The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Hi Aber,
Thanks for making me look at it again. It has caused me to firm up my case.
Out of 1,053 footnotes, I have only counted 74 that refer to archival sources, almost all in the PRO/NA. Allowing for a few "ibids" missed, at least 90% of the citations are to published works. Furthermore not a single one of the 74 archival references are Italian or German. The "other side of the hill" is almost entirely absent.
This looks a lot more like a survey of the existing Englidh language literature, with a minimum of original research to give it academic legs.
Such a survey may be useful in its own right, but I would very seriously question whether this is really PhD material.
To repeat, "If this article was accepted towards a PhD, then (1) the University of Hull needs to look out for its reputation and (2) the University of Axishistoryforum should start dishing out doctorates to some of its more distinguished contributors."
PhD anyone?
Cheers,
Sid.
Thanks for making me look at it again. It has caused me to firm up my case.
Out of 1,053 footnotes, I have only counted 74 that refer to archival sources, almost all in the PRO/NA. Allowing for a few "ibids" missed, at least 90% of the citations are to published works. Furthermore not a single one of the 74 archival references are Italian or German. The "other side of the hill" is almost entirely absent.
This looks a lot more like a survey of the existing Englidh language literature, with a minimum of original research to give it academic legs.
Such a survey may be useful in its own right, but I would very seriously question whether this is really PhD material.
To repeat, "If this article was accepted towards a PhD, then (1) the University of Hull needs to look out for its reputation and (2) the University of Axishistoryforum should start dishing out doctorates to some of its more distinguished contributors."
PhD anyone?
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Hi URMEL you asked me ‘where my information that 7 R.T.R. sent tanks (six I quote) to Crete in April came from’. The simple answer is that the information came, as referenced in my thesis, from Fraser’s book, And We Shall Shock Them, found on p 142. Apart from this one reference I can find no one else who says Matildas went to Crete in April. However, despite the lack of supporting references I still think that Fraser is correct. Although I could not go into detail in my thesis (lack of words) I did do quite a lot of research into the activities of 7 R.T.R. not only to satisfy my own curiosity but to also be sure that at least six Matilda tanks did go to Crete.
Initially I consulted the war diary of 7 R.T.R. which confirmed that three Matildas were sent to Crete on 11 May. Then I referenced the New Zealand official history (which confirms the whereabouts of seven Matildas on Crete) and Fallscirmjager in Crete by Jean-Yves Nasse which gives the locations of nine Matildas. I was also fortunate to find some excellent research into the Matilda tanks on Crete done by an Australian called Michael Grieve. Grieve has undertaken a very comprehensive photographic investigation into the Matildas on Crete. He has collected photographs of most of the hulks, taken from a verity of sources, and has established the names of four and the numbers of six Matildas and has found a seventh which has no number or name visible. I list the identified tanks below:
Gnome III T. 6924
Gnu III T. 7396 (possibly)
Greenloaning T. 7398
Gant IV T. 7411
T. 18896
T. 18935
However, even though the evidence presented above suggests that at least seven, and probably nine, Matildas were sent to Crete it still leaves unanswered the question of when they were sent. Although I cannot be sure my guess is that they were sent in two batches one of six In April and one of three in May. My reasons for thinking this are the differing camouflage schemes the tanks were painted in, five of the seven identified were in Caunter desert garb and two in UK G3 green, the G names four where given and the differing sequence of their numbers.
As can be seen from the groups listed above four tanks are named and have four digit numbers and the photographic evidence confirms that all the named tanks and the fifth un-named tank were in the same Caunter desert garb. The close proximity of the numbers that four were allocated indicates that they were part of the same batch and the G designations indicate that they were part of the same unit. This seems to confirm Frasers claim that they were part of a batch of six and I see no reason to doubt they were sent in April.
Where these six came from and why they were chosen is, as far as I know, not recorded but my guess is that when the call for Matildas for Crete was made in April these tanks were readily available but detached from the main unit possibly at Mersa Matruh or in workshops in Alexandria. This would explain why the author of the war diary does not record their movement to Crete; he probably did not even know they had been sent until much later by which time things of more importance needed recording.
