italian campaign

[scarecrow]

While looking at Amazon for a book about the Italian Campaign, I found this extract of a review:
This is the story of this backwater campaign, a series of battles skillfully staged by the Germans and so botched by the Allies that their victory was achieved only as a result of German exhaustion.


Is it true that the campaign was badly mishandled by the allies?
I m hoping for your comments and opinions about this

Thanks in advance

cédric

[JonS]

The Allies were generally attacking against odds in Italy (ie, had odds lower than 1:1). Given that the aims of the campaign were to
a) pitch Italy out of the war, and
b) tie down German forces, and
c) make bases for strat bombers available

I'd say that they were able to do all three, and clear all of Italy before the end of the war in Europe, and do it all with a disadvantage in manpower, means they must have been doing something right.

Whether they were the right objectives, and whether more forces (or less, I suppose) should have been sent to Italy is a seperate argument, I think. The forces that were in Italy did a reasonable job with what they had. Natch there were screw-ups, but overall it was a good result.

What do you think, and why?

Regards
Jon

[scarecrow]

JonS wrote:

What do you think, and why?

Well, i know that there was a big argument between the British and the Americans about the goals of the Italian campaign. The British wanted to concentrate much more on italy and i believe they even favored to attack germany through italy and forget the invasion through France. The Americans on the other hand saw the Italian theater only as secondary( much to the disapointment of Gen.Clark ) in order to tie down german resources which could be used in Normandy and to crush one of germany's allies.

However, some believe the italian campaign was launched not to achieve any strategic goal( like forcing germany to send troops to italy) or to put italy out of the war (at that stage, italy didn't contribute very much to the axis war effort) but rather to appease Stalin who was constantly pushing the allies to open a second front in the west

I believe that they did it for the 3 reasons but also to serve as a test for the Normandy invasion

However what i meant by the extract was that the allied leadership mishandled the campaign (especially gen. Clark) and that victory could have been achieved faster and easier had the campaign been differently managed.

As to :

The Allies were generally attacking against odds in Italy (ie, had odds lower than 1:1). Given that the aims of the campaign were to
a) pitch Italy out of the war, and
b) tie down German forces, and
c) make bases for strat bombers available

I'd say that they were able to do all three, and clear all of Italy before the end of the war in Europe, and do it all with a disadvantage in manpower, means they must have been doing something right.

Isn't it so that the allies managed to achieve victory because the germans were so weak and not because of the allied superiority???

cédric

[JonS]

Isn't it so that the allies managed to achieve victory because the germans were so weak and not because of the allied superiority???

No.

[Michate]

The Allies were generally attacking against odds in Italy (ie, had odds lower than 1:1).

and

I'd say that they were able to do all three, and clear all of Italy before the end of the war in Europe, and do it all with a disadvantage in manpower, means they must have been doing something right.

It is doubtful that the Allies had less manpower in Italy than the axis, at least after Italy had left the axis.

At least the following data does not support that statement:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. A compilation of strength data points of the German army strength in Italy, taken from this message by Qvist:

1.) 1 May 1944

Directly under HG C: 31,825
AOK 10: 149,460
AOK 14: 127,300
AG v. Zangen: 59,031
Other: 6,158
TOTAL = 373,744

(BA-MA RH2-1341/18, Iststärke des Feldheeres). Not stated if W-SS units are included here, but seen against the figures under 4) below, it seems clear that they are not.

On 1 March 1944, strength on the same basis was 330,572 (1341/13).

2.) 1 July 1944:

Category (Verbände/fe. Heerestruppen)
Iststärke: 258,521/33,282
Tagesstärke: 232,293/26,787
Kampfstärke: 96,288/10,659

(1341/31-32)

3.) Estimated strength of HG C on 1 May 1945: 200,000 (1341/65)

4.) Iststärke of HG C from 1 July 1943 to 1 July 1944 (with/without SS+LW gorund combat)

0743 – 195,000/191,000
0843 – 247,000/209,000
0943 – 371,000/315,000
1043 – 314,000/275,000
1143 – 338,000/296,000
1243 – 299,000/264,000
0144 – 299,000/248,000
0244 – 318,000/251,000
0344 – 370,000/331,000
0444 – 393,000/366,000
0544 – 428,000/374,000
0644 - not known
0744 – 411,000/350,000

(RH2-1339/31)

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2. Some additional data on German strength in Italy according to the East German official history ("Deutschland im 2. Weltkrieg", scattered through Vols. 4 - 6):

- April 1944: total strength: 412,000 (including army, air force, navy, SS + Police, but it seems not the Italians serving with the Germans).


