You wrote, "still there was optimism". Where you use the word "optimism", I use the words "wishful thinking". We are saying the same thing except in one respect: you support their choices and believe them to be appropriate, I take a less biased approach and consider their choices inappropriate and irrational given the context in which they found themselves.xristar wrote:Mark, you speak of an “established history”. What is that? Is there an established English language history of the Greek operations, either against Italy or Germany?
You claim that “that the Greek offensive was not intended to "defeat of the Italians" nor did it offer "any hope of removing the Italians from the equation"”. Where do you base that claim? Certainly, the Greek high command had drawn plans to cover the whole of Albania. The orders issued prior to the April 1941 were such. That the Greek forces would not suffice to implement them became apparent during the early months of 1941. However, already in January, there was the prospect of Yugoslavia joining the offensive in Albania. Mind you that in January the information that the Greek side had was of 15 Italian divisions in Albania. The rate at which the Italians were getting reinforced picked up through 1941. The Greek Army also kept feeding divisions into the fight. It was in February that it became felt that the Italians were getting the upper hand. Still there was optimism.
This is why I say that you rely on hindsight, contrary to your claims. You think of the situation as being static, when in fact everything kept changing.
You also flip reality around thinking that the Greek army was in Albania for nationalistic reasons, and that only post war operation reasons were invented. The truth is rather the opposite. In the discussions held among the senior leadership, things like “liberation” and “not budging an inch” do not appear. Yes, the honour of the Army was a factor, but do not overestimate its influence. The discussions centered around practical factors. Defensive lines, terrain, supply routes (a forgotten parameter, when we discuss of Thessaloniki), balance of forces etc
Greece had sensibly chosen the path of neutrality in an attempt to avoid conflict and war. This approach failed through no fault of its own. After Italy had attacked, Greece quite justifiably decided to defend itself. On the battlefield, the Greek Army outperformed itself and not only managed to halt the Italian advance but also pushed the Italians back. It was so successful, that it even managed to keep pushing them backwards deep into Albania.
At that point in time, it can indeed be said that Greece was involved in a strategic offensive. By strategic I mean specifically that Greece is attempting to achieve a decisive outcome where Italy no longer poses a threat; an outcome where it no longer needs to have the bulk of its armed forces in, or facing, Albania. There is evidence to show that the Greek leadership were considering the terms of an armistace deal with the Italians.
However, by early/mid December, it became apparent to the Greek leaders that a decisive outcome was not going to happen. The Italians had not folded and fled despite their tactical set backs. And Greece simply did not have the resources in manpower, military materiel nor the combat power to overcome that resistance. Where Greece was already at 'full-throttle', Italy had barely scratched the surface of its military potential and had plenty more divisions and resources to throw at the battle if needed. The long term outlook was not good. Before December was out, the Greeks leadership called a halt to their strategic offensive and went onto a more tactically focussed effort to shorten their lines and dig in for the winter. There was no attempt, nor intent, to renew the strategic effort in 1941.
Not only did the Greek leadership have to deal with the actual Italian threat, but it also had to consider the likelihood and potential of a German attack. Greece tried to keep Germany out diplomatically, but, as was written earlier, these two approaches were contradictory not complementary. How can you expect to effect a military and diplomatic humiliation of one partner (Italy) and and the same time assume the other partner (Germany) will sit back and do nothing? The Yugoslav-Greek discussions of the period (October 1940 onwards) show that they saw German occupation of Romania as a threat to, and an advance into, the Balkans - not as part of a major offensive into the Soviet Union. In effect, Greek diplomatic efforts were not to keep Germany out (they were already in), but to try and forestall and delay their encroachment.
Once the decision had been made to bring a halt to the strategic offensive in Albania (a wise choice based on their correct assumption that 'victory' could not be achieved), the Greek leadership in January had to consider how to deal with a likely German attack from Bulgaria AND hold a defensive line against the Italians. During January, they held further discussions about the possibility of British and Empire support, but decided to err on the side of diplomatic caution and not give the Germans cause to speed up their encroachment. At the same time they were in discussions with the Yugoslavs who made no helpful response whatsoever. They, the Yugoslavs, certainly did not consider attacking Albania in January. If the Greek leadership thought it possible at the time, it was erroneous wishful thinking. It looks more like a post war - with hindsight - manipulation of the discussions to justify the strategic choices they made at the time.
Recognising that nobody was coming to their assistance (Yugoslavia refusing and British help being rejected), the military quite sensible looked at the various defensive postures available to them. Their recommendations were made on 8 February. Those recommendations were not followed. Instead of withdrawing to a sensible line that offered the best prospect of success with limited resources, the Greek Army remained dangerously over extended and mutually unsupportive. The lines held in Albania and Macedonia had NOTHING to do with, "taking around practical factors. Defensive lines, terrain, supply routes, balance of forces etc". The lines held were where they stood. Where they stood was where they had managed to advance to or managed to hold. Over two thirds of the Greek Army were dug into untenable positions at the end of horrendous logistic routes through foreign lands. Those lines had nothing to do with pragmatic and rational military thought.
This is a post-war - with hindsight - excuse to 'justify' their choices at the time. Moreover, it is a fear predicated upon an assumption that the Axis will win the war and it would be better to be a client state of, or occupied province of, Nazi Germany than the other suggestions your propose. Do you have evidence to show this was their thinking at the time when they were making their strategic choices?xristar wrote:And let’s speak of the elephant in the room to which I hinted earlier in one of my posts. The Greek side, if not Papagos himself certainly the other senior leaders, always thought of the post-defeat arrangement. The Greek Army preferred to surrender intact and wholesale to Germans if that meant keeping the integrity of the land. Germany had no designs for Greece. Italy and Bulgaria had. Italy wanted to annex the Ionian islands, and propagandized (already pre-war mind you) for giving part of Greek Epirus to Albania (Tsamouria) and creating a Vlach independent state (the Pindos Principality).