As for the three which are recorded in the war diary I suspect these were late issue tanks still in their original G3 camouflage taken direct from the workshop. Although a figure of 50 Matilda tanks being issued to 7 R.T.R and used in Operation Compass is often quoted, and is almost certainly correct, there are numerous references to more than 50 Matildas being sent to the Middle East. Victoria Schofield on p 156 of Wavell Soldier and Scholar claims that 57 Matildas arrived in October. This figure is confirmed by Correlli Barnett in The Desert Generals on p 27. So it is not beyond reason to speculate that seven were kept back as replacements for battle casualties. However, intriguingly, according to the Matilda contract cards T. 18935 was produced around mid-March 1941 so, if this is correct, it could not be part of the October 1940 shipment. This begs the question were more Matildas sent in a later convoy. It is recorded that Wavell was impressed by the Matildas and requested more in November 1940 did he get them?
Anyway, based on the evidence I had, I concluded that nine Matildas were sent to Crete; six in April as referenced by Fraser and quoted by me and three more in May; confirmed by the war diary. So why you may ask did I only quote the six identified by Fraser? My reasoning was as I could only definitely identify seven when writing my thesis, and as the amount did not really undermine the thrust of my argument; which was that Matildas were sent to Crete, I did not see the need to claim more. Looking back, as the presence of more Matildas would only have strengthened my argument that serviceable Matilda tanks would have been available to O’Connor had he chosen to press on to Tripoli in February (which was why I referred to the Matildas in the first place) I should, perhaps, have referenced nine tanks and indeed in my revised work I intend to do so.
Regards Norm
Initially I consulted the war diary of 7 R.T.R. which confirmed that three Matildas were sent to Crete on 11 May. Then I referenced the New Zealand official history (which confirms the whereabouts of seven Matildas on Crete) and Fallscirmjager in Crete by Jean-Yves Nasse which gives the locations of nine Matildas. I was also fortunate to find some excellent research into the Matilda tanks on Crete done by an Australian called Michael Grieve. Grieve has undertaken a very comprehensive photographic investigation into the Matildas on Crete. He has collected photographs of most of the hulks, taken from a verity of sources, and has established the names of four and the numbers of six Matildas and has found a seventh which has no number or name visible. I list the identified tanks below:
Gnome III T. 6924
Gnu III T. 7396 (possibly)
Greenloaning T. 7398
Gant IV T. 7411
T. 18896
T. 18935
However, even though the evidence presented above suggests that at least seven, and probably nine, Matildas were sent to Crete it still leaves unanswered the question of when they were sent. Although I cannot be sure my guess is that they were sent in two batches one of six In April and one of three in May. My reasons for thinking this are the differing camouflage schemes the tanks were painted in, five of the seven identified were in Caunter desert garb and two in UK G3 green, the G names four where given and the differing sequence of their numbers.
As can be seen from the groups listed above four tanks are named and have four digit numbers and the photographic evidence confirms that all the named tanks and the fifth un-named tank were in the same Caunter desert garb. The close proximity of the numbers that four were allocated indicates that they were part of the same batch and the G designations indicate that they were part of the same unit. This seems to confirm Frasers claim that they were part of a batch of six and I see no reason to doubt they were sent in April.
Where these six came from and why they were chosen is, as far as I know, not recorded but my guess is that when the call for Matildas for Crete was made in April these tanks were readily available but detached from the main unit possibly at Mersa Matruh or in workshops in Alexandria. This would explain why the author of the war diary does not record their movement to Crete; he probably did not even know they had been sent until much later by which time things of more importance needed recording.
As for the three which are recorded in the war diary I suspect these were late issue tanks still in their original G3 camouflage taken direct from the workshop. Although a figure of 50 Matilda tanks being issued to 7 R.T.R and used in Operation Compass is often quoted, and is almost certainly correct, there are numerous references to more than 50 Matildas being sent to the Middle East. Victoria Schofield on p 156 of Wavell Soldier and Scholar claims that 57 Matildas arrived in October. This figure is confirmed by Correlli Barnett in The Desert Generals on p 27. So it is not beyond reason to speculate that seven were kept back as replacements for battle casualties. However, intriguingly, according to the Matilda contract cards T. 18935 was produced around mid-March 1941 so, if this is correct, it could not be part of the October 1940 shipment. This begs the question were more Matildas sent in a later convoy. It is recorded that Wavell was impressed by the Matildas and requested more in November 1940 did he get them?
Anyway, based on the evidence I had, I concluded that nine Matildas were sent to Crete; six in April as referenced by Fraser and quoted by me and three more in May; confirmed by the war diary. So why you may ask did I only quote the six identified by Fraser? My reasoning was as I could only definitely identify seven when writing my thesis, and as the amount did not really undermine the thrust of my argument; which was that Matildas were sent to Crete, I did not see the need to claim more. Looking back, as the presence of more Matildas would only have strengthened my argument that serviceable Matilda tanks would have been available to O’Connor had he chosen to press on to Tripoli in February (which was why I referred to the Matildas in the first place) I should, perhaps, have referenced nine tanks and indeed in my revised work I intend to do so.
