German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

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Urmel
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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#46

Post by Urmel » 05 Feb 2015, 23:43

Brevity wrote:The intended role of Division zbV does not matter because attack didn't take place. What matters is their role in actual battle, where it acted as immobile reserve. And without it, the Tobruk front would have crumbled, forcing Panzer divisions into yet another attrition battle (against "useless" infantry).
Well that would probably have worked better for the Axis, since it would have prevented the 'dash to the wire', and it would certainly have wiped out the salient, and prevented the New Zealanders come near to Tobruk and the subsequent link-up.

But since that did not happen, you can instead look at what happened to the immobile reserve. It was so chewed up that it had to be sent to Agedabia after 4 December.
Brevity wrote:Tobruk had an inherent weakness that if it was breached and the breach couldn't have been contained, it was all over.
I take that as agreement that i) it didn't take an inhuman effort to take a strongpoint, and that ii) all strongpoints could be captured.
Brevity wrote:Thats the whole purpose of static fortification, to bind and weaken enemy mobile forces that ultimately are the decisive factor in the battle.
But that only works if the enemy uses his mobile forces to engage you. And it only helps you if you can exploit it.
Brevity wrote:Nothing wrong with a loss of Omar. Note however how many resources had to be used:
"The hasty and haphazard mounting of the Bir Ghirba attack stands in sharp contrast to the careful and thorough preparation of the Indian assault on the Omar forts, which it was meant to assist. This had been the subject of study for some weeks at many levels and entailed close combination on the battlefield of many arms, including the RAF bomber and fighter forces"
Sounds like good planning and good use of combined arms.
Brevity wrote:It can't be ignored that 4 companies of Matildas were expended there out of 6 available.
Try three out of eight in 1 Army Tank Brigade. C Squadron 42 R.T.R. wasn't present until later, but the remainder of the regiments was fully equipped, and there was a swap of B squadron 44 R.T.R. into 42 R.T.R. to make up for the missing C Squadron.
Brevity wrote:Yes the single fortification or two could have been lost to well-prepared attack but the frontier line continued to function and cause difficulties to the enemy just fine.
But that wasn't a function of the brilliance of the line or the numbers of infantry in it, or that the Axis guys had eaten their wheaties, it was a function of the inability of the Allied commanders to focus on dealing with it. First 13 Corps got sucked into Belhamed/Ed Duda/Zaafran/Tobruk because of the failure of 30 Corps at Sidi Rezegh, and then 30 Corps was extremely risk-averse after the bloody repulse suffered by the South Africans in mid-December, since they didn't want to lose more South Africans after what happened to 5 S.A. Brigade. There was no excuse for the line to survive as long as it did other than incompetence, unwillingness, and distraction.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#47

Post by Urmel » 05 Feb 2015, 23:51

Brevity wrote:I fail to see how British would have stood the chance without firm Gazala line.
Give up everything west of the wire in terms of permanent occupation, including Tobruk.

Put the immobile infantry into the Alamein line and dig in.

Combine the mobile infantry with armour and guns to carry out a flexible forward defence in the deep space between Tobruk and Alamein.

Carry out deep raids originating from Siwa to interrupt the supply lines temporarily.

Use the RAF to hammer the now much more extended Axis supply lines, and regularly visit Tobruk.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#48

Post by Gooner1 » 06 Feb 2015, 17:26

Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:I fail to see how British would have stood the chance without firm Gazala line.
Give up everything west of the wire in terms of permanent occupation, including Tobruk.

Put the immobile infantry into the Alamein line and dig in.

Combine the mobile infantry with armour and guns to carry out a flexible forward defence in the deep space between Tobruk and Alamein.

Carry out deep raids originating from Siwa to interrupt the supply lines temporarily.

