Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

[MarkN]

Jeff,

I am even more perplexed by your approach to this discussion.

While this thread started as a fairly decent exploration of options/possibilities, after the first page it has ONLY been about blame (not by my doing to be clear). Read your paragraph above. It itself drips with blame. Not only did the Greeks choose to ignore doing the right thing, but according to you, they INTENTIONALLY chose to ignore it. They should have known better.

That is not blame, it is an opinion on what choices they made and why they may have made them. You are doing exactly the same, just coming up with a different explanation as to why? If I am am 'blaming', then so are you too!

If you don’t understand what this discussion is about, why are you arguing?

????

I know how it horribly went wrong. Without getting a couple of breaks, it was bound to go horribly wrong. You have repeatedly stated it could ONLY go horribly wrong.

Hence neither of us in blaming the Greeks for the ultimate fate which befell it at the hands of the Germans.

What I have been discussing is whether the Greek decisions were rooted in a realistic understanding of the situation ...

Exactly.

We are at odds with one another over whether the choices the Greeks made were coherent, sensible and sound. From bothe a military and political standpoint, you believe they were, I believe they were not.

To recap (nothing new)

The breaks the Greeks needed to survive had nothing to do with which defensive position they occupied. The breaks the Greeks needed were the ones they played for.

Now, I know you consider that your appreciation of the whole scenario is correct, and that we can only have a discussion if I first accept you are right - but I don't. The evidence, most of it from contemporary official documentation, suggests a different story.

Their options to get out of the situation alive were:

1. Try to avoid being attacked. Everything they did was initially focused on this option. I am sorry that the Greeks were unaware that the die was cast in Nov 1940.

2. Defeat the Italians. This was the only real Greek-only military solution to the problem. If the Greeks could get the Italians out of Albania, then all that combat power would be able to face the Germans. It wasn’t until the end of the Greek February offensive that they knew they couldn’t achieve this by themselves.

3. Form a Balkans Alliance. The other military option that might get out of the situation alive. Once again an option they consistently tried to achieve. Sorry they didn’t realize that Yugoslavia would collapse in a few days.

Based on these three options, the Greeks decided:

-Only accept outside assistance if it could truly impact the outcome.

-Don’t withdraw until they had to. Withdrawing in Albania doesn’t make it easier to defeat the Italians, but makes it easier for Italy to attack Greece. Withdrawing from the eastern lands might trigger the Bulgarian/Germany attack. Withdrawing might prevent the Balkan alliance.

In all your pages of rationalization, the one fact you never mention and that the Greeks definitively knew was - The UK couldn’t offer the level of military support required to make Allied outside support a viable option.

Is this your personal analysis of the situation extrapolated from post-war narratives, or is somebody else's analysis?

I don't mean this question disrespectfully. In a couple of your posts, you seem to take offense to the idea that I am posting my thoughts, analysis and opinions and not referencing others. If it's my thoughts, I can't reference my own brain! At the same time, you seem to be quite strict at showing that what you post is what others have written.

Thus, my question is only meant so that I can address my answer directly to you or as a discussion about another's thoughts.

So the only way to blame Papagos is to argue that he should have known that Yugoslavia (Balkan alliance) wasn’t a viable option. I have presented that everyone at the time saw Yugoslavia as a valid option.

Actually, no you haven't. You have posted numerous examples showing that all concerned were trying to bring Yugoslavia on board. I do not dispute that. But, that is not the same as believing that such an aliance would actually come off. And, far more importantly, it does nothing to indicate whether Yugoslav support would actually be able to provide the military support that the Greek stand on the Metaxas Line required.

The UK argument for the Aliakmon Line wasn’t that the Yugoslavians were completely incompetent and shouldn’t be considered at all. No, their argument was time was against us and we need to decide. That is a completely different rational and doesn’t come anywhere close to saying Yugoslavia is out of the picture.

Over the coming days, the evidence will be presented that Papagos was the one (as he wrote himself) that suggested the withdrawal to the Vermion mountains and that an urgent move was imperative.

Additionally, I will post now, that the Greeks had at the political level decided that their defensive posture should ignore help that Yugoslavia and/or Turkey would/could offer - but would welcome it if it came.

Hindsight is not of value in this discussion. Papagos didn't have a time machine to check his judgement. While you have stated he should have know better, I have demonstrated using primary sources that both Papagos and the British agreed that the Yugoslavian alliance was of value and was the better solution to the problem.

You have chosen repeatedly to (attempt to) discredit my arguments by claiming that they are derived from hindsight. And yet, all of my arguments are based on information that was available at the time. Our access to hindsight merely confirms that the option chosen was unsound and thus guaranteed military collapse in swift order. Three days.

The other day, I posted a copy of the telegram sent by Eden to London regarding the prepared statement read out (and handed over) by Koryzis to Eden. It was an English language summary of the original French text. The original text contained a paragraph that did not feature in the English summary sent to London. I think you will see it actually has great bearing on our discussion here.


...



I am not fluent in French, but I believe I understand sufficient to grasp the meaning: the Greeks are choosing to ignore possible help that the Yugoslavs and Turks would/could offer. Presumably because they couldn't count on their support and were wisely setting their defensive posture upon that premise. It was on that premise, that Papagos proposed the withdrawal to the Vermion Line.

Either this is a complete and deliberate lie to deceive the British as to their real intentions and hopes, or that the decision to stand on the Metaxas Line was not taken on the basis that Yugoslavia would come on side.

And the final paragraph of the same document...


This paragraph, also in the English summary, and often quoted in post war narratives can be interpreted in many different ways. The most common interpretation - which I think was held by the British at the time - was that Greece would fight Germany regardless of British assistance. Nothing more sinister than that. Others have noted that it seems to mean the 'fortress troops' would remain put, a sensible military decision.

I now think that what is saying is that the Greeks intend to stand on the Metaxas Line with 3 divisions come what may (the 3 divisions are mentionned in an earlier paragraph)!