Regards Norm
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Many thanks Norm! Good bit of research there.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
I'm impressed with counting footnotesSid Guttridge wrote:Hi Aber,
Thanks for making me look at it again. It has caused me to firm up my case.
Out of 1,053 footnotes, I have only counted 74 that refer to archival sources, almost all in the PRO/NA. Allowing for a few "ibids" missed, at least 90% of the citations are to published works. Furthermore not a single one of the 74 archival references are Italian or German. The "other side of the hill" is almost entirely absent.
I'll have to look at it again to understand what the 'research question' was, but as I understand it original research for a PhD means looking at the evidence in a different way than has been done before, rather than looking at primary source evidence that hasn't been reviewed before. Also depending on how the 'research question' is set up, sources from the other side of the hill may not be relevant (especially when you get onto heavily theoretical topics)
Of course, when I've read it I may change my opinion, but I'm inclined to give PhDs the benefit of the doubt. Do you know who the external examiner was, as they have the key role in maintaining standards?
Agreedthe University of Axishistoryforum should start dishing out doctorates to some of its more distinguished contributors."
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Norm,
Good stuff, very interesting. One thing though:
Regards
Tom
Good stuff, very interesting. One thing though:
I would have thought the number of 3-tonners available would have had more of an impact on any advance towards Tripoli, rather than the number of I tanks. But, some people might suggest that I am obsessed by 3-tonners.Looking back, as the presence of more Matildas would only have strengthened my argument that serviceable Matilda tanks would have been available to O’Connor had he chosen to press on to Tripoli in February (which was why I referred to the Matildas in the first place) I should, perhaps, have referenced nine tanks and indeed in my revised work I intend to do so.
Regards
Tom
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Hi Norm,
Sorry to give the standing of your thesis a hard time. I didn't realize you were on thread. Had I done so I would have used a more more measured tone to make the same point.
One other thing. I felt the mapping was inadequate to match the text. As a result I was left with no visual "feel" for events.
Cheers,
Sid.
Sorry to give the standing of your thesis a hard time. I didn't realize you were on thread. Had I done so I would have used a more more measured tone to make the same point.
One other thing. I felt the mapping was inadequate to match the text. As a result I was left with no visual "feel" for events.
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Hi Sid
No hard feelings on my part. And you are quite right it should have more maps pictures of weapons and photos of some of the main characters such as Wavell, Latham, Neame and Shipton but my supervisor advised me not to put them in so I did as he advised. As with many things in life to gain a PhD you have to jump through the systems hoops.
Regards Norm
No hard feelings on my part. And you are quite right it should have more maps pictures of weapons and photos of some of the main characters such as Wavell, Latham, Neame and Shipton but my supervisor advised me not to put them in so I did as he advised. As with many things in life to gain a PhD you have to jump through the systems hoops.
Regards Norm
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
There is some interesting data in Norm's thesis but I am worried by historians making summarised statements because they often under describe and because of that they obscure.
Norm made the following points and I would like to respond to them:
“Finally in regard to ground forces we may look to the shambolic state of 3AB. The failure by both Gambier-Parry and Rimington to get this unit into some kind of fighting condition was truly scandalous.”
The kit was worn. The soldiers were highly trained professionals – “shambolic” just is not sufficient as a description for highly organised men.
All the tanks were worn and the crews and LAD made them as battle worthy as possible – this is shown by the number of operational tanks with the brigade, but many of them were lost to mechanical problems due to 400 miles of movement back towards Tobruk in desert conditions before ever getting shot at. If the regiments and men had been idle there would have been nothing fielded. The British Army does not do idle especially pre-war professional soldiers.
“They had six long weeks to make their regiments battle worthy and squandered every one of them.”
No. The kit was worn out. The men were not idle after Operation COMPASS. Only if we were present could we make statements like the above.
“There was no reason why 6 RTR could not have taken their Italian tanks down to Brega and dug them into the sand dunes at least then they might have served some useful purpose.”
No. 2nd RTR 3rd and 7th Hussars tested their guns against the captured Italian armour at Beda Fomm – the qualities of armour plate was extremely poor. The 47mm was useful but did not measure up to the 2-Pdr. It did have an HE round but were they present? However, it was not worth sacrificing trained men in the Italian tanks in a head on clash with German armour. Nevertheless M13s were made operational and manned and 3rd Armoured Brigade’s task was to attack the flank of the German attack. Hence the single firefight with the troop from 5th RTR at 0630 hours on the 31st March. That the M13’s did not reach the German flank was due to a series of other events including lost fuel and breakdowns.
