Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

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Jon G.
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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#16

Post by Jon G. » 17 Aug 2011, 03:35

Good idea, done as requested.

The Overlord part of the discussion can be found at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=181097

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#17

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Aug 2011, 05:10

Anyone have German/Allied losses for the Anzio battle? that might answer the original question here.


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Kingfish
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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#18

Post by Kingfish » 17 Aug 2011, 13:23

Both VI Corps and the enemy suffered heavy losses in combat casualties during the four months between the Allied landing at Anzio on 22 January and the attack out of the beachhead on 23 May. In presenting casualty Statistics, a note of caution is in order. Since it is impossible to compile an exact record of combat casualties for any large-scale operation, those presented here should be treated as an approximation.

The combat casualties of VI Corps at Anzio through 22 May numbered about 30,000, including at least 4,400 killed and 18,000 wounded in action. Of these totals, American units lost approximately 17,000 men, including at least 2,800 killed and 11,000 wounded in action. The enemy reported the capture of 6,800 Allied prisoners, including about 2,400 American troops. About two-thirds of the combat casualties occurred during the period of heavy fighting that ended on 3 March. During the first thirty days of the Anzio operation, the combat casualties of VI Corps amounted to about 17 percent of its effective strength. British combat losses were relatively heavier than American, in terms of the number of troops engaged; during the above 30-day period, their units lost 27 percent of their effective strength. In addition to the combat losses, VI Corps reported over 37,000 noncombat casualties during the whole period of the Anzio operation, more than 26,000 of whom were American. About 33,000 casualties, combat and noncombat, were evacuated by sea from Anzio--including 24,000 Americans--without the loss of a single patient's life as a result of the process of moving men from shore hospitals to the waiting ships.

Fourteenth Army lost between 28,000 and 30,000 men as combat casualties in its operations against the Anzio beachhead. This total included at least 5,500 killed and 17,500 wounded in action. The Allies captured more than 4,500 enemy prisoners of war. The German combat losses during the period of relative inaction after 3 March were about 10,000, almost exactly the same as those of the Allied forces.

The total combat casualties of VI Corps and Fourteenth Army were thus roughly equal, although the enemy had a larger number of troops killed in action. Three factors made the enemy losses relatively more costly in terms of combat strength than those of the Allies. The Germans suffered higher losses among combat units, they received far fewer replacements than Allied units, and the replacements they did receive were of progressively poorer quality.
Source:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... index.html

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#19

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 18 Aug 2011, 01:06

Thanks, thats a really usefull quote. The implication from it is the losses were more than the Germans could sustain to some vaguely defined extent. One comparison missing is the percent of the 14th Army the German casualties represented. I might guess the 14th Army laager hence the percent smaller.

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#20

Post by Valerio » 19 Aug 2011, 13:36

Carl Schwamberger wrote:Anyone have German/Allied losses for the Anzio battle?
Kingfish wrote:
Fourteenth Army lost between 28,000 and 30,000 men as combat casualties in its operations against the Anzio beachhead. This total included at least 5,500 killed and 17,500 wounded in action. The Allies captured more than 4,500 enemy prisoners of war. The German combat losses during the period of relative inaction after 3 March were about 10,000, almost exactly the same as those of the Allied forces.
Source:[url http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... index.html[/url]
For completeness, during this battle died on the Axis side also 600 Italian soldiers of the RSI "Barbarigo" Battalion.
"Et fia 'l combatter corto / che l'antiquo valor / nell'italici cor / non è ancor morto"
(Francesco Petrarca)

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#21

Post by JamesL » 19 Aug 2011, 17:11

VI Corps reported over 37,000 noncombat casualties during the whole period of the Anzio operation, more than 26,000 of whom were American.

That is a very telling statistic. That's almost 2 or 3 divisions.

In Feb. 1944 the battalion medical report for my f-i-l's company at Nettuno indicated that 35 men suffered 'neuropsychiatric disease', also known as 'Nettuno Neurosis'. Add that number to the 35 KIA/WIA and it shows an approximate casualty rate of 33% for the company...in one month. The battalion surgeon attributed the psychiatric cases to living in dug-outs, in the mud, under essentially continuous air raids.

