Withdrawal from Sicily - 1943.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; after a while here I'm........this time it will be the Axis Retreat from the island.............

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Axis Situation.

At the beginning of the battle for Sicily the Germans had roughly 30,000 troops arrayed in two mobile divisions (the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the Hermann Göring Division) that eventually formed the XIV. Panzer-Korps, commanded by General Hans Valentin Hube. The Germans later added most of the 29. Panzer-Grenadier-Division and elements of the 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division to the forces defending Sicily.

The Italians had approximately 200,000 troops (some estimates place the number as high as 325,000) arrayed in two corps consisting of four mobile divisions (the 4th (Livorno) Division, the 28th (Aosta) Division, the 26th (Assietta) Division, and the 54th (Napoli) Division), five coastal divisions, two coastal brigades, a coastal regiment, two port defense groups, and several mobile and tactical groups. Together, these units formed the Italian Sixth Army under the command of General Alfredo Guzzoni, who, in his additional capacity as the commanding general of the Axis’ Armed Forces Command Sicily, technically exercised operational command over Hube’s 14th Panzer Corps.

Though sixty-six years old, Guzzoni was still an able commander who possessed solid tactical judgment and had a reputation for knowing what he was doing and for pursuing it with determination. He was also one of the few senior Italian officers who maintained sound relations with the Germans. He had retired from the army in 1941, but the Comando Supremo (the Italian Army High Command) called him out of retirement to assume responsibility for the defense of Sicily on 20 May 1943.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Axis Situation.

On paper, Axis forces looked formidable, but much apprehension existed in the German high command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) concerning the reliability of the Italian units. The Italian soldiers on Sicily were ill equipped, poorly-trained, and led by officers and noncommissioned officers whose loyalty was to Italy, not Fascism, and certainly not to Germany. The coastal formations were static units organized to defend the coast and generally consisted of older men, approximately seventy-five percent of whom were locals. Their equipment consisted of antiquated armament, horse drawn artillery, inadequate antitank weapons, and no naval guns. Their principle weapons were automatic rifles and machine guns. The Germans suspected these units would be of low combat value, and this result was clearly proven on the day of the invasion, D day, 10 July 1943.

These concerns left Kesselring in a difficult position. Though he agreed with Guzzoni that the Allies would attack in southeastern Sicily, he could not rule out an attack in the west. Additionally, because of the possibility of a betrayal and wholesale surrender by the Italians, Kesselring chose to disperse German forces in such a manner that they could counterattack against an Allied landing in the south or the west and disarm the Italians in the event they defected. He thus placed most of the 15. Panzer-Grenadier-Division in the west, while deploying the Hermann Göring Division in the southeast.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

Overview of Allied Moves.

Attacking on the southeast corner of Sicily the two Allied armies, the British assuming the main effort along the Sicilian east coast and the Americans protecting their left flank, pushed northward toward the cities of Syracuse, Catania, and Messina. Despite success in the early days of the operation, chiefly due to a lack of resistance on the part of the Italian divisions, Eighth Army soon found itself facing tough German resistance and in a tactical stalemate on the plains of Catania along highway 114 near the Primosole Bridge. On 17 July while Eighth Army struggled in the east, Patton paid a surprise visit to Alexander at Tunis and pressed for approval for a move by Seventh Army on the northwest Sicilian city of Palermo. Alexander acquiesced and on 19 July the drive to Palermo commenced.

Patton’s forces liberated Palermo on 22 July, but on the twentieth Alexander had changed the boundary between Seventh and Eighth Armies and issued new instructions to Patton. After capturing Palermo, Seventh Army was to employ maximum strength in a drive eastward along highway 113 (the north coast highway) and highway 120, which was the next main east-west road about 10 miles south of highway 113. Eighth Army was to continue to attempt to break the stalemate along the east coast and, together, both armies were to converge on Messina and finish off the remaining Axis forces.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[C.GILLONO]

Many thanks for that, Tigre!

[tigre]

You're welcome pal . Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Evacuation.