“The time taken to move 5 RTR forward was ludicrous.”
No. They did remarkably well despite having to make it on their own. The 3rd Armd Bde Operation Order quoted below makes it clear how the rapidity of the German threat was still unknown at the time. The 5th RTR were present and ready for the flank attack that did not happen as expected. By the 28th March breakdowns had reached a point where only twenty-eight A13s were still runners despite the care shown by the crews. On reaching El Adem the 5th R.T.R. carried out recces to find the easiest cross country routes to Agedabia.
Sergeant Jake Wardrop of ‘C’ Squadron recorded that fifteen out of fifteen of their tanks made it further forward to the edge of the Sebcha el Chebira salt flats of El Agheila where each driver had his hand shaken by their Major for having so skilfully avoided breakdowns.
“ It was known in early March that German armour was being landed at Tripoli it could, therefore, only be a matter of time before this enemy armour moved onto the offensive.”
Yes but there were insufficient mechanically reliable and unworn tanks in the Middle East – the whole of the 3rd Armoured Brigade as well as 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades needed replacement tanks. The 20 or so still operational A13s with 5th RTR were the best to hand and able to make it into battle as they did on the 2nd April.
Unidentified Panzer Crew Member diary entry 3rd April 1941*
“Yesterday we had a terrifying experience in action against British tanks near Agedabia.
Our casualties were considerable” (WO 169/1414)
“Had 5 RTR been moved to the Brega area in early March they might have been able to make some useful contribution to the defence as it was by sending them in late March they were no value whatsoever.”
No. Because of their resources their role was to attack the flank as 2nd Support Group withdrew – this was the plan worked out before the battle/German reconnaissance in force on the 31st March.
“Furthermore, the inability of 3H to make any worthwhile contribution to the defence was a totally self inflicted wound.”
3rd Hussars were waiting to attack the soft vehicles on the flank and were in touch with the battle on the 31st by wireless.
“There was no need to send all the British cruisers back to the Delta just leaving 15 for 3H would have made all the difference to the fighting ability of this unit.”
No. They were worn and needing major overhauls.
“The release of officers to go on leave and the leisurely way in which the work on the light tanks was carried out is hard to understand. The tanks in this unit were virtually all the possible serviceable tanks in the forward areas their immediate return to fighting ability should have been their COs primary concern not the issuing of leave passes.”
These were professional soldiers – if the known threat was such that battle was imminent – no one would have had leave. Also we do not know if these men were so over wrought with killing Italians that they were useless until they had had a break. The slaughter at Beda Fomm was sickening for both sides even though it seems to us that it was a comparative walk over. It took a week to bury the dead and several weeks to sort out the salvageable stuff from the road.
On the 24th March the situation as 3rd Armoured Brigade understood it to be, was summarised in its Operational Instruction No. 9.
3 ARMD BDE OP. INSTRUCTION NO. 9
I. GENERAL SITUATION
(a) An enemy advance in force before the first week in April is unlikely. Should he advance so soon his route is more likely to be via BENGHASI [sic] than Eastwards across the Desert. The latter cannot entirely be ruled out but would have to be via BENGHASI and DERNA to obtain the coast road for supplies.
(b) Any advance would probably be made by a German Colonial Armoured Div. (See Appendix A) Full use of roads and well known tracks would possibly be made using large numbers of Motor Cyclists as fwd elements.
(c) Small forces of the enemy have been seen in MARADA and he appears to be reoccupying AGHEILA.
(d) Any advance by us being at the moment impossible we are thrown on the offensive - defensive. Considerable reinforcements to the forces now available are expected in the near future.
(e) 2nd Armd Div is holding a line MERSA BREGA - BIR ES UERA [sic] - WADI FAREGH as far EAST as MAATEN BETTAFAL with reconnaissance WEST and SOUTH of the general line AGHEILA - MAATEN GIOFER - WADI FAREGH.
II.
(a) The role of the 3rd Armd Bde may be summarised as follows:-
1st Stage. It will be prepared to operate against the flank or rear of any enemy advance from AGHEILA MAATEN GIOFER or MAATEN BELCLEIBAT.
