Kingfish wrote,
No comparison really.
The Dragoon landings achieved far more towards the total war effort than had those same divisions stayed in Italy. Bear in mind that the med ports -and the fairly intact rail net- served the supply needs of both 6th AG and the northern army groups as well. Keeping the Dragoon force in Italy would not assist the campaign in NWE apart from tying down German forces, but the Normandy front actually increased in strength while the allies were in the exploitation phase following Op Diadem.
As I mentioned in my post, I have not carried out a detailed study of the benefits of DRAGOON/breaching the Gothic Line but before I accept your suggestion of "no comparison" I would tentatively suggest that the Germans would have withdrawn from Southern France anyway after the defeat of their forces in Normandy and so the southern French ports and communications systems may well have fallen like the proverbial "ripe plums" into Allied hands.
Also,
the Normandy front actually increased in strength while the allies were in the exploitation phase following Op Diadem.
What, with forces from Italy??
Rich wrote,
But that still doesn't change anything re Harding/Alexander being petulant schoolchildren WRT OP ARMPIT. They could whine all they wanted in a July 1944 about troops for a hairbrained let's go "pierce" the Ljubljana Gap idea (did either of them even bother to LOOK at a map?), but they already knew the only troops they could possibly use had been committed to other operations months before.
Rich, did they in fact "whine" like "petulant schoolchildren"? I genuinely don't know, do you? Or did post-war historians use their words to do the whining? Was this not about the time that Churchill thought-up his last minute "stop DRAGOON and put all the forces into Northern France" idea? Any chance, Harding/Alexander thought they were pushing at an open door? After all, Churhcill's memoirs certainly contained a fair amount of criticism of the final decision to go through with DRAGOON.
Sadly, the Med in 1944 and 1945 was pretty much a haven for the lesser lights of the Allied command structure. Alexander, Harding, Clark, Leese anyone?
"Lesser lights" or a much harder job? Let's face it, the terrain in Italy was hardly conducive to great dashing advances; Montgomery certainly struggled in Italy, not sure that Bradley or Patton would have raced north any faster either; after all, when they actually came up against the Germans in Sicily in similar terrain they struggled to overcome them (just like everyone else did!) Leese for one seems to have done a good job at El Alamein, and Montgomery wanted him to command British Second Army in Normandy; if Montgomery thought he was good enough to command an army then that's good enough for me. After all, he wanted Patton in France!
Regards
Tom