Use the RAF to hammer the now much more extended Axis supply lines, and regularly visit Tobruk.
I think even Dorman O'Gowan would consider that a far out plan! :D

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#49

Post by Urmel » 06 Feb 2015, 18:44

Yeah, what did he know! :p
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#50

Post by Brevity » 06 Feb 2015, 22:26

Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Tobruk had an inherent weakness that if it was breached and the breach couldn't have been contained, it was all over.
I take that as agreement that i) it didn't take an inhuman effort to take a strongpoint, and that ii) all strongpoints could be captured.
In retrospect, Gazala line was poorly organised. There were 5 brigades covering 15 miles by the coast and only 2 brigades covering the following 30 miles.
The coast sector was unlikely to get attacked as Afrikakorps would have been sandwiched between the coast and the escarpments with little room for maneuver. The inland strongpoints are a center of gravity for the defender. Sidi Omar proves that, too.
Weak as it was, 150 brigade box held until 1 June and Bir Hakeim held until 10 June, under heavy attack from all sides supported by tanks.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Thats the whole purpose of static fortification, to bind and weaken enemy mobile forces that ultimately are the decisive factor in the battle.
But that only works if the enemy uses his mobile forces to engage you. And it only helps you if you can exploit it.
If DAK haven't used elements of 15, 21 Pz Div and Kampfstaffel against 150 Bd box, then who was going to do the job? Italian infantry? Good luck with that.
The most advantageous scenario is to attack enemy strongpoint from all sides and especially from the rear and by nature, only mobile troops were capable of that.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Nothing wrong with a loss of Omar. Note however how many resources had to be used:
"The hasty and haphazard mounting of the Bir Ghirba attack stands in sharp contrast to the careful and thorough preparation of the Indian assault on the Omar forts, which it was meant to assist. This had been the subject of study for some weeks at many levels and entailed close combination on the battlefield of many arms, including the RAF bomber and fighter forces"
Sounds like good planning and good use of combined arms.
Sure, but if it took "some weeks of study", then by extension it would have taken several months to capture the whole line in the same way (hundreds of Matildas, too).
Omar shouldn't have been attacked at all, thou. The resources spent there could have been better used if diverted to the main battle (this includes air support and planning time).
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Yes the single fortification or two could have been lost to well-prepared attack but the frontier line continued to function and cause difficulties to the enemy just fine.
But that wasn't a function of the brilliance of the line or the numbers of infantry in it, or that the Axis guys had eaten their wheaties, it was a function of the inability of the Allied commanders to focus on dealing with it. First 13 Corps got sucked into Belhamed/Ed Duda/Zaafran/Tobruk because of the failure of 30 Corps at Sidi Rezegh, and then 30 Corps was extremely risk-averse after the bloody repulse suffered by the South Africans in mid-December, since they didn't want to lose more South Africans after what happened to 5 S.A. Brigade. There was no excuse for the line to survive as long as it did other than incompetence, unwillingness, and distraction.
I do not understand. Do you advocate that the Frontier Line should have been assaulted by force?? That's what Rommel wanted.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:The intended role of Division zbV does not matter because attack didn't take place. What matters is their role in actual battle, where it acted as immobile reserve. And without it, the Tobruk front would have crumbled, forcing Panzer divisions into yet another attrition battle (against "useless" infantry).
Well that would probably have worked better for the Axis, since it would have prevented the 'dash to the wire', and it would certainly have wiped out the salient, and prevented the New Zealanders come near to Tobruk and the subsequent link-up.
But since that did not happen, you can instead look at what happened to the immobile reserve. It was so chewed up that it had to be sent to Agedabia after 4 December.
In this scenario: a) Tobruk sortie makes a good progress b)successful attack against 7 Arm Bd has to be stopped c) 6 RTR is not destroyed d) very successful attack on Sidi Rezegh airfield the next day doesn't take place e) same for the capture of night leager f) Rommel is forced to descent to Sidi Rezegh already on 21 Nov. and fight there with tanks in labyrinth of escarpments g) NZ Brigades arrive and DAK is encircled.

Why criticize Div zbV unfairly on the basis of casualties alone? You should look at the full picture, results, command blunders and what could have been done better.

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#51

Post by Brevity » 06 Feb 2015, 22:38

Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:I fail to see how British would have stood the chance without firm Gazala line.
Give up everything west of the wire in terms of permanent occupation, including Tobruk.

Put the immobile infantry into the Alamein line and dig in.

