The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#106

Post by Attrition » 28 Mar 2015, 10:08

I think they fell between two stools - any serious move by the Italo-Germans would succeed because of the diversions to Greece. The token force in Cyrenaica should have been told to do what it could as it legged it to the frontier. Instead Wavell wanted it both ways and got neither. In that context I can't see any failings of Gamber-Parry being of more than marginally influential. Having outmanoeuvred the 10th Army and defeated it in detail at the start of Compass, WDF/XIII Corps got the same treatment in Cyrenaica, pretty much for the same reasons.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#107

Post by MarkN » 28 Mar 2015, 18:25

Attrition wrote:I think they fell between two stools - any serious move by the Italo-Germans would succeed because of the diversions to Greece. The token force in Cyrenaica should have been told to do what it could as it legged it to the frontier. Instead Wavell wanted it both ways and got neither. In that context I can't see any failings of Gamber-Parry being of more than marginally influential. Having outmanoeuvred the 10th Army and defeated it in detail at the start of Compass, WDF/XIII Corps got the same treatment in Cyrenaica, pretty much for the same reasons.
While it is manifestly true that the defence of Cyrenaica Command was deprioritised politically and thus the forces remaining were signficiantly weakened, hence Gambier-Parry (and others) should not be made scapegoat/s for losing Cyrenaica, it should be no excuse for giving him/them a 'free ride' when it comes to examining performance.

Many generals were commended for their handling of units during the BEF debacle. In particular, and chosen for its topicality, was Brigadier Crocker who gained plaudits and much kudos with his delaying actions and final retreat to Cherbourg. In effect, his performance was measured against what could be expected with the tools at his disposal.

I would argue that history has not treated Neame, Gambier-Parry and Rimington with the same 'respect' due their performances at hand rather than dismissing them outright. In effect, irrespective of the handicaps imposed upon them, they performed woefully.

Consider this, and point 7 of the conclusions above, a lack of tactical recconaissances. Gambier-Parry (2ArmdDiv) had an RAF flight under his direct command as well as the KDG armoured car regiment. That's far more tactical recconaissance capability than doctrine or establishment prescribe. There should be no complaints in that department. Thus, why did this become an issue?


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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#108

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 28 Mar 2015, 21:39

MarkN,
Thus, why did this become an issue?
Gambier-Parry didn't write the report though did he?

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#109

Post by MarkN » 29 Mar 2015, 14:29

Hi Tom,
Tom from Cornwall wrote: Gambier-Parry didn't write the report though did he?
Very true.

Had he been able to write a report, do you think he would have come to the same conclusions or different?

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#110

Post by ClintHardware » 01 Apr 2015, 10:46

The original report is a collection of reports and they are roughly typed (not like the above excerpt) and it describes a very problematic set of circumstances dealt with few resources. It pulls no punches about what worked and what did not. I don't remember seeing the word disaster in the typing. Is it a later (political) attribution? I do not trust it. I know many of you will trust it and I can't change that but data has changed my perceptions.

MarkN's Point 3 was dis-owned by the RAF but the unit war diaries record groups of MET being reported without detail. The RAF were not able to give detail (probably because of altitude) and when the situation became temporarily fluid confusion on confusion crept in.

Brigadier Latham praised his Royal Signallers for their maintaining communications. Signals breakdowns did happen but they were sporadic not continuous according to the unit war diaries. Much was done with very little by the Middlesex Yeomanry squadrons.

We are all looking back at what was a very fluid situation and where when communications failed Latham and Rimington followed logic based on what they knew and G-P became redundant as known circumstances/visual evidence and contact with Axis elements overtook the relevance of orders. G-P acted logically in his decision about not holding the Escarpment but there is very little activity to measure him by. G-P was made further redundant when holding Mechili because he was unable to be reached by 3rd Armoured Brigade and 2nd Support Group due to fuel and time and worn out AFVs.