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#22

Post by Delta Tank » 20 Aug 2011, 03:41

JamesL wrote:VI Corps reported over 37,000 noncombat casualties during the whole period of the Anzio operation, more than 26,000 of whom were American.

That is a very telling statistic. That's almost 2 or 3 divisions.

In Feb. 1944 the battalion medical report for my f-i-l's company at Nettuno indicated that 35 men suffered 'neuropsychiatric disease', also known as 'Nettuno Neurosis'. Add that number to the 35 KIA/WIA and it shows an approximate casualty rate of 33% for the company...in one month. The battalion surgeon attributed the psychiatric cases to living in dug-outs, in the mud, under essentially continuous air raids.
Are you implying that none of those soldiers ever returned to duty?? I bet, most of them returned to duty, do you have those numbers?

Mike

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#23

Post by JonS » 20 Aug 2011, 04:19

JamesL wrote:VI Corps reported over 37,000 noncombat casualties during the whole period of the Anzio operation, more than 26,000 of whom were American.

That is a very telling statistic. That's almost 2 or 3 divisions.
I suspect a large proportion of that was probably malaria cases.

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#24

Post by JamesL » 21 Aug 2011, 03:23

Mike - I don't have the actual names for the enlisted men who were treated for psychiatric illnesses. It is also tough to get a handle on the replacements since the battalion medical records don't specify who arrived at Nettuno, who left and for what reasons. I do have a list of dead and wounded for the company.

Surprisingly, the morale of the company at Anzio was better than the morale of the rest of the battalion in the rear at the Palace of Caserta. At Caserta they built a swimming pool, a dance hall, shower facilities and even a wine cellar for Gen. Ira Eaker. The men at Anzio thought they were doing something useful to defeat the Germans.

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#25

Post by JonS » 21 Aug 2011, 05:39

This isn't strictly relevant to this thread, however, attached is something written a few years ago about SHINGLE and logistics.

###############

Operation Shingle, January – May 1944

We hoped to land a wild cat that would tear out the bowels of the Boche. Instead we have stranded a vast whale with its tail flopping about in the water. Winston Churchill, 1944 [1]

Campaign Outline

Operation Shingle was conceived as a way to exploit Allied command of the sea to outflank the German army in central Italy. Originally planned to coincide with a successful breakthrough of the Gustav Line at Cassino by the main Allied Armies, the objective changed when these attacks foundered. When launched in January 1944, Shingle was intended to be the lever to force the Germans out of their strong positions and facilitate the fall of Rome, rather than enhance an existing breakthrough.

The Allied VI Corps landed at Anzio, just south of Rome, on January 22nd 1944 with two infantry divisions plus a mixed bag of US rangers and paratroopers (landing amphibiously) and British Commandos, amounting to roughly another nine battalions. Surprise was complete, and the landings went off without a hitch. Once ashore General Lucas, commander of VI Corps, carefully consolidated his beachhead until the end of the month. By then Lucas had all his forces[2] ashore and felt strong enough to attack towards the Alban Hills in order to cut the German lines of supply to Cassino.

However Field-Marshall Kesselring, commander of the German forces in Italy, had used the intervening week to swiftly reposition forces from within Italy and across Europe.[3] In all, elements from some ten divisions were in place in time to meet, and then defeat, Lucas’ attack. With the Allied attack stalled, Kesselring went over to the attack to try and eliminate the beachhead. These counter-attacks continued throughout February.[4] Due to Lucas’ cautious build-up these attacks too were ultimately unsuccessful.

[map missing]
Map 1: Allied Strategy in Italy, January 1944. It is clear from the map just how isolated the Anzio Beachhead should become if the main front were not broken.

