Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

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RichTO90
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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#46

Post by RichTO90 » 06 Aug 2010, 03:03

JonS wrote:I think what Tom meant was that DRAGOON, VI Corps and the FEC was Alexander/Harding/Clark's reserve.
Um I know Jon, that's why I mentioned them. But that still doesn't change anything re Harding/Alexander being petulant schoolchildren WRT OP ARMPIT. They could whine all they wanted in a July 1944 about troops for a hairbrained let's go "pierce" the Ljubljana Gap idea (did either of them even bother to LOOK at a map?), but they already knew the only troops they could possibly use had been committed to other operations months before.

Sadly, the Med in 1944 and 1945 was pretty much a haven for the lesser lights of the Allied command structure. Alexander, Harding, Clark, Leese anyone? Theyr'e just the guys I wanrt on my team thinking about how to defeat the Germans in Italy. :roll: Even sadder though, they were all untouchable politically and certainly at least Clark should have been sent packing in January.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#47

Post by The_Enigma » 06 Aug 2010, 10:17

:o How dare you slag off poor old Alex, you better keep your comments about Monty to yourself or it will be 1812 alll over again! :lol:


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Kingfish
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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#48

Post by Kingfish » 06 Aug 2010, 12:16

Tom from Cornwall wrote:BTW Although DRAGOON certainly achieved results (opening ports, inflicting casaulties on German units), the withdrawal of the forces for DRAGOON certainly had its affects too (failure to pierce the Gothic Line? extra casualties to the Allied forces? etc). Anyone done a cost/benefit analysis of the two? :)

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Tom
No comparison really.

The Dragoon landings achieved far more towards the total war effort than had those same divisions stayed in Italy. Bear in mind that the med ports -and the fairly intact rail net- served the supply needs of both 6th AG and the northern army groups as well. Keeping the Dragoon force in Italy would not assist the campaign in NWE apart from tying down German forces, but the Normandy front actually increased in strength while the allies were in the exploitation phase following Op Diadem.

There was also no real drawn-out battle in Southern France as like that in Normandy. After a period of token resistance the Germans began retreating towards the west wall (no doubt spurred by the collapse of 7th Army at Falaise), so the allied advance proceeded at a rapid rate with few losses, something near impossible on the Italian peninsula, especially when up against the mountains of the Gothic line in fall / winter.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#49

Post by Cannonade » 06 Aug 2010, 23:55

Kingfish wrote:There was also no real drawn-out battle in Southern France as like that in Normandy. After a period of token resistance the Germans began retreating towards the west wall.
Token resistance? No, indeed. Dragoon was a highly successful operation, as were the alllied combat operations in the days following the landings. The defenses of Nineteenth Army were quickly broken, necessitating a wholesale withdrawal to the line of the S. Vosges (not the West Wall by the way.).

Cannonade

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#50

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Aug 2010, 00:20

Delta Tank wrote:I can't remember how many of these divisions taken for Dragoon were French, but would the French had fought in Italy? I believe that eventually they fielded 10 or 12 divisions and I also believe, what ever the number, that they would not have fought in Italy.
The French had five or six US equipped & retrained/reorganized division in mid 1944. One armored div was in the UK awaiting Overlord. The remainder were in Italy & Corsica or Africa. By the time Dragoon started eight modern armored or motorized infantry divisions were combat ready. There were several unupgraded divsions remaining in Africa, and several more were formed out of the maquis & other volunteers From August 1944. Those were equipped with salvage from the the old German & French depots & battlefields in France and trained on the fly. By 1945 France had eight or nine divisions with modern equipment & proper training and a number of others who's ethusiasm was their main attribute. The latter were used as guards around the ports still held by the Germans.
JonS wrote:The French did fight in Italy, and very effectively too - it was they who finally pierced the Cassino Line.
Just to get it perfect: It was the 'Gustav Line'. "Cassino Line" is a a name invented by some pop historian back in the 1950s or 1960s. The French Corps (four divisions plus independant regiments) attacked through the Arunci mountains along with the US II Corps (85th & 88th US Inf Div). Those lay between the Liri valley and the west coast. Two weak German divsions, 71st & 94th held the Arunci. Cassino Town and the Monte Cassio lie on the east side of the Liri Valley some 8 kilometers from the flank of the French Corps.