As the Allies continued their drive toward Messina, Kesselring knew he had a serious weakness in Calabria and southern Italy, where he had only small alarm units and one division spread thinly across a wide area. An attack in these areas could cut off and trap the entire 14th Panzer Corps on Sicily and open the door for an allied advance to the northern Apennines. He requested reinforcements so that he might have at least adequate forces to defend the toe of Italy and the west coast up through the Naples-Salerno area. Kesselring felt with these actions he could tie up eleven or twelve Allied divisions.

Colonel General Alfred Jodl, chief of the OKW Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (the operations section) did not agree with Kesselring’s optimism in tying down the allies on Sicily. Jodl looked at the situation from the opposite view that the Allies in Sicily were tying down German divisions. He felt that the existing Axis lack of forces in southern Italy merited an immediate withdrawal not only from Sicily, but from southern Italy as well.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Evacuation.

The OKW and Kesselring both knew that to avoid the disastrous losses that befell the Germans in Tunisia they would have to prepare early to evacuate whatever forces they could. Consequently, on 26 July, OKW issued an order to Kesselring directing preparations for an eventual evacuation of Sicily. The order also directed Kesselring not to inform the Italians of German intentions to evacuate at that time.

On 27 July, Kesselring directed his chief of staff to call a conference with German commanders where he briefed the planned conduct of future operations on the island. Kesselring noted, “If the Italians should leave the alliance with Germany, the 14th Panzer Corps will immediately disengage from the enemy and evacuate all troops from Sicily. Preparations for the evacuation will start right away in coordination between 14th and 76th Panzer Corps and other headquarters involved.”

Based on Kesselring’s direction, Hube ordered Colonel Ernst Guenther Baade, the commandant of the Strait of Messina, and the German Sea Transport Leader (Seetransportfuehrer) Messina Strait, Captain Gustav von Liebenstein, to begin preparations for the evacuation.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Evacuation.

On 28 May, von Liebenstein assumed his position (two months before Kesselring’s direction to prepare for evacuation) and found an inefficient and chaotic operation. There were several large commercial steam ferries that could each carry as many as twenty-five rail cars between Messina and two primary termini on the mainland side, but von Liebenstein knew these ferries and their terminals were extremely vulnerable to Allied air, sea, and land attack. Fortunately, the German officers realized this before von Liebenstein arrived and had prudently acquired a variety of smaller coastal vessels to use on three dispersed routes outside the normal ferry routes. While a step in the right direction, von Liebenstein knew it would not be enough. Additionally, he found that the Luftwaffe and the army engineer construction battalion that serviced the ports each had their own ferry “fleets,” but operated them independently with complete disregard of each other’s requirements.

Von Liebenstein quickly made two important changes that would literally save the day for the 14th Panzer Corps during the evacuation. First, he reorganized these disparate flotillas into a single efficient ferry service that increased its daily capacity nearly ten-fold in its ability to transport men, supplies, and equipment. Secondly, he increased the number of German primary ferry routes from three to five operating from twelve separate locations on the Messina side and twelve locations on the mainland. He also oversaw construction of more efficient docking facilities and road networks to service the landing points. He instituted what may arguably be the first roll-on/roll-off system of cargo movement; his system operated so efficiently that his port handlers could pack as many as twelve fully loaded supply trucks onto a ferry in as little as twenty minutes.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Evacuation.

The result of von Liebenstein’s modifications was a ferry service with plenty of built-in redundancy, ready to quickly and efficiently move large assemblies of troops and equipment across the Messina Strait. Combined with the Italian ferry service consisting of four ferry routes that by August had achieved a level of efficiency rivaling that of the Germans, the sea-transport pieces to ensure a successful evacuation were in place. The ferry services needed this built-in redundancy to act as a counterbalance to frequent Allied air raids on both sides of the strait.

Fortunately for the Axis, Kesselring had the foresight to address this issue also when on 14 July he appointed Colonel Baade to the new post of German Commandant, Messina Strait. Baade had a reputation as a maverick infantry officer who shared many characteristics with the beloved commander of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen.18 More importantly, Baade was an exceptionally able officer in whom Kesselring had much confidence.

