Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

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Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#1

Post by ClintHardware » 14 Apr 2014, 17:56

Hi All

Does anyone have anything to add or correct concerning this action written up briefly by Brigadier Pemberton in 1950 for his book: The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment page 75 - 76? It seems to be 'C' Battery 2nd RHA (25-Pdrs), and the 102nd RHA (Northumberland Hussars) using 2-Pdrs.

Brigadier A. L. Pemberton M.C.
Perhaps the most successful action of this type occurred at Proasteion (Proastion) Ridge on 13th April during the withdrawal from the original Aliakhmon positions. The fighting started with a morning attack by enemy infantry which was broken up by 25-prs firing direct over open sights. This was followed by the first massed attack from the air, during which the whole position was heavily dive bombed and machine-gunned; and at 1900 hours the assault culminated in a thrust by about 30 light and medium tanks, with infantry support against the village of Mavropage, which was at the time the headquarters of the 1st Armoured Brigade. A troop of anti-tank guns defending the entrance to the village, drove the enemy into a nullah and in the dusk knocked out eight tanks for the loss of one gun, one truck and one man wounded. The 25-prs again came into action over open sights and with the aid of our own tanks, the position was held. Altogether the enemy had been so severely handled that neither the SS Hitler nor the armoured formation that was with them made a move for the next 36 hours. (94)


Definition of Nullah: A ravine or gully, especially in southern Asia. [Hindi nālā, rivulet, probably of Dravidian origin.] nullah (ˈnʌlɑː). n. 1. (Physical Geography) a stream or drain.
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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropa

#2

Post by xristar » 15 Apr 2014, 13:54

There are more details if you want them. The general descritpion is correct, although the conclusion if pure fantasy. German losses were minimal (4-5 knocked-out tanks, 10 wounded), the SS LAH was nowhere near the battle (and actually very active elsewhere), and the Germans stopped due to running out of ammo and fuel, due to the traffic jam that happened in the narrow Klidi pass, where the 9th PD and the rest of XL Corps was passing their units. The British 1st Arm. Brig. succeeded in disengaging, but it left some 30 tanks behind mostly due to mechanical failures.


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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropa

#3

Post by ClintHardware » 15 Apr 2014, 16:35

Hi xristar

I am not surprised with the discrepancies. Can you please quote what you have and the sources of it.

Does anyone have the Northumberland Hussars regimental history edited by Joan Bright and if so can you quote what is there (if anything) about this action.
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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropa

#4

Post by xristar » 15 Apr 2014, 19:25

ClintHardware wrote: I am not surprised with the discrepancies. Can you please quote what you have and the sources of it.
There are the official Australian and New Zealand official histories available for free online. The Greek history (printed) uses them as sources.

Two years ago I wrote a small summary here from Karl Heinz Golla's book "Der Fall Griechenlands". It gives a German perspective. I quote
The actions of KG Koppen on 13 April are given in pages 232 and 233.
Panzer Regiment 33, under Oberst v. Koeppen, on the morning of 13 April was concentrated around Bitola (Monastir), when it received the order to pursue the enemy along the road Vevi-Ptolemaida-Kozani. The top of the tank column arrived at Vevi at 10.00 and by 12.30 they were exiting from the Klidi Pass to the locations that until a few hours ago were occupied by British troops. Behind the tanks comes artillery battalion II/102 (my note: which was part of Vor.abt. Apell). The arriving Krad-schutzen battalion 59 goes from either side of lake Himaditis to the south. At 15.15 the tanks arrive and cross through Ptolemaida without resistance. The reconnaissance elements report that 1km to the south there is a deep and 3m wide irrigation ditch, whose road bridge is demolished. Some 2km south-east from Ptolemaida the land rises by about 300-500 meters on both sides of the road, and is occupied by the enemy. From there the enemy opens fire with machineguns and antintanks against the first vehicles that come out of Ptolemaida. Trying to find a way around the obstacle the reconnaissance finds a way west from Ptolemaida and south of the village Asvestopetra. The area is swampy and crossed by several irrigation ditches but is determined to be crossable by the Panzers. Oberst Koeppen gives the order for the tanks to follow this route at slow pace and with scouts marching on foot in front of them. One after another the vehicles come out of the swamp and take battle deployment as they come under fire. They attack toward the road Ptolemaida-Kozani and the enemy tries in vain to stop the about 30 Panzers with an AT platoon, some field guns and some cruiser and light tanks. Some Panzers are shot but the mass continues and eliminates some enemy guns and vehicles. At 19.00 attacks the KradSchutzen battalion 59 from Ptolemaida along the road toward the enemy infantry occupying the high ground around the village of Proastio. With the Panzers on their rear they were retreating already when the attack began. As darkness comes north of the village Mavropiye and less than 2km west of the road the Panzers find themsleves again in a tank battle as Cruiser tanks from the north-east are coming, but the battle is short and the Panzers prove again superior. Due to the darkness aimed fire is no longer possible and the enemy can disengage. The pursuing Panzers are forced to stop after barely 5km at the village of Pontokomi, because they have exhausted their fuel. Supply vehicles cannot arrive because the Klidi Pass is hopelessly jammed from the movement of the LSSAH and 9. Panzer division through it. Only on 14 April can the victory be assessed. Next to some wounded the PazRgt 33 has lost 2 PzIV, one Pz II and one Pz I heavily damaged. The British have next to some dead, lost 32 armoured vehicles, mostly Crusiers (also some VI light tanks and some Bren carriers) mostly from mechanical failures and not battle damage, 2 portee-2pdr and some trucks.

