Doctrine: British Failures

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Sheldrake
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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#166

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Aug 2015, 10:57

MarkN wrote:Hi Sheldrake,
Sheldrake wrote: No You need to read the rest of what I posted.
I fear we are talking through one another by focussing on different elements of the discussion.

There are a number of terms and concepts being bandied around in this thread and they have become somewhat jumbled. I think we have all become, as a group, muddled - despite us individually being completely clear with our own thoughts and posts. :wink:

From my perspective, the Germans were light years ahead in 'manouver warfare' compared to the British. That is not to say the British couldn't do 'combined arms' well, it's just they did it differently. A different way that was more suited to slow tempo, whole-front 'pedestrian warfare' not high tempo 'manouver warfare'. As a former British military officer, you will of course recognise that 'manouver warfare' and 'combined arms' are not the same thing.

The reason the Germans were ahead was down to their ability to be much more organisationally flexible, their decision to cascade initiative and tactical authority downwards and an emphasis on bold and quick decisionmaking. You have spent several pages explaining how those fundamentals translated into training and practical effort (as opposed to written doctrine conveniently ignored). Their successess were achieved because when the opposition couldn't cope. The Russians learned quickly how to cope. That is what I admire in the Red Army: their quick understanding and appreciation of how to counter the Wehrmacht's strengths - not their copying of it when they turned to the offensive.

Now, when I consider why the British were pretty inept at manouver warfare in WW2, then it all seems to flow back to their determination not to meddle with their peacetime soldiering structures, norms and attitudes. Conservatism at its very worst. Post-WW2, that conservatism prevailed to the extent that it prevented the British ever being able to implement the Wehrmacht command ways. It came up with a compromise set of conceptual and practical methods that were themselves never were fully adopted.

The Commonwealth forces in the Middle East did not perform so badly because they broke up the DAG, nor because they did 'combined arms' at a higher level. They performed badly against the Germans because the Middle East was made for manouver warfare, and their way of doing C3 couldn't cope. The Italian way of doing C3 was even worse, hence how O'Connor triumphed so spectacularly.

Back at home, 'pedestrian warfare' was still all the rage, and when enough forces could be gathered to conduct 'pedestrian warfare' in the desert, that's what they turned to.
This thread has reached the point where we are talking past each other - but not entirely.

You are arguing that the Germans were better at manoeuvre warfare - whatever that means to you. However, if you dismiss the explanations why the Germans seemed better at about the differences in doctrine and training then it seem as if you are advancing a circular argument. "The Germans were better at manoeuvre warfare because they were better at manoeuvre warfare.(Not because they combined their divisions better, trained their officers more thoroughly etc ")

I agree that the Germans excelled in high tempo operations and seemed to react more quickly in confusing and uncertain situations than the British. Anthropomorphism is a dangerous pitfall. It is easy to Generalise about "Germans " or "British" as id they were single individuals, and not a collective term for millions of soldiers with a range of competences, disciplines and sub tribes. As several posted have pointed out, there are plenty of occasions where British units or formations gave the Germans a drubbing.


I would like to challenge you on what you mean by manoeuvre warfare and whether this really helps to advance this discussion. When I ready you write about "manoeuvre warfare" this reads as a description rather than a prescription. Manoeuvre warfare is the kind of term critics used rather than practitioners. its like "Total Football" or "flowing rugby". These describe the result rather than help to explain how to achieve either. Most of the time armies have intended to practice manoeuvre warfare, but whether they succeed is dependent on other factors. For example, most of the European armies in 1914 expected to fight manoeuvre warfare. It also helps to have a co-operative enemy. Operation Compass might not have been as spectacular against a German enemy.

Military units and formations can be ordered to advance, attack, defend deny, delay or withdraw. There are tactical motifs that commanders can employ such as attack from the line of march, ambush, counter penetration, counter stroke, flank attacks, But do you expect a formation to do if ordered to "engage in manoeuvre warfare?" Does this have any more meaning than some of these NSFW scatological doctrinal concepts from the Army Rumour Service?
http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/thread ... rbs.27157/
http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/thread ... bs.166064/

PS the Divisional Artillery group matters a great deal in a divisional battler. It is the largest element of divisions fire-power. (Even in the Western Desert, the bulk of targets would be soft. Only 10% of the Afrika Korps were in an AFV). The DAg is one of the most responsive assets in mobile operations. If the Divisional commander wants to redeploy a brigade it can take hours.Switching the GAG from one brigade to another takes minutes.

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#167

Post by Attrition » 29 Aug 2015, 11:29

"Fancy a spot of biffing, Crouchback?"


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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#168

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Aug 2015, 18:49

Attrition wrote:"Fancy a spot of biffing, Crouchback?"

