M.G. Bataillon 8 31/3/41 - 14/5/41

[Oasis]

just a small contribution on the basis of Ponath's diary (comments) that surely you already know:
24 march: two tanks destroyed on mines near Agheila, 3 men died (probably of 3.AA)
25: 8. btn advance to Agheila
27: recce of positions near Agheila, at the orders of 8.MG are 39 panzers (maj. Janser) batteries 1.4.5 of AA.33 and italian unit Santamaria at moment lost in the sandstorm
28: taken position 14 km from Agheila together with Santamaria
29: first dead in 8.MG in Africa
30: recce to minefields in Sebcha es-Segura
31: order of attack; 605 PzJaeg at Brega; 3.AA southern bypass; stop in front of british positions; 2.MG ready to troop away taken over by Ariete and Bologna div.
1 april: part of 8.MG advance with some armored patrols of 3.AA, one co. Pioniers, 39.PzJaeger and 33.AA on the track east Brega, no enemy presence.
2: arrived 3.AA, rejected british armored patrol, 10 km north are the british rearguard and minefields: hard resistance north and east of Agedabia, first losses, with 2.MG
No other notices of losses until day 6 (mines at Ben Ganina, inner desert).
I suppose the diary was correct...

[ClintHardware]

Hi Brevity

This is part one of my response:

According to Gruen, his group skirmished three times against 4-5 British tanks. The first fight took place a few kms E of El-Agheila at 8 am.

Looking at Jentz TCinNA he does not attribute what he refers to as the "6. Kompanie account of operations" to a specific officer. What information do you have to attribute the account to Gruen ? I take it that you are referring to Leutnant or Oberleutnant Werner Grün?

The 6. Kompanie account does not include or exclude MGB8 from the battle. The two zugen that went south were doing so ahead of the MGB2 column part of the attack (if you compare the 6. Kompanie account and CAB 146/10 quoted earlier) and that part of the attack (which would have then been a divisional attack had it happened) seems not to have been launched according to CAB 146/10. The zugen rejoined the road and took part in the second attack (IIRC) about midday/early afternoon.

The two skirmishes with 5th RTR (referred to in the 6. Kompanie account in TCinNA) were witnessed by Lieutenant Whetherly's patrol from the KDG and happened south of the road and before the infantry and panzers had contact with 'C' Company on Cemetery Hill. It was a tiny side show and did not derail whatever schutzen were with the panzers heading towards Cemetery Hill. These skirmishes were the only part played by any elements of 3rd Armd Bde.

How did you attribute Gruen?

[ClintHardware]

Second part of response to Brevity

I have re-read the 6. Kompanie account in TCinNA and realised an error on my part in respect of the tank skirmish.

KDG War Diary gives us:
King’s Dragoon Guards
31.3.41. “A” Sqn; No.2 Patrol (Lt. Whetherly) who were under orders of Major Pritchett R.T.R. and accompanied by four Cruiser Tanks met and engaged a body of enemy tanks NORTH of GIOFER at first light. (WO 169/1384)

This sounds like south of the road rather than on it BUT then the 5th RTR WD gives us the following which sounds as though it is contact on the road:

5th Royal Tank Regiment
0630 hrs. A Sqn (the four fit A.13s) encountered main force of enemy moving EAST. One tank of Sqn hit and turret jammed, so withdrew from action. Remaining three tanks stayed in position of observation. Enemy casualties uncertain, probably about three M.13 tanks. (WO 169/1414)

From Jentz we have the 6. Kompanie account stating: "At at 0800 hours having opened fire near kilometre 6 the head of the column attacked by four or five enemy tanks at kilometre 3 on the Via Balbia. The 8.8 cm Flak went into action, dispersing the enemy with its fire without hitting any. The enemy then retired some 6 kilometres, made another attack, and was once again driven off."

KDG and 5th RTR do not mention Flak. BUT the Carriers of 'C' Company who were 1.5 miles west of Cemetery Hill covering the road do.

