The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

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MarkN
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#286

Post by MarkN » 22 May 2015, 12:50

Not really David. It is the comparison to the efforts of the BEF that show up Neame and Gambier-Parry in such a bad light.

After the pantser divisions had broken through the French lines, they had a clear run to the channel - except for the BEF LoC troops who were in no fit state to stop them. But they tried. In particular 12th Infantry Division took a hammering. Remember, this was a division sent out for labour duties and were short of rifles let alone anti-tank and artillery support. And tanks? You're having a laugh. Nevertheless, they did their best and stood their ground to buy time for the rest of the army. They got hammered, but they tried.

On the otherhand, Neame, Gambier-Parry and legions of historical apologists, seem to feel that 2nd Armoured Division were right to turn tail because their tanks were a bit knackered regardless of the consequences to the strategic position. They didn't get hammered, because they didn't try. They lost the majority of their tanks during flight not combat.

Later, the bulk of the BEF having been outflanked, all available hands were pulled together to set up the Canal Line. Various adhoc formations formed in the nick of time to protect the withdrawal of their fellow troops. And how many tanks did they have to face the pantser divisions?

When CYRCOM had been outflanked, and 2nd Armoured Division were ordered to Mechili to perform a similar task. Instead of thinking of the bigger picture, Rimington and Latham took their troops off in the opposite direction to save themselves, and thus leaving the 2 Indian motor regiments and attached forces to their peril.


Now, since we have the benefit of hindsight, we have the opportunity to look at it with far more accurate and detailed information. It is clear that 2nd Armoured Division, despite all their complaints of lack of equipment and poor state, were in a FAR better position to hold their ground than many of the BEF formations. Moreover, we know that had 5.leichte been given a really bloody nose at Mersa Brega or Agedabia, he would have been halted by both the Italian and German high command.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#287

Post by Urmel » 22 May 2015, 12:53

Gooner1 wrote:The Axis 'won' simply because they had the 'stronger fleet', as the British would in December 1941 and the Axis again in January 1942.
The Axis did not have a significantly stronger fleet in January 1942, and more to the point, it defeated the British tank fleet with an inferior one. The battle at Saunnu and pursuit to Mechili was carried out by D.A.K. alone, which did not field more than 97 tanks (of which 15 were Panzer II!) on 20 January, compared to over 130 on the British side.

Most of the damage after Saunnu was done without any involvement of the Axis tanks too, once D.A.K. became immobilised at Mechili. The coastal area was cleaned by two battle groups consisting of infantry, artillery, and some armoured cars. The roadblock at Coefia had not a tank within miles of it.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#288

Post by MarkN » 22 May 2015, 12:56

Gooner1 wrote:John Dill, the then CIGS, made a very prescient comment to the War Office on 18th March after visiting Cyreneaica with Wavell:
"between Benghazi and El Agheila there were no infantry positions on which to fight, the ground being open and suitable for armoured action; other things being equal 'the stronger fleet' would win."

The Axis 'won' simply because they had the 'stronger fleet', as the British would in December 1941 and the Axis again in January 1942.
The sad truth was, "other thing [were not] being equal."

Lt Schorm, in his diary entry of 18 March, notes that German intel assumed CYRCOM had 400 tanks. 5.leichte has 155. Nevertheless, Rommel pushed on despite the perceptive words of Dill.

The Axis had a 'push-on' commander who took risks, the British had 'fall-back' commanders who decided to run their AFVs into the ground.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#289

Post by MarkN » 22 May 2015, 14:05

and...

Image

and...

Image

The Germans attack Mechili with just 7 tanks, and it fell.

2nd Armoured Division defended it with a single A13 tank of HQ protection tp and a single 25-pdr of 104RHA because Rimington and Latham had decided to take their brigades off in the opposite direction!

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#290

Post by Gooner1 » 22 May 2015, 16:10

MarkN wrote: The sad truth was, "other thing [were not] being equal."

Lt Schorm, in his diary entry of 18 March, notes that German intel assumed CYRCOM had 400 tanks. 5.leichte has 155. Nevertheless, Rommel pushed on despite the perceptive words of Dill.