The ones with a particular relevance to this thread were:-
barbs said:today i have mostly been cooperating with the enemy in order to finish early ..
witchdoctor said:.Well, it's certainly better than 'outdrink the enemy'... :D
Darth_Doctrinus said:do not underestimate the value of a small cocktail party as part of an obstacle plan ....
witchdoctor said:followed by 'beating retreat' in order to entertain the enemy folowed by urining on his parade
Proximo said Clearly far too many people being manoeuvrist while pi$$ed on this site. ;) ;)

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#169

Post by MarkN » 03 Sep 2015, 19:23

Sheldrake wrote: You are arguing that the Germans were better at manoeuvre warfare - whatever that means to you. However, if you dismiss the explanations why the Germans seemed better at about the differences in doctrine and training then it seem as if you are advancing a circular argument. "The Germans were better at manoeuvre warfare because they were better at manoeuvre warfare.(Not because they combined their divisions better, trained their officers more thoroughly etc ")
Strange that, I'm pretty sure I wrote along the lines of what you've put in brackets. Still, it's easier to counter what another poster didn't write, isn't it?
Sheldrake wrote: It is easy to Generalise about "Germans " or "British" as id they were single individuals, and not a collective term for millions of soldiers with a range of competences, disciplines and sub tribes. As several posted have pointed out, there are plenty of occasions where British units or formations gave the Germans a drubbing.
It is indeed easy for all of us to write German or British rather than write a 50,000 word essay mentionning every individual's capabilities relative to each point.
Sheldrake wrote: I would like to challenge you on what you mean by manoeuvre warfare and whether this really helps to advance this discussion.
I probably hold, give or take, the same understanding of manouver warfare as you.
Sheldrake wrote: PS the Divisional Artillery group matters a great deal in a divisional battler. It is the largest element of divisions fire-power. (Even in the Western Desert, the bulk of targets would be soft. Only 10% of the Afrika Korps were in an AFV). The DAg is one of the most responsive assets in mobile operations. If the Divisional commander wants to redeploy a brigade it can take hours.Switching the GAG from one brigade to another takes minutes.
Now that's stating the bleeding obvious, isn't it? And, once again, completely avoiding the reality that the Western Desert and Cyrenaica were effing huge and the manpower and units available quite insufficient to clump around their DAG and at the same time serve any worthwhile military purpose other than to provide target practice for Axis incoming.

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#170

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 03 Sep 2015, 19:58

MarkN,
the manpower and units available quite insufficient to clump around their DAG and at the same time serve any worthwhile military purpose other than to provide target practice for Axis incoming
Isn't what was true for the British goose just the same for the German gander? Isn't this just a question of the scale to which British resources were fragmented - the old saw about "trying to defend everywhere making you too weak to defend anywhere", etc, etc.

Assumptions about the tacticians paradise of the desert notwithstanding, didn't reality mean that battles tended to gather around defended localities anyway, moths to a flame?

Regards

Tom

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#171

Post by Urmel » 03 Sep 2015, 21:52

MarkN wrote:Now that's stating the bleeding obvious, isn't it? And, once again, completely avoiding the reality that the Western Desert and Cyrenaica were effing huge and the manpower and units available quite insufficient to clump around their DAG and at the same time serve any worthwhile military purpose other than to provide target practice for Axis incoming.
I continue to be baffled by the fact that Sheldrake keeps avoiding this point, which is rather obvious to even the cursory student of the desert war. The situation only changed at el Alamein, where the concentration was made possible by the extraordinary shrinking of the frontline.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#172

Post by Sheldrake » 03 Sep 2015, 23:11

Markn

The point I appear to have been avoiding is to me a statement of the obvious.

Just because the Western Desert is huge does not mean that an army should try to occupy all of it or maintain a frontage greater than allows for mutual support. Just because the pattern of C20th Warfare was for linear fronts, did not mean that was inevitable or desirable. General Francis Tuker who commanded the 4th Indian Division wrote about this in his book 2Patterns of War"

It is folly and contrary to the principles of war to try to defend everywhere or scatter forces where they cannot support each other. In operations in the western desert the only way an army could dominate this ware was through dynamic action, and manoeuvre. Just as armies had done before the First World War. It is what was called manoeuvre warfare.

OConnor used manoeuvre to enable the tiny western desert force to defeat an Italian army that was much larger but less mobile. he did som by concentrating his forces an objective at a time.

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#173

Post by Urmel » 03 Sep 2015, 23:24

Sheldrake wrote:Markn

The point I appear to have been avoiding is to me a statement of the obvious.
But also one of the totally irrelevant. You know, it is obvious that I would like to date Angelina Jolie. But it's not going to happen for a number of reasons firmly anchored in reality.
Sheldrake wrote:Just because the Western Desert is huge does not mean that an army should try to occupy all of it or maintain a frontage greater than allows for mutual support. Just because the pattern of C20th Warfare was for linear fronts, did not mean that was inevitable or desirable. General Francis Tuker who commanded the 4th Indian Division wrote about this in his book 2Patterns of War"
Yet he split his division into brigade groups in January 1942. Why was that?
Sheldrake wrote:It is folly and contrary to the principles of war to try to defend everywhere or scatter forces where they cannot support each other. In operations in the western desert the only way an army could dominate this ware was through dynamic action, and manoeuvre. Just as armies had done before the First World War. It is what was called manoeuvre warfare.
That's a bit tricky if your division isn't 100% able to move on its own trucks, you know.
Sheldrake wrote:OConnor used manoeuvre to enable the tiny western desert force to defeat an Italian army that was much larger but less mobile. he did som by concentrating his forces an objective at a time.
So what do you do against an enemy that is not at a disadvantage in mobility, and who has larger numbers?
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#174

Post by Don Juan » 03 Sep 2015, 23:53

My own view is that successful extended manoeuvre operations in the desert had very little to do with tactics and firepower, and everything to do with mechanics and engineering. I think the Royal Artillery's contribution to the British Army throughout the war is grossly overrated. In fact, I think the RA were often a liability.

