Doctrine: British Failures

[Urmel]

Gooner1,
If you don't think that the British commanders at all levels showed less initiative and teamwork than the Germans in nthe Western Desert, you need to provide a convincing explanation for the failure of the British to defeat Rommel

Where to start?

Failure of the army commander. Failure to stick to the plan. Failure to understand the value of concentration of force.

Or point out that the British did beat Rommel - several times before Monty and consistently thereafter.

Yes, they did. But that was despite their performance at Brigade/Division/Corps/Army command level, not because of it.

[Sheldrake]

Attrition and Gooner,

While I admire and share your enthusiasm for British military achievements there is a danger that revisionism tends towards rewriting history and ignoring the evidence.

The British were underwhelmed with the performance of their army and disappointed with the leadership training at all levels, not just failures at the top.

The professional head of the British Army CIGS, Sir John Dill signed the Army' Training Memoranda (ATM) No 38 dated Feb 1941 which included as Annex C "Initiative and the Junior Officer - the enemy view." This was a translation of a German article delivering an unflattering critique of British lack of initiative in WW1 and W2. It compared the failure of the British to exploit the breakthroughs on the Somme on 1st and 14th July 1916 with the successful capture of Fouirt Douamont by the initiative of junior officers.

ATM No 39 dated April 1941 develops this theme. Para 19 "Encouragement of Initiative in subordinates" points out that in modern mobile operations the situation changes rapidly and higher command will have difficulty in getting up to date information. For this reason subordinate commanders will need to be trained to work on instructions rather than detailed orders, to use their initiative, to think quickly and to accept responsibility readily. It sets four injunctions on commanders. (1) Give suboditnates the best information available. (2) give them a clear order on the task you want carried out. (3) give them the means to carry out the task (4) Don't interfere with them afterwards.

As a clarification of the FSR this is almost a précis of the Truppenfeurhung section on introduction and command. It continues with

This method of training and developing initiative is far too uncommon at present. Operation Orders are issued which too frequently tell subordinates how to do their jobs in detail. The issue of such orders is delayed by their length, and the recipients have even less time to act on them.

Para 20 "Orders and Instructions" could also be a precis of the Truppenfuhrung and stresses the importance of short verbal orders and that even then this may be too slow.

"Subordinate commanders must therefore be "in the mind" of their superior so they will instinctively take the right course of action in accordance with his general intention , acting on the briefest of instructions and often upon none at all.
To be capable of acting swiftly, commanders must be highly trained in the rapid appreciation of a situation and dealing with it promptly and decisively "

So the Army was aware of the problem and the kind of remedy. One story in the development of British doctrine is how this problem was addressed in the UK and Middle East. In the 1990s the Army revisited the problem and adopted "Mission Command" and seven questions. However, if you want to see how well these ideas worked when grafted on to the British Army try reading this report from the command and control of the British Army in Iraq in 2003, 62 years after ATM 39
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRT ... /4/068.pdf

The problem has never been with the idea, but the execution. Which is why I return to the question implicit in para 20. How can you expect a subordinate (platoon, company commander) to be "in the mind of his superior" if he has not been trained to think a battalion commander?

[Gooner1]

The professional head of the British Army CIGS, Sir John Dill signed the Army' Training Memoranda (ATM) No 38 dated Feb 1941 which included as Annex C "Initiative and the Junior Officer - the enemy view." This was a translation of a German article delivering an unflattering critique of British lack of initiative in WW1 and W2. It compared the failure of the British to exploit the breakthroughs on the Somme on 1st and 14th July 1916 with the successful capture of Fouirt Douamont by the initiative of junior officers.

Including the enemies - naturally somewhat biased view - is an intelligent thing to do. There is no reason to expect it to be received at face value, more as a stimulation, as the Germans no doubt intended the original for their own troops.

I am looking around for that piece by General Freyberg where he states that the German infantry is nothing like as tough as his Great War predecessors and function as no more than mere tank followers. That is in one of the ATM or Notes From Theatres of War.

ATM No 39 dated April 1941 develops this theme. Para 19 "Encouragement of Initiative in subordinates" points out that in modern mobile operations the situation changes rapidly and higher command will have difficulty in getting up to date information. For this reason subordinate commanders will need to be trained to work on instructions rather than detailed orders, to use their initiative, to think quickly and to accept responsibility readily. It sets four injunctions on commanders. (1) Give suboditnates the best information available. (2) give them a clear order on the task you want carried out. (3) give them the means to carry out the task (4) Don't interfere with them afterwards.

As a clarification of the FSR this is almost a précis of the Truppenfeurhung section on introduction and command. It continues with

This method of training and developing initiative is far too uncommon at present. Operation Orders are issued which too frequently tell subordinates how to do their jobs in detail. The issue of such orders is delayed by their length, and the recipients have even less time to act on them.

Para 20 "Orders and Instructions" could also be a precis of the Truppenfuhrung and stresses the importance of short verbal orders and that even then this may be too slow.

"Subordinate commanders must therefore be "in the mind" of their superior so they will instinctively take the right course of action in accordance with his general intention , acting on the briefest of instructions and often upon none at all.
To be capable of acting swiftly, commanders must be highly trained in the rapid appreciation of a situation and dealing with it promptly and decisively "

Most of the above were already in the FSR, what you have there is a rapidly growing army receiving good instruction by emphasis. Didn't the German army also issue memoranda which reemphasised some similar issues?

