Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

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Sheldrake
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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#61

Post by Sheldrake » 28 Jun 2015, 02:20

MarkN wrote:
Sheldrake wrote: MarkN, I think this illustrates the problem - and the point you seem to have missed.

Whatever tactical doctrine Scott Cokburn and his regiments might have practised in the UK was irrelevant when their armour heavy British armoured brigade was committed on its own against a division fighting as a division. The follow eas not a failure of Home forces doctrine,. but of the Eight army for choosing to deploy their army by brigades.

It is the opposite of what happened a year early when the British concentrated their weak forces to defeat the Italian army in detail.
I agree, it does illustrate the problem, many problems. However, I sense I'm not the one missing the point. Several points.

First, Scott-Cockburn's efforts clearly indicate 'combined-arms' was NOT being practiced, honed and perfected in Home Command as you wish us to believe. He made no use of supporting assets attached directly to his command whatseover. That indicates a complete lack of understanding at a conceptual level. That reality is what points me to my conclusions as to why the British Army never really grasped combined arms warfare to the level that they could, and should.

Second, it seems to indicate that the trials that the field artillery branch of the RA were conducting was not towards a combined arms approach, but more of a traditional insular effort.

Third, it shows what a bad divisional (and later higher) commander Gott was.

Fourth, it indicates yet again the generally poor standard of British Army commanders - and thus the structures and organisation that placed them into such positions.

Fifth, it indicates that the concentration of divisional assets into a relatively small area being considered in the non-fighting Home Forces was not being practised by ME Forces due to the very nature of the actual fighting they were being expected to conduct.


8th Army, as it now was, was conducting rapid manouver across huge distances. The concentration of field artillery in a single location supporting a relatively static division holding a miniscule AO was quite inapproriate.
Re #1 I did not claim that Home forces perfected low level all arms tactics. I did state that Home Forces developed a way to fight armoured and infantry divisions, as DIVSIONS, i.e. balanced all arms forces and not as Brigade groups,

Combined arms does not just mean a platoon of infantry with a troop of tanks a d a couple of field artillery. It can also mean a Brigade of tanks/Panzer Regiment operating with a "Brigade of infantry/Panzer grenadier Regiment and three regiments of artillery.

The Germans did not practice All arms across their army during 1939-42. The Germans concentrated their panzers on one sector of the front. Most of their forces had no armour what seo ever. Guderian's motto was Nicht Kleckern sondern Klotzen! (Boot 'em, don't dribble!)

Re 2 You need to read a little more about the Royal Artillery. Shelford Bidwell Gunners at War is a good start and Bailey Field Artillery and Firepower if you want a more academic treatment.

Concentrating firepower at the critical point in the all arms battle is hardly insular. Nor is it reactionary.

The Brigade group of penny packets was the consequence of the mistaken conclusion that larger formations could not communicate or react under the conditions of mid C 20th warfare. The key to gluing divisions and corps together was the ability to concentrate the artillery, field/ Atk across these formations.

After Dunkirk the Gunners made several big changes. a. They reorganised their liaison and observation to provide each infantry battalion or armoured regiment with a BC and two FOO parties mounted in armoured Op vehicles, equipped and trained to use wireless to communicate with the guns. b. They developed the techniques to concentrate the fire of a lot of guns at the critical point under the direction of the supported arm. They also developed medium artillery groups with the capability to engage enemy artillery in depth as Corps and Army resource.
None of this insular.

These were techniques which the non gunners greatly appreciated. While an infantry battalion might feel happier to have "their battery" under command, their Brigade Commander and the Divisional commander preferred to apply three or nine batteries at the critical point - as did the infantry battalion at that point! Montgomery, who the army trusted as a trainer and commander insisted that diviisons fought as divisions and that the artillery was used oin this way.

# 3 &4 While Gott was far from outstanding it shows what a muddle 8th army became after the excellent start with Op Compass.