[MarkN]

Tom,

I have just realised that I do indeed have the recorded minutes to each of the meetings held 22-24 February. They were in a different file to the one I originally held and had stupidly not made the connection!!!!

Now, I choose the lazy option and simply post up the images. You take the arduous route and retype everything. It would be most disrespectful if I posted up all the images after you had spent forever transcribing the notes. I won't post them unless you would like me to do so. It's your thunder, I'm not going to steal it. Let me know if you would like me to take the weight off your keyboard.

[jwsleser]

Mark

I am even more perplexed by your approach to this discussion.

Not as much as I am by yours.

Mark 29 Jan: Secondly, the sovereign independence of Yugoslavia and Greece lay entirely in the hands of the German

s.

And that is why you can’t understand my position. Since you accept this as fact, you wish to discuss only the military considerations GIVEN that your statement is true. Because of your statement, Papagos had to be stupid, deceitful, etc. to make the decisions he made. You must discount anything that indicates that there was an option, a hope, a way out.

Since I am discussing why Papagos did what he did (not whether it was right or wrong, I haven’t gotten to that discussion), he certainly understood the possibility that your statement was correct, but he didn’t give up hope that it could be proven false. To do so would mean that anything the Greeks did was hopeless.

Everything I have offered in this discussion is to disprove that fact that everyone ACCEPTED your statement as absolute fact. That is why you wish to discount the conditions that Papagos stated what he stated (the ifs, the assumptions, etc. that were part of his analysis).

The other day, I posted a copy of the telegram sent by Eden to London regarding the prepared statement read out (and handed over) by Koryzis to Eden. It was an English language summary of the original French text. The original text contained a paragraph that did not feature in the English summary sent to London. I think you will see it actually has great bearing on our discussion here.

Is the document of the French translation No. 263? The French you posted states (I am assuming the first two bits go together):

Indeed, we do not know the intentions and decisions of Turkey and Yugoslavia, and much more, the number of soldiers [forces] of the countries that could possibly be given to come to our aid. This question is not only of exceptional importance, but also of extreme urgency.

In these circumstances the arrival…. [this is the start of “Your Excellency’s arrival…” I assume?]

But I wish to repeat to you that, whatever may be the evolution of the situation in general, Greece, with or without hope of repelling the enemy in Macedonia, will defend its national territory, if only with its own forces.

Okay, nothing new.

Take a read of your document 262. Look at paragraph 4, especially the last sentence. Then read paragraph 5 (b).

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

Mark

Okay, now on to...

That is not blame, it is an opinion on what choices they made and why they may have made them. You are doing exactly the same, just coming up with a different explanation as to why? If I am am 'blaming', then so are you too!

No, all I have been doing is discussing why they did what they did and whether there was reason for their actions. I haven't stated whether it was right or wrong. So no, I am not playing the blame game.

We are at odds with one another over whether the choices the Greeks made were coherent, sensible and sound. From bothe a military and political standpoint, you believe they were, I believe they were not.

Again you are wrong. I am saying they were coherent, sensible and sound at the time given their objectives and available information. I am not judging the quality of those decisions against hindsight.

Is this your personal analysis of the situation extrapolated from post-war narratives, or is somebody else's analysis?

It is a summation of primary accounts, mainly Greek.

I don't mean this question disrespectfully. In a couple of your posts, you seem to take offense to the idea that I am posting my thoughts, analysis and opinions and not referencing others. If it's my thoughts, I can't reference my own brain! At the same time, you seem to be quite strict at showing that what you post is what others have written.

Because you are interjecting your own analysis as an outsider with the use of hindsight. If the Allies had held the Germans back for a longer period of time, we likely wouldn't be having this conversation. I have limited myself to what the individuals involved actually said/recorded. Again I am not judging whether they made the right decisions, only that given their objectives, their decisions were quite rational.

Over the coming days, the evidence will be presented that Papagos was the one (as he wrote himself) that suggested the withdrawal to the Vermion mountains and that an urgent move was imperative.

Something you have yet to do.

You have chosen repeatedly to (attempt to) discredit my arguments by claiming that they are derived from hindsight. And yet, all of my arguments are based on information that was available at the time. Our access to hindsight merely confirms that the option chosen was unsound and thus guaranteed military collapse in swift order. Three days.

By your own statements, rapid collapse was in the cards, so this comment is meaningless.

Over the coming days, the evidence will be presented that Papagos was the one (as he wrote himself) that suggested the withdrawal to the Vermion mountains and that an urgent move was imperative.

Again something you have yet to do.

I am not fluent in French, but I believe I understand sufficient to grasp the meaning: the Greeks are choosing to ignore possible help that the Yugoslavs and Turks would/could offer.

Yes you are not fluent in French. See my translation. "This question is not only of exceptional importance, but also of extreme urgency." I don't see any reference to going it alone except out of necessity.

Either this is a complete and deliberate lie to deceive the British as to their real intentions and hopes, or that the decision to stand on the Metaxas Line was not taken on the basis that Yugoslavia would come on side.

You can't be serious. There is nothing in that statement that is new. Stated in multiple books. It actually reaffirms the fact that the status of Yugoslavia is important and supports Papagos' version of the Tatoi meeting.

This paragraph, also in the English summary, and often quoted in post war narratives can be interpreted in many different ways. The most common interpretation - which I think was held by the British at the time - was that Greece would fight Germany regardless of British assistance. Nothing more sinister than that.

Also matches the 18 Jan and 8 Feb notes.

I now think that what is saying is that the Greeks intend to stand on the Metaxas Line with 3 divisions come what may (the 3 divisions are mentionned in an earlier paragraph)!

Now that is a stretch, but hey, go with it.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

Let me expand on this last bit...

I now think that what is saying is that the Greeks intend to stand on the Metaxas Line with 3 divisions come what may (the 3 divisions are mentionned in an earlier paragraph)!

I would like to point out 1) this was a communique, so is general in scope; 2) the Aliakmon Line was in Macedonia. The term eastern Macedonia is used to describe the part that is east of the Axios River.

