3rd Armourd Brigade Destroyed in the Desert

[Urmel]

5 Tank Regt has following tanks by types (.) Mk I 25 Mk II 40 Mk III 71 Mk IV 20 tanks (.) These
figures probably now reduced 30 per cent by battle casualties and breakdowns (.)

Now this is interesting. Watch the start of British intel failures about the number of German tanks - in this case a massive overstatement of actual strength. The real number on the day of the signal was probably more like 90% breakdowns and battle damage, I think. And it shouldn't have been that difficult to get to that conclusion, based on the observations during the battle on 14 April, and a bit of thinking by the British officers in the intel department about their own tanks' breakdown rates during forced long-range high-speed marches. :roll:

[ClintHardware]

Yes I fully agree. The signal is more interesting than useful. It does lend itself to showing us again how much was not known via Ultra or the 'Y' Service at the time. Also interesting to see how the signal gives two designations for 5. leichte Division. I think they were hedging their bets.

One the quotes included in my book is from a gunner with 107th RHA who had just arrived inside the perimeter with his battery after a fast drive from Egypt. An NCO was updating him on the situation next day and told him: "Rommel is outside with his panzers" and the gunner responded "Who is Rommel, and what is a panzer?"

[Urmel]

Also interesting to see how the signal gives two designations for 5. leichte Division. I think they were hedging their bets."

??? The 27th Division is the Brescia. I think they had the German divisional designation clear.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 74&start=0

[ClintHardware]

The signal refers to "5 Lt Motorised Division" and later "5 Light Armd Div".

[Urmel]

Ah sorry, overlooked that one.

[Urmel]

Not sure if you have seen this, but 5 R.T.R. WD has a report on the period.

24 A13 brought up - 12 lost to enemy action, 12 lost to mechanical breakdown, 9 either left behind in, or recovered to Tobruk.

Puts a nice spike into the idea that 5 RTR sat in Tobruk twiddling their thumbs and could have gone up earlier.

[Tom from Cornwall]

There was a long debate amongst British intelligence about the establishment of 5 Lt Motorised Divsion.

Regards

Tom

[Urmel]

Sorry, long thread, and not sure I brought this up. 5th Light reported 3 tanks lost outside Agedabia, and on 4 April the tank company with A.A.3, advancing from Benghazi to Mechili reported to be unable to move after hitting an enemy rearguard behind a minefield at 18.00 hours 24km east of Benghazi, with many tanks suffering mine damage.

[nmao]

Hello.

Do you know which company was with AA3?
Any details regarding numbers damaged, etc...

thanks

-nuno

[ClintHardware]

Not sure that I know the answer to the above question but will see if I can work it out.

However found the 3rd Armd Bde's Operation Instruction dated 3rd May 1941 in the War Diary of the 3rd Hussars - thought it might have some interesting elements for perusal.

[ClintHardware]

Do you know which company was with AA3?

-nuno

I have just looked at CAB 146/10 and it only mentions that a squadron (i.e. kompanie) was attached to AA3. The previous pages and the later pages do not let you identify it by deduction.

The diary sections that I have seen for Leutnant Schorm of 6. Kompanie do not provide any help either.

[ClintHardware]

Hi All

This topic is some months old but I found some info in Liddell-Hart's The Tanks that dated back to 1934 concerning the origins of 3rd Armoured Brigade that I had overlooked. 1st Tank Brigade became re-designated1st Heavy Brigade in 1939 and then 3rd Armoured Brigade in 1940. Several things interested me about it 1) The expected use of the Ardennes but by the British, 2) the units in 1st Tank Brigade, 3) Gambier-Parry's connection and 4) Wavell's connection.

The text is from my own writing so please correct amend and query as you see fit. I am happy to make any corrections.

1st Tank Brigade and its proposed use
The 1st Tank Brigade was commanded by Brigadier P. C. S. Hobart who was amongst the second wave of mechanisation pioneer officers in the British Army. Brigadier Hobart also retained his then role of Inspector of the Royal Armoured Corps. The brigade’s Order of Battle included the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Battalions of the R.T.C. and a new 1st (Light) Battalion which was formed by detaching the Light Tank equipped companies from the above battalions. The 2nd, 3rd and 5th were then classified as Medium battalions instead of Mixed.

The formation of the brigade enabled the British Army to put into practice the concept of breaking away from close co-operation and protection of the infantry which had limited earlier exercises, instead, the brigade was to take on an independent attack role. Despite government reluctance to commit British troops on the ground in Europe, the international soon situation forced a change of policy. The next European war was expected to begin with German ground forces held by the French and a British Expeditionary Force placed on the French left wing. The 1st Tank Brigade was then to be part of a great counter-offensive which would see the brigade attack through the Ardennes and on into the German rear. In 1934/35 it was believed that the higher command* of the German Army (the Heer) considered that the Ardennes was impassable to mechanised forces of any great size and they would form their attack on basis.