With both sides exhausted the Anzio beachhead remained quiet through March, April, and most of May. Finally, in conjunction with a successful breakthrough at Cassino, a greatly reinforced VI Corps broke out of their confined beachhead and captured Rome on June 4th – 133 days after the initial landings and two days before Operation Overlord.

Logistics Planning for Operation Shingle

Planning for Shingle began in a low-key way November[5] when General Clark, commander of 5th US Army, ordered his staff to begin identifying likely places for amphibious invasions. The intent was to have options available to use the Allied command of the sea to outflank strong German defences. This initial planning took the form of map reconnaissance, and COPP (Combined Operations Pilotage Parties)[6] reconnaissance of the coastlines at night from folbots.[7]

The purpose of these offshore beach reconnaissance and observation missions by the COPP parties was twofold. Firstly, they identified enemy positions and strengths. They also investigated the beaches and their approaches, checking gradients, sand densities, and taking water soundings. All this information is vital during the early stages of an amphibious landing in order to ensure that the ships can identify the correct beaches from identified landmarks, that landing craft will be able to make it to the beach, and that their cargoes – especially vehicles - will be able to move off the beaches.

Off the beaches both north and south of Anzio, sand bars were detected a short distance offshore. There was some concern that these would ground the landing craft during their run-in, and so leave the troops stranded some distance offshore. Follow-up patrols confirmed the existence of these bars, but indicated that the water was deep enough to not cause any problems.

[figure missing]
Figure 1: Beach Reconnaissance Sounding Graph. Recorded by a COPP patrol on the night of 31st December 1943, the offshore sandbar at Anzio – Nettuno can be clearly seen at 60-70 yards offshore in this and other similar sounding graphs.

Beyond the initial reconnaissance and planning there was doubt whether Shingle would ever be launched, and it was an “on-again, off-again” operation through late 1943. There were two areas of concern:
1. would the offensive at Cassino be able to break through to the beachhead, and
2. would there be enough shipping, in particular enough of the large Landing Ships, Tank (L.Ss.T.).[8]

These ships were vital for mounting the attack, and for supplying it afterwards, but many of them were due to sail for England and the build up to Overlord.[9] The first attacks on the Gustav Line had been an abject failure, leaving little hope of a quick junction with any forces landed at Anzio, and since there was sufficient shipping for only a single assault division, the forces landed would be insufficient to look after themselves for an extended period.

As a result Clark cancelled Shingle in mid-December 1943. However, a few days later Winston Churchill heard of the cancellation. Always concerned to maintain the Mediterranean as an active theatre of operations, he used his considerable powers of persuasion to secure enough shipping to mount the operation, and to do so with two, rather than just one, assault divisions. He also managed to delay the departure of the L.Ss.T. long enough to ensure maintenance of the beachhead for at least 28 days. This became the basis of planning, and for planning purposes it was assumed that the main front would have advanced to VI Corps within that time.

The logistic plan prepared by 5th Army for VI Corps identified four general phases of supply for the landing force[10] :
1. Preparatory Phase: in which all administrative planning and preparation would be conducted. This included assembling the men and supplies that would be required. This phase was under command of the Peninsular Base Section for U.S. Troops, and FLAMBO[11] for British troops. This phase was to be completed when the assault convoys were loaded, and at sea.
2. Initial Assault Phase: Supply was to be over the beaches. The Task Force Commander (Gen Lucas) held responsibility, and this was discharged by the beach groups, in control of the beaches and at Anzio port. This phase was scheduled to continue “as long as required.” All assault formations would carry sufficient supplies of all natures to keep themselves going for ten days.
3. Continuing Maintenance Phase A: Supply was to continue to arrive over the beaches, and would be transferred to inland dumps. The Task Force Commander remained responsible, for receiving stocking and issuing supplies in the beachhead, while Peninsular Base Section at Naples was loading and dispatching convoys.
4. Continuing Maintenance Phase B: Once a link up with 5th Army had occurred, supply would revert to a conventional overland basis and sea borne supply would cease. 5th Army would then become responsible for all administration. 5th Army held responsibility for announcing when the link up had occurred and the supply source would change.