I will again point out that once Yugoslavia joined the Axis, Papagos began ordering the movement of the units out of eastern Macedonia. Only the coup stopped this movement. This supports the argument that Yugoslavia was the key factor, not Papagos' ... [fill in the blank with any of your pejorative comments about the man].

Like I said, a stretch. When one needs to use such comments as support for their point, the ice is quite thin.

Pista! Jeff

[MarkN]

Jeff,

Somewhat regrettably, it seems we can no longer generate any productive discussion on the subject.

You have your opinion and I have mine. And, where I have no difficulty discussing with somebody who holds a different opinion, you have made it clear that unless I accept your opinion as fact we cannot have a proper discussion. And this (a proper discussion is not possible) has been proven correct.

Everything I have offered in this discussion is to disprove that fact that everyone ACCEPTED your statement as absolute fact. That is why you wish to discount the conditions that Papagos stated what he stated (the ifs, the assumptions, etc. that were part of his analysis).

No sensible discussion can be held if you persist in your efforts to demolish analysis and opinions that I have not stated or assumed.

I have clearly stated that (based upon the evidence you presented) the Greek military analysis and recommendations of 8 February 1941 were not followed by the Greeks. I have no idea how they justify this. Nothing to do with my hindsight and view about the inevitability of the final outcome.

I have clearly stated that the military analysis and recommendations proposed and presented on 22 February 1941 by Papagos were not followed by the Greeks. This was justified by their decision to await a response from the Yugoslavs. To you, it is sound militarily and politically to remain in an untenable ("inadviseable" was Papagos' word as translated by General Heywood) position on the hope that the Yugoslavs have the desire and capability to protect the flank. To me, that was a militarily and politically unsound choice - but you've already stated I have "no idea of military operations". Nevertheless, nothing to do with my hindsight and view about the inevitability of the final outcome.

I have clearly stated that the military analysis and recommendations agreed upon on 22 February were reiterated during the 2-4 March round of meetings by the British: namely that any reasonable chance of military success depended upon a concentration on the Vermion Mountains in the east and a withdrawal of troops from Albania to shorten the lines and provide a single cojoined line rather than three separated defensive lines. Military recommendations made by the Greeks themsleves and agreed to by the British. This time the failure to adopt their own military advice was justified by their fear that the Germans would attack during their move. When you read the minutes of the meetings, you may see things in a different light. I suspect you won't. And again, nothing to do with my hindsight and view about the inevitability of the final outcome.

My arguments are based upon what was known at the time and the choices made by them using the knowledge they had at hand. If I was arguing that Papagos, or other Greeks, were to "blame" for the military failure based upon my hindsight that the "fact [inevitability of failure]that everyone ACCEPTED your statement as absolute fact" then I would conclude the only sensible option would be to capitulate without a fight. I don't conclude that. I have clearly stated that, in my opinion AND that of the Greek and British militaries as documented, with what was known at the time, the best chance for military success leading to better political outcomes, lay in defending the line as recommended by the Greeks themselves in the third option of 8 February. That line being the Greek-Albanian border - Smolikas Mountains - Orliakas Mountains - Aliakmonas River - Olympus Mountains. The Vermion Mountains and the Vevi Pass being, perhaps bing an initial delaying position.

We cannot have a sensible discussion if you persist in altering my arguments to something they are not but which suit your counter-arguments.

Let's leave it here with, I think,
A)
- You believe the only possibility for military success lay in defending the Metaxas Line in conjunction with the Yugoslavs (and perhaps the Turks).
- I believe the better possibility for military success lay in defending the Vermion Mountains initially and other subsequent lines as indicated above.

B)
- You believe that British and Greek efforts to bring Yugoslavia on board prove that the Greeks thought the Metaxas Line was their only chance of salvation.
- I believe the documents demonstrate that the Greeks and British, when time permitted a withdrawal, had disregarded the Metaxas Line as a viable option. At least that's what the Greeks said, perhaps they privately held different views.

C)
- Given your belief in (B), you understand their choices as being coherent and sound.
- Given my belief in (B), I understand their choices as being incoherent and unsound and that they possibly were deliberately deceitful as to their true intentions.

D)
The viability of the Metaxas Line is predicated on the ability of the Yugoslavs to prevent the Germans from falling on the rear of the Metaxas Line.
- You believe, based upon Papagos' writings post war, that this was a realistic scenario.
- I believe, based upon contemporary documentation, that this was an unrealistic scenario.

I have no problem with you holding a alternate opinion to mine. I thought it would be a good recipe for an interesting discussion. Sadly, I was wrong in thinking that.

***

The source documents regarding the meetings 21-22 February and 2-4 March (ie. the minutes of the meetings etc) that I now realise I have, paint a rather different picture to the one that the Greeks were making choices for sound military or political reasons. Complementary documents regarding the British-Turkish and British-Yugoslav meetings and discussions further depict a very pessimistic outlook for effective support from those directions. If time permits, I may get around to posting further on this. Tom may beat me to it with the original words for others to make their own assessments.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Jeff,

In response to Mark's statement:

Over the coming days, the evidence will be presented that Papagos was the one (as he wrote himself) that suggested the withdrawal to the Vermion mountains and that an urgent move was imperative.

You stated that this was :

Something you have yet to do.

Not wanting to intrude on your debates as I unfortunately have very little time to do any real analysis about all this yet, but in the minutes of the military meeting between the Greek and British military representatives we can see what Papagos said (my bold and underlined - same source: PREM3/294/1):

(Most Secret)
RECORD No. 2

Record of Meeting of the British and Greek Military Representatives, held at
Royal Palace at Tatoi, February 22, 1941

Present:

Chief of the Imperial General Staff. General Papagos, Greek Commander-in
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. -Chief.
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Colonel Kitrilakis, Greek War Office
Middle East.
Vice-Admiral Turle, British Military
Mission Greece.
Major-General Heywood, British Military
Mission, Greece.
Brigadier Mallaby, War Office.