(* In 1934 the Heer’s higher command was formed of the Truppenamt (Troops Department) and officers of the Wehrkreis (Military District) training headquarters that were in effect covering the role of the banned Generalstab (General Staff) of World War One. )

Working on ideas with Captain Basil Liddell-Hart (Military Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph) and Brigadiers G. M. Lindsay and Charles Broad, 1st Tank Brigade’s role was worked out to be:

a) Confuse the Germans by attacking around their flank to attack from a position behind their main battle line and from a position with a choice of alternative objectives.
b) Replenish fuel, food and water from enemy sources found within their lines of communication.
c) Carry all the ammunition required for several days attack.
d) Avoid enemy areas of strength but attack if necessary through weakly held areas.
e) Co-operate with other Arms, especially the R.A.F. wherever possible.

The main exercise objectives for 1934 were to practice co-operation with the R.A.F., try out methods of supply and maintenance, and move 70 miles in one day or 150 miles in three days. An initial Staff Exercise, a TEWT (Tactical Exercise Without Troops) was held at Cambridge during the 8th – 12th May. It included a theoretical 100 mile advance made by a tank brigade into the area some 40 miles behind the expected German battle front. The objective of the advance was to create the maximum amount of paralysis to German headquarters by cutting across lines of communication and supply to dislocate the fighting ability and cohesion of units committed in the main battle line. The exercise revealed that the tank brigade must move on a wide front so that reports of tanks were made by many German units back to their H.Qs, and that the tank brigade should arrive in an area from which it could attack a number of objectives to leave the Germans in doubt right up to the last moment of the main attack. Logic dictated that the deeper the penetration the more widespread would be the confusion and dislocation within the German rear areas, and that German destruction of roads, bridges and fuel in the path of the brigade attack would also add to German dislocation. In addition the Germans would need to commit their best trained and equipped troops in the main battle area leaving the brigade to encounter weaker troops along the lines of communication.

Two of the pre-conditions to enable the attack were thought to include:

a) Considerable areas of suitable terrain available to allow the tanks to operate unhindered.
b) Choice of a large number of well separated alternative objectives to keep the Germans in a state of indecision.

Brigadier Hobart as Inspector of the R.T.C. wrote a paper on the right type of tank required for close co-operation with the infantry and sent it to Brigadier Lindsay, who was then in command of the experimental motorised 7th Infantry Brigade, for Lindsay’s input (the details of tank developments are dealt with in Part Two in the chapter: British Armour). In response, Lindsay wrote a paper that examined the issue at further length but crucially noted that because the army was small compared to Continental armies it followed that its machine (A.F.Vs and other vehicles) and weapon power would be similarly limited. Therefore it was particularly necessary that British armour and motorised units in immediate support should be a developmental step ahead of those armies so that their presence could effectively support the French as envisaged in the main counter attack, and, so that British ground forces could stand up to any aggression in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Brigadier Lindsay prompted that any funds spare after improving the infantry and artillery, should be directed to development of the 1st Tank Brigade to achieve that developmental step. Then 1st Tank Brigade could be developed into the Mobile Division in the U.K and another could follow in Egypt. Brigadier Lindsay also pointed out that these brigades and divisions would raise the attacking power of the Army as a whole whereas other developments would only increase the power of the infantry with less overall effect. However, he pointed out that the power of the infantry must also be addressed as funding became available.

1934 was to be the year when the 1st Tank Brigade and Brigadier G. M. Lindsay’s 7th Infantry Brigade were to exercise. Hobart put forward further ideas to Lindsay that the tank brigade needed to co-operate with other supporting arms that would provide a mobile but secure base for the tank brigade to operate from, and be screened from attack on its flanks by aircraft, armoured cars and the 1st Light Tank Battalion, and that infantry were needed to deal with prisoners and secure towns and routes taken in the advance. This prompted Brigadier Lindsay to put forward the view that now was the time for forming the Mobile Division envisaged in the R.T.C. manual Modern Formations issued in 1931, and that it should command the 1st Tank Brigade, a motorised cavalry brigade, and the motorised 7th Infantry Brigade. However, the exercises of 1934 saw the temporary formation of the Mobile Force which included a horsed cavalry brigade that seriously limited the scope of what should have been possible. Lindsay was promoted Major-General to command the Mobile Force and was assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel M. D. Gambier-Parry as his General Staff Officer Grade I (G.S.O. 1). The Chief Umpire was Major-General A.P. Wavell. Later, as General Wavell and Major-General Gambier Parry, both men were to play significant parts in the events covered in this volume.

Unfortunately General Sir John Burnett-Stuart who had overall control of the exercises set the objectives closely together in order to raise the morale of the non-motorised “enemy” which led to frustration and failure of what should have been a formative test of the main intentions to further test the British concepts of mechanised warfare. The results led to long discussions and arguments about the composition and role of what would become the Mobile Division formed in 1937.

The eventual deployment of 3rd Armoured Brigade six years later in France would not occur as they had forecast.

Had the brigade been launched as planned I can't imagine anyone being seen again until the end of hostilities, but its interesting to wonder what effect it would have had on OKW. Senior panzer officers would not have been concerned once they realised that nothing was following it and once most of its effect had been absorbed.

[David W]

Had the brigade been launched as planned I can't imagine anyone being seen again until the end of hostilities, but its interesting to wonder what effect it would have had on OKW. Senior panzer officers would not have been concerned once they realised that nothing was following it and once most of its effect had been absorbed.