Combine the mobile infantry with armour and guns to carry out a flexible forward defence in the deep space between Tobruk and Alamein.

Carry out deep raids originating from Siwa to interrupt the supply lines temporarily.

Use the RAF to hammer the now much more extended Axis supply lines, and regularly visit Tobruk.
The disadvantage of holding the terrain far forward was stranded supply situation while the advantage was the possession of buffer ground that can be sacrificed if things go bad.
The basic issue is if British lose the battle at El-Alamein (against DAK at full strength), it's over.
You have a bold idea but there is plenty of problems associated with it. The retreat could have as well turned into stampede under concentrated attack. What about loss of morale? Troops had little trust in their commanders at this point.
You can't be serious about fighting a mobile battle with tanks and motorized troops alone. How do you win this?

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#52

Post by Urmel » 06 Feb 2015, 23:53

Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Tobruk had an inherent weakness that if it was breached and the breach couldn't have been contained, it was all over.
I take that as agreement that i) it didn't take an inhuman effort to take a strongpoint, and that ii) all strongpoints could be captured.
In retrospect, Gazala line was poorly organised. There were 5 brigades covering 15 miles by the coast and only 2 brigades covering the following 30 miles.
The coast sector was unlikely to get attacked as Afrikakorps would have been sandwiched between the coast and the escarpments with little room for maneuver. The inland strongpoints are a center of gravity for the defender. Sidi Omar proves that, too.
I'm not sure about that. If you don't organise like that, a strong thrust along the coast cuts the infantry off from the main supply base, and that doesn't really work for the Allies either. It just wasn't a line that could be held against a determined enemy.
Brevity wrote:Weak as it was, 150 brigade box held until 1 June and Bir Hakeim held until 10 June, under heavy attack from all sides supported by tanks.
They could just have left Bir Hakeim whither, there was no need to have a go at it. 150 Brigade box held for what? 2.5 days.
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Thats the whole purpose of static fortification, to bind and weaken enemy mobile forces that ultimately are the decisive factor in the battle.
But that only works if the enemy uses his mobile forces to engage you. And it only helps you if you can exploit it.
If DAK haven't used elements of 15, 21 Pz Div and Kampfstaffel against 150 Bd box, then who was going to do the job? Italian infantry? Good luck with that.
The most advantageous scenario is to attack enemy strongpoint from all sides and especially from the rear and by nature, only mobile troops were capable of that.
Again, I think that rather proves than disproves my fundamental point. :)
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Nothing wrong with a loss of Omar. Note however how many resources had to be used:
"The hasty and haphazard mounting of the Bir Ghirba attack stands in sharp contrast to the careful and thorough preparation of the Indian assault on the Omar forts, which it was meant to assist. This had been the subject of study for some weeks at many levels and entailed close combination on the battlefield of many arms, including the RAF bomber and fighter forces"
Sounds like good planning and good use of combined arms.
Sure, but if it took "some weeks of study", then by extension it would have taken several months to capture the whole line in the same way (hundreds of Matildas, too).
Omar shouldn't have been attacked at all, thou. The resources spent there could have been better used if diverted to the main battle (this includes air support and planning time).
Disagree. Taking out the frontier defensive line opens Halfway Pass and removes a severe supply constraint.
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:Yes the single fortification or two could have been lost to well-prepared attack but the frontier line continued to function and cause difficulties to the enemy just fine.
But that wasn't a function of the brilliance of the line or the numbers of infantry in it, or that the Axis guys had eaten their wheaties, it was a function of the inability of the Allied commanders to focus on dealing with it. First 13 Corps got sucked into Belhamed/Ed Duda/Zaafran/Tobruk because of the failure of 30 Corps at Sidi Rezegh, and then 30 Corps was extremely risk-averse after the bloody repulse suffered by the South Africans in mid-December, since they didn't want to lose more South Africans after what happened to 5 S.A. Brigade. There was no excuse for the line to survive as long as it did other than incompetence, unwillingness, and distraction.
I do not understand. Do you advocate that the Frontier Line should have been assaulted by force?? That's what Rommel wanted.
Well they could only do that if the battle outside Tobruk goes in their favour and 13 Corps does not have to be diverted. But yes, it should all have been taken by force in the initial stage of the battle.
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:The intended role of Division zbV does not matter because attack didn't take place. What matters is their role in actual battle, where it acted as immobile reserve. And without it, the Tobruk front would have crumbled, forcing Panzer divisions into yet another attrition battle (against "useless" infantry).
Well that would probably have worked better for the Axis, since it would have prevented the 'dash to the wire', and it would certainly have wiped out the salient, and prevented the New Zealanders come near to Tobruk and the subsequent link-up.
But since that did not happen, you can instead look at what happened to the immobile reserve. It was so chewed up that it had to be sent to Agedabia after 4 December.
In this scenario: a) Tobruk sortie makes a good progress b)successful attack against 7 Arm Bd has to be stopped c) 6 RTR is not destroyed d) very successful attack on Sidi Rezegh airfield the next day doesn't take place e) same for the capture of night leager f) Rommel is forced to descent to Sidi Rezegh already on 21 Nov. and fight there with tanks in labyrinth of escarpments g) NZ Brigades arrive and DAK is encircled.
No. a) yes. The remainder isn't required to keep the armour outside Tobruk. If the breakout looks like it succeeds, rather than failing, Rommel will use the armour to smash it. If he does that, the battle is essentially over, and the Axis is assured to win, since there is no longer a need to fight in two directions, and it is unlikely that tank losses will be as heavy as they were during the 'dash' combined with losing the recoverable vehicles on Sidi Rezegh for good.
Brevity wrote:Why criticize Div zbV unfairly on the basis of casualties alone? You should look at the full picture, results, command blunders and what could have been done better.
it's not a criticism, it's an observation.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#53

