German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#31

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2015, 18:58

Brevity wrote:You forget Savona division + I./104 + oasen battalion, also 15 Schuetzen Brigade stuck for months at Medauar. Also what about Division zbV? Some battalions arrived in June, attack on Tobruk was to occur in November. What other role could they fulfill, having no transport?
No I did not. Savona and z.b.V. were at the frontier, Savona never, and z.b.V. only on 12 November moved to Tobruk. The German troops at Medauar were a straight relief by Trento's Bersaglieri regiment, one in, one out. There was a total of 4 divisions in the line from that moment. Prior to that there were 3 divisions, and one regiment (not the whole 15. Schuetzenbrigade IIRC). Div. z.b.V. when it went to Tobruk wasn't technically in the line, since they were in their attack positions. They also relieved Bologna units where they were placed.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Same thing happens in 1942. Rommel holds Gazala front with minor battle groups (few battalions), while British, forced into defense, have 3.3 Divisions in trenches alone and it was not enough.
Your conclusion is wrong. It was too much, not 'not enough'. The Gazala line did not fail because of a lack of infantry, it failed because of a lack or lack of competence of the mobile forces. If the armoured divisions had had their act together, the line could have been held with far less infantry.
Brevity wrote:But the lack of competence was prevalent and there was no easy way to fix it.
But more infantry was not the answer to this problem.
Brevity wrote:The defense lines like Gazala or Frontier line were immune and they were never captured, always outflanked.
150 Brigade Box.
Brevity wrote:Capturing a single strongpoint required an inhuman effort, capturing all was impossible. Every extra mile of the line means a) 2 miles longer outflanking maneuver, giving more time to react; b) 2 miles longer way for the following supply columns. The benefits were enormous.
Fortifications were routinely broken with a reasonable effort:
Bardia (twice)
Tobruk 1942 (and I would argue that if the Axis attack had gone in in November 1941, it would have succeeded)
Libyan Omar 1941
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#32

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Feb 2015, 19:13

Urmel wrote: I think that is a complete misreading of two things. 1) the infantry in all three cases you mention was clearly not capable of defending an area, they were overrun in half a day (5 S.A.) or two-three days (4/6 N.Z.). 2) It wasn't the infantry that dealt the crippling losses to the tanks. It was the guns. The infantry was neither here nor there. As a thought experiment, imagine Totensonntag with no South African infantry, only guns, or with only a battalion. Would the Germans have fared much better?
The British added an anti-tank platoon to the infantry battalion W.E. in early '42. I don't know if there had been an intention before then to beef up the infantry's own anti-tank capability but the materiel was lacking?


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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#33

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2015, 19:25

That was the German conclusion too.

http://rommelsriposte.com/2011/06/01/a- ... on-learnt/

I think they i) didn't have the material, and ii) didn't perceive the need. Totensonntag and Zaafran rather drove the point home.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#34