#5 Sorry this misses the point. Op Compass was fought over the same ground with even fewer troops. However O'Connnor managed affairs so the modest artillery of the Western Desert Force was concentrated at the key points - the Italian forts, then for the assault on Bardia and Tobruk. I agree that they were very short of artillery and the shortcomings of the 2 Pdr led to field artillery being used as Anti tank guns, but that does not excuse scattering tank brigades over the desert where they would be defeated piece meal.

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#62

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 29 Jun 2015, 20:49

MarkN

Way back you asked:
Imagine you are the CRA of 9 Aus Div in March 1941. There are 2 brigades of the division holding a 40 mile long ridge line (north/south) from Tocra to south of er Regima and the 3rd brigade in the rear in Tobruk. You have about 150 miles of open left flank between your forward brigades and Tobruk. Where do you site your 3 field artillery regiments? What's your advice to your division commander?

Do you:-
(a) advise GOC to reposition his division into a much more compact area so that your concentrated artillery group can support the whole division,
(b) select a location to concentrate your 3 regiments and leave the majority of the division with no artillery support at all,
(c) break down your regiments into batteries and allocate them to various locations throughout the divisional AO.

In effect, does the artillery support the division, or does the division (and higher command structures) subordinate its effort to what the CRA says is the artillery DS answer as to where he should place his guns?
Well, I would obviously advise (a), then stand well back... :D After listening to a long rant about gunners and their doubtful family lineage I would probably then retire to my caravan and pack my bags in expectation of a long stay in a PoW camp somewhere in Tuscany or Poland.

In addition, I might just pop along to the Intelligence Officer's tent and ask him for an appreciation of possible and the most dangerous enemy options...after a stiff drink (hopefully something stronger than lukewarm water) I would then return to the GOC and find out whether there was a friendly mobile reserve within supporting distance. If not, I would recommend getting on the radio/telephone to GHQ and asking for clarification from my government that they wanted their division sacrificed to no good purpose.

Regards

Tom


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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#63

Post by MarkN » 01 Jul 2015, 16:11

Indeed. :) :)

The correct response for out notional CRA is to advise that the division is spread far too wide for him to be able to provide the fld arty spt he would like, however, he will divvy up his assets to provide the best coverage possible according to divisional intelligence estimates and plans.

In other words, divarty supports the needs of the division (and higher); divarty does not dictate how a division deploys.

In reality, the notional CRA didn't exist as 9 AusDiv had just a single borrowed regiment of artillery under command. In fact, the entire CYRCOM had just 3 of which two were with 2nd Armoured Div.

Now, from this, I do not conclude that ME Forces had taken the wrong lessons and learned the wrong answers on how to do combined arms warfare, I take this as evidence that the nature and context of the conflict in the Western Desert was not one where Director Artillery DS answers were either appropriate or helpful.

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#64

Post by Sheldrake » 05 Jul 2015, 12:13

Tom from Cornwall wrote:MarkN

Way back you asked:
Imagine you are the CRA of 9 Aus Div in March 1941. There are 2 brigades of the division holding a 40 mile long ridge line (north/south) from Tocra to south of er Regima and the 3rd brigade in the rear in Tobruk. You have about 150 miles of open left flank between your forward brigades and Tobruk. Where do you site your 3 field artillery regiments? What's your advice to your division commander?

Do you:-
(a) advise GOC to reposition his division into a much more compact area so that your concentrated artillery group can support the whole division,
(b) select a location to concentrate your 3 regiments and leave the majority of the division with no artillery support at all,
(c) break down your regiments into batteries and allocate them to various locations throughout the divisional AO.

In effect, does the artillery support the division, or does the division (and higher command structures) subordinate its effort to what the CRA says is the artillery DS answer as to where he should place his guns?
Well, I would obviously advise (a), then stand well back... :D After listening to a long rant about gunners and their doubtful family lineage I would probably then retire to my caravan and pack my bags in expectation of a long stay in a PoW camp somewhere in Tuscany or Poland.