1st Tower Hamlets Rifles
0800 ORIB [KDG]
[Lieutenant Budden’s troop] patrol report 5 tanks and 2 lorries with 20 - 30 men dismounted at KILO 27 from AGHEILA at 0745 hrs. (WO 169/1159

Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Shipton, 1st Tower Hamlets Rifles
“As was anticipated, the enemy attacked our position at Mersa Brega with armoured cars, tanks and motor-cycle combinations soon after 8 o’ clock on the morning of March 31st ” (CAB 106/617)

Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Shipton, 1st Tower Hamlets Rifles
“our carrier patrols” - [pulled back] - “after a stiff fight, during which most valuable information was sent back.” (CAB 106/617)

1st Tower Hamlets Rifles
0900 ULBA [‘C’ Coy 1st T.H.R.]
200 enemy AFVs reported moving EAST from AGHEILA (WO 169/1159)

Report on action of the 2nd Armoured Division during withdrawal from Cyrenaica
Early on 31st March patrols of 1st K.D.G. found and engaged five enemy tanks advancing from EL AGHEILA south of the main road; while another patrol of 5th R.T.R., which had gone out to look for trouble among enemy patrols on the road itself, returned and reported having damaged two out of ten enemy tanks. By 0800 hours, 1st K.D.G. reported that the enemy was advancing in some strength both along the main road and south round the SEGHIR salt-marsh, led by armoured cars, light tanks and motor cycle combinations. (WO 106/2149)

King’s Dragoon Guards
The engagement was broken off when “A” Sqn. No. 1 Patrol (Lt. Budden) reported a further small force of tanks advancing EASTWARDS up the road, with the idea of attacking this force in the rear. (WO 169/1384)

King’s Dragoon Guards
However, Lieut. Budden later reported that many lorries and several guns were accompanying the tanks so the Cruiser force withdrew after a further short battle with some enemy tanks which turned SOUTH along the edge of the MARSA BREGA Marsh. In this engagement one of Lieut. Whetherly’s A/Cs; was destroyed though the crew was uninjured. (WO 169/1384)

Lieutenant Alan Hurst-Brown, ‘A’ Company, 1st Tower Hamlets Rifles
On the morning of the 31st March we stood to at dawn as usual. At about 0830 hours a Greek reporter arrived to write a little article about us for his newspaper. I was in the middle of telling him how we were in excellent spirits, and was showing him around our trenches when there was a loud explosion over by the road, and roughly where our few hundred landmines had been laid. I told the reporter that I thought some careless Riflemen must have driven into the little minefield by mistake; it had happened once before. – However, shortly after the first explosion there was the screech of a shell and a loud explosion just behind us. The Greek reporter hurried away! The Germans’ first assault in the desert had begun and their artillery was trying to get the range of our positions.

Fairly soon I noticed we were being fired at by some sort of artillery from the very top of the sand hills in front of us. Having been told that the tanks could not get over these hills I thought that the Germans must have dragged some light artillery up there. So I sent my motorcyclist, in our 15-cwt truck with a message to my Company Commander to tell him what was happening. I told him to take our truck because I reckoned that his motorcycle would be nearly impossible to control over the rough ground with all the shells and bullets flying around. But it wasn’t long before these ‘guns’ started to move towards us, and they turned out to be German medium tanks carrying troops behind their turrets.

As a very professional force they must have assumed that we had a minefield in front of us because the tanks, of which there were about six, moved forward until they were about 250 yards away, and then stopped, and the troops jumped off the back and took up firing positions near them (95).

So Lieutenant Hurst-Brown reports that the panzers confronting his positions shortly after the first shots of the battle were carrying schutzen from whatever unit into battle.

[Brevity]

Hey Clint

KDG and 5 RTR accounts fit nicely. “N of Giofer” is worded awkwardly (Maaten Giofer is 35 km to the S). I believe he meant “N of Giofer, on Via Balbia” which is OK and means “a few km E of Agheila”.

I also noticed the terrain N of the road is difficult. I agree 5 RTR troop was located along the road at least before midday.

Do you know how KDG patrols were positioned? No. 1 (Budden) and No. 2 (Whetherly) patrols were close to Via Balbia as well. I guess the bulk of KDG was opposing AA3 more to the SE?

Report on action of the 2nd Armoured Division during withdrawal from Cyrenaica
Early on 31st March patrols of 1st K.D.G. found and engaged five enemy tanks advancing from EL AGHEILA south of the main road; while another patrol of 5th R.T.R., which had gone out to look for trouble among enemy patrols on the road itself, returned and reported having damaged two out of ten enemy tanks. By 0800 hours, 1st K.D.G. reported that the enemy was advancing in some strength both along the main road and south round the SEGHIR salt-marsh, led by armoured cars, light tanks and motor cycle combinations. (WO 106/2149)

This is nice, 10 tanks is the bulk of Gruen coy (12 total, but maybe not all runners) and 5 tanks means either Schorm or 4. platoon – this also reveals both advanced separately.

