3rd Armourd Brigade Destroyed in the Desert

[MarkN]

Found this while leafing through a file.

Thought somebody might be interested.

[Attrition]

Thanks, do you have a source?

[MarkN]

Appendix E to CR/ME/12757/AFV A summary of previous AFV intelligence summaries of 30 July 1941.

[Attrition]

Thanks

[ClintHardware]

Lies Brevity ? Right back at you MarkN ?

None of us were present and we are not the sources of the quotes the veterans left.

Schorm's statement on the 2nd April refers to 5. Kompanie moving away from the II. Abteilung and later describes the abteilung moving towards where 5. Kompanie was sent - this does not prove or disprove that 5. Kompanie rejoined the abteilung on the 2nd April before the fire fight.

My point about pre-war Regulars is that they had trained a long time for this and were less likely to exaggerate.

None of the arguments thrown back at me have been able to eradicate the doubt about panzer numbers present on the 2nd April. In addition, Drew refers to being under threat of being outflanked and that indicates numbers greater than 6. Kompanie within range or on the edge of range.

Only Schorm has left us with a figure which appears to be a reference to 6. Kompanie on the 3rd April as having 7 operational panzers remaining. His statement does not rule in or rule out damage to others beyond 6. Kompanie and he does not make it clear that he is only referring to his kompanie - it only seems that he is.

Schorm's figure of panzers not present with the still operational 7 ties in roughly with the 5th RTR's impression of having knocked out 12 (IIRC). Knocked out is not necessarily Destroyed. But this also does not rule out other companies being part of the fire fight.

Drew saw 50-60 panzers coming out of the sandstorm and he was able to record their type as being Panzer IIs, IIIs and IVs and supported by a battery of eight 47mm anti-tank guns which were probably self-propelled because they were seen with the panzers. Therefore, for the time being, I standby 5.5 being roughly right as the ratio in the fire fight on the 2nd April from about 1730 hours.

[Brevity]

here we go again

[ClintHardware]

And in addition, the situation indicated by Schorm is worse than just the missing 11 panzers because he says that he is the only zugfuhrer present at the rally. The others, if not dead or wounded, would have taken over a still operational panzer from their own zug and rejoined the fighting and would have been at the rally. Schorm was unable to state that the zugfuhren had been able to do that during the 3rd April. The two or three soldiers he refers to by name may or may not be zugfuhren.

Schorm's unnamed kompanie kommandeur also expresses surprise that he is not dead - is that because he knew the others were? It is likely that we will not know and so cannot state anything definite about them.

I wonder why Jentz left these details out - they fascinatingly illuminate the battle beyond any summary gloss-over describing Rommel's relentless drive on Tobruk.

[MarkN]

here we go again

Quite so! Fiction and defensive wishful thinking to the fore.

At least he's not spouting this fantasy any longer: "The battle on the 2nd April when 11 A13s fought 140 plus panzers"

I can only assume that when he means by "[un]able to eradicate the doubt about panzer numbers present" is that II/PzRegt.5 KTB and Schorm Diary are not written by "pre-war [British Army] Regulars" and thus are are "likely to exaggerate."

Drew saw 50-60 panzers coming out of the sandstorm ...

Did he? The report on the action was written my Major Lister and even he doesn't tell of "50-60 panzers coming out of the sandstorm". Where exactly does Lt.Col Drew claim he "saw 50-60 panzers coming out of the sandstorm".

5.Kp were not present. They were accompanying Ponath's force entering and occupying Agedabia. The day before, a zug of Pz.IV from 8.Kp were also attached as part of 5.Kp. There is no suggestion in II/PzRegt.5 KTB that they had returned to 8.Kp.

The outflanking force was the remainder of 8.Kp who were following up behind 3 Hussars. So, if those tanks of 8.Kp are to be included in the totals then, based upon geographic distance, so should the tanks of 3H - including the M.13s of A/6RTR.

The actual engagement was elements of 5RTR against the remaining elements 6.Kp pf II/PzRegt.5. Schorm provides the numbers of tanks advancing. But since he was not a British Army pre-war regular who had trained a long time for this, I guess his testimony is to be considered suspect.

[Brevity]

Schorm's statement on the 2nd April refers to 5. Kompanie moving away from the II. Abteilung and later describes the abteilung moving towards where 5. Kompanie was sent - this does not prove or disprove that 5. Kompanie rejoined the abteilung on the 2nd April before the fire fight.

Very well. According to KTB II./5, after the battle the battalion took position for the night towards the SE in the following order
Stab 9.5 km S of Agedabia, 300 m SE of the road
6 coy to the right
8 coy to the left
Rgt HQ to the left of the 8 coy
I Staffel arrives and parks its vehicles N of the road

Please explain why is 5 coy not present

In addition, Drew refers to being under threat of being outflanked and that indicates numbers greater than 6. Kompanie within range or on the edge of range.

"I reach the height with 3 tanks, pass the burning British tanks and look for some more. (...) Driver, 11 o'clock! On fast. (...) But I go forward 500 yards on the dune."