In addition, I might just pop along to the Intelligence Officer's tent and ask him for an appreciation of possible and the most dangerous enemy options...after a stiff drink (hopefully something stronger than lukewarm water) I would then return to the GOC and find out whether there was a friendly mobile reserve within supporting distance. If not, I would recommend getting on the radio/telephone to GHQ and asking for clarification from my government that they wanted their division sacrificed to no good purpose.

Regards

Tom
or do what the CRA actually did and be acclaimed for supporting the GOC 9 in wining a significant victory over the German armour ;) See the relevant chapters in Bidwell's Gunners at War and Horner's(?) Australian Gunners at War.

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#65

Post by Sheldrake » 05 Jul 2015, 12:21

MarkN wrote:Indeed. :) :)

The correct response for out notional CRA is to advise that the division is spread far too wide for him to be able to provide the fld arty spt he would like, however, he will divvy up his assets to provide the best coverage possible according to divisional intelligence estimates and plans.

In other words, divarty supports the needs of the division (and higher); divarty does not dictate how a division deploys.

In reality, the notional CRA didn't exist as 9 AusDiv had just a single borrowed regiment of artillery under command. In fact, the entire CYRCOM had just 3 of which two were with 2nd Armoured Div.

Now, from this, I do not conclude that ME Forces had taken the wrong lessons and learned the wrong answers on how to do combined arms warfare, I take this as evidence that the nature and context of the conflict in the Western Desert was not one where Director Artillery DS answers were either appropriate or helpful.

You need to read a little more before and check your facts before you carry out any analysis let alone, draw conclusions.:)

While the 9 Australian Division had only one organic Regiment, as I have already posted, the Tobruk Garrison, formed around 9 Australian division did have a CRA and he had 1 RHA and 106 RHA his disposal in addition to that integral to the RAA. Chestnut Troop and O Battery 1 RHA would be a little surprised and miffed to discover they played no part in this battle.

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#66

Post by Urmel » 05 Jul 2015, 15:56

Um... I think it's quite clear that Mark and Tom are not talking about Tobruk but about the events that unfolded in western Cyrenaica before.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#67

Post by MarkN » 05 Jul 2015, 19:18

Hi Sheldrake,
Sheldrake wrote: or do what the CRA actually did and be acclaimed for supporting the GOC 9 in wining a significant victory over the German armour ;) See the relevant chapters in Bidwell's Gunners at War and Horner's(?) Australian Gunners at War.
That seems to be a rather narrow and inward looking understanding of the Cyrenaica effort in April 1941.
Sheldrake wrote: You need to read a little more before and check your facts before you carry out any analysis let alone, draw conclusions.:)

While the 9 Australian Division had only one organic Regiment, as I have already posted, the Tobruk Garrison, formed around 9 Australian division did have a CRA and he had 1 RHA and 106 RHA his disposal in addition to that integral to the RAA. Chestnut Troop and O Battery 1 RHA would be a little surprised and miffed to discover they played no part in this battle.
I enquired what would be the notional CRA's advice to GOC 9 AusDiv as he set his forces according to CYRCOM's demands BEFORE the retreat into Tobruk and the failure of 2nd Armoured Division.

Having given an answer to a question that wasn't asked is rather telling. A habitual trait of the professional British Army officer down through the ages. But I very much appreciate it, because it supports almost all the points I posit.

Thank you.

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#68

Post by Urmel » 05 Jul 2015, 22:55

MarkN wrote:Hi Sheldrake,
Sheldrake wrote: or do what the CRA actually did and be acclaimed for supporting the GOC 9 in wining a significant victory over the German armour ;) See the relevant chapters in Bidwell's Gunners at War and Horner's(?) Australian Gunners at War.
That seems to be a rather narrow and inward looking understanding of the Cyrenaica effort in April 1941.
It's reminiscent of the German officer memoirs, who won every time they encountered the Red Army, all the way from Moscow to Berlin.

