BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
- ClintHardware
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BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
Whilst at Kew I found this fascinating report on panzer losses. I have not studied the operation recently so I do not know how this fits into what is known BUT I do not think I have ever seen it referred to in any books IIRC. It comes from WO 169/1173 7th Armd Div G file.
The original document referred to 257 Bty as (NH) but of course it was from the Norfolk Yeomanry (NY) not Northumberland Hussars.
I have attached the same report but as a pdf which has kept the original layout of the text and spellings to a high degree.
SECRET
Copy No.........
REPORT on ACTION of 257th ANTI-TANK BATTERY (65TH (NH) ANTI-TANK
REGIMENT, RA) at CAPUZZO, 15 – 17 JUNE 1941
1. Positions were occupied at approximately 1700 hrs, 15 June 1941
A Tp in support of A Coy I BUFFS (in angle between rds CAPUZZO – BARDIA and CAPUZZO – SALLUM)
B Tp in support of B Coy I BUFFS (West of rd CAPUZZO – BARDIA).
C Tp in support of C Coy I BUFFS (South of rd CAPUZZO – SALLUM)
2. Enemy tanks and M.T. could be seen on the forward slopes of a ridge 2000 to 2500 yds to the North on the left of rd CAPUZZO – BARDIA. At 1730 hrs a subaltern of the tanks in support informed one of the Tp Comds that his guns should be moved, as the Hun was massing for a counter-attack (“the reply need not be included”). At 1830 hrs enemy shelling began. A section of “I” tanks went forward about 800 yds to meet German tanks advancing on left flank.
In this action B Tp knocked out eight tanks engaged at 7-800 yds.
One gun C Tp knocked out three tanks.
3. 16 June. At 0500 hrs enemy pushed forward his first wave of tanks, about 30 on the left flank and 10 – 15 on the right , attempting to deny us observation by a small creeping barrage. On the right eight tanks making for SALLUM rd were engaged by A Tp’s forward gun, which switched on to two light tanks (mounting 75 mm guns) and stopped both in five rounds, one catching fire. The eight tanks on the right withdrew but one circling slowly left towards the gun was set on fire by the first round.
In the second attack, which reached this tank, still burning, two more tanks were knocked out by the same gun.
On the left, enemy tanks were engaged by B Tp guns (in addition to fire of 25-pr Bty and ‘I’ tanks) six tanks being immobilised between 0500 hrs and 0830 hrs. These were hit at 1200 yds, 900 yds and four at 7-800 yds. None were set on fire.
4. Notes on the action:-
(a) Tanks were engaged normally at 7-800 yds but two were knocked out at more than 1000 yds range. ‘I’ tanks however, were engaging at extreme elevation. On the evening of 15 June, ‘I’ tanks 150 yds behind A/Tk gun positions opened fire at extreme range.
(b) At these ranges the tanks used by the Germans proved very vulnerable. It is believed, although observation through dust and dusk was poor, that ten tanks were hit frontally, six on the sides. On examination of the tank the front armour plating between the tracks was seen to be pierced by 2-pr shells and diesel oil leaked out on the ground. The smaller tanks mounting the 75mm guns were easily stopped.
(c) The great difficulty in distinguishing between our own and enemy tanks was again experienced. Our ‘I’ tanks firing on the flanks found similar difficulty and engaged the flashes of A/Tk guns on the other flank.
(d) Casualties. Of the three fatal casualties in B Tp, two were due to Besa fire from our own ‘I’ tanks, which after expending their 2-pr ammunition returned to the perimeter and 25 – 30 yds behind our position opened fire at the enemy tank flashes.
(e) Ammunition expenditure. An accurate check of ammunition expended is impossible owing to a quantity being handed over to the tanks in an emergency.
Approximate figures are:-
A Tp. ... 50 rds )
B Tp. ... 150 rds ) = Total 250 rds.
C Tp. ... 50 rds )
The original document referred to 257 Bty as (NH) but of course it was from the Norfolk Yeomanry (NY) not Northumberland Hussars.
I have attached the same report but as a pdf which has kept the original layout of the text and spellings to a high degree.
SECRET
Copy No.........
REPORT on ACTION of 257th ANTI-TANK BATTERY (65TH (NH) ANTI-TANK
REGIMENT, RA) at CAPUZZO, 15 – 17 JUNE 1941
1. Positions were occupied at approximately 1700 hrs, 15 June 1941
A Tp in support of A Coy I BUFFS (in angle between rds CAPUZZO – BARDIA and CAPUZZO – SALLUM)
B Tp in support of B Coy I BUFFS (West of rd CAPUZZO – BARDIA).