Schorm breaking into position would naturally outflank the remaining Cruisers. Also, It's possible the flanking maneuver was actually executed but by other troops (8 coy maybe?). Finally, the activity of recce platoons protecting from the side might have been misunderstood as a flanking action.

Only Schorm has left us with a figure which appears to be a reference to 6. Kompanie on the 3rd April as having 7 operational panzers remaining. His statement does not rule in or rule out damage to others beyond 6. Kompanie and he does not make it clear that he is only referring to his kompanie - it only seems that he is.

"So against 6 British tanks destroyed, we have 2 of our own destroyed, one Mk II out of action for a long time and several others temporarily"

Schorm presented own losses with a clear distinction between destroyed / heavily damaged / lightly damaged. I wish every AAR was so detailed. What else do you need?

Schorm's figure of panzers not present with the still operational 7 ties in roughly with the 5th RTR's impression of having knocked out 12 (IIRC). Knocked out is not necessarily Destroyed.

Of the 9 Pz.III:
- 4 from the Schorm platoon had only slight damage
- 1 was used by the coy commander. He (1) survived the battle in good spirits, (2) was still capable of sending radio messages at the end, and (3) was present when the coy rallied after the battle. I take it as a confirmation his tank survived just fine
- 2 were destroyed
- 2 are unclear

Of the 5 Pz.II:
- 1 was damaged
- 2 were still operational on 11 April. (Schorm)
- 4 were operational on 20 April (Schorm - "Now I have the strongest coy in the Rgt - 4 Mark II tanks, 4 Mark III.")

Please tell me which 12 were knocked out and why Schorm haven't see that.

the situation indicated by Schorm is worse because he says that he is the only zugfuhrer present at the rally. The others, if not dead or wounded, would have taken over a still operational panzer from their own zug and rejoined the fighting and would have been at the rally. Schorm was unable to state that the zugfuhren had been able to do that during the 3rd April. The two or three soldiers he refers to by name may or may not be zugfuhren.

Schorm's unnamed kompanie kommandeur also expresses surprise that he is not dead - is that because he knew the others were? It is likely that we will not know and so cannot state anything definite about them.

He meant Leutnants Frank-Lindheim and Boegh (or Bögh). Missing because their tanks got knocked out. Both survived the first few months just fine.

Enough?

[MarkN]

Very well. According to KTB II./5, after the battle the battalion took position for the night towards the SE in the following order
Stab 9.5 km S of Agedabia, 300 m SE of the road
6 coy to the right
8 coy to the left
Rgt HQ to the left of the 8 coy
I Staffel arrives and parks its vehicles N of the road

Please explain why is 5 coy not present

Please Sir! Please Sir! Can I answer Sir? Please Sir!

Next words from KTB II/PzRegt.5...
"Meanwhile (Inzwischen in the original German) the leading Ponath battlegroup, with 5.Kp under command, was investing Agadebia ... etc etc" . Translation by yours truely ('O' level D grade 1970s with the help of Mr Google).

On the 4th, KTB II/PzRegt.5 notes the return of 5.Kp to II/PzRegt.5 command...

[ClintHardware]

Gosh all these frenzied attacks. I understand repeated accusations of Fiction and Lies as bullying. Are you going to persist in using those words?

Drew's statement (I have always understood it to be Drew's) is in 5RTR's War Diary the "50 - 60" is a direct quote as is his statement of types of panzers seen. The impression given by the Feldzug in Nordafrika from CAB 146/10 is of the whole of Panzer Regiment 5 manoeuvring to threaten attack on 2nd Sp Gp and later on 2nd Sp Gp and what seemed to the Germans as a tank Regiment. At the moment I am unclear as to what extent the I. Abteilung was involved in the attack on 2nd Sp Gp and in this sense I am referring to it being in sight of 2nd Sp Gp and not just physically in contact. It may be that just 5. Kompanie had contact but 2nd Sp Gp had to react to the potential threat facing them not just the infantry and panzers in contact. The amount of shelling undertaken by the 104th RHA indicates a greater threat than just 5. Kompanie.

There were two contacts on the 2nd April the first at about 1200 hrs followed by withdrawal and the second in a new position 30 miles away at about 1500 hrs or later and this later involved the fire-fight with 5RTR from 1730 hrs. I understood that the whole of Panzer Regiment 5 manoeuvred for both.

I'll be back in a few days when I have more time and have re-checked what I have.

I'll state again that I like being corrected but corrections are corrections and intimidation is intimidation even if accompanied by data. In Jentz' TCinNA he refers momentarily to fighting taking place on the 1st April which did not take place until the 2nd but I have not seen anyone using the words fiction or lies in this respect.

[Attrition]

I fear that a note comparing model is competing with a win-lose model of debate to the detriment of both. I've been trying to stop procrastinating about the Siege of Tobruk, by finishing the section on Sonnenblume and this discussion has been very interesting, bearing in mind that Wiki doesn't approve of original research. I'd much rather everyone summarised current thinking to save me the bother than treat it as a duel.

