WO 32/9596 2 Armd Div withdrawal Pt 1

[Gooner1]

That's an interesting approach to take and example to offer up.
First, 6RTR did not engage with any Axis ground forces during this period. Not once. Those casualties were not the product of solid military action, but the product of disorganised and chaotic retreat. A chaos created by the poor decision-making and command performance of the formation
commanders. 6RTR troops got captured after they had been left behind... Oooops!

Second, I'm interested in understanding on what basis the lack of casualties becomes the prime metric in measuring operation military success. Are you sugesting that if 6RTR had taken it upon themselves to run faster and further than everybody else, and paraded in Cairo without losing a single man (ie zero casualties) we should laud them as brilliant military tacticians? That is the natural progression of the approach you are taking.

And finally, since you have access to the 6RTR WD, you will see the CO of 6RTR (LtCol Harland) wanted to go to Mechili as he felt it was the better and more prudent option for his battalion, but was ordered by Rimington to do otherwise.

Rimington "came to the conclusion that there was not enough petrol to reach Mechili, and that the only thing to do was to take his brigade to Maraua. This he did, and some petrol—though not much—was indeed found there." Rimington made the correct decision - the little that was left of 3rd Armoured Brigade was unlikely to make much difference at Mechili where the bulk of 5th Light and Ariete divisions were both headed, apart from add to the bag of prisoners.

If you take the view - and I think with a look at the respective forces it is the only sensible view to take - that defeat of the British was unavoidable, then the metric to look at was how bad was the defeat and could it have been worse. The answer to that is, duh, yeah it could have been worse and, considering that Rommel's offensive did in fact end in failure, the defeat wasn't all that bad either. Nothing like that inflicted upon Italian 10th Army just a few weeks previously.

Oh, and I suspect some of those 6 RTR casualties came from air attacks, so not too laugh at them too much. I take it you would rather 6th RTR had died gloriously fighting a far superior force?

[Tom from Cornwall]

MarkN,

If true, I wonder why any attempt was made to hold Tobruk and Auchinleck/Ritchie set up the Gazala line.

Good questions, I'll see if I can find any British appreciations of where it was possible to hold east and west of the "bulge".

They were a fair distance apart. A point which had negative consequences when compared to Streich/Rommel and the speed of decision making.

Sorry, didn't make myself clear, I was wondering if they were in the same POW camp when Neame produced his report (BTW wasn't that a massive security risk?).

Re 2nd Armoured Division communications - I think there were also considerable problems with 7th Armoured Division communications both forward and rear during COMPASS, it would be interesting to compare the layout and equipment of each. Hence O'Connor being such a front-line commander during COMPASS, it would be interesting to see how far forward Neame, G-P or Rimington went in order to try to clarify what was going on. Incidentally, after CRUSADER there was discussion about the delays in the passing of W/T due to the shortage of cipher operators etc.

Bloody awkward buggers those enemies, aren't they? If only they had the decency to play our game at the pace and location we were comfortable with.

Absolutely I guess one option is to impose such constraints on them that they can only play the game at the pace and location the Allies were comfortable with...

BTW with regard to collecting data of serviceable AFVs and MT to enable the ME Joint Planners to calculate what was logistically possible, the task seems to have been given at this time (Feb 41) to Major David Belchem (source is a quote in "Wavell in the Middle East" by H. Raugh).

Regards

Tom

[MarkN]

Hello Gooner,

Rimington "came to the conclusion that there was not enough petrol to reach Mechili, and that the only thing to do was to take his brigade to Maraua. This he did, and some petrol—though not much—was indeed found there." Rimington made the correct decision - the little that was left of 3rd Armoured Brigade was unlikely to make much difference at Mechili where the bulk of 5th Light and Ariete divisions were both headed, apart from add to the bag of prisoners.

Your extract from Playfair is completely at odds with the 3ArmdBde WD/Uniacke report.
See here:-


Points to note:
1) No fuel at Maraua. Opposite of what Playfair wrote. This alone turns your "Rimington made the correct decision" on its head.
2) 3ArmdBde did have enough fuel to reach Mechili, but not enough to fight once there. Playfair dropping the 3 word subclause "and fight there" completely changes the meaning. Especially when you look at what Rimington was thinking 30 hours earlier.


So, he knew there was fuel at Mechili, and was guessing about fuel at Maraua. There was no fuel at Maraua when he arrived, there was still fuel at Mechili.