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropa

#5

Post by ClintHardware » 16 Apr 2014, 10:42

Excellent summary. Thanks xristar
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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropa

#6

Post by ClintHardware » 19 Jun 2014, 16:26

Thought you might like to see the War Diary of the 102nd RHA (Northumberland Hussars) for the 13th April 1941

The regiment had 'C' and 'D' Batteries each of three troops of four 2-Pdrs on portees. There were two other batteries 'A' and 'B' but I believe they may have been organised out of the regiment- I have not done any extensive digging on batteries and troops numbers etc so corrections welcome.

One final point although the Germans noted four panzers destroyed I am surprised that the six seen burning (at the end of the diary entry) were not all total write-offs. Anyway, here is what the regiment recorded:-

102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery
[13th April] At dawn the Germans put in a heavy attack and the fighting was fierce. The Germans were however kept guessing by the cruiser tanks of the 3.R.T.R. which at frequent intervals showed themselves on the skyline , giving the appearance of an imminent counter attack. At 0630 hrs the withdrawal of the rearguard began. First went 2/4 Australians followed by L/N Bty of the 2 R.H.A.; then Major Cookson went down to extricate 2/Lieut. Key’s troop from in front of SOTER ridge. The ‘get out’ was in full view of the enemy and it was thought that some casualties were bound to result. But the N.Z. Machine Gunners put up such a volume of covering fire that scarcely a German head dared show itself, and one by one the guns came out and passed down the road to the enormous relief of all. The only casualty was one man (Sgt. Spowart) with a bullet wound in the thigh.

Next to come out were the Rangers and the N.Z. Machine Gunners and when they were seen to be safely in their trucks the Duke of Northumberland’s Troop was withdrawn and sent back . During all this time reports were coming in of German infantry trying to infiltrate up the nullahs which cut into the SOTER ridge but the cruiser tanks were sent to deal with them and it was a comforting sight to see them patrolling the ridge and firing down into the nullahs with their machine guns. When the Duke’s Troop had gone, “C” Bty. HQ. Went also, followed by Advanced RHQ. By now it was 0915 hrs, it was only then that the German artillery was brought up and as we went down the road we could see shells falling on the positions which shortly before had been occupied by the Rangers and by the advanced Tp of “C” Bty. Advanced RHQ stopped 3 miles down the PERDIKA road where 2/Lieut. Arnold’s Troop of “C” Bty. was in position with a Squadron of the 4th Hussars. This Troop remained until H/I Bty of the 2 R.H.A. (the next Unit to withdraw from SOTER) and Bde HQ. Had passed through them and then followed back.

From SOTER “C” Bty went right back to MAVRODENDRI and there all 3 Troops occupied positions in the defensive line which was being prepared by Major Boileau of the Rangers. Adv HQ. reached PROASTEION (2 miles south of PTOLEMAIS) at about 1100 hrs and found “D” Bty already in position, with one Tp. (2/Lieut. J. L. Pumphrey’s) on the right covering the road and the other (2/Lieut. Trippier’s) on the left. The guns of the third troop had been lost at PETRAIS. The enemy were quick to follow along the road and by 1200 hrs. only just after the last of our own cruiser tanks had come in, [German] repair parties in armoured vehicles supported by tanks could be seen repairing the blown bridges NORTH of PTOLEMAIS.

At 1300 hrs Adv. RHQ. With Bde HQ. moved back to the cross roads besides KOMANOS, close to which a troop of L/N Bty. of 2 the 2 R.H.A. was in action. By 1400 hrs contact had been made by the advanced troops and throughout the afternoon an infantry battle continued with considerable artillery fire from both sides. Enemy dive bombers showed up for the first time and bombed and machine gunned the road and the F.D.Ls.

