Maintenance Personnel: Panzer Division vs. British Armoured Div.

[Don Juan]

Is anyone able to quantify the difference in the maintenance personnel and assets between German and British armoured divisions? From what I understand German units had more dedicated fitters and workshops within regiments, whereas the British depended on crew maintenance at the regimental level, with a Light Aid Detachment within the Brigade, and forward workshops at the divisional level.

Thanks in advance for any input.....

[Urmel]

Have a look here:

http://www.wwiidaybyday.com/kstn/kstn11871okt37.htm

They had one of these per regiment. I have now idea how this compares to the LAD at Brigade level.

[Don Juan]

It probably dwarfs the LAD.

Thanks very much.

[Gary Kennedy]

To try to answer that question for the British side of the equation, and particularly when talking about the North African arena, you need a date to narrow down the British org used.

The original WE for an Armd Div included a large Armd Div Wksp, which until mid-war was RAOC. In 1941 the Div then switched to a Bde level arrangement with separate Secs responsible for Light Repair, Recovery, and Ord Fd Pk duties. Where it gets confusing is shortly after those WEs were issued a further set of tables allowed for a return to a Div Wskp, supported by an OFP. (This is all still in 1941). At the end of 1941 the RAOC was moving to Brigade level Ord Coys for Wksp duties, which appear in ME theatre WEs in early 1942, different types for Armd, Mot, Inf and later Tk Bdes. These then morph into the REME Bde Wksps in late 1942, which was the system used to the end of the war. Note that the ME Wksps were slightly different in structure from the Home based Divs. OFP remained with the RAOC after the REME was established.

LADs were attached on a scale of one LAD per Armd Regt, Tk Bn or Mot Bn, and normally one per Regt RA (Fd, Med, Hvy, Atk) pretty much throughout as I recall. Type C was normally attached to Armd Regts. Regts also had RAOC, later REME, fitters on strength as attached personnel.

My limited understanding of German arrangements is a Regtl Wksp, including repair and recovery, with the Pz Divs having (I think) three Div Wksps. Pz Bns had a lot of organic grease monkeys as well.

Gary

[Don Juan]

Thanks Gary. Do you know of any source where this is enumerated in detail?

I did know about the early 1942 re-organisation because they were hoping this would improve the availability of the Crusader tank (ha!).

[Leo Niehorster]

By 1941, all German mechanized companies — as well as battalion and regiment headquarters — had a small motor maintenance section with maintenance specialists for their own vehicles. In 1941, a more or less standard company/battery maintenance section had a Senior NCO Master Motor Mechanic — Schirrmeister (K), and three motor mechanics; 1 motorcycle with sidecar, and 1 Kfz. 2/40. The more complicated (read higher maintenance) the vehicles in the companies, the more vehicles were added, usually in the form of one or more trucks for spare parts, tools, tires, and recovery. And, if the unit had tracked vehicles, one or more halftracks for recovery purposes. For example, a 1941 tank company had 38 men, 1 motorcycle with sidecar, 1 Kfz. 2/40, 1 medium 4×4 truck, and two 1-ton halftracks (Sd.Kfz. 10).

In addition, Panzer regiments had an entire maintenance company, (consisting of elements for the maintenance of motor vehicles, armor, weapons, and signals).

The motorized Infantry regiments, on the other hand, had a slightly larger detachment for both the headquarters' vehicles and to back up the maintenance sections of the companies. (11 men, including a highly-skilled technical services official (Werkmeister [K]), 1 Kfz. 2/40, 1 light car, and 2 medium 4×4 trucks). The headquarters also included an armorer section for weapons maintenance and repair (6 men, 1 light car, 1 light truck). Then, as indicated, there were the motor maintenance companies of the Panzer division.

Just to mention, there were the various GHQ motor maintenance elements at army level. Really knocked up stuff was supposed to be sent back to the factories.

[Urmel]

Thanks Gary. Do you know of any source where this is enumerated in detail?

I did know about the early 1942 re-organisation because they were hoping this would improve the availability of the Crusader tank (ha!).

I would assume the early '42 reorganisation was probably linked to the realisation that German recovery was well ahead of the British system, and that this kept the Germans going in terms of tank numbers even when they suffered a lot of battlefield damage, while conversely, far too many British tanks had been lost on retreats by this stage, due to minor damage or simply due to running out of petrol.

[Don Juan]

Thanks again, Gents.

I think what I'm trying to get is a comparison figure of the number of fitters-per-tank for the Germans and British, and also how readily available those fitters were (i.e. the higher up the divisional structure, the less accessible I assume they would be). I believe the Panzer Divs had fewer tanks than the British, so this kind of ratio might be the best measure I think.

Early '42 unavailability for the Crusader was estimated at 50% even when not in action, btw. Unavailability for the Stuart was 15%.

[Gary Kennedy]

I can put together a headcount for the British WEs if you like, it would help to know which particular timeframe you're looking at as there are about ten involved.

Gary

[Urmel]

I'd be interested in the late 41 situation.

[Urmel]

Early '42 unavailability for the Crusader was estimated at 50% even when not in action, btw. Unavailability for the Stuart was 15%.

I find this hard to believe. How was this defined?

[Don Juan]

Early '42 unavailability for the Crusader was estimated at 50% even when not in action, btw. Unavailability for the Stuart was 15%.

I find this hard to believe. How was this defined?

It was a finger in the air estimate by Brig. L.S. Lloyd of G(AFV).

When you hear stories of GHQ Middle East Forces wanting to replace the Crusader with the Valentine, it was this fellow who was behind them.

[Don Juan]

I can put together a headcount for the British WEs if you like, it would help to know which particular timeframe you're looking at as there are about ten involved.

Gary

All ten are useful to me, thanks.

[Urmel]

Early '42 unavailability for the Crusader was estimated at 50% even when not in action, btw. Unavailability for the Stuart was 15%.

I find this hard to believe. How was this defined?

It was a finger in the air estimate by Brig. L.S. Lloyd of G(AFV).

When you hear stories of GHQ Middle East Forces wanting to replace the Crusader with the Valentine, it was this fellow who was behind them.

Ah... So that's complete rubbish then.

[Don Juan]

I dunno, tbh. The percentage of Crusaders unavailable in comparison to Stuarts was very likely to be disproportionate, whatever the exact numbers.