Fact is that while holding on to Tobruk, the two weeks started with the main Axis forces being west of Agheila, and ended with the Axis being in control of the border.
Last edited by Urmel on 06 Jul 2015, 13:11, edited 1 time in total.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#69

Post by Gooner1 » 06 Jul 2015, 12:39

Urmel wrote: Fact is that while holding on to Tobruk, the two weeks started with the main Axis forces being east of Agheila, and ended with the Axis being in control of the border.
Honours even then.

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#70

Post by Urmel » 06 Jul 2015, 13:07

The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#71

Post by Sheldrake » 07 Jul 2015, 00:45

MarkN wrote:Hi Sheldrake,
Sheldrake wrote: or do what the CRA actually did and be acclaimed for supporting the GOC 9 in wining a significant victory over the German armour ;) See the relevant chapters in Bidwell's Gunners at War and Horner's(?) Australian Gunners at War.
That seems to be a rather narrow and inward looking understanding of the Cyrenaica effort in April 1941.
Sheldrake wrote: You need to read a little more before and check your facts before you carry out any analysis let alone, draw conclusions.:)

While the 9 Australian Division had only one organic Regiment, as I have already posted, the Tobruk Garrison, formed around 9 Australian division did have a CRA and he had 1 RHA and 106 RHA his disposal in addition to that integral to the RAA. Chestnut Troop and O Battery 1 RHA would be a little surprised and miffed to discover they played no part in this battle.
I enquired what would be the notional CRA's advice to GOC 9 AusDiv as he set his forces according to CYRCOM's demands BEFORE the retreat into Tobruk and the failure of 2nd Armoured Division.

Having given an answer to a question that wasn't asked is rather telling. A habitual trait of the professional British Army officer down through the ages. But I very much appreciate it, because it supports almost all the points I posit.

Thank you.

Touche.

I did indeed interpret the 9 Div Battle soleley with respect to the defence of Tobruk.

However, the moral of the tale is the same.

Wavell had far too few troops for the many tasks in the Spring 1941 (Greece - East Africa - Libya) . He took a chance that the Axis would take a while to do anything in Libya and he could entrust the defence to a scratch force, which could be built in situ aroundf the new 2nd Armoured Div and building 9th Australian Division. That might have worked had against anyone but Erwin Rommel.

In the event the defences were a raw, under trained Armoured Division,minus a brigade and two brigades of an infantry divisions deficient field, anti tank or AA artillery. under a corps HQ loperat5i ng from an administrative HQ lacking mobility and communications. A close inspection of the Order of Battle for the 2nd Armoured Division shows an HQ arriving with some troops from the UK shuffled with an assorted collection of units taken over in theatre with little chance to train together. The British reinforcements were committed as individual briugades or even units. This was an unbalanced collection of troops with a much lower fighting power than might appear on paper. It reinforces the point that a collection of brigades does not equal a division less still a Corps!

However bravely or skilfully individual units and soldiers fought, the British and commonwealth soldiers deserved to have been committed under better circumstances. They showed their competence in recovering in April.

After the disintegration of the single armoured Brigade, the support group, reinforced by other artillery units became de facto the artillery group for 9 Australian Division. This Anglo Australian force gelled as an organisation under difficult circumstances in a matter of weeks and gave Rommel his first bloody nose in April.

Which returns my to the posts about Moreshead and his British CRA defending the 25 mile Tobruck perimeter, fought as an all arms aggressive defence by an infantry division with the armoured units of 2nd Armoured Division under command - oh and five field regiments, two anti tank-regiments an AA Brigade and Mr Clarke's guns AKA the Bush artillery manned by volunteers under the direction of WO1 |Clarke the RSM 1 RHA, later killed at El Alamein.. These were many of the same units and people who had been driven out of Cyreniaca.