1. General Papagos pointed out that the Italian forces in Albania were still increasing. The present situation was that 209 battalions (amounting to the equivalent of the infantry of 34 or 35 divisions) had been identified, and also 197 light batteries, 37 medium or heavy batteries, 3 cavalry regiments and 5 tank battalions (total, 250 tanks, mostly light with some 13-tonners).

2. General Papagos gave an account of Greek plans for the eventuality of a German attack. He explained that Greek forces in Eastern Macedonia consisted of only three divisions, with a total of –

Four mountain batteries.
Twelve field batteries.
Seven modern heavy batteries.
Eight old-type heavy batteries.

and in Thrace of –

Thirteen battalions,
Three field batteries,
Two mountain batteries.

There were no A.A. or A/Tk. guns in these areas.
24

3. He went on to discuss the choice of a defensive line to face a German attack. This must depend primarily on the attitude of Yugoslavia, which was, of course, a political matter. The Greek aim was to establish a front behind which forces from Albania could withdraw, since the moment Germany attacked, operations in Albania would have to be restricted to the defensive.
Should Yugoslavia come in, the line to be held would be one covering Salonika. Otherwise, there was only one possible line from the military point of view, namely –
Mt. Olympus – Veria – Edessa – Kajmakealan (referred to as the “Aliakmon line”)
If this was held, all troops to the east of it must be pulled in to hold it, otherwise they will be cut off by the enemy coming through the Rupel Pass.

4. The Greeks had an agreement with the Turks to hold a bridgehead about Demotika in order to enable the Turks to take the offensive into Bulgaria and turn the right of the Bulgarian line. This agreement held good only if Turkey took the offensive; should she declare war but make no attack, the obligation lapsed. If, however, the Turks declared war and promised an offensive a little later on, it would be necessary to leave the Greek forces in Thrace; they would then be maintained (except for weapons &c., peculiar to the Greek army) by the Turks.

5. General Papagos realised the extreme importance of time, which made it impossible to wait for Yugoslavia and Turkey to declare themselves. He had therefore asked his Government for permission to begin the withdrawal as soon as possible, and, in any case, before a German move made the withdrawal look like a retreat. It could be made to appear that the Greek troops were being sent to reinforce the Albanian front. Troops would be withdrawn first from rear areas in Macedonia, then (if agreed with Turkey) from Thrace, and lastly from the frontier of Macedonia.
The time required to withdraw the troops from Thrace and Macedonia was 20 days.

6. When the withdrawal was complete the Greeks would have 35 battalions on the Aliakmon line, plus one division (motorised) at Larissa, and possibly one more from reserve. It would then be possible to withdraw the right of the line in Albania.

7. There would then remain only frontier guards and light covering troops on the Bulgarian frontier. These would fight to the last in all positions prepared for all-round defence; from other positions they would withdraw after delaying action. A plan had been prepared for demolitions in Eastern Macedonia, to be carried out by detachments of troops left for this purpose. A similar plan was under consideration for the Vardar Valley.

8. There would be no other delaying actions fought in advance of the Aliakmon line, since the Greek troops were insufficiently mobile for this task and would inevitably be cut off and destroyed. If Yugoslavia did not intervene, the main weight of the German attack would come down the Struma Valley, and perhaps by violating Yugoslav territory down the Strumnitsa.

9. General Papagos was asked how he would propose to employ the British force if it were accepted as offered.
He replied that it would all be needed on the Aliakmon line, which required 8 divisions and one division in reserve to hold it in strength. It must be held for 20 – 25 days to allow for the withdrawal from Albania, and this period might well be longer, since the Italians would be pressing the Greeks as they withdrew.
There might be some difficulty in finding sectors of the line suitable for the high degree of mechanisation of the British forces, and in deploying so large a number of motor-drawn guns.
10. If time allowed and suitable plans could be prepared, British forces, which were suitably organised, might be used for delaying action in front of the Aliakmon line.
11. The British force could not disembark at Salonika, but must use Piraeus and Volos. Though the use of Salonika would help towards a more rapid concentration, its use must depend on whether Yugoslavia took action or not.
Salonika was vital to Yugoslavia; if she realised the danger and came in, the Nestos River line was the best to hold, and it needed no larger forces than would the Struma line; moreover, Kavalla would then be available as a port in addition to Salonika.
12. If Yugoslavia said to-night that she was going to fight, the Greeks would hold the Nestos line and ask the British to land at Salonika and Kavalla.
25
Asked if the Greeks could cover disembarkation at Salonika, General Papagos said they would do their best; their were 10 heavy and 32 light AA guns at Salonika. If the Aliakmon line was held, these guns would remain at Salonika till the last phase of the withdrawal to that line.

13. The Germans could concentrate three or four divisions on the frontier in 12 days, allowing for the practicability of bridging the Danube and for all wheeled vehicles to go by road. This meant that they could attack with three divisions in the Rupel Pass area, and the Greeks would have no chance of holding such an attack.

14. Asked whether a change from offensive to defensive in Albania would release an air forces to cover the Aliakmon line, General Papagos said no, and the air forces covering the Albanian front might, indeed, have to be increased, since the Italian offensive would be mainly by air action.

15. The Germans would need 20 days, if the demolitions had been made, from the time of crossing the frontier before they could be ready to attack the Aliakmon line in sufficient strength. The line was naturally strong and the 35 Greek battalions with the British forces offered should be able to hold it. There were no fortifications, but field works constructed by the troops themselves should suffice. To ensure that the demolitions were not prevented by parachutists or air-borne troops, the Greeks hoped to arm a local militia force; rifles were needed for this purpose.

16. If equipment could be found, the Greeks could raise two more divisions.

17. Finally, General Papagos asked whether the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff were in agreement with him on the military views which he had expressed. They replied that, from the military point of view, they entirely agreed. The meeting then adjourned.

One factor that neither the Greeks nor Yugoslavs seems to have considered is the sheer impossibility of keeping Salonika open against Luftwaffe attack no matter where the much-discussed line was to be. The British seem to be thinking about it (see para 12), but I'm not sure that they were thinking hard enough about it - despite the lessons of Dunkirk and Namsos.

