RASC on the run March - April 1941

[ClintHardware]

In one or four topics in the last two years some stuff has been airborne from the fans about RASC abandoned dumps and panic and buffoonery but not backed up by hard evidence. I have been looking again at files at Kew and have not found the quantity or quality of unreasonable abandonment put about by the DAK advertising staff.

So in the next few days I thought it would be good to put RASC related stuff here to pick over and examine and try to find failings if they exist.

Laters

Clint

PS Hore-Ruthven will be displaying his MSUS Tango during this pub fight.

[nmao]

Bring them on!

[Tom from Cornwall]

Clint,

Yup, looking forward to it.

Regards

Tom

[David W]

Traditionally the French have not been shown in a good light, it will be interesting to see what the facts have to say about them.

If anything I suppose, as they are not RASC.

[ClintHardware]

Thanks Tom, David and Nmao.

The French are relevant and will appear.

This topic is about Field evidence NOT Downing Street Cabinet political crepe which has polluted our understanding for 75 years. If you have Field evidence then join in citing references. Remember the topic where no one found evidence in respect of the men who drove all the way to Cairo on seeing a panzer? Well that is the type of utter crepe that is also not relevant to this topic.

For those of you who like to forget...Don't forget to follow this board's rule to Give References.

Items 1 and 2 below form a CRE Instruction dated 2nd April at 1930 hours found in 3rd Armd Bde's war diary (WO 169/1278): it lacks panic and also refers to the planned withdrawal. Not shown on this item are the details Morshead with Neame, Dill, Wavell and Gambier-Parry began to put together from about the 20th March of responsibilities, positions and intentions of withdrawal when unable to stop an Axis advance without being outflanked at Mersa Brega.

[ClintHardware]

So here is Lieutenant (his rank at the time of the actions reported here) Hore-Ruthven's explanation of the MSUS Tango. This is from AIR 23/6491 - (how's that for reference dropping - Oh! wot am I like?). The report is worth reading through twice because of the detail. What I like about it is the use of logic throughout by Harding and Brown and also H-R's clearly stated logic explained in respect of his decision to destroy the dump and also Harding's statements about movements and times including the possibility of an Axis group being able to pass through between other events.

I also like the lack of panic once again demonstrated. If I had been Hore-Ruthven I think I would have insisted that Mitford stayed with his wireless until more was known. H-R was from the 1st T.H.R. and was one of two Lt.s acting as Liaison Officers with the French on behalf of 2nd Sp. Gp.

It will be interesting to see what you make of it - one way or the other.

[MarkN]

The report is worth reading through twice because of the detail. What I like about it is the use of logic throughout by Harding and Brown and also H-R's clearly stated logic explained in respect of his decision to destroy the dump and also Harding's statements about movements and times including the possibility of an Axis group being able to pass through between other events.

It will be interesting to see what you make of it - one way or the other.

Well, the words look remarkably similar to the "... Downing Street Cabinet political crepe which has polluted our understanding for 75 years."

How bizarre!!!



I guess it's the typeface, font and layout that makes all the difference between "Field evidence" and "Downing Street Cabinet political crepe".

[Urmel]

I have been looking again at files at Kew and have not found the quantity or quality of unreasonable abandonment put about by the DAK advertising staff.

I presume you also haven't found anything contradicting the claims made in the D.A.K. KTB?

[ClintHardware]

Urmel lay out a claim and I'll see what I can do. Where there are failings let us understand them and their context.

Mark - interesting to see Hore-Ruthven's statement not present. Who left it out for Churchill & Co?

Field sources only please and with references.

[Urmel]

I am not accusing the Germans of exaggeration, you are. The KTB makes a clear statement about the staggering volume of booty of all types. You call them advertising staff, not me. You state you haven't found any evidence corroborating this in Kew, but crucially neglect to tell us whether you have found any evidence contradicting it.

So I suggest it is up to you to put up, or leave it, as in the rules of the forum.