Post by Urmel » 06 Feb 2015, 23:57

Brevity wrote:The disadvantage of holding the terrain far forward was stranded supply situation while the advantage was the possession of buffer ground that can be sacrificed if things go bad.
Well they had the same situation up to CRUSADER, when the buffer was the zone from Halfaya to Matruh. Seems to have worked.
Brevity wrote:The basic issue is if British lose the battle at El-Alamein (against DAK at full strength), it's over.
But they are in a far better position to fight it than they were in July.
Brevity wrote:You have a bold idea but there is plenty of problems associated with it.
It's not mine, its in the January ops orders, I just elucidated on some details.
Brevity wrote:The retreat could have as well turned into stampede under concentrated attack. What about loss of morale? Troops had little trust in their commanders at this point.
How is this different from reality? It wouldn't have been a rushed retreat either, it could have been well organised and staged. At the end of the January offensive, the Axis was in no position to pursue fast with combat-capable forces.
Brevity wrote:You can't be serious about fighting a mobile battle with tanks and motorized troops alone. How do you win this?
It's not about winning, it's about not losing and preserving forces rather than trying to hold valueless ground.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#54

Post by Brevity » 07 Feb 2015, 07:35

Urmel wrote:I'm not sure about that. If you don't organise like that, a strong thrust along the coast cuts the infantry off from the main supply base, and that doesn't really work for the Allies either. It just wasn't a line that could be held against a determined enemy.
The Crusader has proven that British resources for transpoting supplies were unlimited. Even with DAK swarming the border, supplies were still being delivered to all troops incl. NZ Division near Tobruk.
Supplying Bir Hakeim wouldn't be a problem irregardless of interrupted routes. Besides, if Rommel attacks along the coast, then other strongpoint are not threatened and don't need supplies in the first place.
Consider if attack is successful, DAK breaks Gazala line near the coast, then what? No British armor was harmed on the first day. Advantage of surprise all gone. Moving troops across minefields takes time. DAK is behind the strongpoints and ready on the dawn of the second day, with all British armor already there.
Urmel wrote:They could just have left Bir Hakeim whither, there was no need to have a go at it.
Agreed.
Urmel wrote:Disagree. Taking out the frontier defensive line opens Halfway Pass and removes a severe supply constraint.
A simple question - what if Germans demolish the pass before they surrender?
Repair works on Derna escarpment road were expected to take 14 days in Feb 1942. British would also need to clear the area of mines, and the route would be endangered by other strongpoints. There is no way Halfaya road would be available before the battle is long over.
That's beside the fact that Halfaya was much stronger than Omar (which held until end of November).
Urmel wrote:Well they could only do that if the battle outside Tobruk goes in their favour and 13 Corps does not have to be diverted. But yes, it should all have been taken by force in the initial stage of the battle.
So you ignore the Schwerpunkt concept and you want to fight 2 important battle at once, on the ignorant assumption that "battle outside Tobruk goes in their favour" and 13 corps is not needed.
To win the mobile battle, 13 Corps should do everything possible to assist it! Any resources wasted on frontier line were unavailable for more important task.