Post by Brevity » 05 Feb 2015, 05:42

Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:You forget Savona division + I./104 + oasen battalion, also 15 Schuetzen Brigade stuck for months at Medauar. Also what about Division zbV? Some battalions arrived in June, attack on Tobruk was to occur in November. What other role could they fulfill, having no transport?
No I did not. Savona and z.b.V. were at the frontier, Savona never, and z.b.V. only on 12 November moved to Tobruk. The German troops at Medauar were a straight relief by Trento's Bersaglieri regiment, one in, one out. There was a total of 4 divisions in the line from that moment. Prior to that there were 3 divisions, and one regiment (not the whole 15. Schuetzenbrigade IIRC). Div. z.b.V. when it went to Tobruk wasn't technically in the line, since they were in their attack positions. They also relieved Bologna units where they were placed.
If we're talking about infantry needed to hold the front, why ignore the frontier line? Also one should include ALL immobile infantry in the region because it had no other role. Besides the troops directly on the line, reserves had to be available to check a potential breakout.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Capturing a single strongpoint required an inhuman effort, capturing all was impossible. Every extra mile of the line means a) 2 miles longer outflanking maneuver, giving more time to react; b) 2 miles longer way for the following supply columns. The benefits were enormous.
Fortifications were routinely broken with a reasonable effort:
Bardia (twice)
Tobruk 1942 (and I would argue that if the Axis attack had gone in in November 1941, it would have succeeded)
Libyan Omar 1941
Bardia Jan 1941 was no part of any defense line, was encircled and defended by demoralised troops and had no value. In Jan 1942 it was doomed anyway. The sheer strength of Tobruk is proven by the fact that extra infantry division + artillery group were sent to even attempt a serious attack.
I also think it would have succeeded but a high number of tanks damaged by artillery and mines would have caused the defeat in subsequent tank battle.
Omar proves my point.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Same thing happens in 1942. Rommel holds Gazala front with minor battle groups (few battalions), while British, forced into defense, have 3.3 Divisions in trenches alone and it was not enough.
Your conclusion is wrong. It was too much, not 'not enough'. The Gazala line did not fail because of a lack of infantry, it failed because of a lack or lack of competence of the mobile forces. If the armoured divisions had had their act together, the line could have been held with far less infantry.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:But the lack of competence was prevalent and there was no easy way to fix it.
But more infantry was not the answer to this problem.
I disagree entirely. If resilient forward line was unimportant then why was Rommel so obsessed with his Frontier line?
Infantry is an asset. It might, or might not, be used wisely to advance the goals.
Forward lines did restrict enemy mobility and complicated bringing supplies. Bir Hakeim and 150 Brigade box had to be attacked and seized no matter what, and that required resources. Panzer-Division attacking 150 Brigade was not available for action elsewhere which left DAK vulnerable.
The British resources used up on Gazala line were resources well spent.

even if tank tactics were revised, and better models were available, the Gazala line still should have been build ans would have been a tremendous help in the battle.

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#35

Post by Sheldrake » 05 Feb 2015, 12:19

Urmel wrote:The extension is a strawman. Read my posts. I do outline the roles they could play.
I have read your posts. Please explain to this old gunner why my response is a "Straw man."

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#36

Post by Urmel » 05 Feb 2015, 13:25

Because the extension of my argument you are arguing against is not an argument I have made.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#37