2nd Stage. Should the Sp Gp be forced to withdraw the role of the 3rd Armd Bde will then be to protect it during its withdrawal from the line MERSA BREGA - BIR ES SUERA.
3rd Stage. Whilst the Sp Gp stands across the road in a position SOUTH of AGEDABIA (Position to be selected by Commander Sp Gp) the role of this Bde will be to protect the Sp Gp’s left flank in an area SOUTH of AGEDABIA.
4th Stage. If the Sp Gp withdraws into the ANTELAT area 3 Armd Bde role is to move into an area SOUTH or SOUTH WEST of ANTELAT with a view to attacking and cutting off supplies etc., along the main BENGHASI road
The Operational Instruction continued with arrangements for 143 Field Park Troop to destroy water supplies in the event of retreat. It then listed three possible orders of battle of a German Colonial Armoured Division. The nature of the German threat was not properly understood.
Norm made the following points and I would like to respond to them:
“Finally in regard to ground forces we may look to the shambolic state of 3AB. The failure by both Gambier-Parry and Rimington to get this unit into some kind of fighting condition was truly scandalous.”
The kit was worn. The soldiers were highly trained professionals – “shambolic” just is not sufficient as a description for highly organised men.
All the tanks were worn and the crews and LAD made them as battle worthy as possible – this is shown by the number of operational tanks with the brigade, but many of them were lost to mechanical problems due to 400 miles of movement back towards Tobruk in desert conditions before ever getting shot at. If the regiments and men had been idle there would have been nothing fielded. The British Army does not do idle especially pre-war professional soldiers.
“They had six long weeks to make their regiments battle worthy and squandered every one of them.”
No. The kit was worn out. The men were not idle after Operation COMPASS. Only if we were present could we make statements like the above.
“There was no reason why 6 RTR could not have taken their Italian tanks down to Brega and dug them into the sand dunes at least then they might have served some useful purpose.”
No. 2nd RTR 3rd and 7th Hussars tested their guns against the captured Italian armour at Beda Fomm – the qualities of armour plate was extremely poor. The 47mm was useful but did not measure up to the 2-Pdr. It did have an HE round but were they present? However, it was not worth sacrificing trained men in the Italian tanks in a head on clash with German armour. Nevertheless M13s were made operational and manned and 3rd Armoured Brigade’s task was to attack the flank of the German attack. Hence the single firefight with the troop from 5th RTR at 0630 hours on the 31st March. That the M13’s did not reach the German flank was due to a series of other events including lost fuel and breakdowns.
“The time taken to move 5 RTR forward was ludicrous.”
No. They did remarkably well despite having to make it on their own. The 3rd Armd Bde Operation Order quoted below makes it clear how the rapidity of the German threat was still unknown at the time. The 5th RTR were present and ready for the flank attack that did not happen as expected. By the 28th March breakdowns had reached a point where only twenty-eight A13s were still runners despite the care shown by the crews. On reaching El Adem the 5th R.T.R. carried out recces to find the easiest cross country routes to Agedabia.
Sergeant Jake Wardrop of ‘C’ Squadron recorded that fifteen out of fifteen of their tanks made it further forward to the edge of the Sebcha el Chebira salt flats of El Agheila where each driver had his hand shaken by their Major for having so skilfully avoided breakdowns.
“ It was known in early March that German armour was being landed at Tripoli it could, therefore, only be a matter of time before this enemy armour moved onto the offensive.”
Yes but there were insufficient mechanically reliable and unworn tanks in the Middle East – the whole of the 3rd Armoured Brigade as well as 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades needed replacement tanks. The 20 or so still operational A13s with 5th RTR were the best to hand and able to make it into battle as they did on the 2nd April.
Unidentified Panzer Crew Member diary entry 3rd April 1941*
“Yesterday we had a terrifying experience in action against British tanks near Agedabia.
Our casualties were considerable” (WO 169/1414)
“Had 5 RTR been moved to the Brega area in early March they might have been able to make some useful contribution to the defence as it was by sending them in late March they were no value whatsoever.”
No. Because of their resources their role was to attack the flank as 2nd Support Group withdrew – this was the plan worked out before the battle/German reconnaissance in force on the 31st March.
“Furthermore, the inability of 3H to make any worthwhile contribution to the defence was a totally self inflicted wound.”
3rd Hussars were waiting to attack the soft vehicles on the flank and were in touch with the battle on the 31st by wireless.
“There was no need to send all the British cruisers back to the Delta just leaving 15 for 3H would have made all the difference to the fighting ability of this unit.”
No. They were worn and needing major overhauls.
