Well that would probably have worked better for the Axis, since it would have prevented the 'dash to the wire', and it would certainly have wiped out the salient, and prevented the New Zealanders come near to Tobruk and the subsequent link-up.Brevity wrote:The intended role of Division zbV does not matter because attack didn't take place. What matters is their role in actual battle, where it acted as immobile reserve. And without it, the Tobruk front would have crumbled, forcing Panzer divisions into yet another attrition battle (against "useless" infantry).
But since that did not happen, you can instead look at what happened to the immobile reserve. It was so chewed up that it had to be sent to Agedabia after 4 December.
I take that as agreement that i) it didn't take an inhuman effort to take a strongpoint, and that ii) all strongpoints could be captured.Brevity wrote:Tobruk had an inherent weakness that if it was breached and the breach couldn't have been contained, it was all over.
But that only works if the enemy uses his mobile forces to engage you. And it only helps you if you can exploit it.Brevity wrote:Thats the whole purpose of static fortification, to bind and weaken enemy mobile forces that ultimately are the decisive factor in the battle.
Sounds like good planning and good use of combined arms.Brevity wrote:Nothing wrong with a loss of Omar. Note however how many resources had to be used:
"The hasty and haphazard mounting of the Bir Ghirba attack stands in sharp contrast to the careful and thorough preparation of the Indian assault on the Omar forts, which it was meant to assist. This had been the subject of study for some weeks at many levels and entailed close combination on the battlefield of many arms, including the RAF bomber and fighter forces"
Try three out of eight in 1 Army Tank Brigade. C Squadron 42 R.T.R. wasn't present until later, but the remainder of the regiments was fully equipped, and there was a swap of B squadron 44 R.T.R. into 42 R.T.R. to make up for the missing C Squadron.Brevity wrote:It can't be ignored that 4 companies of Matildas were expended there out of 6 available.
But that wasn't a function of the brilliance of the line or the numbers of infantry in it, or that the Axis guys had eaten their wheaties, it was a function of the inability of the Allied commanders to focus on dealing with it. First 13 Corps got sucked into Belhamed/Ed Duda/Zaafran/Tobruk because of the failure of 30 Corps at Sidi Rezegh, and then 30 Corps was extremely risk-averse after the bloody repulse suffered by the South Africans in mid-December, since they didn't want to lose more South Africans after what happened to 5 S.A. Brigade. There was no excuse for the line to survive as long as it did other than incompetence, unwillingness, and distraction.Brevity wrote:Yes the single fortification or two could have been lost to well-prepared attack but the frontier line continued to function and cause difficulties to the enemy just fine.