Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

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ClintHardware
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Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#1

Post by ClintHardware » 25 Apr 2015, 11:34

Hi All

I found the attached in the 8th Field Regiment War Diary and it gives a decent amount of background detail to BATTLEAXE and indirectly to other fighting up to BATTLEAXE in terms of tactics, equipment re-supply as well as ammunition and the lack of effect of indirect 25 Pdr HE fire against panzers.

Two things I found immediately interesting were:
1) the problems mentioned in respect of the portees being used by 65th A/Tk Regt because 3rd RHA had been fighting from their own portees on many occasions since 31st March 1941 so perhaps the 65th had different version of vehicle although I can't imagine what it might have been if that is the case.
2) The quite calm reference to the high velocity gun thought to be a type of AA being used against British tanks. I was surprised this was not of more concern but perhaps this was because the author was not a member of a tank crew but a Brigadier C.R.A. (i.e.the role of rather than the rank of) for 4th Indian Division or so it seems from the text. I could not make out his signature at the foot of the document please let me know who he might have been if you know.
Battleaxe Artillery Analysis.pdf
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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#2

Post by Urmel » 07 May 2015, 13:27

Good stuff, thanks for posting it.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42


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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#3

Post by ClintHardware » 07 May 2015, 18:30

Your welcome Urmel
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David W
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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#4

Post by David W » 08 May 2015, 08:01

Thank you

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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#5

Post by Sheldrake » 08 May 2015, 10:46

Probably written by Brigadier Mirlees. He had been CRA during the attacks six months earlier on the Italian Forts. Beresford-Pierce who led the Battleaxe operation was himself a gunner and had been CRA then GOC 4th Indian Division. Shelford Bidwell in Gunners at War praised BP as a brillian t trainer.

It reflects the view current in the Western Desert at the time that it was German tanks which caused the tank casualties, hence the limited attention paid to the AA guns. Battleaxe was fought with the British Armour convinced that the key was tank v tank combat and that artillery support could not be used nor was necessary. These may have been the false lessons from the 21 May 1940 counter attack. The bulk of the report is about how you cannot get the best from artillery without vehicles and communications.

There is also the claim that more German tanks could have been knocked out had the Britrish armour exercised greater fire discipline and waited until the germans came into effective range. Bidwell quotes a splendid account from the same battle by a gun sergeant in 31 Field Regiment whose battery waited until the advancing armour was within 1,000 yards and knocked out 11 tanks before withdrawing.

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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#6

Post by Andy H » 09 May 2015, 11:09

Hi Clint

Thanks for posting the link, very interesting.

Pt 8a, where the ammunition supply was described as a failure is of interest to me.
The CRA states that the system would have been adequate against Italian opposition, but
was found to be inadequate against German forces. In light of this comment, were there
changes made in ammunition supply systems for future operations predominately against
German forces?

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Andy H

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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#7

Post by David W » 09 May 2015, 12:59

Thanks for posting.

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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#8

Post by ClintHardware » 12 May 2015, 10:55

Hi Andy - Glad it was of interest. I do not know the answer to your question but it is very likely as this is a Brig C.R.A. and he could change the organisation within his division at least. I am constantly looking out for this sort of technical information so future research might be forthcoming on giving an answer.

Hi Sheldrake - thanks for the suggestion - it does seem to fit his signature in terms of the leading letter which could be an M although if so the last e and s becomes a fast written curving line away from a previous e. However, I think you are probably right. Ta.

I think this might be Bidwell's quote:
Regimental Sergeant-Major R. T. Bowery, 31st Field Regiment R.A.
We were on the escarpment west of Capuzzo, moving west in desert formation with the troop commander some 2000 yards ahead of us. It was hot and dusty standing up in my Quad keeping one eye on the troop leader and the other watching for Stukas. Suddenly out of the haze came the troop commander flat out flying the Tank Alert signal. We did a 180 turn and came into action fast. Out came the ammunition from the limber, H.E., as we had no armour piercing shot, and we quickly filled the empty ammo boxes with sand and built a wall under the gun shield. The Quads went off to the rear.