Regards

Tom

[jwsleser]

Thanks Tom!

I appreciate that we (meaning Mark and I) haven't scared you off.

Not wanting to intrude on your debates as I unfortunately have very little time to do any real analysis about all this yet, but in the minutes of the military meeting between the Greek and British military representatives we can see what Papagos said (my bold and underlined - same source: PREM3/294/1):

Please do intrude when you have time.

First nothing new here. Many of the sources restate what is contained in the document. Cruickshank cites it on pages 101-104. Bilzes on pages

Let me go through the document (I will skip paragraphs as needed). if anyone feels that I skipped something impportant, please point it out.

Para 3: States choice of the defensive line must depend primarily on attitude of Yugoslavia. The proposed withdraw in Albania is for defense in Albania (restricted to defense). States with Yugoslavia, line to cover Salonika. Otherwise Aliakmon Line.

Para 5. States to start withdrawal eastern forces immediately (not Albanian forces, see cover story).

Para 6. States forces on Aliakmon Line. None of these units are from Albania. Note the comment about the Albanian right. This is to occupy a better defense in Albania (see P3). Important below.

Para 8. Note the comment "if Yugoslavia did not intervene".

Para 9. Here is an interesting bit. Aliakmon Line must be held for 20-25 days to allow Albanian forces to withdrawal. Does this mean that they withdraw would happen immediately after the withdrawal and manning of the Aliakmon Line without any German attack, or does it mean to hold 20-25 days once the Germans attack begins. I believe the latter as that P3, P5, P6, P14 all indicate that Albania would be defended.

Para 11 and 12. Again the issue of Yugoslavia pops up.

Para 14. No air reinforcement from Albania.

So to recap what I previously stated and is supported here, Yugoslavia still has a impact on the decision, no withdrawal from Albania, no help from Greek forces in Albania. if you count the Greek units in the east, you find the total are the 35 battalions.

Now to Document 262 posted by Mark (Tatoi agreements)

Para 4. Again Yugoslavia. Note it states "..., it emerged that in view of the doubtful attitude of Yugoslavia the only line that could be held and would time for withdraw of troops from Albania would be a line west [... i.e. the Aliakmon Line]. If we could be sure of Yugoslav moves it should be possible to hold a line further north [... i.e. Metaxas Line]." Next sentence reinforces issue of Yugoslavia.

Para 5 (a) The Set-up for what comes next. Trip to Yugoslavia.

Para 5(b). [The Money Line] Read it out loud. Read it with the commas.

Tom I hadn't noticed before but read para 5(g). Here the issue of the Germans crossing the Greek border appears. Maybe there is something to Koryzis changing the the point of Greek acceptance of aid. I have a copy Cruickshank again, so I see the comment on page 99.

So to Mark's comment. Yes he stated that and also stated he was requesting permission. So Mark is correct that he stated it.

Note the entire discussion still has Yugoslavia clearly in the picture. Note that both sides still accepted that Yugoslavia is added valve. Note the final agreement is what Papagos stated it was and doesn't state immediate withdrawal.

Thanks again Tom

Pista Jeff

[jwsleser]

Mark

I have no issues with discussing differences. I recognized early on that the political understanding of the problem would lead to deadlock and said as such. I am sorry if you couldn't understand that. To discuss the operational and tactical level decisions without clarifying the strategic and political is pointless.

How does one discuss whether the Metaxas Line, the Aliakmon Line, or the Smolikas-Olympus Line is militarily better if we disagree on the purpose that the defense is supposed to enable and the conditions under which it will fight? What are the risks vice the rewards?

I am sorry that you can't get your head around that.

I am also sorry that you believe this deadlock is a one-way street. IIRC it takes two to Tango

Your statements below clearly demonstrate this problem.

A)
- You believe the only possibility for military success lay in defending the Metaxas Line in conjunction with the Yugoslavs (and perhaps the Turks).
Papagos believed there were several options as I outlined. Given the need for Yugoslavian support, It was the best line to defend Salonika. It has nothing to do with the best military defensive line without understanding the political objective of the line.
- I believe the better possibility for military success lay in defending the Vermion Mountains initially and other subsequent lines as indicated above.
You could be correct. However you also stated that "I have argued that defeat in detail was inevitable, and the only chance of, perhaps, delaying that inevitability was for the defensive line to be shortened significantly." So no, you don't believe in military success. The better line doesn't doesn't matter. This is part of our inability to discuss the issue.

B)
- You believe that British and Greek efforts to bring Yugoslavia on board prove that the Greeks thought the Metaxas Line was their only chance of salvation.
You like to ask twisted questions. Everyone (not me) stated that Salonika was important in any attempt to gain Yugoslavian support. Given the need for Yugoslavian support, it was the best line to defend Salonika. It has nothing to do with the best military defensive line without understanding the political objective of the line.
- I believe the documents demonstrate that the Greeks and British, when time permitted a withdrawal, had disregarded the Metaxas Line as a viable option. At least that's what the Greeks said, perhaps they privately held different views.
Then you are wrong. Read the notes Tom posted. If Yugoslavia was not an objective, then the Aliakomon was considered the better line. It is an if/then situation, not which is the absolute best. Again you wish to ignore the stated conditions that make the Aliakmon Line better in the conversations on 22 Feb.

C)
- Given your belief in (B), you understand their choices as being coherent and sound.
I believe Papagos believed his choices were coherent and sound. My belief isn't important.
- Given my belief in (B), I understand their choices as being incoherent and unsound and that they possibly were deliberately deceitful as to their true intentions.
Good for you.

D)
The viability of the Metaxas Line is predicated on the ability of the Yugoslavs to prevent the Germans from falling on the rear of the Metaxas Line.
- You believe, based upon Papagos' writings post war, that this was a realistic scenario.
The generals at the time felt it was a viable option.
- I believe, based upon contemporary documentation, that this was an unrealistic scenario.
Yet everyone at the time thought it would work.