The turning point in the desert was when the RAOC was replaced with the REME, and this organisation adopted a number of simple but effective methods to keep tanks and trucks mobile up to and over their overhaul lives. This is what made the race to Tunisia possible in 1943 when it would have been impossible in 1941. Before the REME managed to enable even Crusaders to achieve 1500+ miles between overhauls, any British offensive against the Axis was always going to run out of puff prematurely.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#175

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Sep 2015, 11:29

Urmel wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:Just because the Western Desert is huge does not mean that an army should try to occupy all of it or maintain a frontage greater than allows for mutual support. Just because the pattern of C20th Warfare was for linear fronts, did not mean that was inevitable or desirable. General Francis Tuker who commanded the 4th Indian Division wrote about this in his book 2Patterns of War"
Yet he split his division into brigade groups in January 1942. Why was that?
Bit puzzled by the direction the discussion is going

"The divisional battle
When advancing to gain contact with some unknown threat it will be necessary to decentralize supporting arms so that infantry brigades can fight quickly and with effect on the main axes of advance. But where definite and co—ordinated resistance is met it will be necessary to centralize control in order to strike a hard blow at Ihe selected point .."

I don't think the intention of brigade groups was ever to prevent centralization when it was required.

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#176

Post by Urmel » 04 Sep 2015, 11:33

Sorry, let me be more precise.

One Brigade was at Tobruk. One was in the Jebel Akhdar. One was at Benghazi, preparing to move to Agedabia.

Similar situation in December, where two Brigades moved from the border to Bir el Gobi, and one remained behind.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#177

Post by MarkN » 04 Sep 2015, 23:32

Sheldrake wrote:Markn

The point I appear to have been avoiding is to me a statement of the obvious.

Just because the Western Desert is huge does not mean that an army should try to occupy all of it or maintain a frontage greater than allows for mutual support. Just because the pattern of C20th Warfare was for linear fronts, did not mean that was inevitable or desirable. General Francis Tuker who commanded the 4th Indian Division wrote about this in his book 2Patterns of War"

It is folly and contrary to the principles of war to try to defend everywhere or scatter forces where they cannot support each other. In operations in the western desert the only way an army could dominate this ware was through dynamic action, and manoeuvre. Just as armies had done before the First World War. It is what was called manoeuvre warfare.

OConnor used manoeuvre to enable the tiny western desert force to defeat an Italian army that was much larger but less mobile. he did som by concentrating his forces an objective at a time.
Finally!

You may feel it was "a statement of the obvious", which it is of course, but that reality has consequences - and you have have been avoiding discussing those consequences too. Now you have. Hurrah!

On a number of occasions, you have stated that the British failed against the Germans because they didn't concentrate their field artillery. And now you have finally stated the bleeding obvious that if you concentrate the field artillery, they couldn't occupy Cyrenaica. Period! I mean, just how much of Cyrenaica would you be able to occupy, hold and defend with just 2 divisions (2ArmdDiv and 9AusDiv): Bardia and a bit of the desert to the south?

Dispersal of field artillery was not the cause of British misfortunes, it was a consequence of poor decision-making. And that poor decision-making was the cause of so much failure.

And, it's interesting that you bring up the term 'linear'. Linear was what the British were comfortable with. Linear and pedestrian. They simply were not prepared to adapt their rigid peacetime structures, organisation and thinking. So, they did their best to hold on until the 'merikans showed up and they could, combined, put together the scale of forces that made linear and pedestrian possible. And even that only worked because the Russkies were keeping the bulk of the German war machine busy elsewhere.

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#178

Post by Attrition » 05 Sep 2015, 11:06

~~~~~Linear was what the British were comfortable with. Linear and pedestrian. They simply were not prepared to adapt their rigid peacetime structures, organisation and thinking.~~~~~

Apart from when Eric Dorman-Smith changed everything again....

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#179

Post by Sheldrake » 05 Sep 2015, 23:38

Attrition wrote:~~~~~Linear was what the British were comfortable with. Linear and pedestrian. They simply were not prepared to adapt their rigid peacetime structures, organisation and thinking.~~~~~

Apart from when Eric Dorman-Smith changed everything again....
While I admire your handle and motto, there is a lot more to British WW2thinking,

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Re: Doctrine: British Failures

#180

Post by Attrition » 06 Sep 2015, 01:02

I know

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