The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

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MarkN
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#166

Post by MarkN » 14 Apr 2015, 21:03

Hi Tom,
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
Then 5th RTR trekked from the Delta to Cyrenaica, without tank transporters, without spares, and without unit fitters (maintenance was concentrated in the Delta workshops, except for the LRS at Beda Fomm; from what Urmel found, it wasn't until 1942 that a fully functioning multi-echelon division/brigade/regiment LAD was organized, trained, and equipped in the British armoured formations).
Just a small point but I think the tanks went by train to Matruh, then by track after that. I'm not sure that 5 RTR were without their unit fitters - have we a source for that? I think a key problem was that without a recovery organisation the "crocks" were scattered to the four winds and the fitters could therefore only work on one at a time before setting off to find the next one?
I think it reasonable to assume that the regiments managed to keep their own fitters.

When it comes to the brigade light repair sections (LRS), recovery sections (RS) and ordnance field parks (OFP), it seems each of the 3 brigades (1Armd, 3Armd and 2SptGp) kept them with them. According to a 2 Armd Div doc dated 3 May, almost all of 1 Armd Bde's RAOC got back to Egypt, 3 Armd Bde 'lost' their LRS, but the RS and OFP managed to make it to Egypt and the Spt Gp lost almost everyone.

At the Div level, half of the workshop went to Greece and most returned, the other half remained intact in Tobruk as part of the AOD. Their OFP only arrived from the UK in March and never left Egypt until broken up and distributed to other units.

In effect, the repair and recovery parts stayed reasonably intact and where they should be. Div workshops did not function as such, but the part working within AOD Tobruk did a great job keeping the tanks there fit and getting the crocks back into action. By 7 April they had got all 18 light tanks back into service and 4 of the 26 cruisers up and running (lacking parts). As those parts started to arrive, the cruisers started to fill the ranks through April too.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#167

Post by MarkN » 14 Apr 2015, 21:19

Tom from Cornwall wrote:One other last thing is that Gambier Parry doesn't appear to have had recent experience of operating with armour - I think I read somewhere that he was in Malaya before arriving in ME, then off to Greece as part of UK Military Mission before being returned and dropped into command of 2 Armd Div on the death of its previous commander. Does that sound right - no chance to exercise his formation as a formation, etc, etc.

Not saying that he was a military genius or anything - just pointing out the constraints within which he was operating.
Gambier-Parry was not an inspired choice, but since he was a 'tank' man, on paper he was about the best bet in the locale. He was an average officer working with bad doctrine and bad armoured tactical SOPs - which, since he was GSO1 Tank Brigade during the mid-30s, he was partly responsible for! He 'job' was to 'push' the Germans around. He made no attempt to do so, and was 'content' to be pushed around endlessly by them. He and Neame seemed to have approached the issue by assuming that they didn't stand a chance, so didn't even try. Latham and Rimington seem to have followed suit. The only time that any armour made an offensive push was when the last 4 or 5 cruisers of 5RTR lashed out at Derna. Coincidentally, or not, after all 4 of those mentionned were out of the C3 loop. Drew taking it upon himself.


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David W
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#168

Post by David W » 15 Apr 2015, 08:38

Rich.
You said....

"From 1st Brigade, 3rd Hussars with 52 Light Tank Mk VI went to Egypt in August 1940, 1st King's DG had been converted to the divisional armoured car regiment, and that left only 4th Hussars with its 52 Light Tank Mark VI when the division arrived in Egypt. In 3rd Armoured Brigade, 2nd and 3rd RTR had gone to Egypt with a mix of A.10 and A.13 Cruiser tanks in October 1940".

Didn't 3.Hussars arrive late September?
And didn't 3. RTR arrive very late December?

Just trying to square things away.

Best wishes,
David.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#169

Post by RichTO90 » 15 Apr 2015, 14:13

David W wrote:Didn't 3.Hussars arrive late September?
And didn't 3. RTR arrive very late December?

Just trying to square things away.

Best wishes,
David.
Hi David. Yes, I wondered that too. Those are the months when they were departing Jolly Old, but I don't recall the specific dates. When they arrived in the ME is a different matter. I'm not at all sure why they seemed to take so long unless they were routed the long way around?

