3rd Armourd Brigade Destroyed in the Desert

[nmao]

And since you repeat the bit about the missing 90 or so German tanks. They had 58 engine changes, the majority of which seem to have been Panzer III. How many replacement engines did they have in North Africa, how much capacity did they have for engine changes? When did the last of these tanks make it back to the front line after the change? Unless you can answer these questions, the number of serviceable tanks at any time prior to CRUSADER doesn't tell you anything about actual combat losses. That's just an unfortunate fact.

Just to add, going by the report of 5 May 1941 cited in Panzertruppen I :
12 pz I, 2 klBef, 19 pz II, 44 pz III & grBef, 6 pz IV were delivered to the two workshop komp. prior to the arrival in Tobruk (i take it as 11 April)
then it says:
58 engines changed
50 shock absorvers changed
20 broken springs changed
16 shackles changed
etc...
they always use the past tense, so it seems that those tanks were repaired prior to 5 May 1941. Am i reading it wrong?

There were 83 damaged tanks received until 11 april, and were repaired/delivered to units prior to 5 May.
Want to comment?

regards,

-nuno

[Urmel]

Repaired yes, good points, thanks for that, and it should put that theory to rest. Delivered to units, probably for most of them.

Then I just note 20 mine damaged tanks of 2./PR5 on 1 May, another 9 of 6./PR5. Again quite a drag on the workshops, since at least some of the tanks of 6./PR5 would also have damage from being fired on.

Tank strengths is given as follows in Geschichte des Panzerregiments 5 (English: Panzers in the Sand):

11 April: 25 - no losses reported (combat report PR5)
12 April: 24 - no losses reported (combat report PR5)
14 April: 38 - on this day 17 losses (combat report PR5)
1 May: 80 (diary Lt. Schorm) - on this day 9 (diary Lt. Schorm) and 20 mine damage (report Sergeant-Major Wendt)

This shows quite clearly that a very large number of tanks must had flowed back to the regiment within about two weeks after the 14 April attack.

Two other points:
1) According to WD naval transport command Italy, 13 tanks were lost in the fire on the Leverkusen, 2 total losses, and 11 which were returned to Germany for repair.
2) I have conflicting information about 3./PR5 and 7./PR5. 7. Is mentioned in the attack on 1 May, by Lt. Schorm. On the other hand, the book narrative of Geschichte des Panzerregiments 5 clearly states that these two companies were not present, and I know that two companies with these numbers were sunk on board Carlo del Greco and/or Fabio Filzi, on 13 Dec 41. Anyone know for sure what happened there?

On BREVITY, PR8 only appeared at the frontline on 16 May, apparently, while Abteilung Hohmann may or may not have had the totality of PR5's tanks. That's not clear to me.

On CRUSADER, it was very clearly a costly victory of the Commonwealth. But it wasn't followed up properly due to its Pyrrhic nature, and the events in the Far East.

[ClintHardware]

Urmel

You and I will not fully agree on the damage caused to 5. leichte division on the 31st March, 2nd April, 4th April (Er Regima) 7th April Derna and then at Tobruk and the border. My previous posts in this topic use contemporary German, British and Australian quotations to describe the damage inflicted. I have many more. You have not provided any positives to counter these.

According to Jentz in TCINAfrica the panzerwerkstatt kompanie report covers damage incurred during advances undertaken at speed during events that occurred after the 3rd April in rocky terrain. The data in the report plus Oberst Olbrich's statement that 25 panzers were operational for the attack on Tobruk for the 11th April only account for nearly one operational abteilung. Where are the others?

On the 14th April and 1st May the situation is similar in respect of the total operational (81 on the 1st May and only 35 at the end of the day).

I am sure that all breakdowns and battle damaged panzers were recovered when they could be reached.

If we take Operation Brevity as a benchmark to test all the events in: the advance to Tobruk, then fighting at Tobruk and fighting at the border with 22 Gds Bde and the Mobile Force under Gott, we have I. and II. Panzer Regiment 5 fielded separately during the those three days of Brevity but their combined total is less than a full complement of panzers for a single abteilung.