[ClintHardware]

Interesting. I will plough on giving both sides where I can. My main German source is CAB 146/10 so please join in if you want to clarify its failings.

All welcome to contribute but Field sources please and references.

[Urmel]

As I said, KTB D.A.K., which you have, states that 'unuebersehbare Beute an Fahrzeugen, Waffen und Munition, und Verpflegung' was made. 'Immense/incalculable/inestimable booty of vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and rations'. If you have something in the Kew documents contradicting this claim, by all means show it.

[Urmel]

Note also that CAB146/10 hardly qualifies as a field source.

[MarkN]

I have been looking again at files at Kew and have not found the quantity or quality of unreasonable abandonment put about by the DAK advertising staff.

The 2nd Armoured Division (note the word underlined and in bold) had, on the morning of 31 March 1941, approximately 150 tanks under command in the forward area. Not all were runners at that point in time, true. Records show that only a handful of those 150 were lost to enemy action and only 3 returned to Tobruk.

Are you sure you haven't found this in your research through the files at Kew?

For an Armoured formation to abandon over 90% of its primary fighting equipment seems to me to be both quantative and qualitative.

[ClintHardware]

As I said, KTB D.A.K., which you have, states that 'unuebersehbare Beute an Fahrzeugen, Waffen und Munition, und Verpflegung' was made. 'Immense/incalculable/inestimable booty of vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and rations'. If you have something in the Kew documents contradicting this claim, by all means show it.

It is a claim but not backed up by British documents. I very much doubt the German statement because the Australians would have needed the weapons and everyone needed the vehicles - so why would they be stored?

If these were Italian weapons and ammunition the British were not using them but the Australians were and they would have been moved to where the Australians needed them closer to Bengahazi. Everyone was using Italian vehicles and no one had more than they needed of British vehicles.

The main concern in respect of Msus from the British standpoint is fuel and Hore-Ruthven dealt with that and so did the KDG who took 5000 gallons leaving very little for 3rd Armd Brigade coming along soon after - so that is the fuel gone but that is not in the German statement.

The German claims and their under reporting of their personnel and equipment losses and damage are a mystery not yet solved. Schorm's statements at least seem raw and honest.

Rommel's seizure of Cyrenaica was a German victory I will not deny that.

My main interest in this topic is to focus on how did CYRCOM actually cope and I want to avoid all the banal summaries we have all seen in books. We are still left with the main evidence of CYRCOM reaching Tobruk before the DAK and intact sufficiently to fight and hold it with some reinforcement. So how did they do that logistically if every book and website keeps saying they collapsed.

I do not trust theories because they encourage us to work with them instead of questioning them - but here is a theory you may question (please do): The mid-1930s exercises to defeat an Italian invasion by retreating to Mersa Matruh to fight the main battle after allowing the Italians to suffer the desert (no metalled road from the border to Mersa Matruh) were not put into effect because the Italians realised they had to pause at Sidi Barrani and forced the British to attack or choose to wait. The same underlying tactics were used by CYRCOM/reformed WDF on the DAK/Axis but were repeated in Libya and there remained the secondary option of falling back to Mersa Matruh to fight the main battle. Holding Tobruk was not decided upon until the 6th April as witnessed by de Guingand who was a spectator at the Wavell Eden Harding Lavarack meeting.

Losing landing grounds in Cyrenaica was a major problem but it did not prove fatal and those landing grounds were not part of British planning when they were working out how to round up 250,000 Italians inside Egypt between 1935 - 1940. Had Rommel followed CYRCOM/reformed WDF to Mersa Matruh in May 1941 he and his officers would have been collected, dined, interviewed, filmed and their three remaining panzers examined.

I will continue to place in this topic evidence of collapse and incompetence as and when I find it alongside successes. I have not yet found incompetence or collapse (no collapse in Harding Brown report which shows logic being used by a junior officer facing great difficulties and consequences) but I have found a lack of resources thanks to the politicians and the Treasury of the mid 1930s.