There were two linked switchbacks, the Hitler Line and Dora Line approx ten to fifteen kilometers behind the Gustav Line, and running across the Arunci Mountains and Liri Valley. Those lines were held briefly by rear guards as Kesslering had recognized his forces were near collapse in late May, and made his decision to gradually abandon everything south of Rome.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#51

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Aug 2010, 00:46

Cannonade wrote:
Kingfish wrote:There was also no real drawn-out battle in Southern France as like that in Normandy. After a period of token resistance the Germans began retreating towards the west wall.
Token resistance? No, indeed. Dragoon was a highly successful operation, as were the alllied combat operations in the days following the landings. The defenses of Nineteenth Army were quickly broken, necessitating a wholesale withdrawal to the line of the S. Vosges (not the West Wall by the way.).

Cannonade
The seminal event in breaking the 19th Army's defense was the destruction of key bridges preventing the 11th Pz Div & its associated corps units from crossing the Rhone River. A Pz Corps had been held in reserve far west of the Rhone valley to respond to Allied landings either on the Atlantic or Mediterrainian coasts.

While the advance north along the Rhone valley was fairly rapid, it took a month to invest, besiege, and clear the critical ports of Marsailles & Toulon. Marsailles did not begain recieving cargo until around 19 September, after the last German held coastal artillery battery was eliminated.

The 6th Army Group's link up with 12th AG did pocket some 25,000+ German soldiers on the roads south of the Loire River, which would not have happened had the 6th AG not closed the roads to the Vosges & Italy.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#52

Post by Cannonade » 07 Aug 2010, 02:51

Carl,

Thanks for the comments. After a little exercise in memory refreshing, I came up with the following.

The ports of Toulon and Marseille were captured by the French on 28 August, approximately one week before the planned dates. The port of Toulon began off-loading cargo ships at quayside on 5 September. The port of Marseille accepted its first Liberty ship for ship to shore discharge on 15 September, and by the end of the month had 13 quay-side berths available for unloading. In September Marseilles received 113,500 long tons of cargo, 32,800 vehicles, and 10,000 barrels of POL. During the same month, Toulon received 3,440 long tons of cargo, 19,000 tons of Civil Affairs supplies, 23,630 vehicles, and 80,000 barrels of POL. Port de Bouc handled 36,840 long tons of cargo and 240,000 barrels of POL before the end of the September. All in all, not a bad start in terms of logistics and supply.

The 11th Panzer did cross the Rhone, and took part in the Battle of Montelimar. The two bridges you mention were destroyed during the battle. This battle, which took place some two hundred miles from the beaches between 21-28 August, was the seminal event of the initial American advance up the Rhone valley. The German Nineteenth Army suffered heavy losses in this withdrawal, particularly among those first line divisions attempting to escape along the east bank of the Rhone. A total of 57,068 German soldiers were taken prisoner by Seventh Army during the 15 days of fighting between D-Day and the last day of August. French forces also captured a large number of prisoners.

Cannonade

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#53

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 08 Aug 2010, 17:05

Kingfish wrote,
No comparison really.
The Dragoon landings achieved far more towards the total war effort than had those same divisions stayed in Italy. Bear in mind that the med ports -and the fairly intact rail net- served the supply needs of both 6th AG and the northern army groups as well. Keeping the Dragoon force in Italy would not assist the campaign in NWE apart from tying down German forces, but the Normandy front actually increased in strength while the allies were in the exploitation phase following Op Diadem.
As I mentioned in my post, I have not carried out a detailed study of the benefits of DRAGOON/breaching the Gothic Line but before I accept your suggestion of "no comparison" I would tentatively suggest that the Germans would have withdrawn from Southern France anyway after the defeat of their forces in Normandy and so the southern French ports and communications systems may well have fallen like the proverbial "ripe plums" into Allied hands.

Also,
the Normandy front actually increased in strength while the allies were in the exploitation phase following Op Diadem.
What, with forces from Italy??
Rich wrote,

But that still doesn't change anything re Harding/Alexander being petulant schoolchildren WRT OP ARMPIT. They could whine all they wanted in a July 1944 about troops for a hairbrained let's go "pierce" the Ljubljana Gap idea (did either of them even bother to LOOK at a map?), but they already knew the only troops they could possibly use had been committed to other operations months before.
Rich, did they in fact "whine" like "petulant schoolchildren"? I genuinely don't know, do you? Or did post-war historians use their words to do the whining? Was this not about the time that Churchill thought-up his last minute "stop DRAGOON and put all the forces into Northern France" idea? Any chance, Harding/Alexander thought they were pushing at an open door? After all, Churhcill's memoirs certainly contained a fair amount of criticism of the final decision to go through with DRAGOON.
Sadly, the Med in 1944 and 1945 was pretty much a haven for the lesser lights of the Allied command structure. Alexander, Harding, Clark, Leese anyone?
"Lesser lights" or a much harder job? Let's face it, the terrain in Italy was hardly conducive to great dashing advances; Montgomery certainly struggled in Italy, not sure that Bradley or Patton would have raced north any faster either; after all, when they actually came up against the Germans in Sicily in similar terrain they struggled to overcome them (just like everyone else did!) Leese for one seems to have done a good job at El Alamein, and Montgomery wanted him to command British Second Army in Normandy; if Montgomery thought he was good enough to command an army then that's good enough for me. After all, he wanted Patton in France! :lol: :lol:

Regards

Tom

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#54

Post by Kingfish » 10 Aug 2010, 03:13

Tom from Cornwall wrote:As I mentioned in my post, I have not carried out a detailed study of the benefits of DRAGOON/breaching the Gothic Line but before I accept your suggestion of "no comparison" I would tentatively suggest that the Germans would have withdrawn from Southern France anyway after the defeat of their forces in Normandy and so the southern French ports and communications systems may well have fallen like the proverbial "ripe plums" into Allied hands.
True, but that only paints half the picture.

The forces that would eventually make up 6th AG would have to be committed anyway because there is no way 12th and 21st AG could stretch to cover the front from the Channel coast to the Swiss border and still maintain any hope of conducting offensive operations.

So whether they waded ashore from landing craft at St. Tropez on August 15th or walked down the gangway from docked transport at Toulon a week later is in the end the same thing.
the Normandy front actually increased in strength while the allies were in the exploitation phase following Op Diadem.


What, with forces from Italy??
Actually from Brittany (parts of 2nd FJ, 77th and 266th ID), The Netherlands (1st SS Pz), Poland (9th SS and 10th SS Pz), SW France (2nd SS Pz) and Norway (89th ID) just to name a few.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#55

Post by Aber » 10 Aug 2010, 10:56

Kingfish wrote:
True, but that only paints half the picture.

The forces that would eventually make up 6th AG would have to be committed anyway because there is no way 12th and 21st AG could stretch to cover the front from the Channel coast to the Swiss border and still maintain any hope of conducting offensive operations.
However it is not clear that there was agreed plan for a complete front from the Channel coast to the Swiss border before Overlord.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#56

Post by Kingfish » 10 Aug 2010, 23:51

No matter, the realities on the ground forced that strategy on them.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#57

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 11 Aug 2010, 04:09

Cannonade wrote:Carl,

Thanks for the comments. After a little exercise in memory refreshing, I came up with the following.

The ports of Toulon and Marseille were captured by the French on 28 August, approximately one week before the planned dates. The port of Toulon began off-loading cargo ships at quayside on 5 September. The port of Marseille accepted its first Liberty ship for ship to shore discharge on 15 September, and by the end of the month had 13 quay-side berths available for unloading. In September Marseilles received 113,500 long tons of cargo, 32,800 vehicles, and 10,000 barrels of POL. During the same month, Toulon received 3,440 long tons of cargo, 19,000 tons of Civil Affairs supplies, 23,630 vehicles, and 80,000 barrels of POL. Port de Bouc handled 36,840 long tons of cargo and 240,000 barrels of POL before the end of the September. All in all, not a bad start in terms of logistics and supply.

The 11th Panzer did cross the Rhone, and took part in the Battle of Montelimar. The two bridges you mention were destroyed during the battle. This battle, which took place some two hundred miles from the beaches between 21-28 August, was the seminal event of the initial American advance up the Rhone valley. The German Nineteenth Army suffered heavy losses in this withdrawal, particularly among those first line divisions attempting to escape along the east bank of the Rhone. A total of 57,068 German soldiers were taken prisoner by Seventh Army during the 15 days of fighting between D-Day and the last day of August. French forces also captured a large number of prisoners.

Cannonade
Thanks for correcting me there. I have a good description of this on the shelf but did not take the twenty minutes to check. Whatever source one uses it is fairly clear the capture of the souther ports was important. A pity they could not have been secured for the Allies far sooner.
Kingfish wrote:
So whether they waded ashore from landing craft at St. Tropez on August 15th or walked down the gangway from docked transport at Toulon a week later is in the end the same thing.
Not clear to me The Allied armies would have made the docks of Toulon usefull by the 21st August with a overland advance from the 3rd Army breakout from Normandy. If that is what you are implying :? Now maybe the Germans were on the verge of evacuating south France when Dragoon was executed on the 15th, I dont know, but I've not seen any indication of a order about to be issued. In any case it is not likely the garrison of the port will abandon the docks intact or even leave. The many other ports were held by their garrisons after the field German armies departed the district. So a fight for Marsailles is inevitable. That means a landing on the coast nearby if the ports are to be in use in a timely manner.