One of the reliable measures is what the Germans thought, and within their descriptions you can see the plan to retreat (that was created with Morshead's participation in the week before Mersa Brega) working in terms of degrading Axis mobility. Below are the points raised within CAB 146/10 pages 38 – 39 sections 58 and 59

CAB 146/10 Points Begin:

The supply position became very difficult shortly after Rommel’s arrival at Tobruk; it considerably affected what the D.A.K. could do.

The fuel position was temporarily eased when the division became more or less stationary. Even so the reduced consumption of the fighting vehicles was soon out balanced by the increased demands of the supply columns, and by the additional fuel used on the bad tracks around Tobruk – which also reduced the life of vehicle engines. Until a sufficient stock could be built up in the vicinity of Tobruk the bulk of the stores still had to be brought with divisional transport from Tripoli – a distance of 2700 – 3000 km (1678 – 1865 miles) there and back.

Once the desert tracks through Cyrenaica were in use, all German transport in Tripoli was freed and sent forward with fuel and provisions. Italian civilian vehicles were used for unloading and loading stores on to coastal vessels. Even so 5 leichte Division and 15. Panzer Division between them possessed no more transport than a normal division in Europe. Eventually transport vehicles belonging to combat units would be pressed into transporting supplies which further reduced the tactical mobility of the divisions.

British air attacks on supply columns increased daily – there was no place and no freedom of action for anti-aircraft M.G. on a fully loaded truck and extra M.T. for A.A. defences could not be spared.

The workshop companies were moved up to Ain el Gazala and another to Mechili, and their workload initially was repair of vehicles that needed repair due to damage caused by crossing the desert – when this workload was largely completed the werkstatt kompanie at Mechili was transferred to a location that came to be named ‘Weisses Haus’, 35 km west of Tobruk to repair fighting vehicles, whilst the werkstatt kompanie at Ain el Gazala dealt exclusively with transport vehicles.

The general supply situation improved slightly when Benghazi was made useable again, although that port was 350 km from Tobruk, and 500 km from the Egyptian frontier. Benghazi was found to be a much smaller port than anticipated, and only suitable for coastal shipping. It also and had to be shared with the Italians.

The supply base at ‘Weisses Haus’, with distribution centres for fuel, ammunition and provisions at El Adem, supplied the units at Capuzzo. Although Weisses Haus was persistently bombed the RAF and RAAF never managed to completely destroy it because stores were distributed over too wide an area.

Little ammunition had been used on the way to Tobruk, so that 5 leichte Division’s attacks on the fortress (including the 14th April) and Gruppe Knabe’s advance on Sollum and Capuzzo could be supplied from current stocks. But consumption then increased and the number of ships carrying ammunition were increasingly sunk by naval and air action, to the point where it became difficult to meet daily requirements and there was little chance of re-building stocks.

Lack of transport and heavy wear and tear on vehicles were however the greatest problems which became more acute as time went on.

CAB 146/10 Points End

We must remember that Neame, G-P, Latham and Rimington were professional soldiers with WW1 and then inter-war experience of studying and to some extent practicing mobile warfare and logistics - especially in respect of wheeled transport if not AFVs. They had to work on the basis of wheeled transport in everything their units did before and during the war.

We focus on tanks and panzers when looking at the desert fighting but the wheeled transport numbers and organisations underpinned everything and the RASC and the unit A and B Echelons performed better than the Axis (judging by CAB/146/10) and built on their inter-war plans and preparations which are covered in the very large RASC Corps History.

There is so little on which to judge G-P when the action began that he is replaced in effect and interest by Latham and Rimington. I do wonder what he thought he was doing putting his rear Div H.Q. at Mechili but why did Wavell/Neame not order its retreat instead of criticising its position after the event?