One story in the development of British doctrine is how this problem was addressed in the UK and Middle East. In the 1990s the Army revisited the problem and adopted "Mission Command" and seven questions.

I think you've done well in helping prove Dr Christopher Pugsley's case that the British Army has a case of doctrinal Amnesia.

MIssion Command as jargon still sucks compared to Auftragstaktik spoken in a suitably aggressive cod German accent.

[Urmel]

I am looking around for that piece by General Freyberg where he states that the German infantry is nothing like as tough as his Great War predecessors and function as no more than mere tank followers. That is in one of the ATM or Notes From Theatres of War.

It's in his writeup on Crusader. Should be available online somewhere, maybe Carlisle?

In fairness though, most of the German infantry he encountered was a hodge-podge of units, including rapidly thrown together elements with little support.

[Gooner1]

So the Army was aware of the problem and the kind of remedy. One story in the development of British doctrine is how this problem was addressed in the UK and Middle East. In the 1990s the Army revisited the problem and adopted "Mission Command" and seven questions. However, if you want to see how well these ideas worked when grafted on to the British Army try reading this report from the command and control of the British Army in Iraq in 2003, 62 years after ATM 39
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRT ... /4/068.pdf

What are the seven 'questions' in the modern doctrine?
The key principles laid down in the FSR of 1935 were: Surprise, Mobility, Concentration, Security and Offensive action.

[Gooner1]

I am looking around for that piece by General Freyberg where he states that the German infantry is nothing like as tough as his Great War predecessors and function as no more than mere tank followers. That is in one of the ATM or Notes From Theatres of War.

It's in his writeup on Crusader. Should be available online somewhere, maybe Carlisle?

In fairness though, most of the German infantry he encountered was a hodge-podge of units, including rapidly thrown together elements with little support.

Cool. One wouldn't expect the opposition to necessarily give a fair and balanced view.

[Urmel]

I think it's clear that the version of 90th Light he encountered wasn't good enough to go up against the New Zealanders. So the statement was fully justified, but it's getting more tricky when you try to extrapolate from it in the 1941 time frame. Then again, if you look into Jary for the 1944 timeframe, you get a similar sentiment.

[MarkN]

One wouldn't expect the opposition to necessarily give a fair and balanced view.

Very fiendish these Fritzers.... Always ready to tell a few porkies to deceive amateur historians after 70 years of research. Luckily we've got you to pull us back on track.

[Attrition]

So the Army was aware of the problem and the kind of remedy. One story in the development of British doctrine is how this problem was addressed in the UK and Middle East. In the 1990s the Army revisited the problem and adopted "Mission Command" and seven questions. However, if you want to see how well these ideas worked when grafted on to the British Army try reading this report from the command and control of the British Army in Iraq in 2003, 62 years after ATM 39
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRT ... /4/068.pdf

What are the seven 'questions' in the modern doctrine?
The key principles laid down in the FSR of 1935 were: Surprise, Mobility, Concentration, Security and Offensive action.

The report is a typical anatomy of an organisation primarily intended to provide sinecures for dullards. What happened to the writer?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Urmel,

I think it's clear that the version of 90th Light he encountered wasn't good enough to go up against the New Zealanders

Not forgetting the achievements of the 70th Division and also the fact that the New Zealanders were not operating in an allied vacuum - even if the half-colonels they met in the RTR were supposedly somewhat "pedestrian". :roll:

BTW did you get a chance to look at the thesis I referenced about the production of the NZ Official Histories - just as an inspection of the letters to and from the UK OHs and commanders serve to introduce doubt and contradictions, the letters that exist in the NZ archives also raise as many issues as they answer.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

All,

I'm enjoying the enlightening debate - often hard to separate the historiography from the history in these kinds of debates though. Liddell Hart and the German generals, Correlli Barnett and the British generals, etc, etc.

I am amused though that German (or NZ!) criticisms of British commanders are quoted seemingly without critical examination of their context, whereas the regular British comments about the poor quality of certain German formations are regarded as foolish propaganda or self-promotion.

Although, to be fair, I have been transcribing the war diary of 2 Rifle Brigade for May and June 1942 and they contain a series of successful actions all the way from Gazala to the Alamein line!

Regards

Tom

[Attrition]

I read somewhere recently that only three divisions in the Western Desert fought in more than two battles, which might explain poor coordination and serial inexperience.

[Urmel]

I don't think that makes a lot of sense.

[Attrition]

Why?

[Sheldrake]

The New Zealand Division was regarded by both sides as a particularly formidable formation with a good reputation throughout the war. It was one of the best fielded by the British Empire and Dominions.

It was run on more collective lines than normal with Freyburg holding regular councils of war with his brigadiers and decisions determined via consensus." The British Army generally regards councils of war as a Bad Thing and a sign of weak leadership or sheer Bolshivism. (However, "Chinese Soviets" - did seem to a be a feature of the command style within the post war SAS, and mildly chocking when introduced by ex SAS Officers to the wider Army.)

Some of its senior commanders had been picked out for the courage and initiative they had shown. Freyburg himself had risen from Lieutenant to Brigadier in three years, via a VC on the Somme and ended the first war with two DSOs six MIDs and nine wounds. The two officers most blamed for the loss of Maleme Airfield in Crete - Brigadier James Hargest and Leslie Andrews, were WW1 veterans whose imitative and courage had been recognised with high awards for distinguished service and gallantry in action.