The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Urmel.
I thought that only the 2nd Kompanie of 606 was lost, and that the 1st & 3rd were present at that time?
Best wishes,
David.
I thought that only the 2nd Kompanie of 606 was lost, and that the 1st & 3rd were present at that time?
Best wishes,
David.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Well not unless they levitated from Tripoli or took witches' broomsticks to cover the distance. They were unloaded from the damaged Ruhr on 31 March, I would suspect them to take 4-7 days to make it to the frontline, just like I./Flak 18.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
That's one way. But requires precise information on losses. Always tricky.Urmel wrote:On the question of cruisers in Tobruk, this should be possible to figure out.
1) Number of cruisers present in September when 32 A.T.B. was established
2) MINUS Number of cruisers arrived with 1 R.T.R. in April
3) MINUS Number of cruisers that reached Tobruk with remnants of 5 R.T.R.
4) PLUS Number of cruisers lost at Tobruk between April and September.
1-4 should give as a result how many of the 26 cruisers in AOW in Tobruk were actually repairable.
However, 1RTR WD offers some detail as of 5/6/41 for tanks in Tobruk. This can be summarised as:-
26 Light tank
6 A9
9 A10
13 A13
18 A12 Infantry
Now, 1RTR itself arrived 7 April with 10 A9, 1 A10 and 18 light tanks and 22 A12s were shipped in during April. 2 A13s from 5RTR made it back to Tobruk as well as 1 light tank. Allegedly, there were 18 light tanks and 26 cruisers already there in AOD.
Of those 26 cruisers, at least 11 must have been A13s and 8 A10s. I say "at least" given the losses incurred over during the 7-8 weeks prior to this WD entry. For every A10 or A13 lost during the period, add that to the 11/8 totals. I suspect, as previously posted, 4 of the 'unknown' 7 were also A13s previously from 5RTR/3ArmdBde that didn't make it further than el Adem. In effect, it seems AOD got (almost) all back into fighting shape.
This analysis goes out the window if there is evidence of additonal crusisers being shipped into Tobruk during this time.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Gooner.
Pertinent to the post above, 5, 71 & 227 ccc didn't join Brescia until April 1941.
Pertinent to the post above, 5, 71 & 227 ccc didn't join Brescia until April 1941.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
OK My post made at about 12.10 has disappeared!
In essence it said that I had stupidly thought that this conversation was taking place in the beginning of April, and not on 31/03/41 specifically. (my mistake) and that as a result, some more of the Brescia O.B is questionable. And the two Kompanies of 606 would still be in Tripoli.
In essence it said that I had stupidly thought that this conversation was taking place in the beginning of April, and not on 31/03/41 specifically. (my mistake) and that as a result, some more of the Brescia O.B is questionable. And the two Kompanies of 606 would still be in Tripoli.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Adding to my post earlier, the following is an excerpt from Peter Brown's A9 article...
It notes at least 3 A10s lost prior to the 1RTR WD entry. That gives us a total of 11 A13s and 11 A10s accounted for from the 26 cruisers allegedly in Tobruk. If my suggestion that there were a total of 15 A13s, that's all now accounted for.
It notes at least 3 A10s lost prior to the 1RTR WD entry. That gives us a total of 11 A13s and 11 A10s accounted for from the 26 cruisers allegedly in Tobruk. If my suggestion that there were a total of 15 A13s, that's all now accounted for.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
By mid-October they had 28 cruisers in total in Tobruk.
http://rommelsriposte.com/2010/11/30/no ... -breakout/
I somehow don't think additional cruisers were sent by sea, so the difference between the 23 cruisers on 15 May in your account, and the 28 in mid-October, would have been rebuilds from AOW. But that's just me guessing.
http://rommelsriposte.com/2010/11/30/no ... -breakout/
I somehow don't think additional cruisers were sent by sea, so the difference between the 23 cruisers on 15 May in your account, and the 28 in mid-October, would have been rebuilds from AOW. But that's just me guessing.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Hello Urmel
The 1RTR WD entry for 5/6/1941 gives a total of 28 (which includes those in AOD). This suggests 11 were written off during the April and May battles. It further suggests no further write-offs up to your mid-October information.
In respect of cruisers, the only puzzle left (for me) is what happened to the cruisers that were part of 2 Armoured Div HQ? Did they take any forward into Cyrenaica? There seems to be no definitive answer to this with evidence being most contradictory.
The AustOH states that 39 cruisers were in Tobruk by the 7/8th April. This number seems to be credible. That 39 is formed as follows: 26 within the AOD Tobruk, 11 arrived with 1RTR and 2 stragglers from 5RTR.Urmel wrote:By mid-October they had 28 cruisers in total in Tobruk.
http://rommelsriposte.com/2010/11/30/no ... -breakout/
I somehow don't think additional cruisers were sent by sea, so the difference between the 23 cruisers on 15 May in your account, and the 28 in mid-October, would have been rebuilds from AOW. But that's just me guessing.