Soon we could see something moving in the heat haze but our drill was very strict, all the detachments lay down and kept still. The layer” [the No.3 of the six man crew] “put on 600 and zero deflection, levelled the piece and lay down too. I alone kept my head up to watch. Then there they were. Five tanks about 1000 yards in front. I started to count, Mark IIIs and Mark IVs by the look of them until it got to 18. They moved very slowly, and at last when they were about 800 yards away they began to shoot, machine guns mostly, and the odd shell, but at the Quads in the rear. I saw one begin to burn and hoped it wasn’t mine. They came on very, very slowly; their fire now coming into the gun-line and becoming quite severe. The men wanted to shoot back, and I had to speak to them to make them lie still. 800. 700. They crept closer.

I remember the tanks at practice before the war, flying back and forth at high speed. I picked my tank and moved the gun a trifle to cover it. “600! Engage!” shouts the troop commander. “Take Post!” Up jumps the detachment “Tank front, 600”, I order. “600 set” calls the layer and “On!” “Fire!” All six guns in our troop fired almost at once. When we could see again through the dust, we had kicked up there were four tanks burning. One tank charged Number One gun but three of us engaged him and he didn’t get far. They slugged it out for about ten minutes and then backed away still shooting. Eleven tanks were wrecked or burning, but we hadn’t time to talk about it. Orders came to limber up, and we were off again, listening to the small arms ammo exploding in the tanks as we went past.

End Quote

We know the 88 was a major problem but have we subsequently placed too much emphasis upon it? I don't know the answer to this but I am going to keep looking and report whatever I can find one way or the other. How many rounds per minute could an 88 get off? I did calculate that Wittmann's Tiger at Villers Bocage took about 9 seconds to fire a subsequent round but I don't recall how I worked that out. Clearly an 88 Flak would have more room to organise the crew but the speed would have been dictated by the recoil and the run up (I think the Americans call it "return to battery").

Were you a Sheldrake in the past? I always liked that voice procedure reference.
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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#9

Post by Urmel » 12 May 2015, 11:25

The 88 was over-emphasised as a problem. The normal ATGs (5cm Pak38 and Italian 47/32) did sufficient execution on the cruiser tanks.

Theoretical ROF seems to have been 15-20 rounds. Practical probably less.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#10

Post by Sheldrake » 23 May 2015, 13:42

ClintHardware wrote:
I think this might be Bidwell's quote:
Regimental Sergeant-Major R. T. Bowery, 31st Field Regiment R.A.
We were on the escarpment west of Capuzzo, moving west in desert formation with the troop commander some 2000 yards ahead of us. It was hot and dusty standing up in my Quad keeping one eye on the troop leader and the other watching for Stukas. Suddenly out of the haze came the troop commander flat out flying the Tank Alert signal. We did a 180 turn and came into action fast. Out came the ammunition from the limber, H.E., as we had no armour piercing shot, and we quickly filled the empty ammo boxes with sand and built a wall under the gun shield. The Quads went off to the rear.

Soon we could see something moving in the heat haze but our drill was very strict, all the detachments lay down and kept still. The layer” [the No.3 of the six man crew] “put on 600 and zero deflection, levelled the piece and lay down too. I alone kept my head up to watch. Then there they were. Five tanks about 1000 yards in front. I started to count, Mark IIIs and Mark IVs by the look of them until it got to 18. They moved very slowly, and at last when they were about 800 yards away they began to shoot, machine guns mostly, and the odd shell, but at the Quads in the rear. I saw one begin to burn and hoped it wasn’t mine. They came on very, very slowly; their fire now coming into the gun-line and becoming quite severe. The men wanted to shoot back, and I had to speak to them to make them lie still. 800. 700. They crept closer.

