Urmel,
I don't think it's overly dramatised. The question is in any case not what they fought, but how they did it. Doctrinal failures were:
1) failure to establish a balanced combined arms-force.
2) failure to carry out appropriate rec. prior to the attack
3) failure to concentrate strike force in the attack
4) failure to utilise even the small infantry/artillery contingents during the fight
Personally, I think (1) is a bit harsh for a brigade entering it's first combat - they went into action with the establishment that was assigned to them, it would have been very hard for Scott-Cockburn to say "give me more infantry and artillery or I'll resign".
(2) is fair, although only a small component of the Brigade was committed to the first attack (not a massed tank charge as some assert).
(3) I'm not sure of the details enough to comment here.
(4) Is also fair.
But this does not mean that 22nd Armoured Brigade launched a massed "tank charge" as is often asserted, for example consider 3 CLY WD:
19 November 1941
At 0830 hrs Lieut. S.W. PEEL arrived with orders from Bde to move forward to the original battle position and at 0908 hrs the Regiment was ordered to go on to BIR DUEDAR 432362 when [sic: where?] it took up battle positions and remained until 1340 hrs. The Regiment was then ordered to get in touch with, and move up on the right of 2 R.G.H., who were reported heavily engaged round Pt. 181 423369. It advanced with A Sqn leading, C right, and B left, but finding no sign of 2 R.G.H. at Pt. 181 continued towards BIR EL GUBI.
At 1500 hrs the leading Tp. of A Squadron (2nd/Lt. A.R. LINDSAY) reported five M.13 tanks in the area 421372 and Lieut.Col. R.K. JAGO ordered Major G.G.L. WILLIS commanding ‘A’ Sqn to attack. The strength of ‘A’ Sqn was at this time 13 tanks. Two tanks under 2nd/Lts. A.W. Henderson and P. Hargreaves were sent up on the left to draw the enemy's fire, and Mr. Lindsay was ordered by Major WILLIS to attack from the right. Supporting fire was given by Major WILLIS from his Sqn. H.Q. at about 1000 yards. The action was completely successful, all five tanks being knocked out by Mr. Lindsay's tp - and then set on fire. 25 prisoners were taken from the tanks and sent back under scout car escort together with 22 infantry and artillery prisoners.
During this action ‘C’ Sqn had been ordered to move up on the right of ‘A’ Sqn, and ‘B’ Sqn, consisting of five tanks under Major GODSON, Capt. VAUGHAN, Lieut. J.C. HOLCROFT, Sgt GREGORY and Sgt MEDLAR, to remain in a hull-down position 1500 yards behind ‘A’ Sqn, to observe the left flank of the Regiment and to watch for 2 R.G.H.
From 1500 hrs wireless touch was lost with ‘B’ Sqn. This Sqn advanced from hull-down position to reconnoitre and was engaged by heavy anti-tank gunfire from the fort at BIR EL GUBI. Almost at once Major GODSON's tank was hit and the track blown off. The tank continued to fire for a while and was then hit on the turret and silenced, Major GODSON and his operator both being wounded.
Immediately after this Mr. HOLCROFT's tank, which had gone further forward was hit on the turret at close range and all the occupants (Mr HOLCROFT, Tpr MAMMEN and Cpl DIXON) killed, except the driver, who brought the tank out of action. Sgt. HANSFORD and Cpl REDDISH treated Major GODSON's wounds under fire and evacuated him from his tank. He was brought out of battle by a tank of 2 R.G.H. In the meantime Capt. VAUGHAN's and Sgt. MEDLAR's tanks were hit by anti-tank gunfire.
At 1650 the Regiment received orders to encircle GUBI and accordingly rallied at Pt. 181 423369. ‘B’ Sqn was still silent and did not come to the rallying point. The Regiment advanced to 42037 and deployed facing West. Visibility was becoming bad and at 1750 orders were received to close leaguer in the area 424375.
This seems far from the much repeated claim of a brigade tank charge; unsupported yes, charge no!
Regards
Tom