Given the additional evidence I've presented, perhaps you see why I totally disagree with your "Rimington made the correct decision".

If you take the view - and I think with a look at the respective forces it is the only sensible view to take - that defeat of the British was unavoidable, then the metric to look at was how bad was the defeat and could it have been worse.

I see. So you have completely bought into the approach that if you think you're going to lose, it's best not to show up at all. And if you're forced to show up, legging it is the correct decision.

Thankfully, 18 Indian Brigade didn't follow your tactical advice at Deir el Shein.

[MarkN]

Hello Tom,

Sorry, didn't make myself clear, I was wondering if they were in the same POW camp when Neame produced his report (BTW wasn't that a massive security risk?).

His report, Neame says, was written in April 1941 and smuggled out of the camp to the US Embassy where it was dispatched to the UK and held by his wife for safe keeping. When he escaped and arrived back in the UK, he produced the document to explain his efforts.

Re 2nd Armoured Division communications - I think there were also considerable problems with 7th Armoured Division communications both forward and rear during COMPASS, it would be interesting to compare the layout and equipment of each. Hence O'Connor being such a front-line commander during COMPASS, it would be interesting to see how far forward Neame, G-P or Rimington went in order to try to clarify what was going on.

The communication problems I posted earlier were primarily human error. 2 Div signallers being incapable of encoding and decoding correctly. The excess chatter on the net was a product of this, which then lead to even more drain on the batteries!!!

[Tom from Cornwall]

MarkN,

The communication problems I posted earlier were primarily human error. 2 Div signallers being incapable of encoding and decoding correctly.

Is that based solely on the 3rd Armd Bde diary, and was that due to insufficient or poor training (either individually or collectively), insufficient numbers of signallers for the number of signals being sent, poor equipment? Have you seen WO169/1150 - 2 Armd Div Signals?

I'm interested in understanding on what basis the lack of casualties becomes the prime metric in measuring operation military success. Are you sugesting that if 6RTR had taken it upon themselves to run faster and further than everybody else, and paraded in Cairo without losing a single man (ie zero casualties) we should laud them as brilliant military tacticians? That is the natural progression of the approach you are taking.

I've been reading about the retreat in Greece, and the way in which excellent intelligence enabled the Allies to withdraw in the face of continual attempts by the Germans to encircle them. Not very "heroic", etc, but an argument can probably be made that in some operations avoidance of encirclement and capture is at least one metric for measuring success.

Regards

Tom

[MarkN]

Hello Tom,

Is that based solely on the 3rd Armd Bde diary, and was that due to insufficient or poor training (either individually or collectively), insufficient numbers of signallers for the number of signals being sent, poor equipment? Have you seen WO169/1150 - 2 Armd Div Signals?

I have not found that complaint or comment anywhere else. The report by the 2 Div Sigs Adj said they did an abslutely wonderful job and any problems that did occur were somebody else's fault. A refrain you ought to be quite familiar with by now.

I've been reading about the retreat in Greece, and the way in which excellent intelligence enabled the Allies to withdraw in the face of continual attempts by the Germans to encircle them. Not very "heroic", etc, but an argument can probably be made that in some operations avoidance of encirclement and capture is at least one metric for measuring success.

It's a comparison with the retreats through Belgium and France that show 2nd Armoured Division up in such a bad light. All of them resulted in the same ending: Germans beat Brits hands down. However, in two of them, they actually had a go of it. One of them, they hardly made an effort, turned and legged it.

[Gooner1]

Your extract from Playfair is completely at odds with the 3ArmdBde WD/Uniacke report.
See here:-


Points to note:
1) No fuel at Maraua. Opposite of what Playfair wrote. This alone turns your "Rimington made the correct decision" on its head.
2) 3ArmdBde did have enough fuel to reach Mechili, but not enough to fight once there. Playfair dropping the 3 word subclause "and fight there" completely changes the meaning. Especially when you look at what Rimington was thinking 30 hours earlier.


So, he knew there was fuel at Mechili, and was guessing about fuel at Maraua. There was no fuel at Maraua when he arrived, there was still fuel at Mechili.

OH: "Petrol for the British tanks was again very low, and by great ill-fortune one convoy which had been sent from Maraua had been destroyed by air attack on 4th April and two more on 5th April."

So there was petrol at Maraua. Probably much of what was there was blown up by Australian demolition parties and/or the Axis air forces before 3rd Armoured Brigade got there.

Given the additional evidence I've presented, perhaps you see why I totally disagree with your "Rimington made the correct decision".

