3rd Armourd Brigade Destroyed in the Desert

[ClintHardware]

All interesting stuff.

You can burst my bubbles anytime - please do.

I will re-check the Drew and Lister aspects. Can you please give us the National Archive references for the items you have added.

1) I am quite happy to accept the position evidence towards Durenborn being within 8. Kompanie, however, what is the source you are relying on and can you please give the quote and the reference.

1A) But when you compare Schorm with Durenborn: - Schorm (IIRC) mentions earlier movement times (0730 compared to 0900) and he does not mention the shelling of the afternoon, and Schorm does not refer to attacking anything but tanks and does not mention an attack at 1500 hours. Durenborn does not refer to attacking tanks. At the moment it seems that Durenborn is describing different events from Schorm on the 2nd April and therefore I am not convinced yet Durenborn is in 8. Kp but you may be right. Can you please tell us why you are confident that their statements similar enough to be covering the same events?

2) If I understand Brevity or MarkN correctly there is no known position or employment concerning I. Abteilung on the 2nd April? CAB 146/10 could well be wrong but it indicates the whole regiment being employed on the day and not just part, and it was written with reference to various document sources as well as memories.

3) What is the source that states I. Abteilung was first employed in combat on the 4th April at Regima? Everything I have read gives no clear ID of the panzers used in the attack. Can you tell us and what are your sources?

4) In terms of ammunition - did 5 cm Panzergranate not always contain an explosive filler? I had thought it did but please burst my bubble.

I can correct my book as often as I need to and I am happy to do that and give credits in the chapter text to those who assist.

[Brevity]

Just a quick answer for now

1) Schorm and Durenborn fought different battles. 31 March - Schorm advances towards Brega all day, Durenborn arrives later at night, and occupies Brega by morning. 2 April - Schorm fights 5. RTR, and Durenborn is in Agedabia with 5. coy and MG8

2) I assume CAB 146/10 means "Axis operations in North Africa" compiled after war from PoW officers? The 31 March part of this account is a joke and can't be treated seriously. What does it say about the 2 April?

3) A unit at Regima was stated to be a "Panzerkompanie" and Mechili was taken by the "I Abteilung" according to DAK KTB so there we go. II Bn is out of question, it was complete when moving thru the desert. My impression is, it was 1. coy that hit Regima, and the bulk of I. Abt. (with 2. and 4.) went straight for Mechili, but evidence is slim.

[Don Juan]

4) In terms of ammunition - did 5 cm Panzergranate not always contain an explosive filler? I had thought it did but please burst my bubble.

I'm going from British descriptions of what the Germans had, rather than the Germans' own specifications, but I think that there was indeed an AP shell without explosive filler. Filling the shot with HE reduced its penetrative capability, so against thicker armour there would have been an advantage in having a solid shot.

I'm going to have to do some investigation on how the British descriptions of German ammo match up to the Germans' own specifications.

[MarkN]

I see that there are still some outstanding issues with the understanding of events at Mersa Brega; which German units were involved and when. Clearly some people still labour under the misconception that the whole of 5.leichte took part.

Should we deal with that in this thread, the thread specific to the Mersa Brega battle, or just pretend that we haven't spotted yet another fact v fiction conundrum?

[MarkN]

1) I am quite happy to accept the position evidence towards Durenborn being within 8. Kompanie, however, what is the source you are relying on and can you please give the quote and the reference.

What is your quote and reference that they were part of another unit or sub-unit?

1A) But when you compare Schorm with Durenborn: - Schorm (IIRC) mentions earlier movement times (0730 compared to 0900) and he does not mention the shelling of the afternoon, and Schorm does not refer to attacking anything but tanks and does not mention an attack at 1500 hours. Durenborn does not refer to attacking tanks. At the moment it seems that Durenborn is describing different events from Schorm on the 2nd April and therefore I am not convinced yet Durenborn is in 8. Kp but you may be right. Can you please tell us why you are confident that their statements similar enough to be covering the same events?

The movements that Durenborn describes places him in 8.Kp

2) If I understand Brevity or MarkN correctly there is no known position or employment concerning I. Abteilung on the 2nd April? CAB 146/10 could well be wrong but it indicates the whole regiment being employed on the day and not just part, and it was written with reference to various document sources as well as memories.

There is no reference in CAB146/10 to I/PzRegt.5 taking part in events on the 2nd April.

Thus, it can only be your bad interpretation and/or incorrect assumptions drawn from the text that lead you to consider their presence.