The Axis had a 'push-on' commander who took risks, the British had 'fall-back' commanders who decided to run their AFVs into the ground.
The British estimated tanks couldn't fight though.

"General Wavell told General Neame that if attacked he was to fight a delaying action between his forward position and Benghazi. He was not to hesitate to give up ground, if necessary as far as Benghazi, or even to evacuate Benghazi if the situation demanded it. He was to hold on to the high ground above Benghazi as long as possible. He was to conserve his armoured troops as much as possible, because now no reinforcements could be provided before May."

The British could, I suppose, have thrown what little they had into holding Mersa el Brega and hope Rommel lost his nerve ... with the risk that if that failed CYRCOM would be defeated in detail and Tobruk taken on the bounce ..

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#291

Post by MarkN » 22 May 2015, 16:50

Gooner1 wrote:
MarkN wrote: The sad truth was, "other thing [were not] being equal."

Lt Schorm, in his diary entry of 18 March, notes that German intel assumed CYRCOM had 400 tanks. 5.leichte has 155. Nevertheless, Rommel pushed on despite the perceptive words of Dill.

The Axis had a 'push-on' commander who took risks, the British had 'fall-back' commanders who decided to run their AFVs into the ground.
"General Wavell told General Neame that if attacked he was to fight a delaying action between his forward position and Benghazi. He was not to hesitate to give up ground, if necessary as far as Benghazi, or even to evacuate Benghazi if the situation demanded it. He was to hold on to the high ground above Benghazi as long as possible. He was to conserve his armoured troops as much as possible, because now no reinforcements could be provided before May."

The British could, I suppose, have thrown what little they had into holding Mersa el Brega and hope Rommel lost his nerve ... with the risk that if that failed CYRCOM would be defeated in detail and Tobruk taken on the bounce ..
With hindsight, knowing Rommel's limited authority to advance, a stiff response at Mersa Brega and/or Agadabia would probably have caused the Italian and German high command to call a halt to his efforts. But....

Now, the 'plan' that you write of above is precisely the plan that Neame was following. A plan that assumed completely that the Axis would be manouvered up the coast by 2nd Armoured Division. Then, when they reached Benghazi - or before - 2nd Armoured Division would strike at the Axis rear from the desert. Take out Rommel's logistic chain and his front line grinds to a halt.

Unfortunately, Gambier-Parry (and Rimington) decided they weren't up for this and simply legged it after Adegabia leaving the desert wide open.

Moreover, Neame didn't have the intellectual capacity to appreciate that Rommel might not follow the plan that he (Neame) had drawn up and right up until 08.00 on 6 April, he (Neame) was still issuing orders assuming the entire force against him was in and around Benghazi - when in reality the majority of the Axis were east of his HQ!

2nd Armoured Division, which should have been protecting the flanks and desert route, weren't. From 2/3 April onwards, 2nd Armoured Division was a waste of rations - being more hinderance than help. When ordered to Mechili to cover the outflanking movement, the two brigades headed off in the opposite direction and fouled up the withdrawal of 9th Australian Division. Rimington's determination NOT to go to Mechili was so strong, he was not only prepared to disobey the CYRCOM orders to do so, but went out of his way to pull rank on the 6RTR CO to prevent him going there too.

And finally, if conservation of their armoured force was their prime objective, they screwed that up as well as they drove all but 3 surviving tanks into the ground!

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#292

Post by ClintHardware » 23 May 2015, 13:35

1) Late on the 7th April (about 2100 hours) Mechili had been held long enough to cover the Australian flank and the escape through the Italians was planned for the next morning and it was executed as planned. Those at Mechili facing the panzers had either not yet escaped or soon found they could not - and some escaped during the surrender such was the patchy nature of the Axis opposition.
2) The Australian's flank was sufficiently occupied/defended south to Mechili such that nothing of consequence got past it until the 9th because of the actions of CYRCOM. Ponath did not prove physically significant and the capture of the senior officers did not stop CYRCOM or cause its collapse.
3) Conservation of armour? The armour was mechanically worn out close to breakdown before any fighting took place and a 450 mile retreat became necessary. Conservation?? Conservation??