(Source Farnedale: Years of Defeat and Horner Austrlain Gunners at War

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#72

Post by MarkN » 08 Jul 2015, 18:05

Hello Sheldrake,

I find your posts both informative and interesting. However, once again, you avoid addressing the specific question/scenario posited and provide answers to questions/scenarios which were not asked.

This discussion flows out of the previous debate about the efficacy and development of British combined arms doctrine and practice and the statement that you made that ME Forces had learned the wrong lessons and applied the wrong solutions whilst Home Forces got it right. To which, you evidence the development of a concentrated divisional artillery group of all 3 field regiments under the (direct) command of a CRA.

I posit, the penny packet distribution of field artillery by ME Forces had nothing to do with combined arms doctrine and tactical useage flowing therefrom. In effect, ME Forces were asking the question about how best to distribute scarce resources across wide expanses of territory - not how to do combined ops better. Your recent posts seem to support my view. Whether they got it right or wrong is another discussion in itself.

Moreover, your repeated reminder of how the 4 field artillery regiments were grouped together within the Tobruk enclave seems to suggest that such a grouping had more to do with common sense than some great, inspirational development by Home Forces post-BEF.

What I am most interested to learn now is whether the various trials and developments by field artillery gurus in the UK post-BEF were insular efforts to do their own tasks more effectively and efficiently, or whether they were part of a genuine attempt to improve cooperation, understanding and all-arms military effect. Do you have the answer to that?

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#73

Post by Sheldrake » 10 Jul 2015, 12:16

MarkN wrote:Hello Sheldrake,

I find your posts both informative and interesting. However, once again, you avoid addressing the specific question/scenario posited and provide answers to questions/scenarios which were not asked. (1)

This discussion flows out of the previous debate about the efficacy and development of British combined arms doctrine and practice and the statement that you made that ME Forces had learned the wrong lessons and applied the wrong solutions whilst Home Forces got it right. To which, you evidence the development of a concentrated divisional artillery group of all 3 field regiments under the (direct) command of a CRA.

I posit, the penny packet distribution of field artillery by ME Forces had nothing to do with combined arms doctrine and tactical useage flowing therefrom. In effect, ME Forces were asking the question about how best to distribute scarce resources across wide expanses of territory - not how to do combined ops better. Your recent posts seem to support my view. Whether they got it right or wrong is another discussion in itself. (2)

Moreover, your repeated reminder of how the 4 field artillery regiments were grouped together within the Tobruk enclave seems to suggest that such a grouping had more to do with common sense than some great, inspirational development by Home Forces post-BEF. (3)

What I am most interested to learn now is whether the various trials and developments by field artillery gurus in the UK post-BEF were insular efforts to do their own tasks more effectively and efficiently, or whether they were part of a genuine attempt to improve cooperation, understanding and all-arms military effect. Do you have the answer to that? (4)


Mark N my dear chap,

Re (1) i thought your scenario was a wah so did not respond. Of course the CRA is the divisional commander's artillery adviser, and under his command.

Re (2) It is true that in this specific case the deployment was driven by an extreme case of resource scarcity. In March - April 1941 Cyrenaica command was two woefully under-prepared divisions deployed, in the expectation that the Italian led axis forces would take four months to be ready to advance. It would have been criminal to have knowingly deployed them against an aggressive German armoured formation. Defending the passes on the escarpment south of Benghazi was the only practical deployment for Immobile infantry lacking communications and anti tank guns. There was no alternative in this case to splitting the meagre artillery support between the two scattered brigades.

However, as I have posted, within a week the 9th Australian division operated successfully as a reinforced division defending a wide front. This was common sense, but also conformed to what looks like a text book way to fight an infantry division reinforced by armour against a panzer force. After April 1941 the decision to fight as brigade groups was not driven by external factors, but a deliberate choice as a way to deploy stronger armoured forces. The British chose to open the battles known as Op Brevity, Op Battleaxe and Op Crusader with their troops fought as separate brigades.

