German vs. British tanks during Crusader

[Andreas]

It is often claimed that German tanks were superior to British tanks during the period of the Crusader battles. I am unconvinced that that is true, and think that the explanation for the relatively poor performance in tank actions is not to be sought in the technological sphere, but rather in doctrine, or the lack of it. The repeated claim by British tankers that their tanks were inferior suspiciously sounds like a poor workman blaming his tools.

I am leaving the Italian tanks out, since there appears to be no disagreement that they were poorer stuff.

Looking at the primary tanks on the battlefield, these appear to have been:

German
Panzer II
20mm gun
30mm frontal armour

Panzer III G
50L42 gun
50mm frontal armour

Panzer IVD
75L24 gun
50mm frontal armour

British
I-Tanks
Matilda
2-pdr
78mm frontal armour

Valentine
2-pdr
60+mm frontal armour

Cruiser Tanks
Crusader
2-pdr
32mm armour

Stuart
37mm gun
38mm armour

Looking at this, it is quite clear that they were all eggshells armed with hammers, with the exception of the I-Tanks. The main tanks should have been able to penetrate each other's armour at standard combat ranges of about 800m or closer (although the German 75L24 might have struggled in the AT role as well, and the 20mm certainly would have). So I would see all British tanks to be a match, if not superior to the German tanks, if it came to a pure tank-on-tank action. Which of course it did not, because the beastly Germans insisted on playing a proper combined arms game, while the British tanks drove about the desert with minimal or no support by other arms.

The only drawbacks I can think of in the case of the British tanks is the lack of HE-ammunition for the 2-pdr, the low speed of the I-tanks, and the unreliability of the Cruiser tanks. But the gun issue could have been rectified by applying proper use of combined arms, i.e. bring guns to the party, just like the Germans did. The other problems could have been worked around as well (and were), by smart commanders.

So looking at the data, it is not quite clear to me what the real world support for the continued whinging about inferior British tanks is, and I would be interested in views by those who know a bit more about tanks than I do.

All the best

Andreas

[The_Enigma]

Its sort of funny, but i have been thinking about this same situation myself recently but over the entire course of the campaign and the bad press our tanks seem to have gotten.

A few things come to mind,

1 - Loss of the "2nd Armoured Division" (even if it was bearly a brigade sized decriped armour force of run down tanks)
2 - I have read the majority of tanks lost during the entire Desert War was due to AT gun fire then tank on tank action.
3 - in some cases the lobsided results in tank losses (91-12 during Battleaxe)
4 - the general reverse in fortunes after high profile wins in what is seen as a mobile war

all contribute to the myth that the British tank was alload of balls ... well thats just my opinion.

I use to read loads about the Desert war when i was a kid (am only 21 now) and the general feeling i got from the books then was British tanks were pants, Ritchie was thicker then two planks of wood and jerry owned us in very possible way.
Now that i have started to reeducate myself on the whole subject (last 5 years) ive seen the huge errors in these pervious works and how they have simplified things so much.

Its works or the general opinion which has simplified the truth so that it is widley believed like Wittmann being killed by a tyhpoon or General Haig being a useless idiot etc

[JonS]

The main tanks should have been able to penetrate each other's armour at standard combat ranges of about 800m or closer ...

I think that range is a bit optimistic. Effective ranges were closer I think. A useful model might be to pit pairs of opposing tanks against each other (say, a Crusader vs a PzIIIH) with one stationary and the other moving at, say, 100m per minute. Then consider how long - in minutes - one can effectively fire at the other before effective return fire can be expected.

But the gun issue could have been rectified [by the British] by applying proper use of combined arms, i.e. bring guns to the party, just like the Germans did.

So looking at the data, it is not quite clear to me what the real world support for the continued whinging about inferior British tanks is

Sort of. The only dedicated a-tk gun the British had at the time was the 2-pr, be in on a tracked hull, a wheeled portee, or on it's own platform on the ground. The Germans had the towed long 50mm as a rather effective a-tk gun, which was superior to those on the tanks themselves. The 88mm was obviously able to reach out and touch anything on the battlefield, whereas the same wasn't a viable proposition for the 3.7-in HAA for reasons already discussed. The 25-pr was effective in an a-tk role* , but that meant that one very important leg of the combined arms body was trying to stand in for someone else (and no-one was standing in for them) in a role they weren't really trained for. [Edit to add:] and there were, of course, a rather sizeable number of 18-prs that were mixed into the a-tk regts. The funny thing is, I know they were there, but I can't recall a single description of their use in action during CRUSADER.[/Edit]

Also, there is the problem of the tracer breaking off the back of the 2-pr round when it struck armour. This gave the demoralising visual effect of the rounds ricocheting harmlessly, when in fact they were striking and penetrating, or at least doing some damage. But the urban legend quickly grew up that the 2-pr could not penetrate German armour.