- Strength of 14. Army, 1 September 1944:
Tagesstärke (strength of the day): 94,133 (including 943 Italians)
Gefechtsstärke (fighting strength): 45,242
Kampfstärke (combat strength): 31,502

- Strength of divisions + subordinated troops within 10. Army, 2 October 1944:
Tagesstärke (strength of the day): 94,332
Gefechtsstärke (fighting strength): 54,725
Kampfstärke (combat strength): 38,508

- November 1944 (divisions and brigades only):

Iststärke (actual strength): 273,000
Tagesstärke (strength of the day): 241,000

This suggests a total strength slightly higher than in July 1944.


- strength on 1 March 1945:
10. Army: 116,766
14. Army: 94,015
Army group Liguria: 66,319

- 7 April 1945: total strength = 439,334 Germans + 160,180 Italians (including all services, civilians…), including:
10. Army:………….125,890
14. Army:……………87,670
Army group Liguria: 51,861

---------------------------------------------------------

3. The same work provides some figures for strength of the Allied forces in Italy (based on a work by Nicholson):

1 April 1944:
8 British army:…..190,182
5 US army:………359,565
all forces in Italy:.1,577,932 (including air force and navy, …)

April 1945:
8 British army:…..350,642 (including 70,468 Polish soldiers)
5 US army:………266,000
all forces in Italy:.1,500,000 (apparently an estimate only)

Even taking into account the total numbers for the Allies include strategic air forces and a large supply organisation, the Allies do not appear to have had a disadvantage in manpower.

Regards.

[JonS]

I should have been clear - I was only talking about 5th and 8th Armies.

[Michate]

But their strength seems not to have been inferior compared to that of the German armies they faced, though an adequate comparison is of course very difficult in terms of what should be included or not.

[RichTO90]

But their strength seems not to have been inferior compared to that of the German armies they faced, though an adequate comparison is of course very difficult in terms of what should be included or not.

If you simply compare the HG C Ist to the strength reported by US Fifth and British Eighth Army on 1 April 1944 you find the Allied manpower advantage is only 1.4-to-1, which given the terrain advantages is hardly a massive advantage. And it certainly is nothing like the 2-to-1 or greater advantage the Allies enjoyed circa 1 July 1944 in Normandy.

Overall, the campaign was relatively advantageous to the Allies in terms of eliminating Axis strength - 90 percent of the Italian armed forces on one day - and continuing to die down Axis forces in the Med so that they were unavailable in other more critical theaters of war. That it also tied down a proportionately larger Allied force is only simple logic, if the Allied force had been smaller then the Germans would either have defeated it or ignored it and reduced their forces in turn. In either case there was nowhere else for the Allied forces to be employed prior to spring 1944, so any attempts to claim the campaign was "wasted" are specious.

[Andreas]

I think a straightforward comparison of numbers beyond what Rich has outlined is not too productive. Italy is a country in which combat power multipliers are very important. I think it speaks for the allies that they managed to defeat the Germans ahead of the general surrender, despite not enjoying a manpower advantage comparable to that enjoyed by the allies in north-western Europe. It certainly does not indicate to me that the campaign was "botched" by them, even though individual aspects certainly were.

The review on Amazon appears to me to have little relation to what happened in Italy.

All the best

Andreas

[RichTO90]

I think a straightforward comparison of numbers beyond what Rich has outlined is not too productive. Italy is a country in which combat power multipliers are very important. I think it speaks for the allies that they managed to defeat the Germans ahead of the general surrender, despite not enjoying a manpower advantage comparable to that enjoyed by the allies in north-western Europe. It certainly does not indicate to me that the campaign was "botched" by them, even though individual aspects certainly were.

The review on Amazon appears to me to have little relation to what happened in Italy.

All the best

Andreas

Exactly. Elements were badly handled, but fundamentally, given that it was essentially a backwater for the Allies and the resources allocated to it were always the bare minimum, expecting more from the campaign or characterizing it as "botched" is unreasonable.