Wavell also tried to reverse G-P's decision to retreat from the Escarpment (about 2100 hours on the 3rd April IIRC) and then realised G-P was right that he could not hold it with what Wavell had left him with. I do not trust Wavell's accounts because Churchill was not wanting to listen to reasoned arguments as to why retreats had to happen. The Ten Year Rule and underfunding was reaping its harvest and G-P was in the path of the harvest. I wonder if he found captivity preferable to the blame game in London. Half of those at Mechili did break out - its not as Leutnant Schmidt quite describes. Captain Constant R.Es and Captain Milward 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers have left better eye witness accounts of Mechili and Milward includes the bayonetting of an Italian artillery battery on the way out. He was present as a L.O.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#111

Post by Urmel » 01 Apr 2015, 11:50

ClintHardware wrote:Benghazi was found to be a much smaller port than anticipated, and only suitable for coastal shipping. It also and had to be shared with the Italians.
That's not correct. You can see volume and origin of cargoes here:

http://rommelsriposte.com/2011/06/01/ca ... ours-1941/

I do not have the April numbers, but from May Benghazi took direct shipments from Italy. It also wasn't that small, and the ability to take 537 tons/day of coastal shipments means a reduction of trucking needs by over 200,000 truck kilometres per day for the axis (assuming the average truck took 2.5t of load), leading to monthly supply requirement reduction of over 1,100 tons of fuel plus assorted other items (spares, wheels, lubricants), and manpower needs as well (2 drivers to a truck = 400 men).

So:

i) the implied downgrading of Benghazi's usefulness due to a (false) claim that it was only suitable for coastal shipping ignores the importance coastal shipping had in reducing supply needs; and
ii) Benghazi could and did take substantial direct traffic from Italy. (32% in May, 19% in June, 50% in July, 51% in August)

Looking at this, I would argue that the authors of CAB146/10 did not do their research properly and/or might have been more interested in putting out feel-good statements for the British side rather than objectively assess facts.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#112

Post by MarkN » 01 Apr 2015, 17:37

ClintHardware wrote: We must remember that Neame, G-P, Latham and Rimington were professional soldiers with WW1 and then inter-war experience of studying and to some extent practicing mobile warfare and logistics - especially in respect of wheeled transport if not AFVs. They had to work on the basis of wheeled transport in everything their units did before and during the war.

We focus on tanks and panzers when looking at the desert fighting but the wheeled transport numbers and organisations underpinned everything and the RASC and the unit A and B Echelons performed better than the Axis (judging by CAB/146/10) and built on their inter-war plans and preparations which are covered in the very large RASC Corps History.

There is so little on which to judge G-P when the action began that he is replaced in effect and interest by Latham and Rimington. I do wonder what he thought he was doing putting his rear Div H.Q. at Mechili but why did Wavell/Neame not order its retreat instead of criticising its position after the event?
Once more some very interesting information made available to a wider audiance. Thank you.

On reading the evidence presented, your interpretation and your commentary, I come to a completely different conclusion: namely that Neame and Gambier-Parry performed very poorly.

You wish to focus on the logistic element. Very good. An excellent place to see just how badly Neame and Gambier-Parry performed. I'm not going to lecture anybody here about what they should or shouldn't believe. What I will do, however, is present some questions which readers can individually consider and thus form their own opinions.

The lack of combat mobility (ie transport and logistical support) was indeed severe and had great influence on the decisions taken over the defence of Cyrenaica. This lack of combat mobility was due soley to the political imperative to prioritise Greece not Cyrenaica. This lack of combat mobility was the reason why the logical and military prudent defensive line west of el Agheila was not taken up. Clearly, it was in their minds when planning defence.

1. Given the severity, and the advance knowledge of the lack of combat mobility, was it a sound policy to even attempt to defend Cyrenaica in its entirety? From Churchill's letter to Wavell I posted earlier, holding Cyrenaica in total was NOT a political or military imperative.

2. Given the severity, and the advance knowledge of the lack of combat mobility, why was Mersa el Brega chosen as the 'first' line of defence?


The lack of combat mobility was so acute, and known to be so, that it was recognised that an armoured division couldn't conduct manouever warfare as far out as Mersa el Brega with supply lines running back to Tobruk and Mursa Matruh. Thus, a major supply dump was set up in Msus to provide, in the forward area, 7 days of ready combat supplies for 2nd Armoured Division to be able to manouver and fight.