I really am amazed at the blanket accusations of failure banded about so glibly in this topic and with such ease of contempt for persons not known or fully understood.

I shall occasionally review the glib-fest here but will probably not comment further.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#293

Post by MarkN » 24 May 2015, 16:20

ClintHardware wrote:I shall occasionally review the glib-fest here but will probably not comment further.
Given all you other committments, your time and effort is most welcomed and generous. Thank you so much.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#294

Post by ClintHardware » 23 Aug 2015, 09:06

I noticed your kind thoughts back in May and I thought I would leave them there in the open to be appreciated by all. I appreciated them - thank you.

I agree that the attack on Mersa Brega was not a divisional attack and currently I believe that that was the case due to a lack of space to deploy. But there is a bit of a problem here because Leutnant Schorm recalls, in your undeclared 31/3 source, that he was directed to cover the divisional H.Q. on managing to get unstuck in the terrain to the south and return to the Via Balbia.

He says "In the salt lake defile outside MARSA EL BREGA the enemy’s resistance has put a halt to our venture. With both troops I proceed to give cover to Div H.Q. and report to Major RAU."

Schorm states that he went forward to Rau on a motorcycle presumably leaving his panzer covering.

How do we rationalise the presence of the Div H,.Q. needing protection with a reconnaissance in force?
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#295

Post by MarkN » 23 Aug 2015, 13:05

ClintHardware wrote: How do we rationalise the presence of the Div H,.Q. needing protection with a reconnaissance in force?
The Div HQ is providing C3 to the forces in front of Mersa Brega.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#296

Post by Brevity » 23 Aug 2015, 16:45

ClintHardware wrote:How do we rationalise the presence of the Div H,.Q. needing protection with a reconnaissance in force?
Rommel was present as well.

The conclusions are obvious - it was a corps-sized attack !


Don't understand your point thou. I thought the composition of troops is well known by now?

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#297

Post by ClintHardware » 30 Aug 2015, 09:29

Yes Rommel was present ...at least in time to have a natter on the 1st April with Lieutenant Hurst-Brown early in the morning. No one speaks of him earlier at Mersa Brega or do they? And... the natter might have been with Streich because Hurst-Brown did not ask for his name. They got on very well for the few minutes they faced each other.

Let me re-assure you that my comment elsewhere about Rommel not being in Libya during Feb and March really was only leg pull - sorry if I upset anyone. I am sure he was in Libya Feb-March.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#298

Post by Urmel » 26 Nov 2015, 12:03

German forces engaged and combat at Mersa el Brega on 31 March were as follows:

1st wave, morning
Northern battle group to assault position, consisting of 2 heavy SPAT coys (presume of Pzjg 605), one engineer and one light AT coy (presume towed ATG), supported by some heavy AA (presume 88s).
Southern battle group to outflank position and protect deep right flank of northern battle group consisting of reinforced AA3 (no further detail).

2nd wave, no determined time, after 2 attacks of the 1st wave failed due to intense and well placed artillery fire
MG2 and artillery battalion of the division. The former moves left of the defended position through the dunes and along the shore, to throw the enemy. In a counterstrike the enemy loses some of the few Bren carriers they had. Under cover of darkness the enemy retreats.

Enemy losses: 55 dead, wounded, or captured
German losses: 5 dead and 28 wounded

Source: von Taysen, Tobruk 1941, quoting KTB 5. lei. Div./Ia for 31 March 1941, and KTB MG2 for 31 March 1941 (BA-MA RH 37/6478) and Maughan, p. 48ff.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#299

Post by Urmel » 29 Nov 2015, 12:35

Here's an excerpt from a captured map found in the KDG war diary for November/December 1941, map dated 5 March 1941, showing KDG positions (Squadrone Autoblinda) in Agheila and the onward Australian positions in Mersa el Brega and on the Via Balbia towards Agedabia. 'Cant' stands for Casa Cantoniera, road workers house.
Attachments
Agheila 5-3-41.jpg
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#300

Post by David W » 29 Nov 2015, 13:43

Nice one. I wonder from which Italian unit they captured it?

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