Re #1 I did not claim that Home forces perfected low level all arms tactics. I did state that Home Forces developed a way to fight armoured and infantry divisions, as DIVSIONS, i.e. balanced all arms forces and not as Brigade groups,MarkN wrote:I agree, it does illustrate the problem, many problems. However, I sense I'm not the one missing the point. Several points.Sheldrake wrote: MarkN, I think this illustrates the problem - and the point you seem to have missed.
Whatever tactical doctrine Scott Cokburn and his regiments might have practised in the UK was irrelevant when their armour heavy British armoured brigade was committed on its own against a division fighting as a division. The follow eas not a failure of Home forces doctrine,. but of the Eight army for choosing to deploy their army by brigades.
It is the opposite of what happened a year early when the British concentrated their weak forces to defeat the Italian army in detail.
First, Scott-Cockburn's efforts clearly indicate 'combined-arms' was NOT being practiced, honed and perfected in Home Command as you wish us to believe. He made no use of supporting assets attached directly to his command whatseover. That indicates a complete lack of understanding at a conceptual level. That reality is what points me to my conclusions as to why the British Army never really grasped combined arms warfare to the level that they could, and should.
Second, it seems to indicate that the trials that the field artillery branch of the RA were conducting was not towards a combined arms approach, but more of a traditional insular effort.
Third, it shows what a bad divisional (and later higher) commander Gott was.
Fourth, it indicates yet again the generally poor standard of British Army commanders - and thus the structures and organisation that placed them into such positions.
Fifth, it indicates that the concentration of divisional assets into a relatively small area being considered in the non-fighting Home Forces was not being practised by ME Forces due to the very nature of the actual fighting they were being expected to conduct.
8th Army, as it now was, was conducting rapid manouver across huge distances. The concentration of field artillery in a single location supporting a relatively static division holding a miniscule AO was quite inapproriate.
Combined arms does not just mean a platoon of infantry with a troop of tanks a d a couple of field artillery. It can also mean a Brigade of tanks/Panzer Regiment operating with a "Brigade of infantry/Panzer grenadier Regiment and three regiments of artillery.
The Germans did not practice All arms across their army during 1939-42. The Germans concentrated their panzers on one sector of the front. Most of their forces had no armour what seo ever. Guderian's motto was Nicht Kleckern sondern Klotzen! (Boot 'em, don't dribble!)
Re 2 You need to read a little more about the Royal Artillery. Shelford Bidwell Gunners at War is a good start and Bailey Field Artillery and Firepower if you want a more academic treatment.
Concentrating firepower at the critical point in the all arms battle is hardly insular. Nor is it reactionary.
The Brigade group of penny packets was the consequence of the mistaken conclusion that larger formations could not communicate or react under the conditions of mid C 20th warfare. The key to gluing divisions and corps together was the ability to concentrate the artillery, field/ Atk across these formations.
After Dunkirk the Gunners made several big changes. a. They reorganised their liaison and observation to provide each infantry battalion or armoured regiment with a BC and two FOO parties mounted in armoured Op vehicles, equipped and trained to use wireless to communicate with the guns. b. They developed the techniques to concentrate the fire of a lot of guns at the critical point under the direction of the supported arm. They also developed medium artillery groups with the capability to engage enemy artillery in depth as Corps and Army resource.
None of this insular.
These were techniques which the non gunners greatly appreciated. While an infantry battalion might feel happier to have "their battery" under command, their Brigade Commander and the Divisional commander preferred to apply three or nine batteries at the critical point - as did the infantry battalion at that point! Montgomery, who the army trusted as a trainer and commander insisted that diviisons fought as divisions and that the artillery was used oin this way.
# 3 &4 While Gott was far from outstanding it shows what a muddle 8th army became after the excellent start with Op Compass.
#5 Sorry this misses the point. Op Compass was fought over the same ground with even fewer troops. However O'Connnor managed affairs so the modest artillery of the Western Desert Force was concentrated at the key points - the Italian forts, then for the assault on Bardia and Tobruk. I agree that they were very short of artillery and the shortcomings of the 2 Pdr led to field artillery being used as Anti tank guns, but that does not excuse scattering tank brigades over the desert where they would be defeated piece meal.