I suppose that would depend on the true scale of the quoted offensive

The 1st Tank Brigade was then to be part of a great counter-offensive which would see the brigade attack through the Ardennes and on into the German rear.

It is also interesting to me how clear the German threat to France is perceived by the British military as early as 1934.

Very interesting, thanks for posting.

[MarkN]

And since you repeat the bit about the missing 90 or so German tanks. They had 58 engine changes, the majority of which seem to have been Panzer III. How many replacement engines did they have in North Africa, how much capacity did they have for engine changes? When did the last of these tanks make it back to the front line after the change? Unless you can answer these questions, the number of serviceable tanks at any time prior to CRUSADER doesn't tell you anything about actual combat losses. That's just an unfortunate fact.

Just to add, going by the report of 5 May 1941 cited in Panzertruppen I :
12 pz I, 2 klBef, 19 pz II, 44 pz III & grBef, 6 pz IV were delivered to the two workshop komp. prior to the arrival in Tobruk (i take it as 11 April)
then it says:
58 engines changed
50 shock absorvers changed
20 broken springs changed
16 shackles changed
etc...
they always use the past tense, so it seems that those tanks were repaired prior to 5 May 1941. Am i reading it wrong?

There were 83 damaged tanks received until 11 april, and were repaired/delivered to units prior to 5 May.
Want to comment?

The original German...

Die durchschnittliche Marschentfernung von 700 Kilometern in der Wüste hatte eine sehr nachteilige Auswirkung auf die Panzer. Bis zu dem Zeitpunkt, an dem das Regiment seine Stellungen vor Tobruk bezog, mußte die nachfolgend genannte Anzahl an Panzern wegen schwerer Motor- und Laufschäden an die Werkstattkompanie übergeben werden:

12 von 25 Panzerkampfwagen Typ I, 2 von 3 kleinen Panzerbefehlswagen I, 19 von 45 Panzerkampfwagen Typ II, 44 von 65 Panzerkampfwagen Typ III bzw. großen Panzerbefehlswagen sowie 6 von 17 Panzerkampfwagen Typ IV. Zusammen 83 Panzer von insgesamt 155. Die Ursache, dass die Durchfahrt des Wüstenabschnittes im Trigh el Abd solche starke Beschädigungen zur Folge hatte, war die taktisch begründete hohe Marschgeschwindigkeit. Wegen der erforderlichen Eile konnten für Panzer ungeeignete Wegstrecken nicht ausgespart werden. Von 65 Panzerkampfwagen III und großen Befehlswagen fielen 44 während des Wüstenmarsches wegen schwerer Motorschäden aus. Der Fehler war immer der gleiche. Der Motor setzte aus und der Öldruck fiel auf Null ab, worauf der Wagen stoppte. Wenn der Versuch gemacht wurde, nach erfolgtem Ölwechsel weiterzufahren, fraßen sich die Zylinder und Kolben fest. Schließlich brach die Kolbenstange des dritten und vierten Zylinders. Die Ursache war in jedem Fall dieselbe. Das Kurbelwellengehäuse verstopfte sich durch den feinen Staub wie mit einer Paste, wodurch die Ölzirkulation unterbrochen wurde. Zylinder und Kolben waren bis zu 6 mm abgenutzt. Von 83 ausgefallenen Panzern tauschte die Werkstattkompanie bei 58 Fahrzeugen den Motor aus. Die vorhandenen Luftfilter sind gänzlich ungeeignet für den Wüsteneinsatz, da sie den feinen Staub nicht zurückhalten. Daher die Verstopfung des Kurbelwellengehäuses. Die Verwendung eines trockenen Filzfilters, wie er bei den britischen Autos, Lastkraftwagen und Panzern eingebaut ist, wird vorgschlagen. Fünfzig Stoßdämpfer waren unbrauchbar geworden und wurden bei den 65 Panzerkampfwagen Typ III und den Panzerbefehlswagen ausgetauscht. Zwanzig gebrochene Federn und 16 Kettenglieder wurden bei den Panzerkampfwagen Typ II ausgewechselt. Der Mangel bei den Federn und den Stpßdämpfern war nicht nur auf die schlechte Wegstrecke, sondern auch auf Minen zurückzuführen. Die Schmierung der Hilfsbremsen war wegen der mangelhaften Bremsklötze ein weit verbreiteter Fehler. Sechzig Instandsetzungsaufträge bei den Panzerkampfwagen Typ III waren auf schlechte Ausgangsinspektionen der Firmen zurückzuführen. Die Lüfterwellen mußten in 40 Fällen ausgetauscht werden, weil die Drucklager mangelhaft waren. Durch Sand aufgetretene Schwierigkeiten bei den Turmdrehkränzen wurden bei 8 Panzerkampfwagen Typ III festgestellt. Fünf Variorex Getriebe mußten gewechselt werden.

Extracted from PzRegt.5 official history.

[ClintHardware]

MarkN Is the official history within a report/war diary from the Bundesarchiv or a published book or both? Can you please provide the details and ISBN etc