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:The intended role of Division zbV does not matter because attack didn't take place. What matters is their role in actual battle, where it acted as immobile reserve. And without it, the Tobruk front would have crumbled, forcing Panzer divisions into yet another attrition battle (against "useless" infantry).
Well that would probably have worked better for the Axis, since it would have prevented the 'dash to the wire', and it would certainly have wiped out the salient, and prevented the New Zealanders come near to Tobruk and the subsequent link-up.
But since that did not happen, you can instead look at what happened to the immobile reserve. It was so chewed up that it had to be sent to Agedabia after 4 December.
In this scenario: a) Tobruk sortie makes a good progress b)successful attack against 7 Arm Bd has to be stopped c) 6 RTR is not destroyed d) very successful attack on Sidi Rezegh airfield the next day doesn't take place e) same for the capture of night leager f) Rommel is forced to descent to Sidi Rezegh already on 21 Nov. and fight there with tanks in labyrinth of escarpments g) NZ Brigades arrive and DAK is encircled.
No. a) yes. The remainder isn't required to keep the armour outside Tobruk. If the breakout looks like it succeeds, rather than failing, Rommel will use the armour to smash it. If he does that, the battle is essentially over, and the Axis is assured to win, since there is no longer a need to fight in two directions, and it is unlikely that tank losses will be as heavy as they were during the 'dash' combined with losing the recoverable vehicles on Sidi Rezegh for good.
You do not realise severity of situation in this scenario. DAK was still located near Gabr Saleh early on 21 Nov. They would need to deal with Tobruk sortie first, with British armor still mostly intact. And how to do that when the sortie area is directly behind 7 Armored Brigade w/ Support Group?

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#55

Post by Brevity » 07 Feb 2015, 08:14

Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:The basic issue is if British lose the battle at El-Alamein (against DAK at full strength), it's over.
But they are in a far better position to fight it than they were in July.
By a rough estimate:
tanks abandoned in retreat to Alamein - 100 vehicles
rearguards smashed by DAK during withdrawal - 2 motor brigades and another 100 tanks (that's an optimistic scenario)
shattered morale, soldiers think their commander is an imbecyle and a coward, too

How is that a better position?
Urmel wrote:At the end of the January offensive, the Axis was in no position to pursue fast with combat-capable forces.
I strongly believe that a mechanized unit should be relatively small to be effective in mobile warfare.
Consider 15 Pz Div in Crusader (4 infantry, 3 artillery battalions) and how many times they acted sluggishly because of supply problems.
Now compare with 21 Pz Div (2 infantry, 1 artillery) that was fast and agile, even if lacking in power.
21 Div in Jan 1942 is even better example (M.G.8 at half strength, 4 batteries). It took them one day to get from Marsa Brega to Saunnu and surprise British there.
Tank strength has recovered quickly. DAK had 6 coys worth of Pz.III by early February (they had 8 in Crusader). Artillery and Pak at half strength was good enough.

Big formations were hardly needed to smash 8 Army at this point. How many panzers did it take to overrun 2 Armored Brigade, sixteen?

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#56

Post by Gooner1 » 09 Feb 2015, 15:57

Urmel wrote: It's not mine, its in the January ops orders, I just elucidated on some details.