Post by Urmel » 05 Feb 2015, 13:49

Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:You forget Savona division + I./104 + oasen battalion, also 15 Schuetzen Brigade stuck for months at Medauar. Also what about Division zbV? Some battalions arrived in June, attack on Tobruk was to occur in November. What other role could they fulfill, having no transport?
No I did not. Savona and z.b.V. were at the frontier, Savona never, and z.b.V. only on 12 November moved to Tobruk. The German troops at Medauar were a straight relief by Trento's Bersaglieri regiment, one in, one out. There was a total of 4 divisions in the line from that moment. Prior to that there were 3 divisions, and one regiment (not the whole 15. Schuetzenbrigade IIRC). Div. z.b.V. when it went to Tobruk wasn't technically in the line, since they were in their attack positions. They also relieved Bologna units where they were placed.
If we're talking about infantry needed to hold the front, why ignore the frontier line? Also one should include ALL immobile infantry in the region because it had no other role. Besides the troops directly on the line, reserves had to be available to check a potential breakout.
Fair enough in general, but keep in mind that for z.b.V. the whole Afrika Regiment was not present until early November. As for reserves, if they are not mobile, they're not reserves. When z.b.V. went to Tobruk, it was not as a reserve, but as an attack force.
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Capturing a single strongpoint required an inhuman effort, capturing all was impossible. Every extra mile of the line means a) 2 miles longer outflanking maneuver, giving more time to react; b) 2 miles longer way for the following supply columns. The benefits were enormous.
Fortifications were routinely broken with a reasonable effort:
Bardia (twice)
Tobruk 1942 (and I would argue that if the Axis attack had gone in in November 1941, it would have succeeded)
Libyan Omar 1941
Bardia Jan 1941 was no part of any defense line, was encircled and defended by demoralised troops and had no value. In Jan 1942 it was doomed anyway.
Sorry, but i) that is simply not true, and ii) your point was that it took an inhuman effort to capture a single strongpoint (it did not, clearly), and that to capture all was impossible (but they did, when the fortresses surrendered due to a few strongpoints being breached, by definition all strongpoints were captured, in Bardia and in Tobruk.) Whether it was doomed or not is neither here nor there. It was attacked, the garrison put up a spirited defense (read Orpen), and when this failed it surrendered.
Brevity wrote: The sheer strength of Tobruk is proven by the fact that extra infantry division + artillery group were sent to even attempt a serious attack.
That's hardly the point I am making. I never argued Tobruk was a weak position.
Brevity wrote:Omar proves my point.
How? Libyan Omar was taken without unreasonable effort in two attacks (at the operational level, the Royal Sussex and 3/1 Punjab may disagree) by a 1 and 2 battalion attack (22/30 November) with a regiment (22 November) and a few I tanks (30 November) in support.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Same thing happens in 1942. Rommel holds Gazala front with minor battle groups (few battalions), while British, forced into defense, have 3.3 Divisions in trenches alone and it was not enough.
Your conclusion is wrong. It was too much, not 'not enough'. The Gazala line did not fail because of a lack of infantry, it failed because of a lack or lack of competence of the mobile forces. If the armoured divisions had had their act together, the line could have been held with far less infantry.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:But the lack of competence was prevalent and there was no easy way to fix it.
But more infantry was not the answer to this problem.
I disagree entirely. If resilient forward line was unimportant then why was Rommel so obsessed with his Frontier line?[/quote]

A resilient forward line is only important if you don't trust your armour, or if you have a specific problem behind it, such as, errr, a siege of a fortified position. Also, Rommel's forward line was very short by comparison to the Gazala line, and it was anchored on a strong fortress position in Bardia and a secure flank at the escarpment. None of this was present at Gazala. The effort expended on the frontier position was not substantial.
Brevity wrote:The British resources used up on Gazala line were resources well spent.
Please tell me you're not serious. :) How could the result of the battle have been any worse for the British if they had not spent any resources on the line itself and stuck to the column principle, keeping up a mobile defense? At least when that didn't work in January, the damage done was far more limited. If you want to look at resources well spent, you need to look at the El Alamein line.
Brevity wrote:even if tank tactics were revised, and better models were available, the Gazala line still should have been build ans would have been a tremendous help in the battle.
But it wasn't and it shouldn't. It forced the British side into a static battle that it could not win because all the resources were in the shop window, it was a gigantic (by desert standards) waste of resources and men. A tremendous help would have been to give up Tobruk in February and defend at the frontier, thereby extending the Axis supply line while shortening the Allied line.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#38

Post by Don Juan » 05 Feb 2015, 14:01

Sheldrake wrote: While I recognise that my own opinions on tanks may be unworthy of comment, I am intrigued to learn what would have been better than Cruiser tanks for British armour in the Western Desert.
Apologies for that statement. I was surfing the wave of my own self-righteousness somewhat.

I wasn't suggesting there were better options than the Cruisers (although there might have been, I don't now). What I was suggesting, is that the Cruisers couldn't have been better than they were, because the British hadn't developed a suspension strong enough to carry a hull that was large enough to mount the air cleaners internally, and the reliability issues with the Crusader and Cruiser Mk.IV were largely related to the external mounting of the air cleaners, which allowed far too much sand to be ingested by the engines. The only answer was far more rigorous servicing and maintenance, which 8th Army for various reasons would, or probably could, not do.