Okay a question for you.

If Yugoslavia stated on 22 Feb that they would immediately join Greece and the UK, and that they need Salonika, which line should the Allies defend? Metaxas or Aliakmon?

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

I feel it will help to look at the timeline of this period with the important dates on it. If any see something I missed, please add.

The three (four) goals (G) for Greek success:

1. Prevent a German attack.
2. Defeat the Italians by themselves.
3. Form/create a Balkan Alliance
4. The UK provides the needed military force (the nature of the discussion has assumed the historical level of UK support. This was a possible option up until 22 February).

8 February – Greece informs the UK that is will fight to defend its territory. Greece informs the UK that they would consider UK military support but need to know what the UK could offer.

13 February – Greeks start Tepelini Offensive in Albania (attempting G2).

22 February Tatoi Meeting. UK can only provide limited military support, G4 is not an option. UK pressed for immediate decision on either Metaxas or Aliakmon Line, with the UK heavily in favor of the latter. Decision was to check with Yugoslavia first before final decision.

24 February – UK delivers question to Yugoslavians.

27 February – Yugoslavian responds to UK in Ankara that they will remain neutral. Information not passed to the Greeks.

28 February – End of Tepelini Offensive. Greeks recognize they can’t defeat the Italians by themselves (eliminates G2 as an option).

2 March – Germans begin to enter Bulgaria. Strong indicator that G1 is eliminated. Would have been the trigger for Greeks to ask for UK assistance.

3-4 March – Meeting with UK. Greeks first learn of Yugoslavia response. Greeks state too dangerous to withdraw forces from Metaxas Line. New defense plan adopted. Western Thrace is abandon except for screening companies.

5 March – UK again approaches Yugoslavia. No change.

7 March – Lead UK units land in Piraeus.

8 March – Meets with Yugoslavian GS representative (working G3). Greeks are encouraged, but no agreements.

9 March – Start of Italian Primavera Offensive. Lead German units arrive at Bulgarian-Greek border.

15 March – Peak intensity of Primavera Offensive.

26 March – End of Primavera Offensive. Greece barely manages to stop Italians. Greek Army is in poor condition.

25 March – Yugoslavia joins Axis (eliminates G3).

25-26 March – Greek-UK meetings to adjust plan based on Yugoslavian status. Papagos orders movement of forces from Metaxas Line to Aliakmon Line. Word received late evening 26 that coup was pending.

27 March – Yugoslavia coup, G3 is again an option. Greek/UK decision to reinforce Beles area.

3 April – Meeting with Yugoslavian GS. Yugoslavians agreed to Greek plan.

6 April – German offensive begins (G1 clearly eliminated as an option).

7-8 April – Joint Greek/Yugoslavian attack against Italians.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

February. A month where Mark feels a lot could have been done but in his opinion, nothing was done.

Greece was working two of their possible goals: Avoiding a German attack and trying to defeat the Italians. The former required Greece to avoid any actions that the Germans could use as a casus belli. This continued the policy Greece had followed since 28 Oct 1940. They avoided inviting UK ground forces and forbade the use of Greek airfields that could be used to attack Romania and the German oil supplies.

They also didn’t want to present weakness to Bulgaria that was currently ‘on the fence’ about joining the Axis. Bulgaria had its own territorial designs of access to the Aegean, and abandoning western Thrace and eastern Macedonia could encourage Bulgaria to become aggressive and precipitate the action Greece wished to avoid.

The Greeks lacked the strength to defend the Aliakmon Line. The Metaxas Line was shorter, had permanent fortifications, and provided operational depth. It also didn't risk Greek morale that could be impacted by a withdrawal that many would see as unnecessary. mMrk likes to point out that Papagos stated the Aliakmon Line was the better option, but forgets that that COA required the UK forces. Those forces weren't available before 22 February (for planning only).

The latter was the goal of the Tepelini offensive. If Greece could defeat Italy, she could focus the bulk of her military force against a possible German attack. By the end of the month the offensive failed to gain the decisive strategic result. Only time would tell whether avoid a German attack was successful.

February wasn't a wasted month. The Greeks were fighting a major campaign in the west and had to project an strong posture in the east against the Bulgarians. Without Yugoslavia or the UK, there was little else the Greeks could do.

Next the possibility of a withdrawal of Greek forces from Albania.

As I noted in a previous post, any withdrawal was based on decisions made in the eastern part of the country. Any withdrawal was to be executed after forces were repositioned in the east.

The timeline tells us that the Greek Tepelini offensive didn’t end until 28 February. The Tatoi meeting on 22 Feb decided the need to clarify the Yugoslavian position. That answer wasn’t provided to the Greeks until 3 March. A new plan was agreed to on 4 March. The Italian offensive started on 9 March to 26 March. The Yugoslavia coup happened on 27 March.

If a decision was taken on 4 March to withdraw all Greek forces to the Aliakmon Line, 20 days would put the date at 24 March. That would require a decision about the Metaxas/Aliakmon Lines on 17 February, 5 days before the Greeks learned that the UK military support was quite limited. As I pint out above, Greece lack the military strength on its own to defend the Aliakmon Line. The Metaxas Line was the better opinion under those conditions.

The Italian offensive wouldn’t end until the 25 March, and of course the Greeks likely needed a few days to insure it was truly over. Regardless of any decision to withdraw the forces from Albania, the earliest any movement likely could begin was 1 April. There wasn’t enough time for a withdrawal to have any impact on the fighting. As I earlier noted, the intent of the withdrawal wasn’t to provide significant forces to the east. The size of the Italian military effort completely consumed the Greek forces.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

To address Mark’s comments about the period 8-22 February 1941 (MarkN » 01 Feb 2016, 16:41). He asks

On 8 February, the Greeks themsleves had produced what I believe was reasonably sound (with a major caveat I will shortly address) analysis of their predicament and solid military recommendations how to deal with each of the three possibilities they identified. This was not followed. I have yet come across a satisfactory explanation why.