Once Panzer Regiment 8 arrives you then have the possibility of panzers being shared with Panzer Regiment 5 so you can only rely upon total landed panzers for both regiments minus the total of those operational and in operations at any one time to understand the damage wrought upon the DAK by the desert and the decisions taken by Neame, Wavell, Gambier-Parry, Latham, Morshead and Thompson.

Wavell did not have any data on the panzer state of DAK because Ultra had virtually nothing on Heer data other than what Luftwaffe enigma keys could provide incidentally at the time (Paulus' report was sent in the Luftwaffe key). Churchill could not be consoled by a very visible retreat so he would only accept descriptions such as "disaster" from Wavell. I am therefore discounting any of Wavell's observations about disasters because he was too removed from the reality on the ground which is given to us by contemporary soldiers who were present.

[ClintHardware]

I have just re-consulted Panzertruppen Vol 1 for data about Brevity Skorpian and Battleaxe and the data is even bleaker for Panzer Regiment 5:

1) Panzer Abteilung Hohmann had 27 operational panzers to face Operation BREVITY.
2) I. Panzer Regiment 5 did not join Hohmann (panzer numbers unknown at this point for this I. Abteilung) for BREVITY.
3) I. Panzer Regiment 8 (not 5) did join the battle to some extent by 0300 hours 16/5/41.
4) 26/5/41 I. Panzer Regiment 5 was available for Operation SKORPIAN numbers unstated.
5) Panzer Regiment 5 had arrived in Libya less the 10 Pz III and 3 Pz IV lost in the Leverkusen incident but replacements arrive in April.
6) Another 15 Pz III and 5 Pz IV arrive for Panzer Regiment 5 by 4th June.
7) 15th June Panzer Regiment 5 has only 96 operational panzers.

So if you take away all 33 replacements by 4th June this indicates that by the 15th June Panzer Regiment 5 was down to 63 original panzers from those landed at Tripoli and engaged in the advance on Tobruk.

I do not know if any panzers were lent to the Panzer Regiment 5 from Panzer Regiment 8 (probably not) but if so the constructive total loss is even greater for Panzer Regiment 5 than I had calculated.

My next book will be on BREVITY, SKORPIAN AND BATTLEAXE and there seems to be a whole wealth of things not said about those three battles when you read between the lines of Panzertruppen Vol 1.

[Urmel]

I'm not disagreeing with your data, but with your analysis, interpretation, representation, and conclusions.

PR5 had the following tanks delivered prior to CRUSADER:

45/71/20/8 (II/III/IV/command) plus a share of the replacements delivered in July/August, which were:

4/25/5

So even if all these replacements had been with them, they would have received in total:

49/96/25/8

Of these, known total losses are:

Agedabia: 1
Tobruk 14 April: 17
BREVITY: 1/2/0
BATTLEAXE: 2/2/0
Sommernachtstraum: 0/2/0 (?)
Total: 27

They fielded:

32/64/15/? on 14 November (runners only) for a total of 111, and 35/68/17/4 on 17 November, plus 4 large command tanks, for a total of 120+4.

178 delivered
24 lost after arrival at Tobruk
124 remaining
30 are missing

Note this is the most positive interpretation for 2 Armoured Division. If PR8 had received replacements for its losses in BATTLEAXE of 3/4/1, the number of missing tanks shrinks to 22, and indeed by 19 November they report more tanks than were delivered initially (see below), so out of the 4/25/5 in replacements they must have got at least 0/9/2, i.e. 11, so therefore the number of missing tanks in PR5 shrinks to 19.

There are no 80 or 90 or even more missing tanks.

As for the idea that they received tanks from PR8 to make up the numbers, let's have a look:

Received initially
45/71/20/10

14 November: 38/75/20/? And 5 Matilda II
19 November: 38/76/21/9 and ?

Missing: 7/0/0/1
Surplus: 0/5/1/0
Known losses: 3/4/1/?
Net: 1 tank missing ignoring the known losses. In any case it's clear that PR5 didn't take tanks from PR8. At least to me.

Ah! But I'm ignoring the mighty Panzer I, and if we count the 50 deliveries, we nearly get to 80. Alas, I am not. On 20 June PR5 had 19 of them on hand, PR8 had zero. Possible loss 31, on the outside, but they could just have been re-assigned, to engineers, the Luftwaffe, rear-area security, etc. but even if all of these were lost, the maximum number of missing tanks is 50, of which 31 are an obsolete type.