Er, no. If you can provide evidence as to how 3rd Armoured Brigade directed on Mechili wouldn't also end up (mostly) in the bag, then I might think Rimington had got it wrong.

OTOH, the Australian OH has this to say "By coincidence Rimington's decision to route the 3rd Armoured Brigade through Derna had brought the 5th Royal Tanks to the place where they were most needed and could be most effectively employed that day. It was a fitting end for a regiment that had acquitted itself well throughout notwithstanding that its equipment, its supplies and its communications continually broke down."

I see. So you have completely bought into the approach that if you think you're going to lose, it's best not to show up at all. And if you're forced to show up, legging it is the correct decision.

Thankfully, 18 Indian Brigade didn't follow your tactical advice at Deir el Shein.

Funny man. Defeat at the El Alamein position was anything but unavoidable.
I await your prescription on how defence at Mersa Brega could end in anything other than defeat ...

[Tom from Cornwall]

MarkN,

I have not found that complaint or comment anywhere else. The report by the 2 Div Sigs Adj said they did an abslutely wonderful job and any problems that did occur were somebody else's fault. A refrain you ought to be quite familiar with by now.

It does appear that at least in this one respect there was a common doctrine within the British Army at this point.

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

I thought it might be useful to clarify whether Churchill was aware of the strength and training status of the formations assigned to hold Cyrenaica and found a reference to a signal sent by Foreign Secretary Eden to Churchill on 21 Feb 41:

Cyrnaica will be garrisoned by one of the less trained and equipped Australian divisions, India Motor brigade at present under training and one armoured brigade group which represents all remaining at present of 7th Armoured Division. You will remember that this armoured division was never at full strength.

Reference Cable No. 355, 21 Feb 41, PWT, quoted in Raugh's "Wavell: A study in generalship".

I'll see if any further signals were sent referring to the relief of 7th Armd Div by units of 2nd Armd Div.

Also, I'll see if there were any further messages back to UK after Wavell and Dill visited Neame on 17 March 41, at which point Wavell later claimed that he finally realised "the deplorable state of the tanks of 2nd Armoured Division. Only 50% of them were runners, and the organisation of the Italian M.13 tanks was still quite incomplete. Both in Cyrenaica and in Greece, the 2nd Division tanks broke down immediately they were asked to move under service conditions; they were in fact completely worn out before they ever left England". (quoted in same source, p.185).

You would have thought someone might have mentioned this to Wavell, but, then again, someone in GHQ said they didn't need a fully staffed RAC Branch. Oh dear...

Regards

Tom

[MarkN]

OH: "...

OTOH, ...

I assume OH stands for Official History, but I cannot work out what OTOH stands for. Please help!

[MarkN]

I thought it might be useful to clarify whether Churchill was aware of the strength and training status of the formations assigned to hold Cyrenaica and found a reference to a signal sent by Foreign Secretary Eden to Churchill on 21 Feb 41:

Cyrnaica will be garrisoned by one of the less trained and equipped Australian divisions, India Motor brigade at present under training and one armoured brigade group which represents all remaining at present of 7th Armoured Division. You will remember that this armoured division was never at full strength.

Reference Cable No. 355, 21 Feb 41, PWT, quoted in Raugh's "Wavell: A study in generalship".

I'll see if any further signals were sent referring to the relief of 7th Armd Div by units of 2nd Armd Div.

Also, I'll see if there were any further messages back to UK after Wavell and Dill visited Neame on 17 March 41, at which point Wavell later claimed that he finally realised "the deplorable state of the tanks of 2nd Armoured Division. Only 50% of them were runners, and the organisation of the Italian M.13 tanks was still quite incomplete. Both in Cyrenaica and in Greece, the 2nd Division tanks broke down immediately they were asked to move under service conditions; they were in fact completely worn out before they ever left England". (quoted in same source, p.185).

You would have thought someone might have mentioned this to Wavell, but, then again, someone in GHQ said they didn't need a fully staffed RAC Branch. Oh dear...

Wavell made mistakes. He recognised that he'd made mistakes and had the honesty and decency to admit them publically alongside hints at where blame lay elsewhere.

The other generals didn't have the same degree of honesty and decency and preferred to shift blame entirely elsewhere.

Remember, the A13 cruisers would have been knackered on arrival in Mersa el Brega even if they'd arrived in the desert with zero miles on the clock. Moving them to Mersa el Brega was Neame's decision. And he knew the state they were in before he sent them another 400 miles forward. They were not "in fact completely worn out before they ever left England".