3. Given this supply dump was set up in Msus, a dump which was the very life-line for 2ArmdDiv in the absence of genuine combat mobility, why was a 'withdraw plan' developed, agreed and put into action which ignored Msus?

4. Given this supply dump was set up in Msus, a dump which was the very life-line for 2ArmdDiv in the absence of genuine combat mobility, why did G-P so willfully leave it undefended and isolated?

5. Why not place the dump on the actual withrawal route you plan to take?

6. Why did the dump at Msus only become a priority for G-P AFTER the report of an enemy approach? Did he really believe ALL of the enemy were chasing him up the coast roads?


And finally, to sum up decisionmaking of the two key GOCs...

7. Given the severity, and the advance knowledge of the lack of combat mobility, why was a "withdrawal strategy" from as far distant as Mersa el Brega the one chosen? How can you withdraw in good order if you don't have enough transport?

And, when considering this last question, in context of their performance, remember ClintHardware's words...
We must remember that Neame, G-P, Latham and Rimington were professional soldiers with WW1 and then inter-war experience of studying and to some extent practicing mobile warfare and logistics - especially in respect of wheeled transport if not AFVs. They had to work on the basis of wheeled transport in everything their units did before and during the war.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#113

Post by Attrition » 01 Apr 2015, 22:15

Wavell allowed a retreat then all of a sudden ordered Benghazi to be held, apparently "thinking of the difficulties the Axis were in", which I infer to be a veiled reference to Enigma intercepts.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#114

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 02 Apr 2015, 12:06

MarkN,
Had he been able to write a report, do you think he would have come to the same conclusions or different?
Obviously, I haven't a clue - did he ever offer an opinion after the war, perhaps to the official historians? I've not really studied this part of the North Africa campaign in great depth, however, whatever the failings of those on the spot, in my opinion we do need to put the performance of 2nd Armoured Division in context. As Lt.Col Richards (A.F.V. Branch, GHQ ME) wrote on 2nd Feb 41 (WO169/952):

"It is unfortunate that the 2nd Division is being hacked to bits and ruined as a Division. I have tried my best to keep it together but with little result."

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#115

Post by Attrition » 02 Apr 2015, 13:56

When its tanks were breaking down every ten miles and when the Italian tanks were abandoned as they ran out of petrol, moving seems more dangerous than fighting the Italo-Germans.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#116

Post by Attrition » 02 Apr 2015, 13:58

Attrition wrote:When its tanks were breaking down every ten miles and when the Italian tanks were abandoned as they ran out of diesel, moving seems more dangerous than fighting the Italo-Germans.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#117

Post by MarkN » 03 Apr 2015, 15:46

Hi Tom,
Tom from Cornwall wrote: Obviously, I haven't a clue - did he ever offer an opinion after the war, perhaps to the official historians? I've not really studied this part of the North Africa campaign in great depth, however, whatever the failings of those on the spot, in my opinion we do need to put the performance of 2nd Armoured Division in context. As Lt.Col Richards (A.F.V. Branch, GHQ ME) wrote on 2nd Feb 41 (WO169/952):

"It is unfortunate that the 2nd Division is being hacked to bits and ruined as a Division. I have tried my best to keep it together but with little result."
I agree, context (the big picture) is everythng. What a terrible shame the Germans were not considerate enough to only attack in one place at a time and delay their start until such time as 2nd Armoured Division were prepared to their own satisfaction. :wink:

Although I jest somewhat, I feel that 2nd Armoured Division would have been "hacked to bits" by 5.leichte even where GHQ ME had sent them to the front fully manned, fully established and with brand-spanking new AFVs.
Attrition wrote:When its tanks were breaking down every ten miles and when the Italian tanks were abandoned as they ran out of petrol, moving seems more dangerous than fighting the Italo-Germans.
I'm no fan of "what if" discussions. However, I think it is of value to question the decision-making. The state of disrepair and unreliability of the British armour was well known. It was 2nd Armoured Divisions greatest cause for complaint. So one has to wonder why it was decided to run them into the ground rather than to run them into the Germans - especially when you know petrol will be short as you've chosen a withdrawal route bypassing your supplies.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#118

Post by Attrition » 03 Apr 2015, 19:32

The Official Historian wrote the same, holding back to conserve them only led to them driving around until they broke down.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#119

Post by ClintHardware » 05 Apr 2015, 11:21

MarkN

What data have you been studying? Please list.