All of this based on primary sources or compilations thereof.

Questions?

Note I now have confirmation that 3rd and 7th coys of both regiments were not sent until December 41. So when looking at the regimental strength, it was 10/34/0 short of establishment in both cases up to then.

[ClintHardware]

Interesting. I will give a proper response later with data and dates.

CRUSADER is 6 months after the end of the period I am looking at.

So your data (from undeclared sources) indicates the DAK panzer losses (damaged awaiting repair and completely KO beyond repair) encompassing: 31st March - 9th April, Tobruk 10th April - 2nd May, and the Tobruk - Border fighting (incorporating elements of 2nd Support Group under Gott during 11th April - 13th May) (see my list) on which was added some later losses BREVITY, SKORPIAN, BATTLEAXE resulted in it taking some six months before Panzer Regiment 5 was again fielding nearly two full abteilung for CRUSADER.

That is a long lasting effect. Had ULTRA been able to give comprehensive Heer data at this time Churchill and Wavell might have been more conciliatory towards what had been achieved 31st March - 13th May 1941.

Where is your data from?

What do we know of spare parts delivered rather than whole panzers?

More later with numbers.

[Urmel]

I'm afraid that is jumping to conclusions. For all I know they could have had 125 tanks operational on 1 August. I don't have that data, so I wouldn't conclude that they were in this state due to 2 Armoured's actions or the attacks on Tobruk.

At the end of BATTLEAXE the division reported a strength of runners of:

19/8/33/9 (I/II/III/IV) for a total of 69 plus command tanks, of which 42 were mediums. For comparison, 15. Panzer reported 0/28/26/13 for a total of 67 of which 39 were mediums. So you can see that in just one month they had seen a reduction in runners of almost half. That was the point user Brevity was making earlier in the thread.

Also remember that comparing these numbers to paper strength of 2 Abteilungen is futile, since they were 44 tanks short of that due to the missing 3. and 7. Kompanien.

Sources are:

War diary Panzergruppe
War diary D.A.K
War diary 15. PD
Combat report PR5 for CRUSADER
Nmao's numbers on arrivals which were used for the table on the blog (presume these are from Jentz?). Totals of these one might be able to corroborate through the Italian navy' OH, but I haven't got the relevant volume. Or through the cargo manifests. I might have those, but haven't looked at them in detail.

I have no info on the delivery of spares.

[ClintHardware]

My list of Panzer Losses attributes their loss to all units within CYRCOM and the Mobile Force under Brigadier Gott.
I have re-titled my copy of the list to be Panzers Damaged in Combat because no permanent outcome can be assumed. I am happy to correct the list at anytime.

Looking at Panzertruppen Vol 1 we have the following events and numbers for Panzer Regiment 5 leading up to CRUSADER.

The 17th Nov operational figures are two months after SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM. I would have expected them to be higher with the low reported losses and the chance to make repairs out of battle. Not including Panzer Is, 50 Pz II - IV are not accounted for on that date. Every re-useable part of a recovered panzer would have been re-used to repair lesser damaged panzers during every hour of every day.

........................................................................................Pz I....Pz II....Pz III....Pz IV
Panzer Regiment 5 arrives at Tripoli in March with..............................25.....45......61.......17
Leverkusen replacements arrive during April......................................................10........3
Another 15 Pz III and 5 Pz IV arrive for Panzer Regiment 5 by 4th June........................15........5
Operational at the end of BattleAxe................................................19......8......33........9
30th June Replacements......................................................................4.......6
10th July Replacements Arrive August to October.........................................4
Operational on 10th September Panzer Regiment 5......................................34......60.......16
Operational after Unternehmen SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM 14th - 15th Sept............18......43.......11
Operational on 17th November 1941.......................................................35......68.......17

Total Landed Before CRUSADER.....................................................25.....53.......92......25
Total Landed minus Reported Operational 17th November........................?......18.......24......8 = 50 Not Present
Original March Landings minus replacements......................................25?....37......30........9 = IIIs+IVs @ 50%

[Urmel]

I think that lines up pretty well with what I had. Since I think we know the operational losses for BREVITY, BATTLEAXE, and Sommernachtstraum, we have an idea of losses in the initial offensive and the Tobruk battles.