These phases roughly followed what was expected to be the developing tactical situation, and it continued to be anticipated that 5th Army would be able to advance from the main front at Cassino quickly enough to link-up with VI Corps at Anzio within 10-28 days.

The plan specified that all assault formations would carry sufficient supplies of all natures to be self-sufficient for the first 10 days ashore. This included food, fuel, and ammunition. Having the assault troops self-sufficient in this way freed up the limited shipping available to bring in reinforcements, and supplies to build up reserves, and also to buffer against any unexpected break in the Navy’s ability to unload supplies. Given that the operation was to be mounted in the middle of winter over fairly exposed beaches, this was more than likely to occur, even without interference from the Germans.

After the first ten days VI Corps would be re-supplied by a shuttle service provided by 14 L.Ss.T and 1500 2½-ton trucks from the 6723rd Truck Group (Prov.). The convoy of L.Ss.T. would arrive at Anzio, and unload the 500 trucks held on board. These trucks would disperse to their respective dumps, and 500 trucks from the beachhead carrying salvage[12] would load back on board the ships. The convoy would then promptly return to Naples, where it would discharge the 500 trucks picked up at Anzio, and load the third lot of 500 trucks waiting pre-loaded at the docks. In this way there would be:
1. 500 trucks unloading supplies at Anzio, then back loading salvage,
2. 500 trucks on board the L.Ss.T., either moving up to Anzio with supplies, or returning to Naples with salvage, and
3. 500 trucks in Naples getting rid of the salvage, then re-loading ready for their next trip up to Anzio.[13]
The round trip would take three days, and this system seemed to ensure good utilisation of the limited number of L.Ss.T. available, as well as minimising the time taken to unload the L.Ss.T. at Anzio. A similar procedure had been trialled by the US 7th Fleet in the South West Pacific with success. However, when Winston Churchill, Admiral Cunningham[14] and General Bedell Smith[15] heard of it during a conference on Operation Shingle held at Marrakech, Morocco in early January they “completely disapproved” of and prohibited.[16] Why such senior personnel felt the need to get involved in such a low level Q issue is a bit of a mystery. Nevertheless, despite the prohibition, staff at 5th Army HQ included it in their plans anyway.

In addition to the L.S.T. shuttles running every three days, a small convoy of four or five regular merchant shipping would arrive at Anzio every 10 days. These ships would carry supplies too large or bulky for the L.S.T. service.
Provision was made for emergency aerial resupply to forces cut off by the enemy. However this was on a small scale, and capacity existed for no more than a battalions worth, and then only for a few days.

Casualties were to be dealt with by the normal land based army medical services, and evacuation to Naples was to be handled by one of the two hospital ships allocated to this operation. These two ships would operate their own daily shuttle service, with one always on station off Anzio, while the other was taking its load of wounded to the rear.
In order to get the logistic lifeline for VI Corps on a solid footing early, an engineer battalion was tasked with clearing and opening the port as soon as possible. However, since it was anticipated that the Germans would thoroughly demolish Anzio before they left, the opening of the port there was seen as a hoped for bonus, rather than a necessity. Plans were made and equipment provided – such as pontoons and bulldozers – to enable the US and British landing beaches to handle all requirements for resupply for an indefinite period.

The plan for Operation Shingle was solid and comprehensive, taking note of the facilities that would exist in the beachhead and planning to make use of them, allowing for flexibility, and utilising the resources that were available to good effect. However, it had a number of weaknesses. The shortage of landing craft has already been discussed, and even though enough had been found to mount the invasion, the continued support of the beachhead still gave cause for concern, even though it was out of the hands of the planners involved.