“The release of officers to go on leave and the leisurely way in which the work on the light tanks was carried out is hard to understand. The tanks in this unit were virtually all the possible serviceable tanks in the forward areas their immediate return to fighting ability should have been their COs primary concern not the issuing of leave passes.”
These were professional soldiers – if the known threat was such that battle was imminent – no one would have had leave. Also we do not know if these men were so over wrought with killing Italians that they were useless until they had had a break. The slaughter at Beda Fomm was sickening for both sides even though it seems to us that it was a comparative walk over. It took a week to bury the dead and several weeks to sort out the salvageable stuff from the road.
On the 24th March the situation as 3rd Armoured Brigade understood it to be, was summarised in its Operational Instruction No. 9.
3 ARMD BDE OP. INSTRUCTION NO. 9
I. GENERAL SITUATION
(a) An enemy advance in force before the first week in April is unlikely. Should he advance so soon his route is more likely to be via BENGHASI [sic] than Eastwards across the Desert. The latter cannot entirely be ruled out but would have to be via BENGHASI and DERNA to obtain the coast road for supplies.
(b) Any advance would probably be made by a German Colonial Armoured Div. (See Appendix A) Full use of roads and well known tracks would possibly be made using large numbers of Motor Cyclists as fwd elements.
(c) Small forces of the enemy have been seen in MARADA and he appears to be reoccupying AGHEILA.
(d) Any advance by us being at the moment impossible we are thrown on the offensive - defensive. Considerable reinforcements to the forces now available are expected in the near future.
(e) 2nd Armd Div is holding a line MERSA BREGA - BIR ES UERA [sic] - WADI FAREGH as far EAST as MAATEN BETTAFAL with reconnaissance WEST and SOUTH of the general line AGHEILA - MAATEN GIOFER - WADI FAREGH.
II.
(a) The role of the 3rd Armd Bde may be summarised as follows:-
1st Stage. It will be prepared to operate against the flank or rear of any enemy advance from AGHEILA MAATEN GIOFER or MAATEN BELCLEIBAT.
2nd Stage. Should the Sp Gp be forced to withdraw the role of the 3rd Armd Bde will then be to protect it during its withdrawal from the line MERSA BREGA - BIR ES SUERA.
3rd Stage. Whilst the Sp Gp stands across the road in a position SOUTH of AGEDABIA (Position to be selected by Commander Sp Gp) the role of this Bde will be to protect the Sp Gp’s left flank in an area SOUTH of AGEDABIA.
4th Stage. If the Sp Gp withdraws into the ANTELAT area 3 Armd Bde role is to move into an area SOUTH or SOUTH WEST of ANTELAT with a view to attacking and cutting off supplies etc., along the main BENGHASI road
The Operational Instruction continued with arrangements for 143 Field Park Troop to destroy water supplies in the event of retreat. It then listed three possible orders of battle of a German Colonial Armoured Division. The nature of the German threat was not properly understood.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Several posts were split off into a what if at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&t=203410
/Marcus
/Marcus
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Good post.ClintHardware wrote:There is some interesting data in Norm's thesis but I am worried by historians making summarised statements because they often under describe and because of that they obscure.
The fundamental issue here to me is that holding on to Brega only makes sense if you have a maneuver element capable of maneuver. The Empire forces in western Cyrenaica did not have that, since 3 Armoured Brigade was evidently not capable of maneuver due to mechanical issues.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Thanks Urmel
There was either a deliberate or an accidental political game going on. Some of the elements are:
1) Wavell knew the state of 3rd AB and 2nd Sp Gp.
2) The 2nd Sp Gp and 3rd AB had a plan a week days before 31st March to retreat.
3) Wavell agreed to a slow retreat to produce as much time as possible and the plans were formed because of Wavell allowing them to be.
4) Wavell later blames Neame and Gambier-Parry for the retreat.
5) Neame was a Royal Engineer and a VC winner - so he is used to battle and his whole career has been based on logically wielding resources. He was promoted in a peace time reduced sized army where promotion was difficult to get. For 70 years we have been encouraged to think of him as completely useless.
6) Brigadier Latham's use of resources at Mersa Brega was excellent - they held for a day and got out. He was also a highly experienced and professional soldier. He got the same treatment as Neame.
7) Gambier-Parry did what he could with what he had. He was a pro. He made a mistake placing Div HQ in the line at Mechili but Mechili had to be held to allow the Australians to escape (Mechili was the pivot to the Wadi Cuff and Wadi Derna positions that were not held). He gets blamed for incompetence but why was Gott not given 2nd AD in his place during early March ?