With regard to 2 pounder armament, HE was less important than APCBC because a telescopically-sighted Cruiser Besa could take out an AT gun at 2000+ yards anyway (once they'd provided AP ammunition to pierce the gun shields), although I don't really buy your idea of tactically employing Bofors with fast Cruiser tank formations. APCBC was more important because it could penetrate the frontal 50mm face hardened armour of a Panzer III at 800-1000 yards, while the uncapped AP provided could only do it at 200 yards. I think that Clarke was very fortunate indeed that the various Parliamentary investigations into British tank production did not pick this up.
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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#39

Post by Gooner1 » 05 Feb 2015, 18:05

Urmel wrote:That was the German conclusion too.

http://rommelsriposte.com/2011/06/01/a- ... on-learnt/
The German proposed restructuring looks to me like converting an infantry battalion into a heavy weapons battalion, which is not what the British did.
Good job too, they would never have been able to 'crumble' the Axis defences at Alamein with an organization like that.
I think they i) didn't have the material, and ii) didn't perceive the need. Totensonntag and Zaafran rather drove the point home.
If the British didn't perceive the need they had actually taken a step back from 1940 where in the W.E. every infantry brigade had an anti-tank company with nine guns.

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#40

Post by Urmel » 05 Feb 2015, 18:09

Some brigades in the desert had the AT Coy, I think 4 Indian Division, and 70 Division. But not in the mobile divisions, and not in the New Zealand or South African Divisions. No idea why, other than that there was no evidence from the early war in the desert that this was needed. What they did in the mobile divisions was to simply split everyone up in multi-arm columns, drive around the desert like lunatics, win numerous tactical engagements, and lose at the operational level while doing so. :p
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#41

Post by Gooner1 » 05 Feb 2015, 18:28

Urmel wrote: But it wasn't and it shouldn't. It forced the British side into a static battle that it could not win because all the resources were in the shop window, it was a gigantic (by desert standards) waste of resources and men. A tremendous help would have been to give up Tobruk in February and defend at the frontier, thereby extending the Axis supply line while shortening the Allied line.
I disagree, twice. The principle of the defensive boxes was a sound one, the biggest problem ISTM was there were not enough of them.
What 8th Army should have been doing, however, was attacking. Never been able to work out quite what the hell they were waiting for.

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#42

Post by Urmel » 05 Feb 2015, 18:46

Gooner1 wrote:
Urmel wrote: But it wasn't and it shouldn't. It forced the British side into a static battle that it could not win because all the resources were in the shop window, it was a gigantic (by desert standards) waste of resources and men. A tremendous help would have been to give up Tobruk in February and defend at the frontier, thereby extending the Axis supply line while shortening the Allied line.
I disagree, twice. The principle of the defensive boxes was a sound one, the biggest problem ISTM was there were not enough of them.
What 8th Army should have been doing, however, was attacking. Never been able to work out quite what the hell they were waiting for.
Well but you cannot judge the Gazala line without considering where it was and what it was there for. Yes, ideally it would have been denser, and maybe even hooked back east to make it more difficult to get round it, and maybe if there had been 15 infantry divisions it would have been a great idea, to do all that with mutually supporting boxes. Ignoring the context of the geography and the force situation, I can justify anything.

But there weren't enough forces, the length of the line was a minimum in terms of what made it useful as a line, and a maximum (even beyond) in terms of what could be established with the forces at hand. And between these two, the line was a desaster waiting to happen, as it duly did. Establishing it handed the initiative in case of an attack by the Axis to the Axis. The same mistake that was made in CRUSADER.

That it was there at all was driven by a political unwillingness in London to give up ground and Tobruk, not by the military judgment of people in the desert, who in January 42 decided that they would not defend Tobruk again if they had to retreat for whatever reason. They then proceeded to violate this decision immediately. The why of that is a mystery to me.

As for why 8 Army didn't attack, the reason is clear to me as a judgment that it was not sufficiently strong to beat the Axis. This was sound judgment in my view, and borne out by its performance in the Gazala battle.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#43

Post by Gooner1 » 05 Feb 2015, 19:16

Urmel wrote: Well but you cannot judge the Gazala line without considering where it was and what it was there for. Yes, ideally it would have been denser, and maybe even hooked back east to make it more difficult to get round it, and maybe if there had been 15 infantry divisions it would have been a great idea, to do all that with mutually supporting boxes. Ignoring the context of the geography and the force situation, I can justify anything.