The 37mm on the Honey was notably less effective that the 2-pr, and equipped 1/4 of the British armour. (actually, proportions overall would be quite interesting. Granted the British had the overall numbers advantage, but as noted above 1/4 of them were Honeys)

Your larger point, though, is valid. Cunningham's plan for CRUSADER wasn't a good one, and in general British operational handling, and armoured tactical handling, wasn't very flash. Still, this was the first British offensive against the Germans during WWII. Everyone has to start somewhere, and starting with a victory is a pretty good result

Jon

P.S. Nice use of inflammatory language

* although in a closing battle with enemy armour there was only a window of some 3 minutes during which the 25-prs could fire and expect penetrations and before they came within range of the tank's MGs which then made PUFOing very problematic. So they had to decide early if they were going to PUFO, or stay and fight the tanks down to the muzzles. Plus, of course, the Germans had effective HE with which to engage an ID'd a-tk gun/25-pr with from beyond effective MG range.

[Andreas]

* although in a closing battle with enemy armour there was only a window of some 3 minutes during which the 25-prs could fire and expect penetrations and before they came within range of the tank's MGs which then made PUFOing very problematic. So they had to decide early if they were going to PUFO, or stay and fight the tanks down to the muzzles. Plus, of course, the Germans had effective HE with which to engage an ID'd a-tk gun/25-pr with from beyond effective MG range.

So did the Commonwealth for engaging the 88s, except they were not mounted on tracks.

I guess I am less convinced that bringing 2-pdr AT along to protect the moving tanks and provide a firm base, together with 25-pdrs for tearing apart infantry and German ATGs would have been a less workable proposition than what the Germans did. We'll never know, because the Commonwealth commanders never seemed to be interested in real trying it throughout the battle. Where they did work combined arms with the I-tanks it seemed to work rather well for them, in general, IIRC.

Regarding the language, I guess my recent in-depth study of CRUSADER has made me a bit bitter about this issue. Even someone like Agar-Hamilton starts out explaining why British tanks were not really as bad as they are made out to be, but 2/3rds through the book sings from the same hymnsheet as everybody else.

I am aware of the tracer breaking off issue, and that, combined with the normally more subdued after-armour effect of solid shot is certainly a valid explanation for lack of trust in the weapon.

All the best

Andreas

[JonS]

I guess I am less convinced that bringing 2-pdr AT along to protect the moving tanks and provide a firm base, together with 25-pdrs for tearing apart infantry and German ATGs would have been a less workable proposition than what the Germans did.

Oh yeah, no question there. British combined arms theory and practice when it meant working with anything on tracks was shite, especially in 1941 and 1942.

Although ... I do wonder just what sort of 'firm base' a line of 2-prs could have provided, given their limited range. Especially when attacking.

re: A-H, I suspect that part of that, at least, may well be a mis-understanding that the British tanks were impaling themselves (repeatedly ) on the long 50mm towed a-tk guns, not the German tanks. The I-tanks with the Kiwis along the escarpments SE of Tobruk suffered heavy losses, but almost never came up against German armour. Much the same thing had happened - IIRC - to 7th Armd Div on the Sidi Rezeg airfield a week or so earlier; those battles are characterised as free-wheeling armoured battles, but I suspect that most of the British tank cas were to towed guns. Do the German sources shed any light on that?

Jon

Ps: note edit to previous post concerning 18-pr.

[JonS]

* although in a closing battle with enemy armour there was only a window of some 3 minutes during which the 25-prs could fire and expect penetrations and before they came within range of the tank's MGs which then made PUFOing very problematic. So they had to decide early if they were going to PUFO, or stay and fight the tanks down to the muzzles. Plus, of course, the Germans had effective HE with which to engage an ID'd a-tk gun/25-pr with from beyond effective MG range.

So did the Commonwealth for engaging the 88s, except they were not mounted on tracks.

Ah yes, but it is very much easier to co-ordinate that HE fire when the HE chuckers are right there, rather than some unknown distance to the rear, and on a different radio net

[Michael Emrys]

The 37mm on the Honey was notably less effective that the 2-pr...

Is that really true though? I still don't have my sources with me, but AIR the weight of the two shots is not that different and the 37mm had a higher m.v. I would expect about the same performance between the two guns.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

I guess I am less convinced that bringing 2-pdr AT along to protect the moving tanks and provide a firm base, together with 25-pdrs for tearing apart infantry and German ATGs would have been a less workable proposition than what the Germans did.

In fact, that was the idea behind the "Jock Columns". These weren't organized until late in the battle though as somewhat of a desperate measure, but seem to have worked fairly well against light resistance. The Germans applied it on a larger scale and were better practiced in it of course.

