This thread has reached the point where we are talking past each other - but not entirely.MarkN wrote:Hi Sheldrake,
I fear we are talking through one another by focussing on different elements of the discussion.Sheldrake wrote: No You need to read the rest of what I posted.
There are a number of terms and concepts being bandied around in this thread and they have become somewhat jumbled. I think we have all become, as a group, muddled - despite us individually being completely clear with our own thoughts and posts.
From my perspective, the Germans were light years ahead in 'manouver warfare' compared to the British. That is not to say the British couldn't do 'combined arms' well, it's just they did it differently. A different way that was more suited to slow tempo, whole-front 'pedestrian warfare' not high tempo 'manouver warfare'. As a former British military officer, you will of course recognise that 'manouver warfare' and 'combined arms' are not the same thing.
The reason the Germans were ahead was down to their ability to be much more organisationally flexible, their decision to cascade initiative and tactical authority downwards and an emphasis on bold and quick decisionmaking. You have spent several pages explaining how those fundamentals translated into training and practical effort (as opposed to written doctrine conveniently ignored). Their successess were achieved because when the opposition couldn't cope. The Russians learned quickly how to cope. That is what I admire in the Red Army: their quick understanding and appreciation of how to counter the Wehrmacht's strengths - not their copying of it when they turned to the offensive.
Now, when I consider why the British were pretty inept at manouver warfare in WW2, then it all seems to flow back to their determination not to meddle with their peacetime soldiering structures, norms and attitudes. Conservatism at its very worst. Post-WW2, that conservatism prevailed to the extent that it prevented the British ever being able to implement the Wehrmacht command ways. It came up with a compromise set of conceptual and practical methods that were themselves never were fully adopted.
The Commonwealth forces in the Middle East did not perform so badly because they broke up the DAG, nor because they did 'combined arms' at a higher level. They performed badly against the Germans because the Middle East was made for manouver warfare, and their way of doing C3 couldn't cope. The Italian way of doing C3 was even worse, hence how O'Connor triumphed so spectacularly.
Back at home, 'pedestrian warfare' was still all the rage, and when enough forces could be gathered to conduct 'pedestrian warfare' in the desert, that's what they turned to.
You are arguing that the Germans were better at manoeuvre warfare - whatever that means to you. However, if you dismiss the explanations why the Germans seemed better at about the differences in doctrine and training then it seem as if you are advancing a circular argument. "The Germans were better at manoeuvre warfare because they were better at manoeuvre warfare.(Not because they combined their divisions better, trained their officers more thoroughly etc ")
I agree that the Germans excelled in high tempo operations and seemed to react more quickly in confusing and uncertain situations than the British. Anthropomorphism is a dangerous pitfall. It is easy to Generalise about "Germans " or "British" as id they were single individuals, and not a collective term for millions of soldiers with a range of competences, disciplines and sub tribes. As several posted have pointed out, there are plenty of occasions where British units or formations gave the Germans a drubbing.
I would like to challenge you on what you mean by manoeuvre warfare and whether this really helps to advance this discussion. When I ready you write about "manoeuvre warfare" this reads as a description rather than a prescription. Manoeuvre warfare is the kind of term critics used rather than practitioners. its like "Total Football" or "flowing rugby". These describe the result rather than help to explain how to achieve either. Most of the time armies have intended to practice manoeuvre warfare, but whether they succeed is dependent on other factors. For example, most of the European armies in 1914 expected to fight manoeuvre warfare. It also helps to have a co-operative enemy. Operation Compass might not have been as spectacular against a German enemy.
Military units and formations can be ordered to advance, attack, defend deny, delay or withdraw. There are tactical motifs that commanders can employ such as attack from the line of march, ambush, counter penetration, counter stroke, flank attacks, But do you expect a formation to do if ordered to "engage in manoeuvre warfare?" Does this have any more meaning than some of these NSFW scatological doctrinal concepts from the Army Rumour Service?
http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/thread ... rbs.27157/
http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/thread ... bs.166064/
PS the Divisional Artillery group matters a great deal in a divisional battler. It is the largest element of divisions fire-power. (Even in the Western Desert, the bulk of targets would be soft. Only 10% of the Afrika Korps were in an AFV). The DAg is one of the most responsive assets in mobile operations. If the Divisional commander wants to redeploy a brigade it can take hours.Switching the GAG from one brigade to another takes minutes.