Baade’s primary task was to defend the evacuation points and sea-lanes from Allied air raids. He was also charged with providing the means to carry out the evacuation. Kesselring gave Baade sweeping powers to accomplish these important missions and Baade accomplished them with what can only be termed stunning efficiency. He appeared to overlook no small detail and provided virtually everything conceivably necessary for the evacuation to include caches of food, brandy, and cigarettes on the mainland for the troops leaving Sicily.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Evacuation.

Baade’s authority allowed him to reorganize and strengthen the strait’s antiaircraft (AA) defenses. He established six flak sectors, three on each side of the strait, made up of sixty AA units. This added up to eighty-two heavy and sixty light AA guns on the mainland side, and forty-one heavy and fifty-two light AA guns on the Sicilian side. Baade also positioned over 150 mobile, dual-purpose, guns (of the three inch and four inch variety) along the shoreline for additional firepower against both aircraft and naval threats.

He addressed the potentiality of sea attack with four batteries of Italian 280 millimeter (eleven inch) guns, two batteries of Italian 152 millimeter (six inch) guns, and, later commandeered from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, a four-gun battery of German 170 millimeter (6.7 inch) guns.

The combination of von Liebenstein’s ferry service and Baade’s evacuation plan and AA protection on both sides of the Strait guaranteed Axis forces had a fighting chance to escape Sicily, provided the Allied armies didn’t break through German defense lines too quickly or the Allied air forces did not close the Messina Strait area. Fortunately, from the German perspective, neither of these critical events happened.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Evacuation.

The German evacuation took place in four discernable stages, the first two of which were actually accomplished before Kesselring’s 27 July direction to Hube (who further directed Baade and von Liebenstein) to prepare for the evacuation. The first stage began almost immediately after the 10 July Allied invasion as the Germans ordered all nonessential units to leave the island.

Though Baade’s plan was sound in concept the execution, at least in this first stage, proved complex and the result was a monumental traffic jam near Messina along route 113 (the main route along the north coast from Palermo to Messina) that took German military police two days to untangle. Fortunately for the Germans, Allied fighter planes did not detect the chaos along route 113.

The second stage involved the evacuation of western Sicily, which began when Patton kicked off his Palermo offensive on 19 July. His advance was so rapid the Germans evacuated only a small amount of material from Palermo, primarily the equipment from four radar stations, before attacks from Allied fighter-bombers precluded any further attempt to evacuate equipment. Among the critical Axis losses resulting from the fall of Palermo were an estimated 10,000 tons of fuel.

Shortly after Palermo fell on 22 July, Kesselring’s chief of staff conducted the 27 July conference that spurred Baade to action in creation of the evacuation plan. Baade quickly worked out the details and, on 2 August, Kesselring approved the plan and asked only that he be notified before Hube implemented the plan. The next day Kesselring informed OKW that the evacuation plan was ready.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Evacuation.

Baade’s plan, known by the Germans as “Lehrgang,” was simple in that it was based on the premise of moving the troops first, followed by as much ammunition, supplies, and other equipment as possible. The real difficulty was in phasing the withdrawal of troops and equipment to avoid the type of chaos and exposure to Allied aircraft that resulted along route 113 during the Palermo evacuation.

Prior to the Lehrgang plan an understandable mood of pessimism existed within the 14th Panzer Corps, as few senior officers believed they could pull off a miracle and escape. With the surrender of the Axis Afrika Korps fresh in their minds, most believed that few would escape Sicily. Von Liebenstein, though, bluntly told Hube that he could evacuate up to 12,500 men every twenty-four hours and planned to take all their equipment as well.

To give Baade and von Liebenstein the best chance for success, Hube devised a phased withdrawal plan for his combat forces based on five defensive lines, each which declined in length across wedge-shaped northeastern Sicily, and converged on Messina. Hube’s five defensive lines were in addition to a sixth defensive line defined by Hitler, the San Stefano line, which was the initial withdrawal point for Axis forces. Beginning from the Etna line, as German forces reached each successive line, approximately 8,000-10,000 troops would make their way to von Liebenstein’s designated ferry sites according to Baade’s Lehrgang plan.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows....................