8) O'Connor was an Infantry Division commander at the point he got given the Western Desert Force - he was not an armour expert at the point he begins to defeats X Armata. He changes little of Neame's arrangments and allows the retreat - because there were no resources to hand and 20th and 26th Brigades had to be protected as they lacked transport.
I do NOT know for definite but on balance Wavell's statements were partly wartime half truths and of necessity when dealing with Churchill. I do not believe he could say that the senior officers had done as well as they possibly could have done with the few resources they had to hand because Churchill would have been extremely unhappy about another retreat.
There was either a deliberate or an accidental political game going on. Some of the elements are:
1) Wavell knew the state of 3rd AB and 2nd Sp Gp.
2) The 2nd Sp Gp and 3rd AB had a plan a week days before 31st March to retreat.
3) Wavell agreed to a slow retreat to produce as much time as possible and the plans were formed because of Wavell allowing them to be.
4) Wavell later blames Neame and Gambier-Parry for the retreat.
5) Neame was a Royal Engineer and a VC winner - so he is used to battle and his whole career has been based on logically wielding resources. He was promoted in a peace time reduced sized army where promotion was difficult to get. For 70 years we have been encouraged to think of him as completely useless.
6) Brigadier Latham's use of resources at Mersa Brega was excellent - they held for a day and got out. He was also a highly experienced and professional soldier. He got the same treatment as Neame.
7) Gambier-Parry did what he could with what he had. He was a pro. He made a mistake placing Div HQ in the line at Mechili but Mechili had to be held to allow the Australians to escape (Mechili was the pivot to the Wadi Cuff and Wadi Derna positions that were not held). He gets blamed for incompetence but why was Gott not given 2nd AD in his place during early March ?
8) O'Connor was an Infantry Division commander at the point he got given the Western Desert Force - he was not an armour expert at the point he begins to defeats X Armata. He changes little of Neame's arrangments and allows the retreat - because there were no resources to hand and 20th and 26th Brigades had to be protected as they lacked transport.
I do NOT know for definite but on balance Wavell's statements were partly wartime half truths and of necessity when dealing with Churchill. I do not believe he could say that the senior officers had done as well as they possibly could have done with the few resources they had to hand because Churchill would have been extremely unhappy about another retreat.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
This is in fact confirmed by 5 R.T.R. war diary, report by its CO, which goes into minute detail on why insufficient new engines were received. He ends it by challenging anyone accusing him of neglecting the mechanical state of his battalion to open a Court of Inquiry.ClintHardware wrote:There is some interesting data in Norm's thesis but I am worried by historians making summarised statements because they often under describe and because of that they obscure.
Norm made the following points and I would like to respond to them:
“Finally in regard to ground forces we may look to the shambolic state of 3AB. The failure by both Gambier-Parry and Rimington to get this unit into some kind of fighting condition was truly scandalous.”
The kit was worn. The soldiers were highly trained professionals – “shambolic” just is not sufficient as a description for highly organised men.
All the tanks were worn and the crews and LAD made them as battle worthy as possible – this is shown by the number of operational tanks with the brigade, but many of them were lost to mechanical problems due to 400 miles of movement back towards Tobruk in desert conditions before ever getting shot at. If the regiments and men had been idle there would have been nothing fielded. The British Army does not do idle especially pre-war professional soldiers.
“They had six long weeks to make their regiments battle worthy and squandered every one of them.”
No. The kit was worn out. The men were not idle after Operation COMPASS. Only if we were present could we make statements like the above.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
- ClintHardware
- Member
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Just been re-visiting 2nd Support Group and their fight outside Tobruk under Brigadier Gott's command 9th - 16th April before being re-designated as the Mobile Force thereafter and being joined/replaced by some of the officers from HQ 7th Support Group.
The 2nd Support Group War Diary (WO 169/1159) at Tahag Camp, Egypt contains these entries:-
May 12th Message from GHQ received stating that 2 RHA, 1 Rangers and NH were to come under comd 1st Armd Bde.
May 16th Private and official mail received from England dated Nov 1940.
May 18th Communication received from GHQ, Tps Mob. Centre, that HQ 2nd Support Group was to be disbanded in the scheme for R.A.C. re-organisation and 1 THR to come under comd 1st Armd Bde.
- End Quote
Not re-equipping and re-fielding 2nd Armoured Division was a choice made in terms of available resources and also a realisation that the OOB of Armoured Divisions needed updating away from 2 Armoured Brigades and a Support Group.