Re (3) The British view of tactics is indeed that it is applied common sense, in the opinion of the senior officer present. However, what counts as common sense depended on the training, background and choice of doctrinal fashion of the commander. By and large infantry divisional commanders were all well aware of the need to fight their divisions as entities according to "The Infantry Division in Battle" and preferably well supported with tanks and artillery. By and large, the infantry divisions do this quite well as long as their flanks were protected

The problem lay in how to fight mobile battles involving large armoured forces. Some RAC officers believed that the only thing that mattered was a contest between tanks waged like naval battles on land. For them artillery and infantry were irrelevant - until they met an infantry and anti-tank gun heavy axis force, at which point they all demanded their own penny packets of gunners or infantrymen under command! There were also those who thought that the key to success was to cross attach arms as brigade groups or battle groups, building up from the Jock Columns named after a particularly gallant horse gunner.

None of the desert warriors had developed a system that beat the Germans division against division or corps against corps. The patchy track record, which had its nadir in June 1942, was taken as evidence of failure. No know can know whether Auickinleck's battle groups would have delivered success at El Alemein and produced a better army for mobile warfare in 1943-45. Nor whether Montgomery would have failed if appointed 8th Army Commander in November 1941. The fact is that the Home Army methods imposed on the 8th Army by Montgomery prevailed as British military doctrine for the duration of the war.

The Home Army had a little more time to think about and test ideas on exercise, and came up with some ideas about how the army would fight as divisions and corps. These ideas were championed by Montgomery, under the patronage of Paget and Brooke, and adopted initially by the Home Army during 1941-42. One of the key components were the artillery techniques which concentrated massed artillery fire quickly on a mobile battlefield. These only were adopted after the persistent advocacy of brigadier HJ Parham who had used wireless to concentrate the fire of his regimet in France in 1940 and then demonstrated how this could be applied to the divisional artillery group. Developing these ideas took the resources of the school of artillery and a lot of war office staff work to ensure that formations had the manpower and equipment to sustain these techniques. E.g Adding a CRA and staff to the WE of an Armoured Division, which took until 1942.

re (4) I cannot find any examples in British conduct of WW2 where inter service rivalry, personal career progression or personal animosity was allowed to influence policy to any significant extent. This was a war of national survival under a united strong political leadership with strong service chiefs. Nest feathering, uncooperative behaviour and careerism were viewed with extreme disfavour. Soldiers were expected to get on their duty, extract digits and not bellyache about their own lot.

This did not mean that there were not differences in outlook and, naturally each service arm had different views of what constituted the common good. Its the way institutions work. However, the Gunners could only work in conjunction with the other arms. What the big artillery ese ideas did mean was that the guns would be only rarely under the command of Brigades. The infantry and armour might be in Direct Support, and have dedicated parties a\t Brigade, battalion and even company level, but that did not mean fire support was guaranteed. Artillery fire was to be commanded at the highest level, but its control decentralised to the lowest practical. This was a powerful tool to concentrate fire power when fighting battles at Divisional and Corps level. This has been a pattern in the development of fire power over the C20th and accepted as a Good Thing.

Broooke, the commander Home forces and then CIGS was a gunner. He was not merely any old gunner, but a gunner who implemented a creeping barrage on the first day of the Somme for a division which achieved all its objectives and organised ammunition logistics for the battle of Vimy Rudge in 1917 His orientation was all arms. He had commanded a corps with distinction in France in 1940 and was the man the country turned to to rebuild and lead the Home Army. His experiences of France were of the chaos and failure of the ad hoc forces. His success in handling his corps of May27-28 when the Belgians collapsed was based on fighting his forces as divisions with centralised artillery support, and one of his divisions, Monty's 3 Div did a particularly fine job.

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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#74

Post by ClintHardware » 16 Aug 2015, 11:21

At Kew the earliest reference I found to the character string "Ninth" Army was March 42. Was it formed during or prior to December 41?
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Re: Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

#75

Post by Urmel » 17 Aug 2015, 18:27

Apparently 1 November 1941
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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