If you have a different copy of CAB146/10 than I, please feel free to post an image of where it mentions I/PzRegt.5 taking part in events on the 2nd April.

[ClintHardware]

I will provide a link to a document of quotes with the four German sources later today or tomorrow and then we can talk about bad interpretation and/or incorrect assumptions drawn.

Outstanding issues as I understand them from what has been said and not said above by Brevity and/or MarkN:
1) Bogh has not been proved to be a zugfuhrer so Schorm's statement about the missing zugfuhren other than Frank and Schorm remains unresolved.
2) We do not have a definite ID on the panzer unit at Regima that seems to have been a kompanie strong and we are not sure which abteilung it was from.
3) We do not have definite data in placing I.Abteilung on 2nd April.
4) We do not have definite data on the employment of I.Abteilung on 2nd April.
5) Durenborn being in 4.Kp or 8.Kp is not yet certain but he refers to different events and timings on the 2nd April from Schorm (see quotes given earlier)
6) Durenborn: despite his two references to 75mm gun training on the 6th and 10th February and being with 4 heavy panzers on the 2nd April it is not yet certain he was a Panzer IV crew man but we have the those three indications that he may have been.
7) We know of 5.Kp supporting the infantry on the 2nd but we do not know if this was just the first contact with 2nd Support Group or the first and second (at 1500 hrs) on the 2nd April.

8) Drew and Major Lister Issue: Pages 40 - 43 of Edward Wilson's Press on Regardless is the source I used for the Drew quotes (the 50-60 etc). Wilson explains that he referred to two reports Drew had written (not Lister) and a Drew postscript and that they are in the 5RTR War Diary which I understand is WO 169/1414. However the photographs I have of that diary do not have the report - I probably did not photograph all the pages or Wilson maybe referring to 3rd Armd Bde war diary.

On checking what I have photographed from 3rd Armd Bde war dairy I note that the statement headed "ACTION OF 3RD APRIL 1941 - 5 R.TANKS" has the 3RD crossed out in pen and corrected to "2nd" and in pen it also has "APPENDIX B" on the top right. It consist of Sheets 1 - 4 and Sheet 4 is not signed by Lister or Drew. Edward Wilson states that Drew wrote it and he does not refer to Lister. However the way it is written leaves me open to doubt as to the actual author and I believe it could have been Lister.

Jentz does not refer to Lister being the author in TCinNA so can MarkN or Brevity let us know why it is definitely Lister's writing or are there two reports one signed by Lister and the other not signed by Drew or Lister?

MarkN it was resolved along time back in this topic that I. Abteilung was not in combat at Mersa Brega on 31st March.

[MarkN]

This is becoming a little tiresome...

1) Bogh has not been proved to be a zugfuhrer so Schorm's statement about the missing zugfuhren other than Frank and Schorm remains unresolved.
2) We do not have a definite ID on the panzer unit at Regima that seems to have been a kompanie strong and we are not sure which abteilung it was from.
3) We do not have definite data in placing I.Abteilung on 2nd April.
4) We do not have definite data on the employment of I.Abteilung on 2nd April.
5) Durenborn being in 4.Kp or 8.Kp is not yet certain but he refers to different events and timings on the 2nd April from Schorm (see quotes given earlier)
6) Durenborn: despite his two references to 75mm gun training on the 6th and 10th February and being with 4 heavy panzers on the 2nd April it is not yet certain he was a Panzer IV crew man but we have the those three indications that he may have been.
7) We know of 5.Kp supporting the infantry on the 2nd but we do not know if this was just the first contact with 2nd Support Group or the first and second (at 1500 hrs) on the 2nd April.

You have been provided with evidence from two credible sources: the KTB of II/PzRegt.5 and the detailed diary of one of the key participants. These two sources provide the details of which units were involved in the events of 2 April, where and when.

If you wish to consider them as inaccurate, that is your prerogative. However, the onus is not upon us to provide you with yet more evidence proving that other units were not involved and people who didn't die, didn't die. If you wish to believe, claim and write in your book things that counter perceived wisdom and currently accepted historical fact, then the onus is upon you to provide the irrefutable evidence that what you claim has validity. The onus is upon you to provide the "definite data" on the names of the 40-60 pantser commanders that engaged with 5RTR as you claim.

