared much better?

This is exactly the core of the problem.
The mere presense of own infantry FORCED the S.A. artillery to stay there and shoot. They had no choice but to fight to the last defending their own men. That's how they knocked out so many Panzers. Same story with NZ Field Regiment.

If there was no infantry at Totensonntag, then there was no reason to fight battle, at all. The Panzer columns approaching were enormous, There was a danger of being cut off. The ground was unimportant, thats what the manuals said.
The whole group would have been evacuated on the first sight of Cruewell's outflanking maneuver.

After that, they would form their famous Joke Columns and start roaming all over the desert, chasing supply convoys. You know how it ended up.

[Brevity]

That said, there was plenty to do for the infantry. Holding static lines (eg. frontier line and ring around Tobruk) alone required 6 divisions or so.

1.3 divisions on the Allied side. Being generous, the equivalent of 2 divisions on the Axis side (Italian divisions counting as 1.5 Brigades, roughly). So far from 6 divisions. Given its length, the Tobruk encirclement ring was actually quite lightly covered by infantry. There was a bucketload of artillery though.

Umm, infantry was mandatory to hold the front, but only for the side currently forced into defense! British only had 1.3 because Egypt was in no way threatened. I've recounted Axis number and I correct it to 5, counting Italian Division as 0.66 (6 battalions), but note that it was not enough! The frontier line was too short.

Brescia, Pavia, Bologna, Trento. 4x0.66 = 2.64 The frontier line also wasn't too short, unless you wanted to extend it to Tobruk there would always be a gap.

You forget Savona division + I./104 + oasen battalion, also 15 Schuetzen Brigade stuck for months at Medauar. Also what about Division zbV? Some battalions arrived in June, attack on Tobruk was to occur in November. What other role could they fulfill, having no transport?

Same thing happens in 1942. Rommel holds Gazala front with minor battle groups (few battalions), while British, forced into defense, have 3.3 Divisions in trenches alone and it was not enough.

Your conclusion is wrong. It was too much, not 'not enough'. The Gazala line did not fail because of a lack of infantry, it failed because of a lack or lack of competence of the mobile forces. If the armoured divisions had had their act together, the line could have been held with far less infantry.

But the lack of competence was prevalent and there was no easy way to fix it.

The defense lines like Gazala or Frontier line were immune and they were never captured, always outflanked. Capturing a single strongpoint required an inhuman effort, capturing all was impossible. Every extra mile of the line means a) 2 miles longer outflanking maneuver, giving more time to react; b) 2 miles longer way for the following supply columns. The benefits were enormous.