At 1600 hrs Bde. HQ. and Adv. RHQ. Moved a few hundred yards back down the road to a less exposed spot on the WEST side of the road, and orders were sent to rear RHQ. to move back from KOILA to the GREVENA area. From about 1500 hrs onwards reports had been coming in from the O.Ps of the 2 R.H.A. and from the 4th Hussars on the left that enemy tanks had been feeling the front. At 1830 hrs these reports culminated in the realisation that about 25 to 30 light and medium tanks followed by infantry had slipped round the left flank and were within a few hundred yards of Bde. HQ. Then followed a fierce battle which lasted until dark and was made the more hectic by the odds – on possibility that Bde HQ. and all the troops in the PTOLEMAIS area would be cut off. Owing to a mistake the withdrawal had already started and some N.Z. Machine Gunners and a troop of 3 R.T.R. who were passing were pushed into position to prevent envelopment. The situation was saved by 2/Lieut. Trippier’s Troop of “D” Bty. This troop had been left in the air since midday owing to an adjustment of the left Company of the Rangers He remained however covering the left and left rear of the position and in the afternoon was joined by a troop of 4th Hussars. When the tank attacked developed, by a skilful use of ground he managed to block their entry to MAVROPEGE and Bde HQ.

Although under heavy automatic fire and light gun fire, his guns firing steadily and accurately from their portees and at times on the move, he edged them away into a copse at the head of the gully . It seems likely that up till then, in the failing light, the Germans had mistaken the portees for cruiser tanks, now they began to sort them and quickly hit two guns one of which went on fire, and riddled the Troop Leader’s truck with bullets setting it also on alight. However, 6 tanks were in flames and 2 more out of action and the arrival of the troop of 3 R.T.R. referred to gave Lieut. Trippier the opportunity to withdraw behind the ridge. Orders for the move back had been issued during the C/A and his troop got their last tank at about 200 yards range firing broadside on as they drove down the road past Bde HQ.

As dusk turned to dark the last trucks to leave the PROASTEION line passed by Bde. HQ. When the attack developed a troop of “C” Bty. had been ordered forward from MAVRODENDRI. This troop came up steadily and well against the traffic but were not needed and on reaching Bde HQ. were turned round in the road and sent back. It was no easy matter turning round the 3 ton portees in the narrow road with a ditch each side, and with the Boche expected at any moment, as nearly everyone had gone already. Luckily a cruiser tank waited to cover us. With darkness the battle subsided. The Boche seemed fought to a standstill and did not attempt to press the attack further. Bde HQ and Adv RHQ. followed the last trucks down the road, one cruiser tank following behind as rearguard. At MAVRODENDRI the Bde sorted itself out into regimental columns and set out to march back via KOZANI, through the METAMORPHOSIS PASS, over the R.ALIAKMON to the GREVENA area. (WO 169/1433)
End Quote.

The German’s recorded that panzer losses during this action amounted to: two Panzer IV, a Panzer II and a heavily damaged Panzer I.
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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#7

Post by MarkN » 01 Oct 2015, 14:41

I am a wee bit late to this party, but maybe my additions will be helpful/useful/interesting to some.
ClintHardware wrote:Hi All

Does anyone have anything to add or correct concerning this action written up briefly by Brigadier Pemberton in 1950 for his book: The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment page 75 - 76? It seems to be 'C' Battery 2nd RHA (25-Pdrs), and the 102nd RHA (Northumberland Hussars) using 2-Pdrs.

Brigadier A. L. Pemberton M.C.
Perhaps the most successful action of this type occurred at Proasteion (Proastion) Ridge [1]on 13th April during the withdrawal from the original Aliakhmon positions. The fighting started with a morning attack by enemy infantry which was broken up by 25-prs firing direct over open sights. This was followed by the first massed attack from the air, during which the whole position was heavily dive bombed and machine-gunned; and at 1900 hours the assault culminated in a thrust by about 30 light and medium tanks, with infantry support against the village of Mavropage, which was at the time the headquarters of the 1st Armoured Brigade. A troop of anti-tank guns defending the entrance to the village, drove the enemy into a nullah and in the dusk knocked out [2]eight tanks for the loss of one gun, one truck and one man wounded. The 25-prs again came into action over open sights and with the aid of our own tanks, the position was held. Altogether the enemy had been so severely handled that neither the SS Hitler nor the armoured formation that was with them made a move for the next 36 hours. (94)
[1] The action on the 13th occured on the withdrawal to the Aliakhmon Line not from.
[2] 2.PzDiv reported losses only 4ish: 2 IV, 1 II and 1 I severly damaged.