The second weakness of the plan was the requirement to support two nationalities in the confined beachhead. Given the small size of the assault forces it would have made sense to restrict to being either an all-US operation, or all-UK forces. Mixing the nationalities would increase the complexities of supply within the beachhead by doubling all forms of logistic support required at Anzio, from ammunition to replacement parts and manpower. That this was done at all must be laid at the feet of Churchill. In late December, after resurrecting Shingle, Churchill noted that since the Mediterranean Theatre would be under British command[17] it would be unfair for such a ‘risky operation’ to be mounted solely by US forces. Also he was concerned lest Rome, the first Axis capital likely to fall to the Allies, should be done without British participation.[18] As a result, the landing would be a joint Anglo-American operation.

Logistics Execution during Operation Shingle

The execution of the logistics plan for Shingle got off to an excellent start on the D-Day when the port at Anzio was captured virtually intact. The booby traps and obstacles were cleared by the afternoon, and the first L.S.T. began to unload there soon after. The provision in the plan to get the port working quickly paid early dividends. The gradient of the British beach north of Anzio was found to be too shallow to allow the easy unloading of amphibious craft, and sandbars off shore hampered their approach – contrary to the COPP reports. This beach was soon shut down and all British traffic was routed through the port instead.

Then a few days later the port paid off again when a winter storm struck on D+4 and wrecked the pontoons and other facilities that had been installed at the US beach south of Anzio. For a period of 24 hours nothing could unload over the beach except ten L.Ss.T. at Anzio.[19] Admiral Lowry, the amphibious taskforce commander, wrote:
Had not the port of Anzio been operated at three or four times its expected capacity for LSTs, the loss of pontoon causeways would have doomed the beachhead.[20]

The innovative use of the pre-loaded truck shuttles worked well, though it had an amusing postscript in March when Churchill was told that 25,000 vehicles had been landed at Anzio. He became quite incensed at the thought of that many vehicles and their drivers sitting around idle in the confined beachhead. What he wasn’t told was that most of them had unloaded their stores, and then been promptly reloaded onto an L.S.T. and taken away again.[21]

One of the prime effects of the truck shuttles was to dramatically reduce the time taken to unload each L.S.T. Since the trucks only had to drive off the turn around time was reduced from around a day to just one hour, and this minimised the exposure of the L.Ss.T. to danger while near Anzio.

Once the German counterattacks began, and with the failure of the attacks against Cassino, it became obvious that Anzio would have to hold out for some months. As a result, some of the L.Ss.T. due to be sent back to England were held in the Mediterranean indefinitely to guarantee supply of the beachhead. Also, the unexpected fierceness of the fighting created a need to reinforce VI Corps, and to pull out units shattered in the fighting there. Eventually there would be six US and British divisions in VI Corps, and the plan created for the initial two-division assault was flexible enough to keep them supplied for over four months, rather than the four weeks initially allowed for, in what became a very extended Continuing Maintenance Phase A.

Protection of the exposed support and supply facilities in the crowded beachhead became a priority once the Germans moved up significant amounts of artillery. Dispersed dumps, revetting exposed facilities such as the field hospital, and extensive use of smoke screens ensured that, while losses occurred, they were kept to a minimum. Luftwaffe air attacks on the port area and ships off shore were dealt with by creating a very strong AA defence scheme.[22]

Some use was made of the emergency aerial resupply contingency during the counterattacks in February when a battalion was cut off in an area known as “the Wadis”. Unfortunately, due to the small area held by the battalion most of the airdropped supplies found their way into German hands.[23]

Conclusion

Operation Shingle was hampered from the outset by a lack of L.Ss.T. The demands of global war, and in particular of Operation Overlord - the forthcoming centrepiece of Anglo-American strategy in Europe – meant that there would never be enough for a secondary theatre, as the Mediterranean became from late-1943. The initial effects of this shortage were the on-again, off-again nature of the entire operation, and the final political decision to do something before the L.Ss.T were withdrawn. The final effect was that the assault as mounted was too small for the tasks that VI Corps was given.[24]