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#170

Post by RichTO90 » 15 Apr 2015, 14:17

MarkN wrote:I think it reasonable to assume that the regiments managed to keep their own fitters.
Hi Mark, I suspect you are right and I was being too cruel, but maintenance at all echelons, with some exceptions such as at Tobruk, appears to have been in a muddle, something that can't all be blamed on the crock tanks. The later British assessment of German recovery and maintenance capability reads like a wake-up call.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#171

Post by nmao » 15 Apr 2015, 14:34

Apart from the Tiger convoy in 1941, every tank unit was sent the long way around Africa.
Typical duration was 6-7 weeks i think...

regards,

-Nuno
RichTO90 wrote:
David W wrote:Didn't 3.Hussars arrive late September?
And didn't 3. RTR arrive very late December?

Just trying to square things away.

Best wishes,
David.
Hi David. Yes, I wondered that too. Those are the months when they were departing Jolly Old, but I don't recall the specific dates. When they arrived in the ME is a different matter. I'm not at all sure why they seemed to take so long unless they were routed the long way around?

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#172

Post by MarkN » 15 Apr 2015, 15:20

3H (ex 1 Armoured Brigade / 2 Armoured Division),
2RTR (ex 3 Armoured Brigade / 1 Armoured Division) and
7RTR (ex 1 Army Tank Brigade) sailed on convoys WS2/2A departing August arriving September.

During October 3ArmdBde joined 2ArmdDiv.

The bulk of 2 Armoured Division, including the 4 armoured regiments (KDG, 4H, 3RTR and 5RTR), sailed on convoys WS4 and WS4B departing October/November arriving December.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#173

Post by MarkN » 15 Apr 2015, 15:38

RichTO90 wrote: Hi Mark, I suspect you are right and I was being too cruel, but maintenance at all echelons, with some exceptions such as at Tobruk, appears to have been in a muddle, something that can't all be blamed on the crock tanks. The later British assessment of German recovery and maintenance capability reads like a wake-up call.
No doubt about that at all.

The Wehrmacht was designed and its officer corps schooled in the mentality of aggressive action and winning the battle against a technologically advanced enemy.

The British Army was structured to provide interesting peacetime soldiering with a bit of colonial policing for excitement. Both WW1 and WW2 were historical aberrations to their employment timeline and the bulk of the senior officer corps were simply unable to adjust. There was resistance to change at every corner at every level of command. How long did it take for them to learn their lesson and build a REME organisation?

When Wehrmacht commanders were given a task, they looked at how best to use the resources at their disposal.

When British Army commanders were given a task, they looked to see what resources they were deficient in according to the Staff College DS answer, and then sent carefully worded complaint and begging memos up the CoC.

Sonnenblume is a perfect example of this.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#174