But there weren't enough forces, the length of the line was a minimum in terms of what made it useful as a line, and a maximum (even beyond) in terms of what could be established with the forces at hand. And between these two, the line was a desaster waiting to happen, as it duly did. Establishing it handed the initiative in case of an attack by the Axis to the Axis. The same mistake that was made in CRUSADER.
Well 8th Army had three brigades in Tobruk not doing much. Just one of those in the line would have complicated matters for the Axis.
That it was there at all was driven by a political unwillingness in London to give up ground and Tobruk, not by the military judgment of people in the desert, who in January 42 decided that they would not defend Tobruk again if they had to retreat for whatever reason. They then proceeded to violate this decision immediately. The why of that is a mystery to me.

As for why 8 Army didn't attack, the reason is clear to me as a judgment that it was not sufficiently strong to beat the Axis. This was sound judgment in my view, and borne out by its performance in the Gazala battle.
London was also very concerned about Malta. 8th Army attacking means taking the initiative. At the worst things could hardly have gone more badly than they did and if the best is only to advance airfields a few dozen miles west even that is worthwhile.

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#44

Post by Brevity » 05 Feb 2015, 21:30

Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:You forget Savona division + I./104 + oasen battalion, also 15 Schuetzen Brigade stuck for months at Medauar. Also what about Division zbV? Some battalions arrived in June, attack on Tobruk was to occur in November. What other role could they fulfill, having no transport?
No I did not. Savona and z.b.V. were at the frontier, Savona never, and z.b.V. only on 12 November moved to Tobruk. The German troops at Medauar were a straight relief by Trento's Bersaglieri regiment, one in, one out. There was a total of 4 divisions in the line from that moment. Prior to that there were 3 divisions, and one regiment (not the whole 15. Schuetzenbrigade IIRC). Div. z.b.V. when it went to Tobruk wasn't technically in the line, since they were in their attack positions. They also relieved Bologna units where they were placed.
If we're talking about infantry needed to hold the front, why ignore the frontier line? Also one should include ALL immobile infantry in the region because it had no other role. Besides the troops directly on the line, reserves had to be available to check a potential breakout.
Fair enough in general, but keep in mind that for z.b.V. the whole Afrika Regiment was not present until early November. As for reserves, if they are not mobile, they're not reserves. When z.b.V. went to Tobruk, it was not as a reserve, but as an attack force.
Immobile infantry acting as a reserve is fine and can still be useful, if you can predict the point of enemy attack and position troops there. It proved very useful for Axis to saturate the area SE of Tobruk with Division zbV and other units, and they managed to contain a breakthru and link up attempt to some extent.
The key is to be able to guess where the battle is going to take place, and it was often rather obvious. If you guess right, the infantry is there and it's mobility is not an issue.
Urmel wrote:As for reserves, if they are not mobile, they're not reserves.
The intended role of Division zbV does not matter because attack didn't take place. What matters is their role in actual battle, where it acted as immobile reserve. And without it, the Tobruk front would have crumbled, forcing Panzer divisions into yet another attrition battle (against "useless" infantry).
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Capturing a single strongpoint required an inhuman effort, capturing all was impossible. Every extra mile of the line means a) 2 miles longer outflanking maneuver, giving more time to react; b) 2 miles longer way for the following supply columns. The benefits were enormous.
Fortifications were routinely broken with a reasonable effort:
Bardia (twice)
Tobruk 1942 (and I would argue that if the Axis attack had gone in in November 1941, it would have succeeded)
Libyan Omar 1941
Bardia Jan 1941 was no part of any defense line, was encircled and defended by demoralised troops and had no value. In Jan 1942 it was doomed anyway.
Sorry, but i) that is simply not true, and ii) your point was that it took an inhuman effort to capture a single strongpoint (it did not, clearly), and that to capture all was impossible (but they did, when the fortresses surrendered due to a few strongpoints being breached, by definition all strongpoints were captured, in Bardia and in Tobruk.) Whether it was doomed or not is neither here nor there. It was attacked, the garrison put up a spirited defense (read Orpen), and when this failed it surrendered.
Infantry line is needed as an assistance in mobile battle. If own mobile forces do not exist in the first place, then whatever fortresses you build, they have no value. January 1941 proves nothing.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote: The sheer strength of Tobruk is proven by the fact that extra infantry division + artillery group were sent to even attempt a serious attack.
That's hardly the point I am making. I never argued Tobruk was a weak position.
Tobruk had an inherent weakness that if it was breached and the breach couldn't have been contained, it was all over. I do not deny that fortifications could have been captured. But it's not the point.
PR5 had 81 tanks ready for attack on Tobruk on 1 May 1941, and was left with 35 by evening, due to mines, artillery and Pak fire. While almost all casualties were repaired and most within days, this situation put DAK under the disadvantage and vulnerable for the time being. Operation Brevity, useless as it was, would have succeeded to some extent if launched at this very moment.
Thats the whole purpose of static fortification, to bind and weaken enemy mobile forces that ultimately are the decisive factor in the battle.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Omar proves my point.
How? Libyan Omar was taken without unreasonable effort in two attacks (at the operational level, the Royal Sussex and 3/1 Punjab may disagree) by a 1 and 2 battalion attack (22/30 November) with a regiment (22 November) and a few I tanks (30 November) in support.
Nothing wrong with a loss of Omar. Note however how many resources had to be used:
"The hasty and haphazard mounting of the Bir Ghirba attack stands in sharp contrast to the careful and thorough preparation of the Indian assault on the Omar forts, which it was meant to assist. This had been the subject of study for some weeks at many levels and entailed close combination on the battlefield of many arms, including the RAF bomber and fighter forces"
It can't be ignored that 4 companies of Matildas were expended there out of 6 available. Yes the single fortification or two could have been lost to well-prepared attack but the frontier line continued to function and cause difficulties to the enemy just fine.