0900 ULBA [‘C’ Coy 1st T.H.R.]
200 enemy AFVs reported moving EAST from AGHEILA (WO 169/1159)

Look at the difference between messages from armored car crews (professional recce guys) and scared infantrymen. This one alone speaks volumes about who should be trusted!

[Brevity]

There must have been some kind of infantry attack at Brega in the night 31/1 April because according to Gruen “An MG Bn was going to make an attack on el Brega at 1700 hrs” and “nevertheless our Inf pushed fwd up to the town during the night”.

It was however a huge effort to bring up the infantry battalion (45+ km from Agheila to Brega alone!), march a few km more on foot to assembly point and attack in the night. The soldiers were no doubt dead tired on the next day.
MG 8 acted as forward unit since 1 April so they seem unlikely. I tend to think the infantry unit used at Brega must have been MG 2.

[Brevity]

Looking at Jentz TCinNA he does not attribute what he refers to as the "6. Kompanie account of operations" to a specific officer. What information do you have to attribute the account to Gruen ? I take it that you are referring to Leutnant or Oberleutnant Werner Grün?

I checked TCiNA and you are right. But yes i can confirm that guy was present at Brega (he was 6. coy commander anyway)

Oh thank you for your kind offer! But don't you think it would confuse readers a lot, with 2 inconsistent stories? I'd rather write one, and do it right.

[ClintHardware]

On that basis Gruen is very likely as the author. I wish we had copies of the whole report to look at. Mr Jentz I do wish you had left us with references everywhere - but thank you for the work you did.

I think because of the MGB8 doubts both/all sides should be covered in an opening paragraph and an end paragraph in my Mersa Brega chapter so that future readers and authors are warned to keep an open mind and also be aware that MGB8 casualties, if there were any, can only be estimated. Almost the only figure that seems reliable is the state of MGB8 on the 30th April and that is a slightly rough figure too.

Apologies if I have seemed slightly manic about this. I am always happy to be corrected and ready to state several cases in anything I write.

You should see the state of my Panzers Damaged list/table Version 4 now .....128 in Column A ...OMG !! No I am just pulling your legs....

[ClintHardware]

Not sure if I have answered the points made about how MGB8 got forward passed the brief fire fight with 5th RTR which was a matter in addition to the discussion about possible MGB8 casualties.

I cannot be 100% whatsoever, but I believe the schutzen seen dropping to the ground from Panzers confronting 'A' Company at Mersa Brega before 1000 hours were mounted on the panzers from 6. and 8. kompanien but not on the leading panzeraufklarungs zug of five Panzer IIs. No schutzen were mentioned as being with 2. and 4. zugen in their move south off the road - but they may have been. It seems as though only one kompanie or less went forward in this first attack when you consider space on top of the numbers of panzers in Rau's column. At about 1400 hours after two attempts had been made to clear the road of mines Major Rau reported that he could not get forward and a Stuka attack was sent in and Major Rau pulled his troops back some 800 metres to allow space for the MGB to be brought up for the attack that then went in after the bombardment at 1700 hrs. The kompanie already present probably joined in that attack which is the attack that appeared to the 1st THR to be as numerous in infantry as two battalions and therefore probably appeared to be over 1000 strong - but I am not able to be certain. It was this attack that faced the four Vickers MMGs of 11 Platoon covering the northern coastal area as best they could.

Corporal Harrison's two Vickers were firing for 1.5 hours and used up all their ammunition on the infantry and by then they had panzers virtually on their position. Here is a quote from the 1st RNF - the firing in fact began just after 1700 hrs:

‘Y’ Company, 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers
1800 hrs. Heavy enemy attack [?] flank on Mersa Brega village.

1 Sec 11 Pl in action till all ammn finished. Cpl Harrison killed & 3 wounded. Guns destroyed to prevent falling into enemy hands. (WO 169/1737)

Fusilier John J. D. Mattocks, 11 Platoon, 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers
“Tanks were however working their way round the section. At the neighbouring section – over a dividing crest – a tank halted in front of the position and a German officer walked up to within a few yards saying “For you the war is over – yes?” The reply was a burst from one of the guns. The tank which had the post at its mercy – then moved off rapidly leaving its commander where he had fallen.”

