Rommel's rationale for not stopping at Halfaya Pass or any

[Felix C]

other defensible position post-El Alamein other than continuing to Tunisia?

Not really covered in David Irving's book. The later I belive quote's Kesselring stating Rommel had several thousand tons of fuel at Tobruk which was destroyed to prevent capture by the pursuing Commonwealth forces.

Was Rommel damaged psychologically at this time?

[Kingfish]

Stopping at Halfaya would not gain him any advantage. There is still the open desert flank to deal with, and his remaining forces were far too weak to plug that gap. His only hope was to withdraw as far west as possible, so as to draw closer to his supply source (Tripoli) while stretching the British further from theirs (Nile Delta).

[Felix C]

Previously Halfaya Pass and the topography to the south posed an obstacle for armor which is why I ask why did he not stop. There were no ports east of Halfaya but retreating westward whould allow Bardia, Tobruk, Benghazi etc for use by the Allies. There was no RR line leading east either until one reached the terminus for the 8thArmy line at El Alamein.

[Kingfish]

Previously Halfaya Pass and the topography to the south posed an obstacle for armor which is why I ask why did he not stop.

Apparently not too serious an obstacle since the British managed to outflank these positions on three separate occasions in '41 (Operations Brevity, Battleaxe and Crusader).

[Felix C]

^^^They had to come quite a bit west before turning north to clear uncrossable ground.

[Oasis]

Paolo Caccia Dominioni (in command of 31º Battaglione Guastatori d'Africa del Genio) wrote ("Takfir", p. 126):
"The Italians were left at the mercy of the enemy, Rommel must save what remains of the Afrika Korps and the disappointment and anger manifest in all axis troops. The germans passed after a few skirmishes Buq Buq and organized to defend the Halfaya Pass for which must pass only the convoys of the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine: italian soldiers, exasperated, opened fire on the germans who responded. Deaths and injuries on both sides."
I do not think there were a way of establish a front at Halfaya at these conditions....

[Kingfish]

Which brings us back to the wide open desert flank, and little to no forces available to cover it.

BTW, how are things down in your neck of the woods?
I'm in Hobe sound, just south of Stuart.
Torrential rains with major flooding. Some gusts up to 40mph. Lots of lightning too.
Seems worse today than when the storm was actually here.

[Felix C]

Thanks everyone again for the posts. I appreciate having a well read group to clear up forming theories.

I recall reading how well German and Italian forces held the pass previously. Those defenders were surrounded and had to surrender eventually. They did provide an obstacle from using the coastal road which was the only road and the direct pathways to the ports enroute. I posed the question after reading piece by Kesselring criticizing the abandonment of Cyrenacia with all of the supplies these ports contained. If Kesselrings's critque is valid, I wonder if Rommel was ill.

I really need to find a good book on El Alamein and the aftermath. I admit my knowledge is limited for this phase of the campaign. Irving's book reads as if Montgomery's forces followed very cautiously due to attritioning of armor in the El Alamein battle. I did read where some consideration was given to allow the Italian foot infantry to withdraw from El Alamein before the Victory or Death dispatch. Later it was too late and instead it was a case of every truck or track for himself. Even Ramcke's paratroopers were left behind.They got lucky in finding a British motor convoy to take possession of.

Very wet and windy. I have a lake as my backyard and it has risen about five feet. Working from home today which allows being here.(and there) Thanks for asking.

[Dili]

There is no way the at that time the Axis could resist anything. Actually the material advantage of Allies should have made possible to destroy the Axis in North Africa earlier.

[Felix C]

I was reading online Kenneth Macksey's book on Rommel's campaigns that he feared the British would execute a similar flanking manuever as used by O'Connor and head for Beda Fomm.

[Urmel]

BATTLEAXE had shown that the Halfaya Pass position was not secure. It was then reinforced, and while very much more difficult to crack during CRUSADER, it still was cracked, with the loss of every man in the position, and substantial stores. Once past Halfaya, there was no defensible position up to the Marada - Marsa el Brega line. And even that could be turned by a deep envelopment through Marada. The Gazala line had also been turned by a deep envelopment in December 41.

Furthermore, there was absolutely no way that the Axis could have supplied anyone that far forward. They needed to fall back on their main ports (Benghazi and then Tripoli) and pull the Commonwealth away from theirs.

[merdiolu]

If he had enough strength left he could have considered a brief delaying battle in Halfaya Pass. So heavy losses Panzer Army suffered in Alamein ( Afrikakorps had just 26 panzers and a handful of guns left ) and still under RAF Desert Air Force attacks Rommel had no choice but to retreat. He did not even time or resources to build defences with close British pursuit

[berlichingen]

Any position could always be outflanked. After El Alamein, giving up North Africa was the only sensible option.