Portee Action Greece 13th April at Proastion and Mavropage

[Urmel]

Quite

[jwsleser]

The fall of Yugoslavia, the Greek unwillingness to make a timely withdraw of the EFAS, and the German drive towards Kastoria combined to doom the defense. By the 13th everyone understood that the front was collapsing and it was only a question of time.

Pista! Jeff

[xristar]

xristar,

The premature withdrawal of the Ranger battalion at Vevi on 12 Arpil pretty much doomed the defence of Mackay force that day, and by extension the defence of Greece.

If the defence of Greece was 'by extension' totally reliant on the action of a couple of companies of British motor infantry then it was evidently 'doomed' from the start.

Regards

Tom

Whether or not Greece could be defended is an open question. Certainly plans were made. Until 15 April the Greek leadership believed in the feasibility of defense. That the British had decided already to bail since 13 April, was unknown. Those plans were upset by the British failure to hold the Germans for enough time to allow the foot-marching Greeks to form a new line further west. Mackay force was of division size, not a couple of motor infantry companies. The Greek Dodecanese Regiment, subordinated to Mackay for the battle, with some 5,000 men as a battlegroup and some artillery, was as that time and location the best Greek force available, and the commander of 20th Division (the division to which the Dodecanese regiment belonged organically) relied heavily on it. It was scattered and lost as the result of battle of Vevi. Another Greek battlegroup at Kleisoura reached its positions on 13 April at the same time as the advancing Germans. It lacked ammo and anti-tank guns, which the British had promised, but failed, to provide. Why the British failed to provide any AT aid to the Greeks is unclear, but the fact that they lost some 15 Australian 2pdr guns at Vevi, may have played a role. Whether the Greeks could hold the Germans at Kleisoura or Siatista passes if they had time to prepare an AT guns, is open for debate. Certainly the British did a good job later at Olympus and Thermopylae killing German armour in narrow passes. They could have done the same earlier at Kleisoura.

My point is, Commonwealth forces fought ineffectively in Greece. They were extremely well equipped compared to all armies but the Germans, but had a seriously undertrained officer corps.

[MarkN]

xristar,

I appreciate this is a subject close to your heart and one that you have read upon extensively.

However, it is not possible to have a serious and honest discussion about historical events and facts when you post ahistorical nonsense.

I ignored your previous post because it was utterly absurd. Whether it was due to an absurdely anti-British bias or an absurdely warped understanding of history, I couldn't tell. But the notion that Greece was lost due to the premature withdrawal by a couple of hours by 1 Rangers at the Kleidi Pass is absurd.

And now....

Whether or not Greece could be defended is an open question. Certainly plans were made. Until 15 April the Greek leadership believed in the feasibility of defense. That the British had decided already to bail since 13 April, was unknown.

True, until that date, it was believed the Aliakmon Line could hold. But that line was compromised / failed when a strengthened battalion from the LSSAH broke through the Greek positions in the Kleisoura Pass and routed anyone and anything in the Kastoria area. It is true that you believe that breakthrough was the fault of the British too. I've seen your posts that they, the British, failed to provide anti-tank and arty support and also failed to counter-attack. Blaming others is easy. In the British Army, it's most de rigueur. But very often it's quite inappropriate. We have the benefit of 75 years of hindsight, and your claims simply don't stack up.

But really! If "until 15 April the Greek leadership believed in the feasibility of defense" then they needed to see a psychiatrist! General Bakapoulos had decided to surrender the Eastern Macedonian Army late on the 8th. He signed the surrender documents in Salonika on the 9th. And you want us to believe that "the Greek leadership [still] believed in the feasibility of defense" on the 15th?

Moreover, it was decided by Wilson, Pappagos and other senior Greek generals, to organise a general withdrawal to the Aliakmon Line on the 9th based on intelligence that XXXX.korps was heading for Bitolj, Florina and so on. On the 10th, 12th and 20th Greek Divisions were already on the move. How can you claim that this withdrawal was still "unknown" until the 13th? By the 13th, the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions were supposed to be in their new position! For the most part, they were.

Here is just one brief excerpt from the Australian official history: To Greece, page 46.



If you have evidence that the Australian official history is untruthful and that it is all lies that Pappagos, Karassos and other senior Greek leaders knew about these moves on the 9th or 10th April, then please feel free to post your evidence here.

[xristar]

Mark

As I said, whether a line could be held against the Germans after the Yugoslav collapse, is up for debate. One fact is that the further the Germans advanced into Greece from Yugoslavia, the thinner their forces became. The other is that the Germans relied heavily on motor transport, armour and close air support. The Aliakmon line was very strong naturally as it was defined by water and mountain obstacles. If a defensive line was stabilised and antitank and antiaircraft cover provided by the British (since the Greeks and Yugoslavs had very little), I think it was perfectly possible that a line could be held. The question is how much force were the German willing to invest in the campaign.