[Corporal Harrison] “realised he was dying and ordered the guns to be made useless by taking the locks to pieces and scattering the parts in the sand. He took one lock himself then ordered the rest of his men to withdraw. After protest they left him.

It should be pointed out that enemy tanks were by this time in and around the village and that the force of which the section was part had already withdrawn.” (ALNFN: 1145/3)

As well as casualties in the last attack (surely there were some), the kompanie in the first attack (if it was a kompanie) had experienced a lot 25-Pdr shelling on the panzers they had accompanied as had the pioniere who made two attempts to clear the mines on the road before Rau asked for support.

[ClintHardware]

Just in case you did not see my update in the 5th RTR first fire fight topic, this is the situation as I believe it to be with having now read the 6. Kompanie report:-

Having now read Brevity's supplied 1941 translation of the 6. Kompanie report probably written by Oberleutnant Werner Grün - Grün states that only one "hy pl" from 8. Kompanie joined Major Rau's column. Jentz's version states "platoons" So it now looks like just 5 Panzer IVs from 8. Kompanie joined the four zugen of 6. Kompanie on the road to Mersa Brega. 2. and 4. left the column to go south at some point before the fire fight with the 5th RTR troop and the KDG troop west of MB.

This has an impact on the infantry present that Hurst-Brown saw mounted on the panzers because only 1. and 3. zugen and the above Panzer IV zug were present at 0830 at MB. Grün states "Engrs" were with the column but does not mention them in the first description of the column so it may be that the infantry seen were pionere from MGB8. But that is only a guess on my part.

I also now believe that most of MGB8 did not come forward in any great numbers until the afternoon to be ready for what was the last attack was launched at 1700 on the 31/3. Although they could not have been stopped by the limited actions of the 5th RTR and KDG the threat was there. but in addition there seems insufficient transport seen near MB in the morning to place MGB 8 there.

[A Coy 2/15 Battalion]

Eyewitness account of Lt Col Gustav Ponath's death by Cpl Jack Anning who stood less than one metre away from the action:

One hundred troops from Ponath's battalion took cover in a tank ditch, sheltering there while the Panzers were being routed by the Royzl Horse artillery. There they were left by the tank commander and therefore were trapped. Officer Commsnding A coy, 2/25 battalion, deployed around the guns, sent out a platoon under zlt Ron Yates to capture what was thought to be a much smaller force. Experiencing more resistance than expected, the O/C sent in two Bren gun carriers, one of which enfillated the ditch. He also attacked with a motar which was accurately fired into the ditch. In a hopeless position, Ponath surrendered to Yates. However, when all was proceeding in a gentlemanly manner, Ponath noticed a group of his troops which were running up a white flag. Incensed by what he considered to be cowardly behaviour, Ponath drew his Luger and fired some shots above their heads. Astounded and taking no chances, Yates shot Ponsth above the heart. He did not die immediately. His 2/ ic asked for permission yo comfort the dying hero, and when he eventually died, a Nazi flag was draped over the body, accompanied by a smart salute and about turn. The Australian "Diggers", considering this flag to be a captured enemy standard, presented it to o/c of A Coy, Cspt Greig Smith. One hundred Germsn prisoners were taken, apparently provided with water, tea and cigarettes, and marched nearby to a POW camp under Bren carrier escort and military police. The flag now resides with Po nath's blood on it, in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, Australia.

Forget what you read in the 8 machine- gun bn accounts. Ponath was not killed leading his troops to safety by an Australian infantryman, but was trapped in a ditch and virtually committed suicice.

See my book for the authentic account of this mop- up.
John Mackenzie-Smith: Tobruk' Easter Battle 1941: the forgotten Fifteenth's date with Rommel's champion. Revised edition 2014, brisbsne: Boolarong Press.

I have written this book with the object of correcting history and mske not one cent from its sales.

[A Coy 2/15 Battalion]

Correction: 2/15 Battalion AIF not 2/15.

[A Coy 2/15 Battalion]

Not 2/25. Sorry. Finger location problems,

[ClintHardware]

Hi A Coy 2/15th Battalion

I have sent you a PM to ask if you can check an item for me.

Clint

[A Coy 2/15 Battalion]

Email sent. Willing to help.

[A Coy 2/15 Battalion]

Yes, go ahead.

John