No decision needed to be made in February until the nature of the problem began to resolve itself. Until then, the Greeks had no reason not to hold the Metaxas Line because that was their national territory. As none of the conditions for any of the three COAs had been met, they protected all of Greece. Germany wasn’t directly threating Greece (hadn’t crossed into Bulgaria), the availability and scale of the UK support was unknown, and the status of Yugoslavia hadn’t been clarified.

All these plans reflected a level of UK forces that weren’t available in January/February. Note that the UK forces are assumptions as the UK government hadn’t decided to send troops to Greece, not had they decided the size of the force. One objective of the 22 Feb meeting was to inform the Greeks on the size of UK force. So Mark is arguing that the Greeks should select and implement a plan in which none of the required parameters had been satisfied.

Now, the Greek analysis seemed to equate Yugoslav diplomatic position to military capability. Thus, if the Yugoslavs are on 'our' side, the Germans can't come through South Serbia and thus our 'northern' front is secure. This leads to Option A and the recommendation that the Metaxas Line can be held as there is not threat to their left flank. This is flawed as proven by history.

This statement offers a False Dilemma. Nothing states that the Greeks assumed any such thing. In fact, as I believe Mark himself had mentioned in previous posts that the Greeks and UK discussed options in the case of such action by the Germans.

Once again I point out the use of hindsight to argue the Greek decisions were wrong. I have shown that everyone through the Yugoslavians would offer a better degree of military resistance. While the decision was proven wrong by history, there is nothing to state it was wrong at the time. As General de Guingand wrote in his Operation Victory [the third week in March 1941, page 72] “Yugo-Slavia appeared to be the one potential bright spot. If they really fought the Germans, then the whole thing might be worth while.” He was at many of the meetings, we were not. I have previous posted many other comments echoing similar thoughts on the Yugoslavians.

Option B is a bit confusing. If Germans have no access to South Serbia, again there is no threat to the left flank of the Metaxas Line. Here I don't see their logic.

Given equal levels of manning, the Metaxas Line is the stronger. It is shorter and has the fixed fortifications. Its vulnerability is if the front is pierced in the Strumma Valley area, the forces in eastern Macedonia are cut off. This is an acceptable risk if Thessaloniki must be held. If that is not important, the Aliakmon Line offers less risk of a portion of the army being isolated.

And considering option 1 and 2 together, I summise the Greeks have concluded Yugoslav being an ally will mean Yugoslav troops will be available to strengthen the Metaxas Line itself.

No.

Finally, Option C is premised around the assumption, and correct recognition, that they will need all their forces sitting ready and prepared (in advance) on a shortened line if they are to stand any chance of repelling an attack from South Serbia.

A German attack from southern Serbia that is uncontested by Yugoslavia, yes. Shorter line? No, the Smolikas-Olympus Line was longer. This line also opens all of northern Greece to the Italian forces.

In effect, two things can be concluded from this reality. First, Yugoslavia perceived as an ally, with the decisions made by the Greeks based upon what they perceived the ally could do for them, actually was their downfall; it would have been better for Yugoslavia to be a foe(on paper).

Using hindsight, I have no issue with this statement. As I have stated, Yugoslavia was one the few ways Greece might survive. The fact that Yugoslavia failed doesn’t mean Greece shouldn’t have tried.

The question is how does this damn Papagos and make him into an incompetent and being willfully deceitful? How was Paapgos to know all this when everyone else also believe all this? Mark has yet to demonstrate that Papagos should have drawn different conclusions by providing what he knew that obviously led him to different conclusions. As I have repeatedly identified, all these conclusions are drawn from hindsight.

I have yet to be shown a Cassandra to Papagos’ Priam.

Next will be the Tatoi Meeting and aftermath (22 Feb-4 March).

Pista! Jeff

[Tom from Cornwall]

Jeff,

One quick question, you say that in Feb 41:

Greece was working two of their possible goals: Avoiding a German attack and trying to defeat the Italians.

Have you seen any sources that explain why the Greeks thought that these two goals weren't incompatible? Did the Greeks think that the Germans would stand aside while the Italians were ejected from Albania or forced into a whole-sale surrender?

Regards

Tom

[jwsleser]

Tom

I am not sure whether I fully understand your question. If I missed your point, please ask again.

I will need to check. I don't feel incompatibility is an issue/consideration.

Off hand, avoiding a German attack was carried over from the pre-Oct 40 period. Adding Germany to the list of enemies could only make things worst. So a worthy goal on its own.

Defeating Italy was the one option that was available to Greece that didn't (initially at least) depend on others. The military events of Nov-Jan indicated that a military victory was possible. If successful, worst case for Greece is facing Germany without Italy at their back, a significant improvement to what historically happened. Best case is once Italy is defeated, would Germany still see the need to 'save' Italy at that point? If Greece can convince Germany that she will honor her neutrality (and had already demonstrated the military capacity to do so), what requires Germany to invade Greece?

The two Greek offensives were in January and February. There wasn't much Germany could do to militarily help Italy. At this time Germany too was keeping options open. Worst case for Greece if Germany intervened is no different than what happened. No new threat is created by trying to defeat Italy.

Keeping options open is always the best strategy in diplomacy and military operations. Options mean flexibility. Once you close an option, you lose flexibility. The Greek political and military decisions in Jan-April 41 were all about keeping options open. None of their options were a guaranteed road to success. Some were better than others. They tried to keep as many of them open until they knew it would fail.

This is one of Mark's main issues with the Greeks during this time frame. He has argued that the decision was clear and the sooner the Greeks made a decision the better. I have little doubt that if the UK had offered 9-10 divisions, the Greeks would have jumped at it. But what was offered was 1 1/2 divisions which might grow to 3. Too much uncertainly and too much risk when other options were still open. As the UK offer stood, it still required the Yugoslavians for success.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

22 February - 4 March 1941

To address the Tatoi meeting.

To summarise briefly the following key points (among others) were brought up and discussed.
- Papagos laid out his plan to remain in Albania and stand on the Metaxas Line.