The 2nd Support Group War Diary (WO 169/1159) at Tahag Camp, Egypt contains these entries:-
May 12th Message from GHQ received stating that 2 RHA, 1 Rangers and NH were to come under comd 1st Armd Bde.
May 16th Private and official mail received from England dated Nov 1940.
May 18th Communication received from GHQ, Tps Mob. Centre, that HQ 2nd Support Group was to be disbanded in the scheme for R.A.C. re-organisation and 1 THR to come under comd 1st Armd Bde.
- End Quote
Not re-equipping and re-fielding 2nd Armoured Division was a choice made in terms of available resources and also a realisation that the OOB of Armoured Divisions needed updating away from 2 Armoured Brigades and a Support Group.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Regarding the "hotly debated" issue of the 47mm - 2-Pdr comparison, I've got the draft of a yet unpublished article written by a remarkable specialist in army weaponry - who happens to be a friend of mine, and has already published articles in Italy's most popular military history magazine, Storia Militare. To my knowledge it is the most thorough analysis and comparison of the performances of the two gun models ever, based on an impressive array of primary and secondary sources in several languages and making lavish use of charts and tables.ClintHardware wrote:2nd RTR 3rd and 7th Hussars tested their guns against the captured Italian armour at Beda Fomm – the qualities of armour plate was extremely poor. The 47mm was useful but did not measure up to the 2-Pdr. It did have an HE round but were they present? However, it was not worth sacrificing trained men in the Italian tanks in a head on clash with German armour. Nevertheless M13s were made operational and manned and 3rd Armoured Brigade’s task was to attack the flank of the German attack. Hence the single firefight with the troop from 5th RTR at 0630 hours on the 31st March. That the M13’s did not reach the German flank was due to a series of other events including lost fuel and breakdowns.
While at short range the 2-pdr superiority is undisputed, it turns out that due to the lighter weight of the 2-pdr AP round (about 1 kg vs. 1.5 kgs for the 47/32) at long range (from fifteen hundred meters up) the 47/32 mod. 39 would come off best, piercing through 35 mm of good quality armor at 1,500 meters whereas the 2-pdr would penetrate 34 mm.
At 1,750 meters range the penetration capability would be 32 mm for the 47 and 29 for the 2-pdr - which means that on the theory at that distance the 47 might punch a hole through the front armor plate of an A-10 cruiser, but the 2-pdr could not do the same to an M13 30 mm thick frontal armor (let alone the 42 mm of the gun shield). Additionally, all tests carried out in various countries concur on the 47/32 hitting the target roughly twice as many times as the 2-pdr - at 1,000 meters, 52% chances of scoring a hit for the 47 vs. 26% for the 2-pdr. It's true, however, that the 47/32 sight device was not of tremendously good quality and the 2-pdr's was likely to be better.
Curiously enough, it seems that while the British usually would test their ammunition on armor plates somewhat softer than those of their own tanks (440-475 Brinell), the Italians would use test plates considerably harder than the average 210-323 Brinell ones of their M13s, which to make matters worse were of very bad quality initially as the British themselves found out in 1940-41 (thereafter metal quality improved over time). Unlike Italian armor plates, the material and manufacture quality of the 47/32 round was quite good, rated by the Americans as just a notch below that of their own US-manufactured rounds which was the topmost.
So in the final analysis, both armies in a way stuck to tactics fairly inconsistent with the performance features of their respective tank guns. The British tended to open rapid fire on the Italians at the longest and least effective 2-pdr range, and the Italians on their part would strive to get as close as possible to the British before starting shooting - thereby enhancing the 2-pdr's short range superiority - instead of trying to hit the enemy at long, stand-off range also exploiting their higher chances of scoring hits. However, aimed fire was impossible farther than 1,200 meters distance with the 47/32 on the M13 mount... a case of self-defeating self-restriction. British cruisers could open aimed fire at about 1,700 meters distance.
Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 M
Just noted that. Yet in Crusader 7 Armoured went into battle with 2 armoured brigades (7&22) and 1 support group, and 1 Armoured was structured as a 2 armoured (1 & 22) and 1 support group division as well when it was slated for service in the ME, it is just that sending of 22 Armoured Brigade was expedited.ClintHardware wrote:Not re-equipping and re-fielding 2nd Armoured Division was a choice made in terms of available resources and also a realisation that the OOB of Armoured Divisions needed updating away from 2 Armoured Brigades and a Support Group.
Mechili, thanks for the very interesting post!
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42