C Tp in support of C Coy I BUFFS (South of rd CAPUZZO – SALLUM)
2. Enemy tanks and M.T. could be seen on the forward slopes of a ridge 2000 to 2500 yds to the North on the left of rd CAPUZZO – BARDIA. At 1730 hrs a subaltern of the tanks in support informed one of the Tp Comds that his guns should be moved, as the Hun was massing for a counter-attack (“the reply need not be included”). At 1830 hrs enemy shelling began. A section of “I” tanks went forward about 800 yds to meet German tanks advancing on left flank.
In this action B Tp knocked out eight tanks engaged at 7-800 yds.
One gun C Tp knocked out three tanks.
3. 16 June. At 0500 hrs enemy pushed forward his first wave of tanks, about 30 on the left flank and 10 – 15 on the right , attempting to deny us observation by a small creeping barrage. On the right eight tanks making for SALLUM rd were engaged by A Tp’s forward gun, which switched on to two light tanks (mounting 75 mm guns) and stopped both in five rounds, one catching fire. The eight tanks on the right withdrew but one circling slowly left towards the gun was set on fire by the first round.
In the second attack, which reached this tank, still burning, two more tanks were knocked out by the same gun.
On the left, enemy tanks were engaged by B Tp guns (in addition to fire of 25-pr Bty and ‘I’ tanks) six tanks being immobilised between 0500 hrs and 0830 hrs. These were hit at 1200 yds, 900 yds and four at 7-800 yds. None were set on fire.
4. Notes on the action:-
(a) Tanks were engaged normally at 7-800 yds but two were knocked out at more than 1000 yds range. ‘I’ tanks however, were engaging at extreme elevation. On the evening of 15 June, ‘I’ tanks 150 yds behind A/Tk gun positions opened fire at extreme range.
(b) At these ranges the tanks used by the Germans proved very vulnerable. It is believed, although observation through dust and dusk was poor, that ten tanks were hit frontally, six on the sides. On examination of the tank the front armour plating between the tracks was seen to be pierced by 2-pr shells and diesel oil leaked out on the ground. The smaller tanks mounting the 75mm guns were easily stopped.
(c) The great difficulty in distinguishing between our own and enemy tanks was again experienced. Our ‘I’ tanks firing on the flanks found similar difficulty and engaged the flashes of A/Tk guns on the other flank.
(d) Casualties. Of the three fatal casualties in B Tp, two were due to Besa fire from our own ‘I’ tanks, which after expending their 2-pr ammunition returned to the perimeter and 25 – 30 yds behind our position opened fire at the enemy tank flashes.
(e) Ammunition expenditure. An accurate check of ammunition expended is impossible owing to a quantity being handed over to the tanks in an emergency.
Approximate figures are:-
A Tp. ... 50 rds )
B Tp. ... 150 rds ) = Total 250 rds.
C Tp. ... 50 rds )
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Re: BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
My guess is that this was against PR8, but unfortunately the WD for the period is lost, only a summary is available, and it is not very detailed. There is a bit of info in the D.A.K. WD. 7 R.T.R. also has something on this, attached below.
Summary of entry in D.A.K. WD:
15 June - at 17.00hours it was believed Capuzzo had been retaken. At 19.30hours (all Berlin time I believe) Ia of 15. Panzer reported that the outcome of its counterattack was still uncertain, and losses were reported as 'naturally quite heavy', with tank losses unclear, but not considered very high. At 23.45 it was finally acknowledged that the attack had failed. On 16 June at 11.00 it was acknowledged the attack had failed, and only 35 tanks of PR8 remained in condition to drive, out of presumably about 150 or so they had when they started the day on 15 June.
So the loss claims are quite believable. Note that the I tanks also claimed German tanks. This action would go some way to explain the quite high total write offs suffered by PR8 (3/4/1). I would guess the AT gunners and I tankers failed to systematically destroy German tanks left immobilised on the battlefield by setting them on fire, and that enabled recovery. That was one lesson learned for CRUSADER.
Summary of entry in D.A.K. WD:
15 June - at 17.00hours it was believed Capuzzo had been retaken. At 19.30hours (all Berlin time I believe) Ia of 15. Panzer reported that the outcome of its counterattack was still uncertain, and losses were reported as 'naturally quite heavy', with tank losses unclear, but not considered very high. At 23.45 it was finally acknowledged that the attack had failed. On 16 June at 11.00 it was acknowledged the attack had failed, and only 35 tanks of PR8 remained in condition to drive, out of presumably about 150 or so they had when they started the day on 15 June.
So the loss claims are quite believable. Note that the I tanks also claimed German tanks. This action would go some way to explain the quite high total write offs suffered by PR8 (3/4/1). I would guess the AT gunners and I tankers failed to systematically destroy German tanks left immobilised on the battlefield by setting them on fire, and that enabled recovery. That was one lesson learned for CRUSADER.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
- ClintHardware
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Re: BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
You seem to have found it Urmel. Strange how the performance and role of the Royal Artillery gunners is not noted by 7th RTR - their WD reads like it was written up well after the event without much interest in finding out detail.