No, he outline three plans as you indicated below and the criteria to make the decision. He didn't state that he would stand on the Metaxas Line. Complete misrepresentation of what Papagos said.

- That Yugoslavia's position (not military capability) was crucial to Greece's strategic defensive posture.

No. I assume this idea came from Record No 2 para 3. “This must depend on the attitude of Yugoslavia, which was, of course, a political matter.” This sentence is stating that determining Yugoslavia’s future role in this matter is for the politicians to resolve. Since the differences between the three COAS are based on the Yugoslavs’ ability/willingness to defend their territory, once the politicians have answer the question, the military could then determine the COA.

- That standing on the Metaxas Line was intended to both protect Salonika AND provide a delaying feature in order to withdraw units from Albania.

Yes and no. The purpose of holding the Metaxas Line was to hold a shorter, better line and protect Thessaloniki. As I have pointed out, there wasn’t any intent to withdraw from Albania if either the Metaxas or Aliakmon Line were held until the actual German attack. The requirement to hold the Aliakmon Line for 20 days is based on the German attack.

- That without Yugoslavia, they would stand on the Vermion Line.

Again a false presentation of the decision. The Aliakmon Line would be selected if the Yugoslavians remain neutral but will defend their territory against the Germans. If the Yugoslavians would not defend their territory, the Allies would occupy the Smolikas-Olympus Line. A very significant difference.

- That forces in Albania were at major risk if not withdrawn.

Only if the Allies can’t hold the Aliakmon Line. The Greeks agreed that once the German attack began, the Greek forces would withdraw from Albania.

- That the British considered a stand on the Metaxas Line unsound with less than 9 divisions, and refused to move their contribution that far forward.

The UK refused to move their forces forward without Yugoslavia clearly announcing their intent to join the Allies. They recognized the challenges of hold forward, but they felt is would be worth the risk if Yugoslavia was an active partner. Mark earlier used the phrase cup half full/empty. The Greeks and the UK both recognized that abandoning Thessaloniki before there was a real threat could negatively impact a Yugoslavian decision to join the Allies, an outcome both partners saw as desirable. The UK saw the cup as half empty, the Greeks as half full. Neither was right or wrong, but the Greek view better preserved options that supported their goal of surviving.

You will, note that the risk to the forces in Albania, and discussion about their withdrawal was indeed very much under consideration. I believe you have commented that published history does not seem to record this or plays down its significance. It pays to make ones own analysis as well as relying on the anaysis of published authors.

No it wasn’t. It was all depended on the actions/decisions in the east. The actual documents clearly shows this as I pointed out in my earlier post. The forces in Epirus would retreat once the Germans attacked. I don't know why Mark keeps trying to make the withdrawal of Greek forces in the west as a requirement to occupy either the Metaxas or Aliakmon Lines. That is not the case as all the documents and books demonstrate. I will again point out that my comment was made in regards to Mark linking the decision-to-occupy to a decision-to-withdraw.

The rest of Mark’s post is repeating what has already been addressed.

In toto:

1. Yugoslavia joins the Allies: defend Metaxas Line. Begin withdrawal of forces in Albania when the Germans attack.

2. Yugoslavia neutral but actively defends its territory: Defend the Aliakmon Line. Begin withdrawal of forces in Albania when the Germans attack.

In both 1 and 2 some readjustment is done in Albania to make a better line and possibly release some forces for the east.

3. Yugoslavia joins the Axis: defend the Smolikas-Olympus Line. Everything withdrawals from Albania.

So what happened at the Tatoi meeting and why are there two different understandings? Actually I now believe that both accounts are true and the timeline holds the key.

The agreement (Document 263) paragraph 5.(b) supports Papagos’ version of the agreement: "That the Greeks should at once make, and began execution of, preparations to withdraw the advance troops to the line which we should hold if the Yugoslavs were not willing to come in". Diagramming the sentence clearly shows that ‘at once make’ and ‘begin execution’ are adverbs to the verb ‘withdraw ‘ for the noun ‘preparations’.

Connelly in his biography of Wavell quotes Wavell’s notes from the Tatio meeting (page 339). Connelly was allowed access to Wavell’s papers,

[22 Feb] “Line to be held depends largely on Yugoslav attitude. If Germans attack, offensive operations in Albania must stop. We must therefore establish a line behind which Albanian front can withdraw. If Y.S. do not play, Aliakmon is only possible line and all troops in E. Macedonia must be withdrawn to it.”

Note that no withdrawal from Albania until Germans attack. Note that the decision depends on Yugoslav position. Note the last line is an if/then statement. So Wavell’s own notes support Papagos’ version of the meeting. Later that same evening Wavell writes (page 341):

“Conference 10.45 p.m..: Papagos; APW 11.10p.m.-11.20; S of S re Y-Slavs: proposal to send staff officer to see Prince Paul; Question of command; final acceptance 11.50 p.m.”

Here it is agreed to send a representative to Prince Paul. Again supports Papagos’ version.

So how can both versions be correct? Look at the timeline.

Both sides agreed to approach the Yugoslavians one more time. This happened on 24 February. The British received the answer on the 27th. No one told the Greeks. When the Allies met again on 2 March, the British are thinking that the Greeks already knew and had acted in accordance with the decision of 22 Feb. The Greeks were still waiting for an answer, so hadn’t made any changes.

I had though that I had puzzled this out by myself but I discovered I was not the first. While checking Higham this morning to verify some dates, I found he had advanced this same argument (pages 131-132). No new discovery for me.

In all, I feel I have shown that Papagos and the Greeks had been honest and direct when dealing with the UK. They were consistent and were following their own analysis. They were between a rock and a hard place and played the game as best they could. As I noted in the post right before this one, the Greeks didn't wish to close any options until they had to. The UK sources all mention this (if not by using the same words, clearly by showing the same intent).

The real question for me is 2-5 March. I was hoping that Mark and I could have reach this point together, as that is the real meat of the discussion.

Pista! Jeff