Second point, you did not understand what I said. On 13 April the British unilaterally decided to begin the retreat to Thermopylae, far to the south, thus abandoning the Aliakmon line. It was on 15 April that Papagos had eventually decided that indeed the defense was unfeasible and that the British should plan their withdrawal from Greece. These are two different things.

Unfortunately I don't have time right now to be more analytical, I have to go.
Just this: the battle of Vevi/Kleidi was the most important of the West Macedonian operations. It was fought very poorly. If you think I have an anti-British bias, just read Büchner's book. He is stricter than me. He pretty much concludes that the Greco-British front broke on its own, and that the British made no effort to cooperate with the Greek forces. That's a excessive assessment, but not too far from the truth.

Blaming others is easy.

That works both ways.

EDIT: If you can't examine Büchner examine the New Zealand official history (available on line) for a much more critical approach to the conduct of the fight by the commonwealth forces than the Australian history.

[MarkN]

Hello again xristar,

The Aliakmon line was very strong naturally as it was defined by water and mountain obstacles. If a defensive line was stabilised ....

.... before the Wehrmacht launched their offensive, - ie. Epirus, Western and Eastern Macedonian Armies had been withdrawn to that line and were part of the force defending it - then perhaps the Greek Army reinforced by the meagre Empire offering could have stalled the Axis much longer. That was the original British proposal rejected by the Greek heirarchy - for understandable reasons. But that's a silly 'what if' that will not help anybody understand history. ...

...I think it was perfectly possible that a line could be held.

Second point, you did not understand what I said.

I understood perfectly what you said.

Unfortunately, you didn't say...

On 13 April the British unilaterally decided to begin the retreat to Thermopylae, far to the south, thus abandoning the Aliakmon line. It was on 15 April that Papagos had eventually decided that indeed the defense was unfeasible and that the British should plan their withdrawal from Greece. These are two different things.

If you had done, I would have understood.

But what you now say is also a false understanding of history.

Looking at the Australian and New Zealand official histories, and the appropriate war diaries, it is clear that Wilson was considering and confiring on the 13th regarding a further withdrawal from the Aliakmon Line to the Thermopylae Line. In effect he had decided where to withdrawal if the tactical situation made it necessary. He had not decided to withdraw immediately and regardless of the tactical situation.

It was made necessary once the Kleisoura Pass had been breached. Why? Because that means the Germans were through the Aliakmon Line. When did that happen?

On the morning of the 15th - not the 13th - Wilson made the decision (in the form of an operational instruction) to withdraw to the Thermopylae Line. This instruction was issued to Blamey at ANZAC Corps HQ who orally passed it on to the two divisional commanders at lunchtime. He, Blamey, issued his written instruction early in the evening for that withdrawal to start that night 15/16 April. The war diaries show thinning out began as instructed.

Wilson met with Papagos in the morning of the 16th and informed him of the decision to which he agreed.

Thus, it is true the decision was made without referral to Papagos, but was based upon the Aliakmon Line already being broken and a key component of its defence - the Western Macedonian Army - in the process of being routed around Kastoria.

Just this: the battle of Vevi/Kleidi was the most important of the West Macedonian operations.

That is nonsense. The withdrawal to the Aliakmon Line had already been agreed and was in the process of being implemented. If LSSAH had decided to have a short break for tea and crumpets in Bitola instead of pushing straight on, and arrived after 20h on the 13th, the Kleidi Pass would have been vacated and they would have driven straight through unhindered.

Similarly, the actions at Sotir and Ptolomais only occured because 1st Armoured Brigade was trying to buy more time for 12th and 20th Greek Divisions to reposition.

It was fought very poorly. If you think I have an anti-British bias, just read Büchner's book. He is stricter than me. He pretty much concludes that the Greco-British front broke on its own, and that the British made no effort to cooperate with the Greek forces. That's a excessive assessment, but not too far from the truth.

Under the conditions prevailing, the Empire forces fought as well as could be expected. If you have/had higher expectations, then they fought poorly according to your opinion.

Blaming others is easy.

That works both ways.

The only person who can be blamed for the fall of Greece is Mussolini. Once his desire to march past the Parthanon was put into motion, it was inevitable that Athens would fall either to the Italians themselves or the Germans coming to save their embarrasment. With the benefit of hindsight, we know it was the latter. Greece put up a fantastic fight beyond expectations. The fact, the historical facts, that certain battles were lost here or there by either Greeks or Empire troops is irrelevant in understanding the big picture. Athens did not fall because of 1 Rangers at Kleidi Pass or I/87 at Kleisoura Pass. They were merely roadbumps on the way south.

[MarkN]

Pozdrav Marko,

Although the A10 got a bad write up in Greece,The sittuation was compounded by the very poor maintenance practises of the British Army.

Another persistant falsehood that has reached mythical status and worth putting down.

Here is a brief extract from the report by Brigadier Charrington GoC of the 1st Armoured Brigade Group regarding their efforts in Greece.