Not entirely sure who the infantry were that attacked in the morning. Perhaps forward recce tps from KradSchBtl.59 doing their standard 'bump' recce.

After Xeron Neron, Vorausabteilung BOROWEITZ (note to xristar... Vorausabteilung APELL was now no longer having been replaced in the vanguard by Vorausabteilung BOROWEITZ late on 12 April) had advanced south and reached the British (vacated) defensive line near Perdika/Sotor when their advanced M/C tps drawn from KradSchBtl.59 and air recce observed a British armoured division (sic) a little further south. So, they held firm whilst 9. PzDiv hurried forward PzRegt.33 from north of Vevi/Florina to engage the British armour.

The end result was...

Image

1st Armd Bde then hoofed it to their allotted position on the Aliakhmon Line at Grevena. Between Ptolemais and Grevena, they left this behind....

Image

All info drawn from KTB Ia 9.PzDiv and Anlagen.

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#8

Post by MarkN » 05 Oct 2015, 12:35

I haven't looked at this topic for many years and my last post was essentially off the top of my head with a few minutes search of my hard drives to see if I could find some supporting evidence.

All the time, something didn't seem right and it pestered me a little so I did a bit of a reread of my notes and the details. And it all be came alot clearer....
ClintHardware wrote:Hi All

Does anyone have anything to add or correct concerning this action written up briefly by Brigadier Pemberton in 1950 for his book: The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment page 75 - 76? It seems to be 'C' Battery 2nd RHA (25-Pdrs), and the 102nd RHA (Northumberland Hussars) using 2-Pdrs.

Brigadier A. L. Pemberton M.C.
Perhaps the most successful action of this type occurred at Proasteion (Proastion) Ridge on 13th April during the withdrawal from the original Aliakhmon positions. The fighting started with a morning attack by enemy infantry which was broken up by 25-prs firing direct over open sights.
There was no attack on the Proasteion (Proastion) Ridge in the morning: infantry or otherwise. Thus it was not "broken up by 25-prs firing direct over open sights".

Withdrawing from the Kleidi Pass, the Empire forces set up a further delaying blockline on the Sotir-Amindaion axis.

On the morning of the 13th, a firefight erupted between the infantry of LSSAH (primarily 5.Kp) and the adhoc Empire forces manning the line under command 1st Armoured Brigade Group. The 25-pdr guns of 2RHA certainly came into action, but to claim that they "broke-up" the LSSAH advance is misleading at best, completely false if understood correctly. Why? Well, despite the 25-pdrs being in action, the LSSAH broke into the lines of 1RANGERS and their advance was finally checked by some tanks of B/3RTR. If anybody was "broken-up" by the 25-pdr action, it could have been the 120 odd 'prisoners' that LSSAH had captured the day before and deliberately forced into no-mans land to shield their advance....

Once a bit of calm had been restored, the Empire forces then disengaged and legged it south to their next delaying blockline around Proasteion (just south of Ptolomais). The LSSAH headed off in a different direction to bump into elements of the Greek 20th Division holding the Kleisoura Pass whilst 9.Pz Div took up the southward advance.

The LSSAH claim just 2 of their number "fell" and reported 8 British pantsers aflame! The latter may well be true, but probably due to their owners deliberately destroying mechanically broken tanks rather than damaged by enemy action.

As regards the second engagement that day, it seems once again it was the arrival of 3RTR tanks from the right flank that shored up the left flank and permitted a withdrawal without too great a loss rather than the efforts of 102RHA. Without doubt, the latter caused problems for the pantsers of Kampfgruppe KOPPEN and should be recognised for having done so, but the decisive event in encouraging them to halt their forward movement was the arrival of the 3RTR cruisers.

Reading through the WDs, there seem to be claims for upward of 15 pantsers 'definitely' destroyed by the various Empire forces. KOPPEN's report of the action which I posted previously shows a somewhat lower figure.


In effect, Brigadier A. L. Pemberton M.C. is conflating two seperate incidents in two different locations and being somewhat over generous with his analysis of the effects of the field artillery. But then, he was a gunner himself so it's to be expected. :wink:

General outline extrapolated from the British, Australian and New Zealand OHs, details culled from the relevant WDs, from an LSSAH report of their actions in Yugolsavia and Greece and KOPPEN's report of the action south of Ptolemais.