I found the cargo manifests on my HDD. There is something in there I want to check with the chap I got them, and I need to do some cross-checking, from but I'll get back to this.

In the meantime, note that Panzer I could of course have been used as replacements for lost Panzerjaeger I from Pz.Jg.Abt. 605. I have no idea what data is available about them, other that they seem to have had 27 vehicles when they landed, and 27 in CRUSADER, which seems to indicate that losses were replaced with either new vehicles or by converting Panzer I in theatre.

[ClintHardware]

That information would be very interesting. Look forward to seeing it if you can manage it.

[Urmel]

Still trying to figure this out. In the meantime, from the D.A.K. war diary I have the following confirmations:

Operation Skorpion (re-capture of Halfaya): 1 Panzer III total loss (Gruppe Herff, probably Abteilung Hohmann)
Operation Sommernachtstraum (14 Sept): 2 Panzer III total losses (PR5)

I also now have confirmation from two independent sources (cargo manifests and D.A.K. war diary) that 3. and 7. Kompanie PR8 were sent to North Africa with the initial transports. I therefore struggle to see why they were sent again in December.

[RichTO90]

Still trying to figure this out. In the meantime, from the D.A.K. war diary I have the following confirmations:

Operation Skorpion (re-capture of Halfaya): 1 Panzer III total loss (Gruppe Herff, probably Abteilung Hohmann)
Operation Sommernachtstraum (14 Sept): 2 Panzer III total losses (PR5)

I also now have confirmation from two independent sources (cargo manifests and D.A.K. war diary) that 3. and 7. Kompanie PR8 were sent to North Africa with the initial transports. I therefore struggle to see why they were sent again in December.

What elements are included in the cargo manifests? Is it possible that parts of each Kompanie were shipped separately? Perhaps the Kompanietrupp, Tross, Instandsetzungsgruppe, and Zugen went in different transports due to space limitations? Quite a lot of DAK stuff sat in Italy for months waiting for convoys remember, and quite a bit of it was sharp end stuff. It would not surprise me at all that bits of Panzer units took a while to get in country as well.

[Urmel]

Hi Rich

Happy belated birthday!

It looks to me as if the companies went in one or two gos actually. The tanks were sent over in quite a compact schedule. When the shipping losses started racking up and it became more chaotic over the summer, that's when the delays started.

[ClintHardware]

Just had another realisation about the panzers not reported operational or counted on the battlefield:

When you look at the repairs that had to be undertaken by the Werkstatt Kompanie that was reported on the 5th May for the damage incurred in the fast advances across the difficult terrain from the 3rd April to Tobruk, the nature of the repairs could not have been greatly fulfilled by cannibalising knocked out panzers.

This indicates that the missing panzers that were not reported operational or counted on the battlefield were not largely due to cannibalising those damaged in battle or from desert conditions. IIRC there were 58 engine replacements noted as one of the figures.

That number of engine replacements also indicates that a large number of spares were present as part of the stores landed with Panzer Regiment 5 and that damage from desert conditions had been anticipated (as we would expect to be the case).

The 50% reduction in numbers of Panzer IIIs and IVs by the 17th November after two months of repairs out of battle seem to be composed of the documented write offs and others that so far could not be made fully operational and therefore constructive losses. I am using constructive loss in the Insurance sense of loss. I have previously used the phrase constructive total loss but I believe "total" is too definite when panzers may yet be made operational with spares and cannibalising others.

[ClintHardware]

Can I please ask for your advice on the following and please shoot me down - I need your criticism:

I am editing some information on armour penetration and I have created two new terms of "manufactured thickness" and "presented thickness". I do not think I should be creating terms at all but I have done so to try to help the reader. The problem is that we read of thickness and also equivalent thickness due to angle/obliquity, and I have also seen the term horizontal thickness which seems to have been used to describe the path followed on penetration. I feel that "presented thickness" is better able to include equivalent thickness and impacts occurring with the target and firer in any attitude dictated by terrain.

And just to be clear I am not needing or wanting to replace any accepted terms - the two new terms are complimentary terms for clarity (I hope).

Any thoughts?