8) Drew and Major Lister Issue: Pages 40 - 43 of Edward Wilson's Press on Regardless is the source I used for the Drew quotes (the 50-60 etc). Wilson explains that he referred to two reports Drew had written (not Lister) and a Drew postscript and that they are in the 5RTR War Diary which I understand is WO 169/1414. However the photographs I have of that diary do not have the report - I probably did not photograph all the pages or Wilson maybe referring to 3rd Armd Bde war diary.

On checking what I have photographed from 3rd Armd Bde war dairy I note that the statement headed "ACTION OF 3RD APRIL 1941 - 5 R.TANKS" has the 3RD crossed out in pen and corrected to "2nd" and in pen it also has "APPENDIX B" on the top right. It consist of Sheets 1 - 4 and Sheet 4 is not signed by Lister or Drew. Edward Wilson states that Drew wrote it and he does not refer to Lister. However the way it is written leaves me open to doubt as to the actual author and I believe it could have been Lister.

The Appendix B located in the 3rd Armd Bde WD that you describe is most definitely signed by Maj Lister.

And I don't understand why you should now try to shift the blame onto Wilson for your poor effort when you have copies of the source documents at your own fingertips.

Please don't tell me you are continuing with this charade because you neglected to photograph the bottom of the page 4!

Jentz does not refer to Lister being the author in TCinNA so can MarkN or Brevity let us know why it is definitely Lister's writing or are there two reports one signed by Lister and the other not signed by Drew or Lister?

I repeat what I wrote yesterday (or the day before) and what I have written just an inch or so above...

The report on the tank engagement between 11 A13s of 5RTR and 13 pantsers of 6.Kp/II/PzRegt.5 on 2 April 1941, quoted in Jentz and appearing as Appendix B to the 3rd Armoured Brigade WD for April 1941, was signed by Maj Lister.

No other report of the event appears in any of the relevant WDs. I therefore cannot comment on who wrote something that doesn't appear to exist. If you have another report of the event, feel free to share.

MarkN it was resolved along time back in this topic that I. Abteilung was not in combat at Mersa Brega on 31st March.

If so, why are you still confused by the Durenborn narrative? He describes being part of the 3rd wave against the Mersa Brega position. QED, he was part of II/PzRegt.5...

[ClintHardware]

Durenborn confirms he continues the march to Mersa Brega at 0300 hours and he is therefore not part of the attack on MB because MB had been evacuated and his statement is not incorrect for I. Abteilung or II.Abteilung. MB was evacuated by the British by about 2100 hrs (IIRC). Durenborn does not confirm that he entered MB at 0300.

In addition parts of 8.Kp attacked with 6. Kp in the morning at MB so surely Durenborn would have been closer to MB in the very early morning of the 31st even if he was not in the attack. That in itself is likely to place Durenborn in 4.Kp in addition to the items he recorded and which are mentioned above in this topic.

Sheet 4 in the 3rd Armd Bde War Diary does not include any signature (unless it is on the very bottom-most edge) and it does not look like your example. The last line of text is "There was one additional casualty in a tank that came out of the action". The sheet is not ruled and it is not thin or transparent-ish paper.

There are two elements in the 2nd April attack on 2nd Sp Gp at 1500 hrs that may also play a part in adding further doubt. 1) The raised dust cloud which extended for something like four miles and the very very long frontage adopted by 2nd Sp Gp. Both could not be created or dealt with by just 5. Kp with some infantry. The positions of 2nd Sp Gp were struck head on and then the panzers went either side before 5th RTR was attacked after 1730 hrs.

The areas involved and the extent of the dust raised raises doubt on I. Abteilung not being a part of the 1500 hrs attack on 2nd Sp Gp.

In addition Durenborn's diary does not match the events Schorms refers to so I am not convinced he was 8. Kp.

Then CAB 146/10 refers to the entire Panzer Regiment 5 advancing on the 2nd April - I am not relying on CAB 146/10 because of its late production despite its reference to various German war diaries but CAB 146/10 does not rule out I. Abteilung.

I don't have a problem with it being a II. Abteilung only attack on the 2nd April that then glances off to attack 5th RTR but the German resources of just one abteilung would have been very limited for the frontage involved and no one so far has been able to definitely exclude or include I. Abteilung in the 1500 hrs attack on 2nd Sp Gp.

At the moment my position is that the doubt stands about I. Abteilung on the 2nd April and also standing is the 5.5 ratio of the panzers faced by the A13s which Edward Wilson's research supports even though they only seem to have been from II. Abteilung.