The 1RTR WD entry for 5/6/1941 gives a total of 28 (which includes those in AOD). This suggests 11 were written off during the April and May battles. It further suggests no further write-offs up to your mid-October information.
In respect of cruisers, the only puzzle left (for me) is what happened to the cruisers that were part of 2 Armoured Div HQ? Did they take any forward into Cyrenaica? There seems to be no definitive answer to this with evidence being most contradictory.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Hi Mark
I don't think that 39 cruisers present is the same as 'operational', and I doubt that all of the 26 in AOW were repairable. Losses of cruisers in the April/May battles seem to have been quite low, and are documented in the 1 RTR war diary. I don't think they lost 11 cruisers in those battles, but happy to be corrected.
I don't think that 39 cruisers present is the same as 'operational', and I doubt that all of the 26 in AOW were repairable. Losses of cruisers in the April/May battles seem to have been quite low, and are documented in the 1 RTR war diary. I don't think they lost 11 cruisers in those battles, but happy to be corrected.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Hi Urmel,
However, the 1RTR WD entry of 5/6/41 specifically states that of the 28 total, 21 were in use, 2 were in LAD and 5 in AOW. It doesn't specify whether those 5 in AOW had ever been in use, but since 2 were A9s, at least they must have been, since they came with 1RTR. The breakdown of the 28 is 6 A9, 9 A10 and 13 A13.
Now, consider this. The Peter Brown excerpt above details 1RTR losses and has a total of 5: 1 A9, 3 A10 and 1 unknown. It does not detail the actions and losses of the composite 3H/5RTR efforts 9-18 April. Also note that the 1RTR WD entry of 5/6/41 shows only 6 A9 remaining from the 10 which arrived. In effect, the details of losses are incomplete but, from what is available, we have at least 7, possibly 8 accounted for. So thats only 3 or 4 losses missing and we don't know how many 3H/5RTR lost.
Another way of looking at it is that 1RTR WD entry of 5/6/41 notes 9 A10s of which 2 are in AOW. 3 have already been written off (w/o) up to this date for a total of 12 examples. 1 came with 1RTR, the other 11 started off in AOD Tobruk. Even of the 2 in AOW in June have never been serviceable, it means 9 out of the 11 were. Applying the same logic to the A13s gives us a minimum of 10 brought back to service.
To cut a long story short, even with broken data, we can account for a minimum of 19 (out of 26) getting back into service - but potentially all of them.
Only 4 of the 26 were immediatly available for use.Urmel wrote: I don't think that 39 cruisers present is the same as 'operational', and I doubt that all of the 26 in AOW were repairable. Losses of cruisers in the April/May battles seem to have been quite low, and are documented in the 1 RTR war diary. I don't think they lost 11 cruisers in those battles, but happy to be corrected.
However, the 1RTR WD entry of 5/6/41 specifically states that of the 28 total, 21 were in use, 2 were in LAD and 5 in AOW. It doesn't specify whether those 5 in AOW had ever been in use, but since 2 were A9s, at least they must have been, since they came with 1RTR. The breakdown of the 28 is 6 A9, 9 A10 and 13 A13.
Now, consider this. The Peter Brown excerpt above details 1RTR losses and has a total of 5: 1 A9, 3 A10 and 1 unknown. It does not detail the actions and losses of the composite 3H/5RTR efforts 9-18 April. Also note that the 1RTR WD entry of 5/6/41 shows only 6 A9 remaining from the 10 which arrived. In effect, the details of losses are incomplete but, from what is available, we have at least 7, possibly 8 accounted for. So thats only 3 or 4 losses missing and we don't know how many 3H/5RTR lost.
Another way of looking at it is that 1RTR WD entry of 5/6/41 notes 9 A10s of which 2 are in AOW. 3 have already been written off (w/o) up to this date for a total of 12 examples. 1 came with 1RTR, the other 11 started off in AOD Tobruk. Even of the 2 in AOW in June have never been serviceable, it means 9 out of the 11 were. Applying the same logic to the A13s gives us a minimum of 10 brought back to service.
To cut a long story short, even with broken data, we can account for a minimum of 19 (out of 26) getting back into service - but potentially all of them.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Gents,
A little more information (again from WO169/952) about the concern generated by the state of 5 RTR's cruisers:
"SECRET
CIPHER MESSAGE
OUT
To: CYRCOM 23/2
From: MIDEAST T.O.O. 1100 G.M.T.
Originators No. AFV/43580
Cruiser tanks of 5 R.T.R. must be restricted to a 100 (100) miles a month running until further notice.
Ciphers:
The above message is to be enciphered.
Sgd.
G.W. Richards
Lieut. Colonel.