I remember the tanks at practice before the war, flying back and forth at high speed. I picked my tank and moved the gun a trifle to cover it. “600! Engage!” shouts the troop commander. “Take Post!” Up jumps the detachment “Tank front, 600”, I order. “600 set” calls the layer and “On!” “Fire!” All six guns in our troop fired almost at once. When we could see again through the dust, we had kicked up there were four tanks burning. One tank charged Number One gun but three of us engaged him and he didn’t get far. They slugged it out for about ten minutes and then backed away still shooting. Eleven tanks were wrecked or burning, but we hadn’t time to talk about it. Orders came to limber up, and we were off again, listening to the small arms ammo exploding in the tanks as we went past.

End Quote

We know the 88 was a major problem but have we subsequently placed too much emphasis upon it? I don't know the answer to this but I am going to keep looking and report whatever I can find one way or the other. How many rounds per minute could an 88 get off? I did calculate that Wittmann's Tiger at Villers Bocage took about 9 seconds to fire a subsequent round but I don't recall how I worked that out. Clearly an 88 Flak would have more room to organise the crew but the speed would have been dictated by the recoil and the run up (I think the Americans call it "return to battery").

Were you a Sheldrake in the past? I always liked that voice procedure reference.
That is the Bidwell quote. makes one proud to be a gunner ;) In the same chapter Bidwell wrote about the demolition of Rommel's first attack on Tobruk, a model of all arms co-operation. Which also answers your last question. If you follow the links in my signature you will see who I am and what i do. My Blog is a bit of a give away too: www.theobservationpost.com A couple of years ago 42 (Alem Hamza) battery, the last unit in the British Army to wear the red shitehawk was about to be placed in suspended animation. I was the historian with them to Flanders and Normandy. Libya was off limits but we could look at air observation and their actions in WW1.


The 88 was too high to be survivable as an anti tank gun. It was invaluable in the western desert because the British armour was obsessed with the tank v tank battle and did not pay enough attention to the threat posed by anti tank artillery. It lacked tanks with a useful HE round and the British were going through the phase of decentralising artillery to brigade groups, which made it difficult to concentrate fire at tany critical point, where, say ten different targets might need to be suppressed.

I suspect the limiting factor in rate of fire might have been the time for any dust to clear. There should not be any need for an 88mm gun to " run up" it had an efficient recoil system and was usually deployed on a cruciform platform. The recoil system of most C 20th field artillery was designed to ensure that the gun returned to its initial position and minimise the need to relay between each round.

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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#11

Post by MarkN » 17 Oct 2017, 14:13

ClintHardware wrote: We know the 88 was a major problem but have we subsequently placed too much emphasis upon it? I don't know the answer to this but I am going to keep looking and report whatever I can find one way or the other. How many rounds per minute could an 88 get off?
A huge quantity of German documentation was captured by the British during Op CRUSADER. A small quantity of that documentation still remains today. However, the majority of it appears to have been destroyed by ME Command more effectively than the great Potsdam fire.... Nevertheless, those documents were read and analysed before destruction and some of the content was reproduced in condensed, summarised and translated form. Some of this was disseminated to units through Int Summs etc.

There exists a 26 page analysis/write up entitled "The Development of German Defensive Practice in Libya". It comes in 8 instalments. Here is page 1 to give you a flavour of the contents.
Image

The 4th instalment concerns Op BATTLEAXE. Here is the header to this instalment of 5 pages.
Image

As part of the general introduction...
Image

Specific to the defence of Point 208...
Image

The final concluding paragraph of the 4th instalment....
Image


There are many references to the 'battle-winning' efforts of I./Flak.33. What I have posted above is just a couple of extracts to highlight how the Germans themselves saw the 88mm flak's effort.

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Re: Operation BATTLEAXE Artillery Analysis

#12

Post by David W » 18 Oct 2017, 07:38

Nice find. Thanks for posting.

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