And there is another aspect which is probably not provable one way or the other - elements of the II. Abteiung had born the action on the 31st March so why not include I. and II. Abteilungen in the attack on the 2nd April - it does not make sense to keep relying upon the II. Abteilung because that would have affected morale within the regiment.

It has been good re-examining this with you and Brevity in the last couple of days and I agree that there is doubt about the I. Abteilung but neither of you have yet satisfied the issues I have raised. I don't think I will respond further until someone produces further evidence about where I. Abteilung was on the 2nd April.

If I find anything further to add from another visit to Kew I will share it here.

[MarkN]

O Lordy lordy!!!!

Durenborn confirms he continues the march to Mersa Brega at 0300 hours ... Durenborn does not confirm that he entered MB at 0300.

???

Sheet 4 in the 3rd Armd Bde War Diary does not include any signature (unless it is on the very bottom-most edge) and it does not look like your example. The last line of text is "There was one additional casualty in a tank that came out of the action". The sheet is not ruled and it is not thin or transparent-ish paper.

The report of 5RTR's engagement on 2nd April is signed by Maj Lister. There are 2 copies available. One has his actual signature written in ink. The second is a copy, retyped, with a different layout and format and underscored by the words (typed): Signed M. B. Lister. You, however, have confirmed you are looking at the former, because that is the one with the date amendment in the title.

There are two elements in the 2nd April attack on 2nd Sp Gp at 1500 hrs that may also play a part in adding further doubt. 1) The raised dust cloud which extended for something like four miles and the very very long frontage adopted by 2nd Sp Gp. Both could not be created or dealt with by just 5. Kp with some infantry. The positions of 2nd Sp Gp were struck head on and then the panzers went either side before 5th RTR was attacked after 1730 hrs.

The areas involved and the extent of the dust raised raises doubt on I. Abteilung not being a part of the 1500 hrs attack on 2nd Sp Gp.

In addition Durenborn's diary does not match the events Schorms refers to so I am not convinced he was 8. Kp.

I don't have a problem with it being a II. Abteilung only attack on the 2nd April that then glances off to attack 5th RTR but the German resources of just one abteilung would have been very limited for the frontage involved and no one so far has been able to definitely exclude or include I. Abteilung in the 1500 hrs attack on 2nd Sp Gp.

At the moment my position is that the doubt stands about I. Abteilung on the 2nd April and also standing is the 5.5 ratio of the panzers faced by the A13s which Edward Wilson's research supports even though they only seem to have been from II. Abteilung.

And there is another aspect which is probably not provable one way or the other - elements of the II. Abteiung had born the action on the 31st March so why not include I. and II. Abteilungen in the attack on the 2nd April - it does not make sense to keep relying upon the II. Abteilung because that would have affected morale within the regiment.

I know you want to believe that I/PzRegt.5 was involved on the 2nd of April, but your belief is not supported by the evidence.

The reason for your "doubt" is simple: you are trying to sustain a false narrative.

It has been good re-examining this with you and Brevity in the last couple of days and I agree that there is doubt about the I. Abteilung but neither of you have yet satisfied the issues I have raised. I don't think I will respond further until someone produces further evidence about where I. Abteilung was on the 2nd April.

Academically and historically speaking, it has not been good; it has been a been a joke.

You have failed to produce a single piece of evidence placing I/PzRegt.5, or any elements of thereof, at any of the engagements on 2nd April. The onus is upon you to generate the evidence to support your theory that I/PzRegt.5 were in play on 2nd April. The onus is upon you to support your claim that more than 13 pantsers engaged 5RTR. The onus is not for us to provide evidence that they were not there and/or not engaged.

You have once again demonstrated that your knowledge of the events is weak to the point of absurdity. You may have many, many quotes and references - but you have singularly failed to place them together into a coherent and sustainable context. Your doubts exist simply because you are barking up the wrong tree; they exist because you are trying to make them fit a narrative which didn't happen.

I am making no attempt to "satisfy the issues you raise" as it is clear from your posts that you are not interested in historical fact but merely to rebut anybody who dares to question your false narrative. I make no attempt to convince you of anything. My role here is simply to post an alternative to your inaccurate musings so that other readers are not duped.



In brief, very, very brief...

2 Armd Div had retreated to a position about 30km south of Agadabia (DivHQ much further back): 2 Spt Grp on the Via Balbia (1TH right, FF MB left, 104RHA rear) and 3 Armd Bde to their East in the desert (3H right in contact with FF, 1 RHA and 5RTR slightly to their rear).