The logistics plan and execution, given the constraints within which they had to work, was very sound – although it was great good fortune which placed an undamaged port at Anzio in Lucas’ hands. But as Molony puts it in his official history, “operations were never hamstrung by administrative failure or difficulties.”[25] However, as D’Este notes:
There was nothing wrong with the basic conception of Shingle. In fact, if the operation had been carried out with a sufficiently large force, Kesselring might well have been forced to abandon the Cassino front in favor of a stand along the Gothic Line. The main flaw of Shingle was its logistical restrictions, which severely reduced its scope to a size far to small to achieve its basic aim of cutting the German lines of communication with Cassino.[26]

Notes
[1] There are several variations on this quote. The one above is from Hastings, M. (1984). Overlord: D-Day and the battle for Normandy, 1944. (1985). London: Pan Books Ltd.
[2] 1st(Br) and 3rd (US) Inf Divs, the Commandos, Rangers and Paras in the initial landings, plus 1st (US) Armd Div and 45th (US) Inf Div as well as miscellaneous corps troops.
[3] The Germans were puzzled – and very relieved – that Lucas took so long to move out of his initial beachhead. After the war General Hauser asked “Why didn’t the enemy, in a daring quick dash to the Alban Hills [the Colli Laziali], push through to Valmonte and cut the supply road to the south flank of the Tenth Army?” Quoted in Morison, S.E. (1954). History of United States Navy operations in World War II, volume IX: Sicily – Salerno – Anzio, January 1943 ~ June 1944. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
[4] It was in response to these attacks that Operation Dickens, the attack on Monte Cassino by The New Zealand Corps, was mounted in an effort to draw pressure off the Anzio beachhead. The respective roles of the main front at Cassino and the beachhead at Anzio as “main effort” and “feint” swapped several times throughout this campaign. Bailey, B. (2000). Operation Dickens, the third battle for Cassino: an analysis of defeat. Massey University.
[5] Morison, Sicily – Salerno – Anzio. p. 318.
[6] COPP was an acronym to disguise the real name for these parties: Beach Reconnaissance and Assault Parties. Recruited mainly, but not exclusively, from the Royal Navy and Royal Engineers (and including some Americans), these two man patrols would reconnoitre the physical state of the beaches including such things as offshore depth soundings, beach gradients, sand firmness for trafficability, beach exits, and the state of the defences on and near the beaches.
[7] Collapsible two-man canoes launched from patrol boats a mile or so off shore. Anonymous, (1944). Outline Plan OPERATION “SHINGLE”. Headquarters Fifth Army.
[8] The Landing Ship Tank, or L.S.T., was a key part of all Allied amphibious operations around the world during the later part of World War II. These ships displaced approximately 2,150 tons, and had a forward draught of just 3 feet, which along with their forward ramp and clamshell doors made them suitable for landing vehicles and stores directly onto beaches. L.Ss.T. supplying Anzio carried approximately fifty 2½-ton trucks each. See: Morison, S.E. (1947). History of United States Navy operations in World War II, volume II: Operations in North African waters, October 1942 ~ June 1943. Boston: Little, Brown and Company p.266-271 for the capabilities of the L.S.T., and the other major amphibious vessels; the L.C.T. and the L.C.I.
[9] The L.Ss.T. needed to be sent to England months early to allow time for modifications to the ships for the different tidal conditions in the English Channel, for the crews to train in these new conditions, and to practice with the Operation Overlord assault troops. Furthermore, much of the shipping available in the Mediterranean was required just to support the forces on the main front in Italy, and to assist with the build up of ground forces there, and of the strategic bomber forces scheduled to move into the airfields around Foggia. These demands left little spare capacity for amphibious operations. Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio. p.322-326.
[10] Outline Plan OPERATION “SHINGLE”. Annex No. III, G-4 Annex To Outline Plan SHINGLE, Headquarters Fifth Army
[11] FLAMBO was the telegraphic code name for the Administrative Echelon of Allied Forces HQ, and quickly became the general name by which that HQ was known. Molony C.J.C (1973). History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East: Volume V, the campaign in Sicily 1943 and the campaign in Italy3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1744. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. p.398
[12] Salvage: rubbish and broken equipment of no use in the beachhead.
[13] Outline Plan OPERATION “SHINGLE”. Headquarters Fifth Army. Amendment No. 2 to Annex No. III p. 2, and Appendix #2 (Corrected) to Annex No. III.
[14] Royal Navy Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean
[15] Chief-of-Staff to Allied Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Theatre
[16] Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio. p.327-328.
[17] There was considerable re-shuffling in the Allied high command in late 1943- early 1944 in order to get the designated commanders for Operation Overlord out of the Mediterranean and back to England. General Alexander took of from Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Theatre
[18] D’Este, C. (1991). Fatal decision, Anzio and the battle for Rome. New York: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd. p.95-96.
[19] Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio. p.348-350.
[20] Adm. Lowry. Supplementary Action Report 17 May 1944. p.10.
[21] Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio. p.367.
[22] Pemberton, A.L. (1950). The development of artillery tactics and equipment. London: The War Office. p.196
[23] D’Este. p.283.
[24] Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio. P.336 “… That was the fundamental weakness of Operation Shingle. Either it was a job for a full army, or it was no job at all; to attempt it with only two divisions was to send a boy on a man’s errand…”
[25] Molony. p.427.
[26] D’Este. p. 401.