Actually I've always been a bit supirsed by how fast the Marsailles/Toulon port group was captured & restored to use. Hope to find a good description of how that happened some day.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#58

Post by kiseli » 11 Aug 2010, 09:29

The deception plan, “Operation Bodyguard”, was designed to reinforce Hitler’s belief of where he was convinced the invasion would take place. The Allies decided to convince Hitler that land operations would begin in the spring of 1944 with an invasion of Norway. The British, American, and Soviet participants would then advance into Sweden, turn south into Denmark and enter Germany across the vulnerable plains of Schlwswig-Holstein. The main thrust would be the Balkans and would consist of an Allied invasion of Peloponnese, followed by an advance into Germany through the Ljubljana Gap. Simultaneously, the Soviets would attack Ploesti oil fields, denying Hitler a third of his fuel supplies. If an invasion of France were to come at all it would be subordinate and would be directed against the Pas de Calais. Additionally the Allies would have to convince Hitler that when the landings on the coast of Normandy occurred they were diversionary (from "Employing Special Operations Forces to Conduct Deception in Support of Shaping and Decisive Operations", Major Guy A. LeMire)
problematic and long supply line, absence of roads and daily need of 700t war material (munition not included ), for one infantry division, made "ljubljana gap strategy" logistically unfeasible in the available time frame

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#59

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 27 Aug 2010, 22:56

kiseli wrote:.....
problematic and long supply line, absence of roads and daily need of 700t war material (munition not included ), for one infantry division, made "ljubljana gap strategy" logistically unfeasible in the available time frame
Add in the corps/army support units and 950 tons per day per div HQ is not unrealistic for offensive operations. On top of that would be build up of artillery ammuntion reserves for major attacks, airforce requirements for forward air base groups, and requirements for supplying the civilian population. The latter proved a enourmouns burden for the Allied armies in 1944-45. The local food & coal supplies were inadaquate for needs & the transportation and financial systems were too disrupted to provide needs from outside each region. The Allied armies were forced to find resources to relieve severe shortages amoung the civilian poulations. A Allied army group of 20+ divisions advancing north towards the Danube River is going to require over 570,000 tons per month just for the ground combat formations. I'm skeptical the ports and railroads across Italy & the Balkans could handle that load, plus airforce and rear service requirements, and civilian requirements.

On the relatively modern highway system of France automotive transport failed completely to make up the slack. It will be worse on the upland and mountain roads, which were certainly no better & probablly far worse that those of France & Belgium.

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Re: Ljubljana Gap! Myth!

#60

Post by Delta Tank » 30 Aug 2010, 02:52

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
kiseli wrote:.....
problematic and long supply line, absence of roads and daily need of 700t war material (munition not included ), for one infantry division, made "ljubljana gap strategy" logistically unfeasible in the available time frame
Add in the corps/army support units and 950 tons per day per div HQ is not unrealistic for offensive operations. On top of that would be build up of artillery ammuntion reserves for major attacks, airforce requirements for forward air base groups, and requirements for supplying the civilian population. The latter proved a enourmouns burden for the Allied armies in 1944-45. The local food & coal supplies were inadaquate for needs & the transportation and financial systems were too disrupted to provide needs from outside each region. The Allied armies were forced to find resources to relieve severe shortages amoung the civilian poulations. A Allied army group of 20+ divisions advancing north towards the Danube River is going to require over 570,000 tons per month just for the ground combat formations. I'm skeptical the ports and railroads across Italy & the Balkans could handle that load, plus airforce and rear service requirements, and civilian requirements.

On the relatively modern highway system of France automotive transport failed completely to make up the slack. It will be worse on the upland and mountain roads, which were certainly no better & probablly far worse that those of France & Belgium.
Carl,

All what you said and in winter to boot!!!! Absolutely brilliant!! I think I put in a quote from Sir Alan Brooke, who mentioned the units forcing the Ljubljana Gap would of fought three enemies, terrain, weather, and of course the Germans!!! BRILLIANT!! "He is so stupid that the other officers of the mess have begun to notice!!"

Forcing the Ljubljana Gap has to rank right up there with some of the stupidest ideas ever conceived in World War II!! Thank God we did not do it, a lot of Brits would of died a needless death!!

Mike

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