Post by Attrition » 15 Apr 2015, 15:53

~~~~~The British Army was structured to provide interesting peacetime soldiering with a bit of colonial policing for excitement.~~~~~

This myth was exploded in Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 (2001) by David French

MarkN
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#175

Post by MarkN » 15 Apr 2015, 16:14

Attrition wrote:~~~~~The British Army was structured to provide interesting peacetime soldiering with a bit of colonial policing for excitement.~~~~~

This myth was exploded in Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 (2001) by David French
Exploded? Hmmm!

Tank design was primarily limited by the requirement that tanks could be transported by rail through/under standard British guage tunnels and bridges. Is that a design parameter dictated by the need to maximise military effect (on the continent or elsewhere) or to 'fit' peacetime soldiering in the UK? Or was it assumed mechanised warfare wuld only be practised on, and for the defense of, the British mainland?

I could go on...

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#176

Post by Attrition » 15 Apr 2015, 16:23

There was no rival industrial power to arm against after 1918, so no need for big tanks. Massacring civilians is a low-tech activity.

MarkN
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#177

Post by MarkN » 15 Apr 2015, 16:36

Attrition wrote:There was no rival industrial power to arm against after 1918, so no need for big tanks. Massacring civilians is a low-tech activity.
Nothing to do with British commanders not being mentally prepared for a major war against a major competitor...

Quote from the book you mentionned (my bold and underline)...
Added to problems involving the interpretation of doctrine were the myriad of practical obstacles that hindered realistic training both before and during the war. They were made much worse because too much responsibility for training was left in the hands of individual commanders. Some were energetic and committed trainers who tried to make training realistic and interesting for their troops. But many others did not share their enthusiasm or commitment and the preparation of their troops for battle suffered accordingly. Senior British officers did not lack professional ambition. Those who rose to command formations after 1939 had worked hard to pass the necessary examinations to enter the Staff College, for possession of a coveted psc certificate became almost the sine qua non of high command. But, what they did all too often lack was adequate training at the tactical and operational level of war. Although most divisional commanders and their seniors had received the best professional training that the army had to offer by passing through the Staff College, the training they received there was defective. The Staff College devoted too much time to preparing officers to be strategists, rather than to training them to be divisional and corps commanders. At a lower level, the battalion and brigade commanders of the expanded wartime army were supposed to be provided from the ranks of the ‘middle piece officers’ of the pre-war regular army. That some of them did not function successfully was not the result of the fact that they were without professional ambition, or because they looked upon soldiering as a pleasant pastime, or because they saw the army as a refuge from the modern world. They failed because the inter-war army had not created a system to ensure that they received the appropriate training for their new role. Critics of the regimental system have exaggerated the ways in which it inhibited combined arms co-operation in the same way that its supporters have exaggerated the extent to which it sustained morale in the wartime army. It was the lack of opportunity given to the different arms to train together, not inter-arm or interregimental jealousy, which inhibited combined arms co-operation. When units did have the chance to train together, co-operation was usually good. When combined arms co-operation failed, the regimental system served as a convenient excuse to hide more intractable problems.
The system was, at best, designed for peacetime soldiering and colonial policing, at worst, simply broken.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#178

Post by Gooner1 » 15 Apr 2015, 18:05

MarkN wrote: He 'job' was to 'push' the Germans around. He made no attempt to do so, and was 'content' to be pushed around endlessly by them. He and Neame seemed to have approached the issue by assuming that they didn't stand a chance, so didn't even try. Latham and Rimington seem to have followed suit. The only time that any armour made an offensive push was when the last 4 or 5 cruisers of 5RTR lashed out at Derna. Coincidentally, or not, after all 4 of those mentionned were out of the C3 loop. Drew taking it upon himself.
Push the Axis around with about a 3-1 force inferiority?
Press On Regardless
"Then on 31st March 5RTR had its first clash with the enemy on African soil. This came about because 'Fit tanks of 'A' Squadron (6 A13s) went forward with the armoured car patrol of the KDG in a supporting role. Half an hour later one A13 became a mechanical casualty and by 1900 another A13 lost power and was sent back."

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#179

Post by Gooner1 » 15 Apr 2015, 18:07

MarkN wrote: Nothing to do with British commanders not being mentally prepared for a major war against a major competitor...
For another thread, but it was the politicians who decided on 'limited liability' for the coming war ..

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#180

Post by MarkN » 15 Apr 2015, 18:17

Hi Gooner1,
Gooner1 wrote: Push the Axis around with about a 3-1 force inferiority?
Was it "a 3-1 force inferiority?" I don't think it was.


Gentlemen,

Found this and would appreciate your thoughts...
A column set out from El Mechili that afternoon to find the 2nd Armoured Division which they almost did. What they encountered coming towards El Mechili was the Divisional Commander (General Gambier Perry) and his advanced HQ with one surviving cruiser tank. They joined up and arrived at El Mechili about 2130 hours on the 6th. The armoured brigade and support group of the 2nd Armoured Division never did arrive, having taken a different route from what was ordered.
Found here: http://www.omsa.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=31&t=404

...with one surviving cruiser tank. Is this,
a) a 5RTR A13 attached to DivHQ?
b) evidence that 2ArmdDiv took some, if not all, of its compliment of 8 tanks forward - and this is the last survivor. By my calculation, 2 ArmdDiv arrived in Egypt with 7 A13 and 3 LT (2 more than establishment)?
c) other?

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