[David W]

Yes, it would be a shame if a difference of opinions descended into a slanging match. I for one would like to see this discussion continue, and not to be locked by mods for rule breaking.

[ClintHardware]

If I am wrong in terms of the data then I am wrong.

There are two groups of evidence that I have been using concerning I. Abteilung that may or may not be correct - all comments are welcome.

1) Within WO 169/1436 the 'B/O' Battery War Diary there is a translation of a diary of Wilhelm Durenborn. I have images of pages 1 and 3 but I do not have page 2 - if anyone has page 2 perhaps you can help. I am not sure if page 2 still exists within the file and hence why I missed photographing it.

On page one Durenborn refers to undertaking 75mm gun training on two dates: 6th Feb and 10th Feb. On the 10th Feb he refers to being with "Tank Leader officer Schuster, Driver Kaurt, Gun Loader Emmerich and Tank No Jatzauer." I understand Schuster as probably being a Leutnant and a zugfuhrer, and the 75mm gun references indicating Durenborn and Schuster etc being in either 4. Kompanie or 8. Kompanie.

On page 3 the diary continues with the 31st March and Durenborn states only that: "March to a point 22 Km behind Agheila. Reach our position about 0215 hrs." This seems to indicate that Durenborn and Schuster did not take part in the Mersa Brega battle and were west of Agheila and not in the fighting and therefore that they are likely to be in 4. Kp from I. Abteilung.

On the 1st April Durenborn states that: "0300 hrs. Continue our march to Merga [sic] Brega. In the morning about 0900 first attack from Merga Brega. Continue to Kilo 50 stone from Agedabia." In this he probably was referring to advancing from MB because the British units do not record any ground contact - only air activity.

On the 2nd he states: "Morning, beginning of the attack on Agedabia. 1500 hours, I am with the advanced troop. 5 motor-cycles and heavy troop of 4 panzers of ours 800x" (x being translators indication of yards/metres) "short of Agedabia. We met with very heavy artillery fire. The 5 motor-cycles go back, our troop continues dispersed."

Then Durenborn states: "We break through to the right and left. After half an hour of very heavy shooting enemy gives in and pushes off, and following him up we bog ourselves, and have to pull all the tanks out again."

I understand this evidence as indicating that the I. Abteilung was involved in the attack against 2nd Sp Gp at least from 1500 hrs (the second episode of fighting 2nd Sp Gp on the 2nd April) and that they are sufficiently threatening to be subjected to a lot of shelling from the 104th RHA.

End of 1)

2) The second set of evidence lies in the post-war references in CAB 146/10 referring to Panzer Regiment 5 advancing and not to just elements thereof. I do not place much reliance on this because of the passing of time but it does not place I. Abteilung away from the rest of the regiment.

End of 2)

So do we know if Schuster was an officer and was he in 4. or 8 Kp or elsewhere?
And what other statements are there about where I. Abteilung was on the 2nd April?

In respect of Schorm and the zugfuhren: how do we know that Bogh was a zugfuhrer? It does seem that Frank was and I had forgotten that in my earlier post - sorry.

In respect of 5. Kp supporting the infantry we need to note that there are two contacts with 2nd Sp Gp on the 2nd April: one at 1200 hrs and then another 30 miles later at 1500 hrs. I am not sure if the reference to 5. Kp and the infantry covers the situation all day - it might. Drew stated that he saw 50 - 60 panzers at about 1730 and that might be II. Abteilung without 5. Kp or he may not have seen all the panzers coming towards his position. 5. Kompanie may have been with them but with fewer operational panzers they had begun the day. Drew was able to note their type so he did have some quality of vision despite the raised dust and he was a combat experienced leader and a Regular officer.

The panzer contact with 5RTR takes place at 1730 hrs onwards and it is very likely to have involved only the II. Abteilung with most damage caused to 6. Kp.

All of the above might be wrong. You are all welcome to add in your evidence to correct it.

.

[Brevity]

Clint

Gotta burst your bubble again even thou I hate it.

The night attack was made by the II. Bn with 5. and 8. coy, 6 was still detached to KG Rau. They left km 22 at 3:15 am, reaching Brega unoccupied seemingly at 6:20 am, then continuing a bit towards the E.

So your soldier must have served in 8. coy. Additional confirmation would be achieved if he boarded the ship to Africa on 4 March, and the ship's name was one of - Marburg, Kybfels, Reichenfels or Ankara. His diary would typically mention details of this kind. If his tank was hoisted up on 6 March and the ship's name is different, then I have a problem.

The diary also reveals the Pz.IV platoon that supported 6 coy on 31 March, and the platoon in battle on 2 March against C / 5. RTR, were the same. Durenborn served in the other platoon - he occupied Brega early on 1 April, and was in Agedabia with 5 coy on 2 April. This also proves 5 coy. missed a tank battle.

I don't know any evidence regarding I. Abteilung fighting anything before they attacked Regima pass / Mechili.

Regards

I'll explain 6 coy officers situation tomorrow