General Staff
Distribution:
DCGS
G(O)
G(SD)
OS"
Regards
Tom
A little more information (again from WO169/952) about the concern generated by the state of 5 RTR's cruisers:
"SECRET
CIPHER MESSAGE
OUT
To: CYRCOM 23/2
From: MIDEAST T.O.O. 1100 G.M.T.
Originators No. AFV/43580
Cruiser tanks of 5 R.T.R. must be restricted to a 100 (100) miles a month running until further notice.
Ciphers:
The above message is to be enciphered.
Sgd.
G.W. Richards
Lieut. Colonel.
General Staff
Distribution:
DCGS
G(O)
G(SD)
OS"
Regards
Tom
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Uh, this thread is about the battle of Mersa el Brega. Those listings were, give or take a few minor units, of the forces available to take part in the battle of Mersa el Brega.MarkN wrote: Nope. An honest and undistorted analysis of the opposing forces would be appreciated.
Your list of axis units represents the force put together for the entire campaign to take the whole of Cyrenaica. A campaign which, despite some tactical brilliance on the part of Rommel, failed! CYRCOM, with a bit of reinforcement, held Tobruk despite Rommel receiving reinforcement too. Of all the objectives in Cyrenaica, Tobruk was the key.
Your list of allied units represents only the forward element of CYRCOM for the defence of Mersa Brega area and the manouvering of forces south of Antelat. It completely ignores the very units which lead to Rommel's failure.
It is this deliberate attempt to distort the analysis which leads to wrong conclusions and thus the wrong lessons taught and supposedly learned.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Hi Gooner,
Whereas Neame had the authority to deploy all his forces as he saw fit. It was his choice not to involve 9 Aust or 3 Ind in the fight forward.
Brescia and Ariete only became "available" in a combat role a couple of days later when Rommel 'lied' to his Italian superiors about his orders from Berlin.
But that's not true. Brescia and Ariete were not "available" for the assault on Mersa Brega; Rommel only had authority (at that time) for 'aggressive recce'. Had 5.leichte been given a bit of a mauling, Brescia and Ariete would not have been released by his Italian commanders.Gooner1 wrote: Uh, this thread is about the battle of Mersa el Brega. Those listings were, give or take a few minor units, of the forces available to take part in the battle of Mersa el Brega.
Whereas Neame had the authority to deploy all his forces as he saw fit. It was his choice not to involve 9 Aust or 3 Ind in the fight forward.
Brescia and Ariete only became "available" in a combat role a couple of days later when Rommel 'lied' to his Italian superiors about his orders from Berlin.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Ariete was under command of DAK since 7th March, and Gariboldi had approved the attack on Mersa Brega but no further advance without his consent.MarkN wrote:Hi Gooner,
But that's not true. Brescia and Ariete were not "available" for the assault on Mersa Brega; Rommel only had authority (at that time) for 'aggressive recce'. Had 5.leichte been given a bit of a mauling, Brescia and Ariete would not have been released by his Italian commanders.
Whereas Neame had the authority to deploy all his forces as he saw fit. It was his choice not to involve 9 Aust or 3 Ind in the fight forward.
Brescia and Ariete only became "available" in a combat role a couple of days later when Rommel 'lied' to his Italian superiors about his orders from Berlin.
3rd Indian Brigade only arrived at El Adem on 29th March and was anyway without artillery or anti-tank guns. 9th Australian Division was chronically short of transport and was also lacking artillery.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
Hi,
A little more re the state of 2nd Armoured Division (again WO169/952) this time from a letter from John Bond A.F.V.1 in War Office on 2nd Jan 41 to Col Richards in GHQ, ME:
Regards
Tom
A little more re the state of 2nd Armoured Division (again WO169/952) this time from a letter from John Bond A.F.V.1 in War Office on 2nd Jan 41 to Col Richards in GHQ, ME:
So we have more evidence of the British trying to extract lessons from current operations - but also off the "highly unsatisfactory" spares position...We badly need as much precise information as you can give us of the experience gained from recent operations – particularly in regard to the performances and causes of mechanical failure of the various Marks of A.F.V. engaged. Full information in regard to enemy A.F.Vs and of our own and their tactics supplementing the notes sent with your letter of 10th December will also be appreciated. I think the General feels it is a pity that General Tilly felt it necessary on his arrival to lay such emphasis on the known defects of A.9 and A.10 tracks etc.
We knew the position before he left this country.
Everything possible was in the time available done to overhaul his tanks and the pot was scraped to provide as high a proportion of spares as could be got from meagre stocks.
We diverted the whole of the Australian Box track production to the M.E. and as General Tilly knew no other source was available.
Admittedly the spares position is highly unsatisfactory and we are attacking all the time, but at least the 2nd Armoured Division was better equipped than the poor old 7th Armoured Division and they seem to have done their stuff alright!
Regards
Tom