The Light tanks with 75mm guns that they knocked out - what do you think they were?
The description of German tanks being vulnerable is completely at odds with 2-Pdrs described by angry veterans as "pop guns". I have been reading anything I can find at Kew about 2-Pdr A.P. Shot and APHE (virtually nothing on APHE) and it seems that range, striking angle, velocity and the equivalent armour effect from obliquity (I tend to think of the latter as "presented armour thickness") were critical elements for inducing (or not inducing) shatter in A.P. Shot. This action is about a year before APCBC was introduced for the 2-Pdr ( I think the first APCBC rounds were issued in the field in September 42 - I could be wrong).
Strange that having got near enough to see the effect of their shot they did not destroy them further.
The Light tanks with 75mm guns that they knocked out - what do you think they were?
The description of German tanks being vulnerable is completely at odds with 2-Pdrs described by angry veterans as "pop guns". I have been reading anything I can find at Kew about 2-Pdr A.P. Shot and APHE (virtually nothing on APHE) and it seems that range, striking angle, velocity and the equivalent armour effect from obliquity (I tend to think of the latter as "presented armour thickness") were critical elements for inducing (or not inducing) shatter in A.P. Shot. This action is about a year before APCBC was introduced for the 2-Pdr ( I think the first APCBC rounds were issued in the field in September 42 - I could be wrong).
Strange that having got near enough to see the effect of their shot they did not destroy them further.
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- ClintHardware
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Re: BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
One other thing can anyone please explain the relationship of GMT to Egyptian Summertime and what time the Germans were using in the desert. I have Googled this but still not sure of the accuracy of anything I have found. Thanks
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Re: BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
I believe the Empire troops were on DDST (double daylight savings time I believe), i.e. GMT-2, during the summer, and GMT-1 during the winter. The Germans were on Berlin summer time, i.e. GMT-2 throughout. So time difference for end of March to end of October 41.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
Re: BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
Quite. But there are any number of reasons for that.ClintHardware wrote:You seem to have found it Urmel. Strange how the performance and role of the Royal Artillery gunners is not noted by 7th RTR - their WD reads like it was written up well after the event without much interest in finding out detail.
a) an errorClintHardware wrote:The Light tanks with 75mm guns that they knocked out - what do you think they were?
b) misidentified Panzer IV
Well there are two things: i) it wasn't a popgun up to CRUSADER, but the tracer had apparently a bad habit of breaking off on strike and disappearing into the orbit, making it look as if the whole round had bounced; ii) even when hit the solid 2-pdr shot did normally not set German tanks on fire - again making it difficult to see the effect, while British tanks burned easily when hit by German APHE rounds. That by the way gave rise to the idea that German tanks ran on supposedly less flammable Diesel (see your quote where they even claim leaking diesel), which of course they did not. Furthermore, the Germans had some Panzer III already (mostly with PR8, incidentally) that had the face-hardened armour that defeated the first strike of a 2-pdr. But the Panzer IV and older models of the Panzer III did not keep the round out.ClintHardware wrote:The description of German tanks being vulnerable is completely at odds with 2-Pdrs described by angry veterans as "pop guns".
Might have been SOP at the time? You need to find the orders about treating captured material - they might have wanted to keep them for further examination. Big mistake if you are not 150% certain you'll own the battlefield at the end of the day. Or it might have been an oversight, lack of personnel to send 800-1,000 yards in front of your position in the night to do the job. Again, many good reasons for it. It was normally the job of the R.E. I believe. They also seem to have been concerned about their ammunition status, so pumping more rounds into them wasn't a good idea either.ClintHardware wrote:Strange that having got near enough to see the effect of their shot they did not destroy them further.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
- ClintHardware
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Re: BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
Urmel can you remember where you read about the detached Tracer. Sounds very feasible but I have not come across anything about it before.
Also the way you have given the clock settings would place Germans and British on the same hour between March - October is that what you meant?
Thanks for your help on these points it is appreciated.
Also the way you have given the clock settings would place Germans and British on the same hour between March - October is that what you meant?
Thanks for your help on these points it is appreciated.
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Re: BATTLEAXE 2-pr Action 15th - 17th June 257 Battery
1) I think it's in Macksey's Afrikakorps book.
2) Yes, that's what I mean. A bit of a surprise to me to, but it would explain why it's difficult to make sense of the information.
By the way, to clarify on the German WD - the attack on 16 June, which by 11am had failed, was another attack I believe, distinct from that in the evening of 15 June.
2) Yes, that's what I mean. A bit of a surprise to me to, but it would explain why it's difficult to make sense of the information.
By the way, to clarify on the German WD - the attack on 16 June, which by 11am had failed, was another attack I believe, distinct from that in the evening of 15 June.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
- ClintHardware
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- Joined: 21 Jan 2011, 13:17