Vorausabteilung PONATH was tasked with the charge up the Via Balbia and the taking of Agedabia. This was the advance guard of MG8 with significant attachments: Pz (5.Kp incl. mtlzug 8.Kp), PzJaeg, Flak etc etc etc. They engaged with 1TH in the morning. Codeword OXFORD was broadcast and the British commenced a further withdrawal to positions just north of Agedabia.

Vorausabteilung PONATH (with 5.Kp incl. mtlzug 8.Kp) followed the withdrawal and engaged again with 1TH and 2 Spt Grp at the new position about 2km north of Agedabia in the mid afternoon. The British commenced a further withdrawal to Antelat.

AufKl.3, following VAbt PONATH, shot off to the west of Agedabia unopposed all the way to Zuetina which they took unopposed.

PzRegt.5 (Stab with the remainder of II.Abt and none of I.Abt) came off the Via Balbia and followed 3 Armd Bde's retreat. 3 Armd Bde was retreating in 3 parallel columns: 3H left, 1RHA centre and 5RTR right. During the withdrawal, 3H lost contact with the FF and thus 2 Spt Grp and the two formations were now separated. II/PzRegt.5 was following them: 8.Kp left (short of 1 mtlzug), 6.Kp right, Stab II/Abt rear and Stab PzRegt.5 behind all of that. Due to abysmal C3 at formation level, the Germans were catching up the retreat and Lt.Col Drew was forced into a delaying engagement about 10-15km SE of Agedabia. That engagement consisted of 11 A13s of 5RTR against (at most) 8 Pz.III and 5 Pz.II of 6.Kp/II/PzRegt.5. Vague and inconclusive evidence exists that could point to a second minor skirmish between 6 A13s of A/B 5RTR and (at most) 6 Pz.IV and 5 Pz.II of 8.Kp/II/PzRegt.5. A second, and even vaguer possibility exists of an even more minor skirmish between light tanks of 3H and unknown German AFVs mid afternoon.

This brief narrative is drawn from information contained in the DAK KTB, the II/PzRegt.5 KTB, the Schorm diary, the two 5RTR WD entries (both reconstructed after the event (late April): one in Tobruk and signed by Drew, the second in Abassia and signed by Lister), the 5RTR report of the engagement written in Abassia and signed by Lister, 3ArmdBde WD, 2SptGp WD, Latham's report and Shipton's report. It is also supported by the Duernborn account and other sources.



There is ZERO mention in any of these accounts of the participation of I/PzRegt.5 or MG2 or any elements thereof. The only reference I can find to MG2's participation is in the 'Feldzug' entry in CAB146/10. Even this makes NO mention of I/PzRegt.5. And, we must remind outrselves of what the British editors wrote in CAB146/10 with reference to this Feldzug entry:


The narrative that I/PzRegt.5 was involved on 2 April is based upon:
a) no mention of them in any document,
b) a single reference to PzRegt.5 being involved that is prefixed with "...more detailed, but possibly less accurate, account..."
c) a misidentification of a mtlzug (which you bizarrly use to confirm itself!!!)
d) an inabilty to place it anywhere else, QED it must be where you choose it to be....


Edited to correct:
My mistake. Text should read "...a second minor skirmish between 6 A13s of A/B 5RTR and (at most) 6 Pz.IV, 3 Pz.II and 2 Pz.I of 8.Kp/II/PzRegt.5" NOT 6 Pz.IV and 5 Pz.II of 8.Kp/II/PzRegt.5. This is based upon Jentz' analysis of PzRegt.5's establishment.

[Brevity]

Durenborn confirms he continues the march to Mersa Brega at 0300 hours and he is therefore not part of the attack on MB because MB had been evacuated and his statement is not incorrect for I. Abteilung or II.Abteilung. MB was evacuated by the British by about 2100 hrs (IIRC). Durenborn does not confirm that he entered MB at 0300.

In addition parts of 8.Kp attacked with 6. Kp in the morning at MB so surely Durenborn would have been closer to MB in the very early morning of the 31st even if he was not in the attack. That in itself is likely to place Durenborn in 4.Kp in addition to the items he recorded and which are mentioned above in this topic.

There are two elements in the 2nd April attack on 2nd Sp Gp at 1500 hrs that may also play a part in adding further doubt. 1) The raised dust cloud which extended for something like four miles and the very very long frontage adopted by 2nd Sp Gp. Both could not be created or dealt with by just 5. Kp with some infantry. The positions of 2nd Sp Gp were struck head on and then the panzers went either side before 5th RTR was attacked after 1730 hrs.

