Op Crusader observations and initial lessons learned

[Urmel]

Such as?

[Don Juan]

No codified reference, e.g. BM/AFV/C/10 (which means something specific), no addressee, no initialled signature to indicate authorship, no date to indicate exactly when it was written.

That's just the start, btw.

Even if all those were present, I would still be suspicious.

[MarkN]

Mark,

There are aspects of them that make me suspect that they are fake.

That's an interesting thought.

Who do you think has faked them?

And to what end?


Edited to add....
Do you find the content suspicious too?
I'm intrigued now, notwithstanding the heading and references, what it is that has got your antennae up?

[Urmel]

No codified reference, e.g. BM/AFV/C/10 (which means something specific), no addressee, no initialled signature to indicate authorship, no date to indicate exactly when it was written.

That's just the start, btw.

Even if all those were present, I would still be suspicious.

They are original, unless they were faked by the War Office and then placed in Kew.

[Don Juan]

Mark,

There are aspects of them that make me suspect that they are fake.

That's an interesting thought.

Who do you think has faked them?

And to what end?


Edited to add....
Do you find the content suspicious too?
I'm intrigued now, notwithstanding the heading and references, what it is that has got your antennae up?

Well, the reports back to the War Office during this period emphasized what were considered the two most important problems that had emerged during the fighting:

i) The combustibility of British Cruiser tanks.
ii) The unreliability of the Crusader.

Neither of these are mentioned in these reports, but a lot of very trivial matters are. I suppose saying they are "fake" is OTT, but there is definitely something very odd about them.

[Urmel]

Look at the dates. It is maybe too early for that kind of observation to be passed back.

[MarkN]

Well, the reports back to the War Office during this period emphasized what were considered the two most important problems that had emerged during the fighting:

i) The combustibility of British Cruiser tanks.
ii) The unreliability of the Crusader.

Neither of these are mentioned in these reports, but a lot of very trivial matters are. I suppose saying they are "fake" is OTT, but there is definitely something very odd about them.

The second point about the Crusader is indeed mentionned in part 2. And, to make matters more interesting, it praises the Crusader saying it is "very good", had "little maintenance" and got an all round thmbs up.

[Urmel]

At the rate they were losing them to enemy action, I have no doubts that little maintenance was required.

[MarkN]

At the rate they were losing them to enemy action, I have no doubts that little maintenance was required.

Would that be when they ran into Italian anti-tank guns? The same Italian anti-tank guns that provided little menace during Op COMPASS 12 months earlier?

[Urmel]

22 Armoured Brigade was wiped out by the Italians at Bir el Gobi and the Germans at Sidi Rezegh. It reported 21 tanks operational on 24 Nov, that would have included any survivors from 7 Armoured Brigade as well I would think. They left the battle area that day.
7 Armoured Brigade was wiped out at Sidi Rezegh.
4 Armoured Brigade fielded only M3s until the arrival of Composite Rgt. 22 Armoured Brigade (although I need to check now whether these were M3s or cruisers).

http://rommelsriposte.com/2008/07/16/di ... -armd-bde/

All from memory.

All within six days of the operation starting. There were hardly any cruisers in operation in the first days of December I believe. I'll check my records.

[MarkN]

22 Armoured Brigade was wiped out by the Italians at Bir el Gobi and the Germans at Sidi Rezegh. It reported 21 tanks operational on 24 Nov, that would have included any survivors from 7 Armoured Brigade as well I would think. They left the battle area that day.
7 Armoured Brigade was wiped out at Sidi Rezegh.
4 Armoured Brigade fielded only M3s until the arrival of Composite Rgt. 22 Armoured Brigade (although I need to check now whether these were M3s or cruisers).

http://rommelsriposte.com/2008/07/16/di ... -armd-bde/

All from memory.

All within six days of the operation starting. There were hardly any cruisers in operation in the first days of December I believe. I'll check my records.

22 Armoured Brigade.
Was that the one that had just come out from the UK and had thus benefited from the correct lessons learned by Home Forces on how to do combined arms operations?

[Urmel]

That would be the one. They had been in transit from late July to October.

[Sheldrake]

22 Armoured Brigade was wiped out by the Italians at Bir el Gobi and the Germans at Sidi Rezegh. It reported 21 tanks operational on 24 Nov, that would have included any survivors from 7 Armoured Brigade as well I would think. They left the battle area that day.
7 Armoured Brigade was wiped out at Sidi Rezegh.
4 Armoured Brigade fielded only M3s until the arrival of Composite Rgt. 22 Armoured Brigade (although I need to check now whether these were M3s or cruisers).

http://rommelsriposte.com/2008/07/16/di ... -armd-bde/

All from memory.

All within six days of the operation starting. There were hardly any cruisers in operation in the first days of December I believe. I'll check my records.

22 Armoured Brigade.
Was that the one that had just come out from the UK and had thus benefited from the correct lessons learned by Home Forces on how to do combined arms operations?

MarkN, I think this illustrates the problem - and the point you seem to have missed.

Whatever tactical doctrine Scott Cokburn and his regiments might have practised in the UK was irrelevant when their armour heavy British armoured brigade was committed on its own against a division fighting as a division. The follow eas not a failure of Home forces doctrine,. but of the Eight army for choosing to deploy their army by brigades.

It is the opposite of what happened a year early when the British concentrated their weak forces to defeat the Italian army in detail.

[Urmel]

Well Scott-Cockburn didn't even pull the battery of artillery he had forward into action, and sent his regiments in one by one. So I am reasonably certain that while he was being taught whatever in the Home Forces, he was too busy to listen and process because he was either filling in betting sheets for the 12.30 at Aintree, or reading up on fly-fishing or some other pursuit more appropriate than learning his trade to a double-barrel named Brigadier. Still got a D.S.O. for losing his Brigade in four days, so that's okay then.

[MarkN]

MarkN, I think this illustrates the problem - and the point you seem to have missed.

Whatever tactical doctrine Scott Cokburn and his regiments might have practised in the UK was irrelevant when their armour heavy British armoured brigade was committed on its own against a division fighting as a division. The follow eas not a failure of Home forces doctrine,. but of the Eight army for choosing to deploy their army by brigades.

It is the opposite of what happened a year early when the British concentrated their weak forces to defeat the Italian army in detail.

I agree, it does illustrate the problem, many problems. However, I sense I'm not the one missing the point. Several points.

First, Scott-Cockburn's efforts clearly indicate 'combined-arms' was NOT being practiced, honed and perfected in Home Command as you wish us to believe. He made no use of supporting assets attached directly to his command whatseover. That indicates a complete lack of understanding at a conceptual level. That reality is what points me to my conclusions as to why the British Army never really grasped combined arms warfare to the level that they could, and should.

Second, it seems to indicate that the trials that the field artillery branch of the RA were conducting was not towards a combined arms approach, but more of a traditional insular effort.

Third, it shows what a bad divisional (and later higher) commander Gott was.

Fourth, it indicates yet again the generally poor standard of British Army commanders - and thus the structures and organisation that placed them into such positions.

Fifth, it indicates that the concentration of divisional assets into a relatively small area being considered in the non-fighting Home Forces was not being practised by ME Forces due to the very nature of the actual fighting they were being expected to conduct.


8th Army, as it now was, was conducting rapid manouver across huge distances. The concentration of field artillery in a single location supporting a relatively static division holding a miniscule AO was quite inapproriate.