It's not about winning, it's about not losing and preserving forces rather than trying to hold valueless ground.
I can understand not trying to hold at El Agheila against superior numbers but withdrawing 700 miles for fear of being beaten?! There were important lessons to be learned (or remembered) from Crusader - which clearly weren't, mostly, in time for Gazala - but the uselessness of non-mobile infantry cannot be among them.

Considering the aims of the British were a) to drive the Axis out of Africa and b) to hold onto Malta, I can't see trying to defend in front of Tobruk as holding valueless ground.

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#57

Post by Urmel » 11 Feb 2015, 15:59

It had to do with the inability to guarantee a new encirclement of Tobruk, and an unwillingness of the Royal Navy to guarantee a repeat of the 1941 supply runs due to the heavy losses they suffered.

Given this, the ground became valueless in my view.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#58

Post by Urmel » 11 Feb 2015, 16:04

Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Brevity wrote:The basic issue is if British lose the battle at El-Alamein (against DAK at full strength), it's over.
But they are in a far better position to fight it than they were in July.
By a rough estimate:
tanks abandoned in retreat to Alamein - 100 vehicles
rearguards smashed by DAK during withdrawal - 2 motor brigades and another 100 tanks (that's an optimistic scenario)
shattered morale, soldiers think their commander is an imbecyle and a coward, too

How is that a better position?
Sorry, I have no idea what you are talking about?
Brevity wrote:
Urmel wrote:At the end of the January offensive, the Axis was in no position to pursue fast with combat-capable forces.
I strongly believe that a mechanized unit should be relatively small to be effective in mobile warfare.
Consider 15 Pz Div in Crusader (4 infantry, 3 artillery battalions) and how many times they acted sluggishly because of supply problems.
Now compare with 21 Pz Div (2 infantry, 1 artillery) that was fast and agile, even if lacking in power.
They acted sluggishly as well when they weren't supplied, and they certainly didn't deliver the hitting power needed by the Axis to hurt the Allies.
Brevity wrote:21 Div in Jan 1942 is even better example (M.G.8 at half strength, 4 batteries). It took them one day to get from Marsa Brega to Saunnu and surprise British there.
You might want to read up on the tank battle in Saunnu and what actually happened there. Yes, 21 PD surprised 10 Hussars. And then needed to be bailed out by 15 Panzer.
Brevity wrote:Tank strength has recovered quickly. DAK had 6 coys worth of Pz.III by early February (they had 8 in Crusader). Artillery and Pak at half strength was good enough.
Well that's great. Unfortunately they were all stranded at Mechili with no fuel.
Brevity wrote:Big formations were hardly needed to smash 8 Army at this point. How many panzers did it take to overrun 2 Armored Brigade, sixteen?
Nonsense. Try 'the full strength of the Afrika Korps', i.e. around 100.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#59

Post by Gooner1 » 11 Feb 2015, 18:44

Urmel wrote:It had to do with the inability to guarantee a new encirclement of Tobruk, and an unwillingness of the Royal Navy to guarantee a repeat of the 1941 supply runs due to the heavy losses they suffered.

Given this, the ground became valueless in my view.
If there was one lesson from Crusader it was that the Germans could be beaten, so where did this pusillanimity come from?

That appreciation has me in mind of that German generals saying "The war in the desert ceased to be a game when Montgomery took over".

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Re: German Military Doctrine vs British Doctrine in the desert war

#60

Post by Urmel » 11 Feb 2015, 18:51

Gooner1 wrote:
Urmel wrote:It had to do with the inability to guarantee a new encirclement of Tobruk, and an unwillingness of the Royal Navy to guarantee a repeat of the 1941 supply runs due to the heavy losses they suffered.

Given this, the ground became valueless in my view.
If there was one lesson from Crusader it was that the Germans could be beaten, so where did this pusillanimity come from?
1) Having been given a severe spanking at Gazala and Uadi al Faregh (twice) in December.
2) Lacking the resources to ensure a successful defense
Gooner1 wrote:That appreciation has me in mind of that German generals saying "The war in the desert ceased to be a game when Montgomery took over".
Well, one could argue that San Marino playing the Germans is still a game, even though the outcome is preordained...
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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