The areas involved and the extent of the dust raised raises doubt on I. Abteilung not being a part of the 1500 hrs attack on 2nd Sp Gp.

In addition Durenborn's diary does not match the events Schorms refers to so I am not convinced he was 8. Kp.

ClintHardware

I'm getting bored of explaining you everything 5 times.

According to their KTB, II./5 attacked Marsa Brega at night 31 Mar/1 Apr, leaving at 3:15 am, reaching the objective without resistance few hours later, and 5 coy attacked Agedabia with MG.8 on 2 April. At least a platoon of Pz.IVs was present on both occasions.

This matched perfectly with Durenborn account so why do you raise pointless doubts??? In other thread you have made a claim that Durenborn belonged to the I. Abteilung. I assume you wrote the same stuff in your book, you are now unwilling to admit a mistake, and will defend your statement no matter what.

I don't have Durenborn's diary while you do. Figuring out his assignment should be trivial for an "accomplished researcher" like you. Both I. and II. Abteilung were loaded on ships at different times. Same for arrival to front area. Same for arrival to Mechili. Same for leaving Mechili. Same for arrival at Tobruk.

Does his diary end on 13 April? That alone proves he could have only belonged to 8 coy.

Not gonna bother with talking to someone who falsifies evidence to prove his fallacies so this might be my last reply to you.

No regards

[ClintHardware]

Brevity I agree with your evidence.

Looking at the other evidence your evidence is only some of the evidence and we know from other posts in this and other topics that German records are not necessarily describing everything.

When I find two or three or whatever number of versions of an incident I include all of them and leave the reader to own the problem and make up there own minds. If something needs to be re-written to include wider evidence I will do so. I do not have a problem in doing that.

You seem to be unable to cope with multiple views of a battle being reported.

MarkN - No to all your points because of Durenborn (I have quoted all of Durenborn's words for the 2nd April in this topic from WO 169/1436 at Kew) Schorm's various translations which have been added to several topics on this forum, CAB 146/10 at Kew and the British accounts I have mentioned earlier with references describing the frontage held on the 2nd and the visibility problems. There is plenty of doubt and there is room to report doubt for future historians to review.

I do not have a problem with the 2nd April being only an attack by II. Abteilung but I will report that version and the wider versions of the commitment of the whole of Panzer Regiment 5 because of CAB 146/10 and others' statements.

It is strange that you both think it is acceptable to accuse forum users of lying, falsifying and fiction writing especially when a wider view is trying to be taken based on veterans evidence formal and informal. All of us on this forum are keen to discover what happened in various battles and theatres and there is no future is falsifying anything (the Hitler Diaries anyone?) - I can not think of a more irrelevant set of descriptions you two want to glibly throw at people wanting to explore history and understand it and test it.

So I will not be limited by you two ever on here or anywhere else.

In a fortnight or so I will compile a document with each of the elements of evidence I am using to give the broader view of the 2nd April with photos of the diary pages taken at Kew and add a link here.

Laters

[Attrition]

~~~~~I will compile a document with each of the elements of evidence I am using to give the broader view of the 2nd April with photos of the diary pages taken at Kew and add a link here.~~~~~

I look forward to it.

[MarkN]

MarkN - No to all your points because of Durenborn (I have quoted all of Durenborn's words for the 2nd April in this topic from WO 169/1436 at Kew)

And the words you posted here places him within ll/PzRegt.5. How does that lead you to consider, and provide evidence towards, l/PzRegt.5's involvement?

There is plenty of doubt and there is room to report doubt for future historians to review.

But what is basis of YOUR doubt? A misreading of Durenborn? Reports of clouds of dust that you assume to be too large? Do you know how many vehicles make up a typical battalion? Frontages....what are you on about?

[MarkN]

~~~~~I will compile a document with each of the elements of evidence I am using to give the broader view of the 2nd April with photos of the diary pages taken at Kew and add a link here.~~~~~

I look forward to it.

So do l. It may include some excellent source material. I just hope the images he produces are of the full page and not cropped deliberately to hide unhelpful signatures.

[MarkN]

I suspect we have now exhausted discussion of PzRegt.5 on the 2nd April. Shall we turn to what you've written in your book about Mechili and the surrender of Gambier-Parry to a force probably inferior in numbers and how his subordinate formation commanders elected to leave him in the lurch?