Bibliography
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Morison, S.E. (1947). History of United States Navy operations in World War II, volume II: Operations in North African waters, October 1942 ~ June 1943. Boston: Little, Brown and Company
---- (1954). History of United States Navy operations in World War II, volume IX: Sicily – Salerno – Anzio, January 1943 ~ June 1944. Boston: Little, Brown and Company
Pemberton, A.L. (1950). The development of artillery tactics and equipment. London: The War Office
Smith, K.V. ( - ). The US Army campaigns of world war II, Naples – Foggia, 1943 – 1944. U.S. Army Center of Military History
Wilmot, C. (1952) The struggle for Europe. (1954). London: Collins, Sons and Co. Ltd.
Woodruff, W. (1995). The battle for Anzio. Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1995, 62 - 67.

Picture Credits [pictures not reproduced]
Map 1, and Figure 2 from: Bowditch, J. (1947). Anzio beachhead 22 January - 25 May 1944. (1990) Washington, D.C.: Center Of Military History, Department Of The Army.
Figure 1 from: Anonymous, (1944). Outline Plan OPERATION “SHINGLE”. Headquarters Fifth Army. Shingle Intelligence Summary No. 6, 3 January 1944. p.3.
Figure 3 from the Imperial War Museum via: Molony C.J.C (1973). History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East: Volume V, the campaign in Sicily 1943 and the campaign in Italy, 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1744. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.

JamesL
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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#26

Post by JamesL » 21 Aug 2011, 22:54

I think most of the sickness at Anzio was due to common respiratory illnesses. The operation took place during the cold, miserable, rainy Italian winter and early spring. Battalion records show that approximately 30% of the battalion came down with pneumonia, bronchitis, flu, etc. Malaria wasn't a real problem at Anzio.

However, during a 3 month period in the North African Campaign approximately 10% of the battalion came down with malaria (75 out of 750). The month long Sicilian Campaign resulted in 30 cases of malaria and 15 of fever of unknown origin. Most of the Sicilian cases popped up in the area between Termini and Milazzo, on the north coast. The US Army learned a lot about malaria during those campaigns and worked hard to avoid a repeat when they moved into Italy.

Cases in the battalion of 'neuropsychiatric disease' were nil in the North African and Sicilian campaigns.

As far as venereal disease rates? The battalion surgeon said the Engish women were clean, the Arab women non-existant, and the Sicilian women chaste. All bets were off when the battalion arrived in Naples!

For what it's worth, the battalion landed at Oran (Nov. 8, 1942) with the 1st Infantry Division and eventually was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division. Until they reached Naples Airfield (Oct. 9, 1943) the soldiers lived in 'pup' tents (shelter halves) or slept under trucks. That is a long time out in the open.