[Aber]

OH: "...

OTOH, ...

I assume OH stands for Official History, but I cannot work out what OTOH stands for. Please help!

On The Other Hand

[MarkN]

OH: "...

OTOH, ...

I assume OH stands for Official History, but I cannot work out what OTOH stands for. Please help!

On The Other Hand

Ahhhhhh!

Thank you.

[Attrition]

Interior lines in that neck of the woods didn't work as well as elsewhere.

[ClintHardware]

Well having read the various items and your responses and taking into account the lack of resources in respect of communication, the distances, the timings, the mechanical wear on AFVs as well as soft vehicles before battle - and then looking at the collapsed state of Panzer Regiment 5 (Mark's pantzers) and "M2" 's "considerable" and then "severe" losses witnessed by Schorm and the British and Aussies who did them in but not mentioned by Rommel's officials it just remains to say Well Done CYRCOM you shagged them up well with your worn out kit and your retreat (more mobile than the Axis yo) and then CYRCOM you hammered the phuk out of them at Tobruk with the British Artillery and the Australian rifles and borrowed Italian kit. In addition all of those gruppi and gruppen achieved some concern but phukall on contact (give us numbers if you disagree). Ponath was well unproductive on contact at Derna on the 7th and his own losses quite extreme but not German officially recorded.

Yes Ponath gathered in some resting convoys and yes he had a couple of Generals for breakfast - so what? Really so what? If it was really BIG then Rommel would have had a hotel in Cairo....which one did he manage to book into?

Undermining everything the Axis tried was the fact that they failed to force the combat units to surrender to avoid the hammering the Axis received at Tobruk. Why did they fail to do that? They also failed to destroy significant platoons of the RASC RIASC and AASC - how did they fail to do that?

The damaged Axis kit and their lack of presence on the battlefield at Tobruk are not on the side of those who want to cast blame and scream incompetence in respect of CYRCOM's units and don't attempt to tell us it was the Australian rifles and borrowed 47/32s that did the damage.

Each of you incompetence throwers were not there and yet you really get your rocks off with your glibness and hurried contempt based on deep media propaganda. One of you spells armour as armor ......hmmmm.

If you could convince me with raw data I would be happy to agree with you and tell you so. Where is the data you need because so far it's not cut the cloth your way. Everytime you deny losses and damage on the Axis side (usually because the records are not present if they ever were) you have failed to explain the Axis lack of effect in the Field. Oh but they did gather some desert and some important landing grounds. I'll agree to the landing grounds being a real and substantial loss.

In respect of Mechili - Captain Constant (later Brigadier R.E.) who was there believed it was a good use of time and space to get the Australian 20th and 26th Brigades back to Tobruk. At the moment I agree with him. And don't forget that had always been the expected use of Mechili ever since it was taken and examined in January in respect of Wadi Cuff and Wadi Derna. The three anti-tank batteries got out of Mechili during the fighting. The others less well equipped were unlucky in terms of timing and the weight of the Italian small arms fire and then the arrival of a handful of panzers that forced the issue of surrender after another hour. Many escaped during and after the surrender including 100 men from the 4th Field Squadron R.E. who just got in their transport and shot their way out. Corporal Facer was one of them. Constant got out separately and took a German prisoner en route...

And when you look at the splitting off of Herff and his Wendepunkt party he got played with like a YoYo...yo... and still missed capturing 22nd Guards Brigade or causing them any harm (according to their own war diairies) because they already had a planned withdrawal just like CYRCOM. And CYRCOM followed the WDF tactic in September 1940. And the WDF 1940 tactics were worked out in 1935 due to Abyssinia and exercised accordingly. And the great armour expert O'Connor (Really?) had been commanding the 6th Infantry Division before the WDF....that's a bit odd .....armour....infantry....and then COMPASS. So if a British Infantry Major-General can be promoted to Lieutenant-General and then do COMPASS on the Italians then.... could Lieutenant-General Neame the R.E. guy do similar on 5. leichte Division? OMG. OMG wait a minute... someone tell Peter Jackson we have a movie to make but we will need to squeeze in some New Zealanders for some local colour - we could put them in a truck swearing at the cut glass nicely spoken British officers somewhere on the Via Balbia - lets make it Derna on the 7th April....and then armed with Bredas they could join the 1st KRRC and brass off/up Ponath before getting back into their Italian truck again - Nice.

Jus sayin yo