[Michate]

I just might add I did not want to imply anything like wastage or disaster. I more or less stumbled about the data by default and thought they might be worthwile to be shared.

[Andreas]

I don't think you did. Adding the data is certainly extremely helpful to the discussion.

All the best

Andreas

[pitman]

The calculus of the Italian campaign is very difficult. Not only do you have to account for changing goals during the campaign itself, but also the combatants' respective satisfaction or lack thereof in the campaign. Supporters for both Axis and Allies' conduct of the campaigns in Italy have basically argued that the campaign served its purpose in tying down large numbers of the other side's forces. I think it probably works out to a draw.

Both sides also sent lots of second rate or otherwise problematic units to the theater.

Other than tying down opponents' forces, neither side has much to boast about in terms of strategic goals. Once the Allies got the Foggia airfields, their main achievement was simply the liberation of the rest of Italy, and that was a long, slow, bloody process. Had they been more militarily successful on the peninsula, they would have achieved it more quickly, but further goals are debatable. It seems very unlikely they could successfully fight their way through the Alps if strongly defended. They could possibly have been more successful breaking out to the northeast, into Istria and beyond, but that itself is debatable and the strategic consequences would have been minor, as they had too few troops. Suggesting additional forces for this purpose, as the British did, would likely simply have been a waste of forces from the western front, which was more important.

From the German perspective, they got a moderate amount of production out of Northern Italian factories during those two years, and a great deal of slave labor. They kept short range Allied airpower further away for some time, though not long range stuff from Foggia. In all likelihood, though, withdrawing to a fortified Alps line rather than defend the whole peninsula probably would not have been a bad idea. As it was, it was only the ego of Mark Clark which prevented German armies from being trapped in the summer of 1944, which would have been a catastrophe for the Germans when they could least afford it (as their western and eastern fronts would both shortly start to collapse). In that sense, defending the whole peninsula presented considerable risks--risks that in the event the Allies were not able to take advantage of successfully.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the campaign, in one sense, was that it gave Italy a chance to redeem itself. The hundreds of thousands of partisans who fought the Axis, and fought hard, gave Italy something positive, at least, to take away from the war, and helped redeem Italy's image.

[pitman]

Overall, the campaign was relatively advantageous to the Allies in terms of eliminating Axis strength - 90 percent of the Italian armed forces on one day - and continuing to die down Axis forces in the Med so that they were unavailable in other more critical theaters of war. That it also tied down a proportionately larger Allied force is only simple logic, if the Allied force had been smaller then the Germans would either have defeated it or ignored it and reduced their forces in turn. In either case there was nowhere else for the Allied forces to be employed prior to spring 1944, so any attempts to claim the campaign was "wasted" are specious.

But this misstates the argument. The argument, as it has historically been posed, is not whether or not the Allies should have invaded Italy at all, but rather whether or not they should have invaded in order to force an Italian surrender and take the Foggia airfields and then basically stop--as opposed to fighting up the whole peninsula.

People who claim the campaign was wasted typically refer not to September 1943 but to the subsequent 600 days.

[RichTO90]

But this misstates the argument. The argument, as it has historically been posed, is not whether or not the Allies should have invaded Italy at all, but rather whether or not they should have invaded in order to force an Italian surrender and take the Foggia airfields and then basically stop--as opposed to fighting up the whole peninsula.

People who claim the campaign was wasted typically refer not to September 1943 but to the subsequent 600 days.

I am not sure it does, since nowhere in the "argument" are the Allied goals or any time line mentioned. To repeat it as it was first given in this thread:

This is the story of this backwater campaign, a series of battles skillfully staged by the Germans and so botched by the Allies that their victory was achieved only as a result of German exhaustion.

If you wish to parse the campaign into its bits and say that this and that part were more or less wasteful then please be my guest. But that was not the argument raised by this particular "people", who may or may not be "typical".

Seriously, I'm not sure I said anything different from what you did. I would question whether or not the "we'll stop once we get the Italian's to surrender and capture the Foggia airbases" plan was ever a realistic option. Campaigns tend to develop a dynamic and inertia all their own, "liberating" only part of Italy wasn't in the cards - generals don't get their names in history books for liberating countries halfway.