So far I can not agree with any of your statements and I am saying that because I have been looking at original Unit and Brigade and Divisional and Corps records on which my understanding is based as well as the German material in CAB 146/10. Where are your statements coming from?

Slagging off Neame & Co is only following all the summaries we have all read - but what research did those authors really do?

Looking at what they (CYRCOM's units and formations) had left to use and the distances, and looking at the armoured warfare history in the Middle East going back to 1920 (Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Lindsay etc) and earlier, and RASC preparations in the 1920s and 30s, and then looking at the tactics used by CYRCOM made in relation to the resources and mobility they had there and then - I can not agree with you.

There is another point to bearing in mind: Neame and the others were promoted against much competition during the financially tight period of inter-war funding. These men were not Buffoons - the caricature is that they were. These were men used to wielding limited resources and having to account for their use as being provably logical and economic. Neame's list to Wavell of what was required in Cyrenaica is logical.

You seem to be entertained by denigrating the performance of GOCs and senior COs with third hand material.

What material (other than my writings here) are you referring to?
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#120

Post by MarkN » 08 Apr 2015, 17:49

Hi,
ClintHardware wrote:Slagging off Neame & Co is only following all the summaries we have all read - but what research did those authors really do?
That's a novel way to dismiss the work of so many historians and authors...
ClintHardware wrote: Looking at what they (CYRCOM's units and formations) had left to use and the distances, and looking at the armoured warfare history in the Middle East going back to 1920 (Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Lindsay etc) and earlier, and RASC preparations in the 1920s and 30s, and then looking at the tactics used by CYRCOM made in relation to the resources and mobility they had there and then - I can not agree with you.

There is another point to bearing in mind: Neame and the others were promoted against much competition during the financially tight period of inter-war funding. These men were not Buffoons - the caricature is that they were. These were men used to wielding limited resources and having to account for their use as being provably logical and economic. Neame's list to Wavell of what was required in Cyrenaica is logical.
You do realise that it is your own words that suggest Neame, Gambier-Parry et al performed badly, don't you?

If they knew they had such limited transport and armoured resources, and that those resources were in a pitiful state (some being beyond 'last legs'), why did they post 2nd Armoured Division so distant and so remote?

If they knew they had such limited transport and armoured resources, and that those resources were in a pitiful state (some being beyond 'last legs'), why did they assume a strategic withdrawal was the best option?


The desert exercises, manouvers and training through the 20s and 30s culminated in a tactical withdrawal plan as part of the defence of Egypt. Note tactical not strategic.

You may choose to make a leap of understanding that that tactical withdrawal plan as part of the defence of Egypt morphed into a strategic withdrawal plan as part of the defence of Cyrenaica. So be it. No doubt you have numerous operational directives, instructions and orders that you have found during your 5 years of research to prove your leap of understanding and theory.

Personally, I believe that 2nd Armoured Division were to hold Mersa Brega (not retreat from it) and that only if attacked by overwhelming forces were they to make a tactical withdrawal. That tactical withdrawal would be to the Agadebia-Antelat region from where 2nd Support Group would "entice" the enemy up the coast road and then 3rd Armoured Brigade would strike out of the desert and into the enemy's rear causing his advance to stall and force a withdrawal or surrender as his supply system is destroyed. Where that to fail, a withdrawal along the Msus-Mechili-Tmimi axis could be contemplated (although not actually expected to be required) given the "dumping" layout.

What happened was hardly any of the above and no "strategic withdrawal" in good order occured. What happened was a rag order retreat that many call a complete rout.

I believe that historians have been quite kind to 2nd Armoured Division and CYRCOM over the years and that may be down to the influence of a certain Brigadier who was Head of the Army Historical Section in the Cabinet Office, 1947-1958.

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