Michael

[JonS]

Actually, the Jock Columns were a response to the debacle of Rommel's first advance back in Feb(?) 1941. With much of the available force getting a jolly good pasting in Greece and then Crete, and what remained consisting of poorly trained and/or equipped forces, and a lot of those been given their own jolly good thrashing between El Aghelia and the Egyptian border there wasn't much left to hold the Italo-Germans. Fortunately they had their own problems, especially with supply and the inconvenience of Tobruk still holding out. So, the JCs were an effort to make good use of what little was available to gather intel on what the Germans were doing over the border, and when circumstances were suitable to engage small elements of the Italo-German forces. [Edit:] 'desperate' is still a good description of them though. [/Edit]

For the particular circumstances of 1941 they were a fine idea, and worked well enough in their intended role. Unfortunately, like most good ideas, the link between intended role and the circumstances of their creation was forgotten, and JCs (of increasing size) came to be seen as the answer, regardless of the question. Fast-forward to May-Jul 1942 for the logical outcome of that line of thinking

[JonS]

The 37mm on the Honey was notably less effective that the 2-pr...

Is that really true though? I still don't have my sources with me, but AIR the weight of the two shots is not that different and the 37mm had a higher m.v. I would expect about the same performance between the two guns.

Michael

Ooops - my bad. Based on an averaging of reported data from a number of sources, the 2-pr had about 3mm greater pen than the 37mm at any given range. More effective, but perhaps not 'notably' so.

Sorry.

[Jon G.]

I guess I am less convinced that bringing 2-pdr AT along to protect the moving tanks and provide a firm base, together with 25-pdrs for tearing apart infantry and German ATGs would have been a less workable proposition than what the Germans did...

According to Gudmundsson - who I freely admit is not a fantastic source - the problem with the 2-pdr was that it was only effective at 600 yards and less. German tank-mounted MGs were very effective at that range, even if the British AT gunners managed to hold their fire until the tanks were that close.

Earlier you wrote that

...Panzer IVD
75L24 gun
50mm frontal armour...

The Panzer IV D only had 30 mm of front armour. The E retained the D's 30 mm turret front armour but added an extra 20 mms to the hull front. But then I don't think the L24 armed tanks were ever intended to engage enemy tanks. Rather, they were supposed to give covering HE fire to advancing Pz II and Pz IIIs from some hundred yards back the attacking tanks. It's interesting to see that the Germans identified the need for the short-barrelled HE-firing 75 mm gun also after they upgraded the Pz IV - first by mounting it in the Pz III (which was even evident in the early Tiger battalions), later by mounting it on various half-track and eight-wheeler chassis.

For mechanical comparisons the Germans clearly had the edge during the Crusader battles - not only were their tanks more reliable, they also had a superior maintenance organisation in place.

The Meteor engine (actually a de-rated Merlin aeroengine) of the Crusader tank had a chain transmission driving most of the tank's auxiliary systems, but whenever the chain broke or needed replacement (a none too infrequent incident in a sandy climate), you needed to lift the entire engine in order to re-connect the chain transmission.

What's the Rap on the Crusader III tank?
viewtopic.php?p=777165

BTW, Macksey identifies Jock columns as early as 1940 as an ad-hoc assembly of forces organised to patrol the gaps between Italian outposts in preparation for Operation Compass.

[JonS]

Andreas,
there is some good material on this in Pemberton's "The development of artillery tactics and equipment" for about 10 pages either side of page 100, incl diagrams.

ISTR seeing a diagram showing various engagement bands and timed intervals (ie, a visual representation of the model I outlined above) somewhere, but I can't for the life of me remember where it was.

Jon

[Michael Emrys]

It's interesting to see that the Germans identified the need for the short-barrelled HE-firing 75 mm gun also after they upgraded the Pz IV - first by mounting it in the Pz III (which was even evident in the early Tiger battalions), later by mounting it on various half-track and eight-wheeler chassis.

Wasn't this gun—or a slightly modified version of it—also mounted on the early models of the StuG?

Michael

[David W]

The biggest drawback with the 2Pdr was it's medieaval solid shot ammunition. At least the 37mm gun had good(ish) capped ammo.


Contemporary Italian Ammo was better! (than 2pdr).

[Pips]

I'm more knowledgable on things airborne, so i may be taking through my top.

But always put down the success of the Germans to superior tactical use of their tanks. Wasn't the German tactic to avoid tank on tank? They left that to their AT forces to combat and defeat the oppositions tank force. German tank forces were there to exploit weak points and effect a break through or rout.

Like almost everything in war, it's the man and his skill in using the weapon that usually is the deciding factor.