Withdrawal from Sicily on July – Aug 1943.

The Evacuation.

By 4 August the Allied pressure at Troina and Adrano along the Etna (or San Fratello) line had grown to the point where Hube ordered the evacuation of all units that could be spared, thus beginning the third stage of the German evacuation. It was a somewhat risky decision because even though Kesselring had left the door open for Hube to order the evacuation on his own initiative, OKW had given specific instructions that the evacuation was not to begin without their permission.

This direction from OKW did not surprise Hube as he was well aware of Hitler’s penchant for not wishing to inform German troops when withdrawal was imminent based on the belief that they would fight better if deprived of any notion that retreat was a possibility. Hube, on the other hand, believed it essential that his troops have hope they would not be sacrificed and, though he was not at liberty to openly tell his corps, he made sure by indirect means that his men knew of the pending evacuation.

Adrano, the key defensive position on the eastern portion of the Etna line, and held by the Hermann Göring Division, finally fell to the British 78th Division on the night of 6 August. Hube’s defenders began the retreat to their second well-prepared defensive line, the Tortorici line, and on 10 August Hube ordered commencement of the fourth and final stage of the evacuation. The plan called for the Hermann Göring Division to leave Sicily first, followed by the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and finally the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division.

Source: THE GREAT ESCAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ACTIONS LEADING
TO THE AXIS EVACUATION OF SICILY IN WORLD WAR II. by BARTON V. BARNHART, MAJ, USAF B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri, 1988. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tomo 3. SARPE. 1978.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Pips]

Just to add to the 'background' of the Axis in Sicily. The following are extracts from "Circles Of Hell", by Eric Morris. One of the very best books on the Italian campaign IMHO.

"When compared to their German, American and British counterparts, Italian senior officers were an average of ten years older; thus by May 1943 all Italian army commanders and the Chief of the General Staff were well into their sixties. Promotion in the Italian army had always been slow and cumbersome and the quality of junior officers, even judged by their superiors, was regarded as mediocre - though not in bravery:
As long as it is a question of risking ones skin they are admirable; when instead they have to open their eyes, think, decide in cold blodd, they are hopeless. In terms of reconnaissance, security, movement to contact preparatory to fire, coordinated movement and son on, they are practically illerate. That statement was by General Trezzani to Marshal Badoglio in 1940."

And on Guzzoni.
"The commanding general of the last army of any significance in the history of Italy was Generale d'Armata Alfredo Guzzoni. He was a fat, pompous little man who sporte a dyed wig. Guzzoni had previously been Deputy Chief of the General Staff and then commanded a corps in Albania in 1939. It did not help matterseither that Guzzoni kept a Hungarian Jewess as a mistress who was well known in Rome for her defeatist chatter, and so he had retired. Now, at 66, Mussolini brought him back into active service to command the Sixth Army in Sicily, an island which he had never visited.
Guzzoni, who was a more capable officer than his appearance suggested, was never very sanguine about his chances from the outset. Before the landings he assessed a German division in terms of firepower as the equilavent of half an Allied division while his best, the Livorno, he rated as worth a quarter. He knew he had almost no chance to build up his war stocks, and that the primitiive nature of Sicilian roads, coupled to a mountainous terrain and no practical air defense, would prevent the rapid deployment of reinforcements from a central reserve to a threatened front.
So Guzzoni deployed small tactical groups, mobile where possible, relatively close to the beaches. He also recognised that the main targets, when the Allies came, would be the airfields. So he concentrated all his efforts on their defence. Static formations of infantry and artillery were to be dug in behind minefields and barbed wire; at least that was the way things were shown on maps in army headquaters. In reality, as the actual tasks were left to Corps, Division and junior officers, the final result was a haphazard mix of uncompleted tasks that offered almost no hinderance to the Allies."

[Peter H]

Samuel Mitcham's The Battle of Sicily has a good chapter on Operation Lehrgang,the evacuation of Sicily.

He makes the point that German mobile formations,for example the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division,ended the campaign with more vehicles than they started off with--"they took,confiscated,or stole(depending on one's point of view) hundreds of vehicles from the Italians during the evacuation".