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#9

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 05 Oct 2015, 21:22

Hi,
the decisive event in encouraging them to halt their forward movement was the arrival of the 3RTR cruisers
British tanks counter-attack with decisive effect in early 1941. 8O So they didn't lose all their A10's in Greece without firing a shot? I can't remember in which book I read that, can anyone help me with a reference?

cheers

Tom

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#10

Post by MarkN » 06 Oct 2015, 13:48

Hello Tom,
Tom from Cornwall wrote: British tanks counter-attack with decisive effect in early 1941. 8O So they didn't lose all their A10's in Greece without firing a shot? I can't remember in which book I read that, can anyone help me with a reference?
I believe it crops us in a number of books and articles. It normally sits alongside as an apology for the poor performance in Cyrenaica.

However, I'm not sure it is correct to call them 'counter-attacking'. It was more defensive and 'gap plugging' than anything else.

Moreover, even less written about is the series of mini-engagements conducted by the 7 A13s. They even claim some enemy pantsers too.

It is a comparison with the Greek adventure that leads me to my less than generous commentary on the Cyrenaica formation commanders. The end result was the same. But in Greece, they stood their ground when required and only in a few situations did anybody withdrawal prematurely and thus avoided imposing dire consequences on others as occured in Cyrenaica. The commanders all seemed to be on top of the events and coped well when thrown a googly. The units were no less adhoc, nor better trained or equipped than those in Cyrenaica. They were just better lead.

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#11

Post by xristar » 06 Oct 2015, 19:38

MarkN wrote: It is a comparison with the Greek adventure that leads me to my less than generous commentary on the Cyrenaica formation commanders. The end result was the same. But in Greece, they stood their ground when required and only in a few situations did anybody withdrawal prematurely and thus avoided imposing dire consequences on others as occured in Cyrenaica. The commanders all seemed to be on top of the events and coped well when thrown a googly. The units were no less adhoc, nor better trained or equipped than those in Cyrenaica. They were just better lead.
The premature withdrawal of the Ranger battalion at Vevi on 12 Arpil pretty much doomed the defence of Mackay force that day, and by extension the defence of Greece. At Vevi the Commonwealth forces had a complete advandage in terrain, numbers and firepower over the Germans but still suffered a nasty defeat, losing lots of prisoners and materiel.

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#12

Post by jwsleser » 07 Oct 2015, 03:44

Robert Crisp describes this action in his The Gods were Neutral. My main challenge was finding a map that had all the place names so I could follow the action. Between the Greek official, the Australian official, Playfair, and Crisp's book, I finally was able to see how everything played out.

Crisp was frustrated that they didn't get to fire much, but B Sqdn did see more action than C Sqdn (A Sqdn was in reserve). Agree that the 3 RTR was more moving to plug holes than counterattacking, but it was effective.

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#13

Post by MarkN » 07 Oct 2015, 16:10

Hello Jeff,
jwsleser wrote:Robert Crisp describes this action in his The Gods were Neutral. My main challenge was finding a map that had all the place names so I could follow the action. Between the Greek official, the Australian official, Playfair, and Crisp's book, I finally was able to see how everything played out.

Crisp was frustrated that they didn't get to fire much, but B Sqdn did see more action than C Sqdn (A Sqdn was in reserve). Agree that the 3 RTR was more moving to plug holes than counterattacking, but it was effective.
C Sqn were the first called to action (on the 11th). But they weren't required and lost over a third of their tanks in the process...

Image
(from the Australian OH)

Elements of B Sqn (5 and 6 Troops) were called forward to Xinon Ninon on the 12th to support the retreating 2RHA gunners, couldn't find them, but provided cover to retreating infantry instead.

By lunchtime on the 13th, after the morning engagement, both squadrons had withdrawn to the Proastion line. C Sqn had, by now, lost another 6 tanks to mechanical failure - mainly tracks - over the previous 36 hours - and were thus down to four remaining. B Sqn also left 7 (OC B/3RTR report) or 10 (3ArmdBde WD) tanks between Sotir and the Proastion line due to mechanical failure and had just 6 or 9 remaining.

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#14

Post by MarkoZ » 08 Oct 2015, 19:25

Although the A10 got a bad write up in Greece,The sittuation was compounded by the very poor maintenance practises of the British Army.
Something which came to the fore later that year in North Africa when they encountered Rommel, the British quickly learned from their German Foes and were soon able to turn things round in relation to mechanical issues.

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Re: Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

#15

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 08 Oct 2015, 20:28

xristar,
The premature withdrawal of the Ranger battalion at Vevi on 12 Arpil pretty much doomed the defence of Mackay force that day, and by extension the defence of Greece.
If the defence of Greece was 'by extension' totally reliant on the action of a couple of companies of British motor infantry then it was evidently 'doomed' from the start.

Regards

Tom

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