Brevity wrote:Urmel wrote:Brevity wrote:You forget Savona division + I./104 + oasen battalion, also 15 Schuetzen Brigade stuck for months at Medauar. Also what about Division zbV? Some battalions arrived in June, attack on Tobruk was to occur in November. What other role could they fulfill, having no transport?
No I did not. Savona and z.b.V. were at the frontier, Savona never, and z.b.V. only on 12 November moved to Tobruk. The German troops at Medauar were a straight relief by Trento's Bersaglieri regiment, one in, one out. There was a total of 4 divisions in the line from that moment. Prior to that there were 3 divisions, and one regiment (not the whole 15. Schuetzenbrigade IIRC). Div. z.b.V. when it went to Tobruk wasn't technically in the line, since they were in their attack positions. They also relieved Bologna units where they were placed.
If we're talking about infantry needed to hold the front, why ignore the frontier line? Also one should include ALL immobile infantry in the region because it had no other role. Besides the troops directly on the line, reserves had to be available to check a potential breakout.
Fair enough in general, but keep in mind that for z.b.V. the whole Afrika Regiment was not present until early November. As for reserves, if they are not mobile, they're not reserves. When z.b.V. went to Tobruk, it was not as a reserve, but as an attack force.
Brevity wrote:Urmel wrote:Brevity wrote:Capturing a single strongpoint required an inhuman effort, capturing all was impossible. Every extra mile of the line means a) 2 miles longer outflanking maneuver, giving more time to react; b) 2 miles longer way for the following supply columns. The benefits were enormous.
Fortifications were routinely broken with a reasonable effort:
Bardia (twice)
Tobruk 1942 (and I would argue that if the Axis attack had gone in in November 1941, it would have succeeded)
Libyan Omar 1941
Bardia Jan 1941 was no part of any defense line, was encircled and defended by demoralised troops and had no value. In Jan 1942 it was doomed anyway.
Sorry, but i) that is simply not true, and ii) your point was that it took an inhuman effort to capture a single strongpoint (it did not, clearly), and that to capture all was impossible (but they did, when the fortresses surrendered due to a few strongpoints being breached, by definition all strongpoints were captured, in Bardia and in Tobruk.) Whether it was doomed or not is neither here nor there. It was attacked, the garrison put up a spirited defense (read Orpen), and when this failed it surrendered.
Brevity wrote: The sheer strength of Tobruk is proven by the fact that extra infantry division + artillery group were sent to even attempt a serious attack.
That's hardly the point I am making. I never argued Tobruk was a weak position.
Brevity wrote:Omar proves my point.
How? Libyan Omar was taken without unreasonable effort in two attacks (at the operational level, the Royal Sussex and 3/1 Punjab may disagree) by a 1 and 2 battalion attack (22/30 November) with a regiment (22 November) and a few I tanks (30 November) in support.
Urmel wrote:Brevity wrote:Same thing happens in 1942. Rommel holds Gazala front with minor battle groups (few battalions), while British, forced into defense, have 3.3 Divisions in trenches alone and it was not enough.
Your conclusion is wrong. It was too much, not 'not enough'. The Gazala line did not fail because of a lack of infantry, it failed because of a lack or lack of competence of the mobile forces. If the armoured divisions had had their act together, the line could have been held with far less infantry.
Urmel wrote:Brevity wrote:But the lack of competence was prevalent and there was no easy way to fix it.
But more infantry was not the answer to this problem.
I disagree entirely. If resilient forward line was unimportant then why was Rommel so obsessed with his Frontier line?[/quote]
A resilient forward line is only important if you don't trust your armour, or if you have a specific problem behind it, such as, errr, a siege of a fortified position. Also, Rommel's forward line was very short by comparison to the Gazala line, and it was anchored on a strong fortress position in Bardia and a secure flank at the escarpment. None of this was present at Gazala. The effort expended on the frontier position was not substantial.
Brevity wrote:The British resources used up on Gazala line were resources well spent.
Please tell me you're not serious.
How could the result of the battle have been any worse for the British if they had not spent any resources on the line itself and stuck to the column principle, keeping up a mobile defense? At least when that didn't work in January, the damage done was far more limited. If you want to look at resources well spent, you need to look at the El Alamein line.
Brevity wrote:even if tank tactics were revised, and better models were available, the Gazala line still should have been build ans would have been a tremendous help in the battle.
But it wasn't and it shouldn't. It forced the British side into a static battle that it could not win because all the resources were in the shop window, it was a gigantic (by desert standards) waste of resources and men. A tremendous help would have been to give up Tobruk in February and defend at the frontier, thereby extending the Axis supply line while shortening the Allied line.