Delta Tank
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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#27

Post by Delta Tank » 23 Aug 2011, 16:35

JamesL wrote:Mike - I don't have the actual names for the enlisted men who were treated for psychiatric illnesses. It is also tough to get a handle on the replacements since the battalion medical records don't specify who arrived at Nettuno, who left and for what reasons. I do have a list of dead and wounded for the company.

Surprisingly, the morale of the company at Anzio was better than the morale of the rest of the battalion in the rear at the Palace of Caserta. At Caserta they built a swimming pool, a dance hall, shower facilities and even a wine cellar for Gen. Ira Eaker. The men at Anzio thought they were doing something useful to defeat the Germans.
JamesL,

My comment was based off this:
VI Corps reported over 37,000 noncombat casualties during the whole period of the Anzio operation, more than 26,000 of whom were American.

That is a very telling statistic. That's almost 2 or 3 divisions.
I am not talking about a company size element.

Mike

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#28

Post by JamesL » 23 Aug 2011, 17:30

I am not sure where they got '37,000 noncombat casualties'.

Here are some snips from the Medical Dept. History at Anzio.

Patients
US Hospitals - 22 January through 22 May 1944, these hospitals cared for 33,128 patients, of whom 10,809 suffered from battle wounds, 4,245 from injuries, and 18,074 from disease.
In the same 4-month period, British hospitals at Anzio cared for 14,700 cases, including all causes.

Evacuation From the Beachhead
From 22 January through 22 May, 23,860 U.S. casualties and 9,203 British casualties, or a total of 33,063 were evacuated safely from Anzio beachhead.

Re: psychiatric illnesses
The 56th Evacuation Hospital admitted 483 such cases in the period 16-29 February, of which only 9.6 percent were returned to duty.


Between the two sources, the numbers don't quite add up. ~48,000 total Allied casualties of which 37,000 were noncombat? Doesn't ring true.

Trench foot was also a serious problem.

Source:
U.S. Army Medical Department, Office of Medical History, Anzio Beachhead
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs ... apter7.htm

Delta Tank
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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#29

Post by Delta Tank » 23 Aug 2011, 17:56

JamesL wrote:I am not sure where they got '37,000 noncombat casualties'.

Here are some snips from the Medical Dept. History at Anzio.

Patients
US Hospitals - 22 January through 22 May 1944, these hospitals cared for 33,128 patients, of whom 10,809 suffered from battle wounds, 4,245 from injuries, and 18,074 from disease.
In the same 4-month period, British hospitals at Anzio cared for 14,700 cases, including all causes.

Evacuation From the Beachhead
From 22 January through 22 May, 23,860 U.S. casualties and 9,203 British casualties, or a total of 33,063 were evacuated safely from Anzio beachhead.

Re: psychiatric illnesses
The 56th Evacuation Hospital admitted 483 such cases in the period 16-29 February, of which only 9.6 percent were returned to duty.


Between the two sources, the numbers don't quite add up. ~48,000 total Allied casualties of which 37,000 were noncombat? Doesn't ring true.

Trench foot was also a serious problem.

Source:
U.S. Army Medical Department, Office of Medical History, Anzio Beachhead
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs ... apter7.htm
JamesL,

I don't know how they count these things either, but maybe if a guy gets injured (not wounded) and he gets evacuated to the battalion aid station and he is treated and given two days bed rest, he may be counted as a non-combat casualty. After two days bed rest he is examined again and deemed fit to return to duty.

Mike

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Re: Anzio : A Beached Whale or An abcess in Axis rear ?

#30

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 23 Aug 2011, 22:29

Atkinson has something about the casualties in 'Day of Battle'. First item is he claims some 500 replacements a day were being sent to he Anzio beachead in March. No indication if that was everyday, & how it might have fluctuated over several months. I suspect many of those replacements were recovered wounded or ill who were being returned to their regiments.

He also notes the medical service & corps staff learned a bit about fighting Malaria from the Sicillian campaign. Discipline was strict for taking Atrabine, & the engineers & other unit working partys paid close attention to keeping the stagnant water drained away. The result was only some 2,200 Malaria cases for the entire campaign.

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