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#45

Post by Brevity » 05 Feb 2015, 22:46

Urmel wrote:Your conclusion is wrong. It was too much, not 'not enough'. The Gazala line did not fail because of a lack of infantry, it failed because of a lack or lack of competence of the mobile forces. If the armoured divisions had had their act together, the line could have been held with far less infantry.
Urmel wrote:But more infantry was not the answer to this problem.
Urmel wrote:A resilient forward line is only important if you don't trust your armour, or if you have a specific problem behind it, such as, errr, a siege of a fortified position. Also, Rommel's forward line was very short by comparison to the Gazala line, and it was anchored on a strong fortress position in Bardia and a secure flank at the escarpment. None of this was present at Gazala. The effort expended on the frontier position was not substantial.
Urmel wrote:Please tell me you're not serious. :) How could the result of the battle have been any worse for the British if they had not spent any resources on the line itself and stuck to the column principle, keeping up a mobile defense? At least when that didn't work in January, the damage done was far more limited. If you want to look at resources well spent, you need to look at the El Alamein line.
I am looking from British perspective and trying to figure out what could have been done better.
In the perfect world, there are great commanders, excellent tactics and abundance of modern equipment. We aren't living in a perfect world though.
A few divisions of infantry were available, either sent to Africa by mistake, or not.
With British armor being so inept, other ways had to be explored. And the experience of Crusader was infantry was capable of assisting the battle in a meaningful way.
I fail to see how British would have stood the chance without firm Gazala line. Consider this scenario with 2 southernmost strongpoints not existing, and 2 more mobile infantry brigades available instead.
Image
It would have been a week-long battle resulting in a crushing defeat.
Gazala line, even if ultimately breached, have caused a serious crisis for Rommel and gave Allies a chance. That this chance was thrown away is an entirely different story.

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