To clarify, when he writes none were lost to enemy action, he means none lost to German pantsers. Some A10 were indeed taken out by the enemy artillery or the Luftwaffe.

[Tom from Cornwall]

MarkN,

I'd be grateful if you give me a reference for the report from Brigadier Charrington, I'm interested in researching their operations in Greece in more depth.

Regards

Tom

[ClintHardware]

As well as a reference to meet Tom's needs....does anyone have the 2nd RHA war diary entries covering this topic?

I am sure the German figures are right but it would be good to see what everyone thought had happened.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

I'm hoping to pick that up tomorrow. I'll try to post up the entry for April 13 when I get a chance.

Tom

[ClintHardware]

Excellent Thanks

[Tom from Cornwall]

WO169/1427 - 2 RHA

13th (Easter Sunady)
Enemy attack heavily with infantry and tanks, but this attack was successfully dealt with by Arty fire and our own A.F.V's. The force then withdrew - L/N Bty. at about 0900 hrs and H/I 1000 hrs - the latter under fire from enemy hows. as they pulled out. The Regt. took up ositions South of PROASTION to cover a line covering the flats South of PTOLEMAIS. Enemy made contact again about 1300 hrs. Throughout the day both Btys. engaged many useful targets, including a large traffic jam in PTOLEMAIS caused by a forward gun of I Tp hitting the leading vehicles of a column over open sights. About 1930 hrs the enemy broke through on the left with a large force of tanks and the line withdrew. L/N engaged tanks over open sights. Both Btys. came out of action successfully - H/I taking up a new position North of KOSANI but the Commander ordered a general withdrawal behind the SERVIA line, and marching all night the Regt. crossed the R. ALIAKHON and arrived 3 miles North of GREVENA to harbour.

[ClintHardware]

Thanks Tom.

[Sheldrake]

WO169/1427 - 2 RHA

13th (Easter Sunday)
Enemy attack heavily with infantry and tanks, but this attack was successfully dealt with by Arty fire and our own A.F.V's. The force then withdrew - L/N Bty. at about 0900 hrs and H/I 1000 hrs - the latter under fire from enemy hows. as they pulled out. The Regt. took up ositions South of PROASTION to cover a line covering the flats South of PTOLEMAIS. Enemy made contact again about 1300 hrs. Throughout the day both Btys. engaged many useful targets, including a large traffic jam in PTOLEMAIS caused by a forward gun of I Tp hitting the leading vehicles of a column over open sights. About 1930 hrs the enemy broke through on the left with a large force of tanks and the line withdrew. L/N engaged tanks over open sights. Both Btys. came out of action successfully - H/I taking up a new position North of KOSANI but the Commander ordered a general withdrawal behind the SERVIA line, and marching all night the Regt. crossed the R. ALIAKHON and arrived 3 miles North of GREVENA to harbour.

Any more on this action?

WO2 James (TSM L Troop) was written up for an immediate DCM after the Greece Campaign, (as he was after Dunkirk after saving the day at the Mont des Cats) but was not recognised. His "coolness under fire and example to all" in Greece did form part of the citation for the award later that year which added gallant stuff as a BSM/FOO in north Africa, by which time he had been commissioned.

[djbamforduk]

The premature withdrawal of the Ranger battalion at Vevi on 12 Arpil pretty much doomed the defence of Mackay force that day, and by extension the defence of Greece. At Vevi the Commonwealth forces had a complete advandage in terrain, numbers and firepower over the Germans but still suffered a nasty defeat, losing lots of prisoners and materiel.

I recently obtained my own copy of The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, Volume VI (1921 -1943) and my initial motive was to get the Rangers' side of the story regarding the alleged 'premature withdrawal', which is an accusation that came specifically from the Australian Official History published two decades earlier (i.e. early 1950s).

In the KRRC Annals, vol. VI (published in 1971), the Rangers' own war diary is corroborated by other relevant war diaries, which most notably includes the Royal Horse Artillery complete with time logs of withdrawals from specific positions.

This corroboration proves that there was no 'premature' withdrawal by the Rangers. Furthermore, the RHA even refer to the Rangers 'withdrawing in good order'.

What actually happened is that the Rangers and Australians lost contact with each other, as they were both pushed back on opposite sides of the foothills on the eastern side of the Vevi / Kleidi of the pass.

Both units fought their own separate battles, as they were unable to support each other or guard each others' flanks.

The Australians were much further up in the hills, where they had been having a particularly rough time with heavy snowfall and repeated German night raids and where it was more difficult for them to make an orderly retreat. Unlike the Rangers, they did not retreat in 'good order' and many of them dropped their weapons.

Sadly, it seems that the Australian official historian felt it necessary to find some 'Pommies' to blame for the hardships and humiliation of the Australians.

The KRRC Annals try to strike a conciliatory tone by concluding that they both had a rough time and stood their ground for as long as ordered, but the line was so thin over rough terrain, that they were unable to maintain contact and support each other.