The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

[nmao]

Hello.

I just found this thesis online:
https://hydra.hull.ac.uk/catalog/hull:5595

It seems to be very well written and researched, many primary sources, full of details.
I haven't had time to read more than a few pages, but it seems to be very critical of Wavell.

I don't agree with some of the conclusions and details, here are some:
-"the only significant motorised unit the Italians possessed was their brothel", page 102
-some ignorance of the value and difference of diferent british and italian tanks
-some stereotypical analysis of italian units
-too much reliance on hindsight
-sometimes uses secondary sources when there are better data on primary sources easily available

Maybe one day i'll substanciante better my criticisms

But anyway, still a very interesting document!

Any comments?

regards,

-Nuno

[enzus]

Hi,

it is an interesting document. I belive only that it is too long for a missing day of battle and there are not sources from the other side of the hill. I didn't find primary or secondary souces from Germany and Italy. So, it is another nice work with the english point of view. It is like see history with a spyglass.

Regards
Enzus

[Urmel]

It's amazing what people get PhDs for.

[Urmel]

Just one example. In the section on the LAA, the author criticises Wavell for not sending the Bofors guns to Benghazi, since they were useless in the Canal zone. The reason given is that the Axis bombers bombed from above the effective range of the Bofors. Maybe they did, but maybe they did so because going lower would have been too dangerous, given the presence of Bofors guns? Certainly going lower would have enabled them to bomb more accurately, and maybe also use their machine guns for strafing (as Wellingtons did against Axis targets in Tripolitania). So maybe there was some value in keeping the Bofors back after all?

[Gooner1]

Well I quite enjoyed it. Probably the least explored battle in the North African campaign, Murphy makes a good case that is was an avoidable defeat for the British.

The weakest part for me, however, is the lack of speculation over how the campaign could have progressed if the British had held Rommels first attack.

[Urmel]

It's hardly news that it was an avoidable defeat.

The funny thing is, if the attack had been held, it could well have been worse in the long run for the Commonwealth, since this would have alleviated a lot of the supply problems on the Axis side.

[Gooner1]

It's hardly news that it was an avoidable defeat.

Well it was news to me!

(outside of the 'no Greek campaign' scenario, anyway)

The funny thing is, if the attack had been held, it could well have been worse in the long run for the Commonwealth, since this would have alleviated a lot of the supply problems on the Axis side.

I don't think so .. If the British can hold at Mersa Brega until Redbeard starts, things look bad for the Axis position with just the one port to rely on.

[Urmel]

As I said, could. That's where the speculation starts. If the Commonwealth had failed to rapidly reinforce, they would have been outnumbered at Mersa el Brega within a short time, and at the end of a very long and tenous supply line. I don't think it would have been all that rosy. The judgement of the official German history (Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg) is that Rommel's advance to the border with Egypt in April 41 essentially compromised the Axis position in North Africa because of the pressure that imposed on supplies, and was a major miscalculation.

[John Hilly]

The weakest part for me, however, is the lack of speculation over how the campaign could have progressed if the British had held Rommels first attack.

Sorry to interrupt as an outsider, and not from the Commonwealth.
This study was a thesis, so how could the writer speculate. "What ifs" don't belong to an academic study.
Etenim, credo...
...Otherwise I believe that British historical studies are still after 70 years too self-important and won't consider other aspects seriously enough...
One good example is Mr. A. Beevor, who gets blind at once when his work deals with British forces and their actions.

With best
Juha-Pekka

[Urmel]

...Otherwise I believe that British historical studies are still after 70 years too self-important and won't consider other aspects seriously enough...

Quite so. I note that the author did not even consult the official German history, even though an English translation is available, and has been for a long time.

http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/acad ... 8228844.do

[Gooner1]

Sorry to interrupt as an outsider, and not from the Commonwealth.
This study was a thesis, so how could the writer speculate. "What ifs" don't belong to an academic study.

I don't think that is cast-iron rule? Nor a very useful one considering the subject.

As it is Murphy does allow himself a little speculation: "a rebuff at Brega may well have brought his [Rommel's] military career to an abrupt end" and includes rather more speculation from Ronald Lewin "He would probably have been pulled back to Sirte and told to wait until 15th Panzer arrived, after which, and when told, he could essay another attack. By which time, of course, the British would have been fully rested, re-equipped, reorganised and waiting for him’"

[Urmel]

What endangered Rommel's command was not a possible rebuff, but attacking and succeeding at Brega and then dashing off to the border. Murphy should look into the German history books on that matter. He was seen as crazy by OKH after his attack.

I'm deeply unimpressed by Lewin. In my view he is building this danger of waiting up to glorify Rommel's genius for not waiting. We are talking 4-6 weeks on the outset for most of 15 Panzer to arrive. I somehow doubt that the British forces in the forward area would have been able to be built up to the stage where they could resist an assault by the full force of the Afrikakorps. It's also not just a question of force strength, but one of tactical handling, and here BREVITY, BATTLEAXE, and CRUSADER demonstrated the very severe shortcomings of the British command.

[Gooner1]

What endangered Rommel's command was not a possible rebuff, but attacking and succeeding at Brega and then dashing off to the border. Murphy should look into the German history books on that matter. He was seen as crazy by OKH after his attack.

Yeah, but Hitler thought he was great and that's what counted ..

I'm deeply unimpressed by Lewin. In my view he is building this danger of waiting up to glorify Rommel's genius for not waiting. We are talking 4-6 weeks on the outset for most of 15 Panzer to arrive. I somehow doubt that the British forces in the forward area would have been able to be built up to the stage where they could resist an assault by the full force of the Afrikakorps.

Panzer Regiment 8 arrived at Tripoli between the 24th of April and 6th May, the 'Tiger' Convoy arrived at Alexandria on 12th May.

It's also not just a question of force strength, but one of tactical handling, and here BREVITY, BATTLEAXE, and CRUSADER demonstrated the very severe shortcomings of the British command.

Rommels assaults on Tobruk weren't too clever either. A later German offensive would be up against a well prepared British defensive position and Tobruk is the benchmark for comparison there.
Besides which O'Connor would probably be in charge.

[Urmel]

As I said, 4-6 weeks. It took about 2 weeks to get tanks from Tripoli to Agheila.

I fully agree that Rommel's assaults on Tobruk weren't clever, but I would refute that Tobruk was the benchmark. There was no way that the Mersa el Brega position could have been fortified to this extent. Also, it could still be turned by a wide southern hook. It was the best position between the border and Tripoli, but it wasn't invincible.

[Gooner1]

As I said, 4-6 weeks. It took about 2 weeks to get tanks from Tripoli to Agheila.

I fully agree that Rommel's assaults on Tobruk weren't clever, but I would refute that Tobruk was the benchmark. There was no way that the Mersa el Brega position could have been fortified to this extent.

Murphy's thesis does a good job in revealing what resources were available to the British. Another 4-6 weeks (plus the rest) is ample time to get a very tough defensive position in place.

Also, it could still be turned by a wide southern hook. It was the best position between the border and Tripoli, but it wasn't invincible.

Not invincible of course, but there is certainly room to doubt the German history's verdict that Rommel's hasty early attacks were a major miscalculation.