Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

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MarkN
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#121

Post by MarkN » 26 Feb 2016, 14:22

Hello xristar,
xristar wrote:Mark, you speak of an “established history”. What is that? Is there an established English language history of the Greek operations, either against Italy or Germany?

You claim that “that the Greek offensive was not intended to "defeat of the Italians" nor did it offer "any hope of removing the Italians from the equation"”. Where do you base that claim? Certainly, the Greek high command had drawn plans to cover the whole of Albania. The orders issued prior to the April 1941 were such. That the Greek forces would not suffice to implement them became apparent during the early months of 1941. However, already in January, there was the prospect of Yugoslavia joining the offensive in Albania. Mind you that in January the information that the Greek side had was of 15 Italian divisions in Albania. The rate at which the Italians were getting reinforced picked up through 1941. The Greek Army also kept feeding divisions into the fight. It was in February that it became felt that the Italians were getting the upper hand. Still there was optimism.

This is why I say that you rely on hindsight, contrary to your claims. You think of the situation as being static, when in fact everything kept changing.

You also flip reality around thinking that the Greek army was in Albania for nationalistic reasons, and that only post war operation reasons were invented. The truth is rather the opposite. In the discussions held among the senior leadership, things like “liberation” and “not budging an inch” do not appear. Yes, the honour of the Army was a factor, but do not overestimate its influence. The discussions centered around practical factors. Defensive lines, terrain, supply routes (a forgotten parameter, when we discuss of Thessaloniki), balance of forces etc
You wrote, "still there was optimism". Where you use the word "optimism", I use the words "wishful thinking". We are saying the same thing except in one respect: you support their choices and believe them to be appropriate, I take a less biased approach and consider their choices inappropriate and irrational given the context in which they found themselves.

Greece had sensibly chosen the path of neutrality in an attempt to avoid conflict and war. This approach failed through no fault of its own. After Italy had attacked, Greece quite justifiably decided to defend itself. On the battlefield, the Greek Army outperformed itself and not only managed to halt the Italian advance but also pushed the Italians back. It was so successful, that it even managed to keep pushing them backwards deep into Albania.

At that point in time, it can indeed be said that Greece was involved in a strategic offensive. By strategic I mean specifically that Greece is attempting to achieve a decisive outcome where Italy no longer poses a threat; an outcome where it no longer needs to have the bulk of its armed forces in, or facing, Albania. There is evidence to show that the Greek leadership were considering the terms of an armistace deal with the Italians.

However, by early/mid December, it became apparent to the Greek leaders that a decisive outcome was not going to happen. The Italians had not folded and fled despite their tactical set backs. And Greece simply did not have the resources in manpower, military materiel nor the combat power to overcome that resistance. Where Greece was already at 'full-throttle', Italy had barely scratched the surface of its military potential and had plenty more divisions and resources to throw at the battle if needed. The long term outlook was not good. Before December was out, the Greeks leadership called a halt to their strategic offensive and went onto a more tactically focussed effort to shorten their lines and dig in for the winter. There was no attempt, nor intent, to renew the strategic effort in 1941.

Not only did the Greek leadership have to deal with the actual Italian threat, but it also had to consider the likelihood and potential of a German attack. Greece tried to keep Germany out diplomatically, but, as was written earlier, these two approaches were contradictory not complementary. How can you expect to effect a military and diplomatic humiliation of one partner (Italy) and and the same time assume the other partner (Germany) will sit back and do nothing? The Yugoslav-Greek discussions of the period (October 1940 onwards) show that they saw German occupation of Romania as a threat to, and an advance into, the Balkans - not as part of a major offensive into the Soviet Union. In effect, Greek diplomatic efforts were not to keep Germany out (they were already in), but to try and forestall and delay their encroachment.

Once the decision had been made to bring a halt to the strategic offensive in Albania (a wise choice based on their correct assumption that 'victory' could not be achieved), the Greek leadership in January had to consider how to deal with a likely German attack from Bulgaria AND hold a defensive line against the Italians. During January, they held further discussions about the possibility of British and Empire support, but decided to err on the side of diplomatic caution and not give the Germans cause to speed up their encroachment. At the same time they were in discussions with the Yugoslavs who made no helpful response whatsoever. They, the Yugoslavs, certainly did not consider attacking Albania in January. If the Greek leadership thought it possible at the time, it was erroneous wishful thinking. It looks more like a post war - with hindsight - manipulation of the discussions to justify the strategic choices they made at the time.

Recognising that nobody was coming to their assistance (Yugoslavia refusing and British help being rejected), the military quite sensible looked at the various defensive postures available to them. Their recommendations were made on 8 February. Those recommendations were not followed. Instead of withdrawing to a sensible line that offered the best prospect of success with limited resources, the Greek Army remained dangerously over extended and mutually unsupportive. The lines held in Albania and Macedonia had NOTHING to do with, "taking around practical factors. Defensive lines, terrain, supply routes, balance of forces etc". The lines held were where they stood. Where they stood was where they had managed to advance to or managed to hold. Over two thirds of the Greek Army were dug into untenable positions at the end of horrendous logistic routes through foreign lands. Those lines had nothing to do with pragmatic and rational military thought.

xristar wrote:And let’s speak of the elephant in the room to which I hinted earlier in one of my posts. The Greek side, if not Papagos himself certainly the other senior leaders, always thought of the post-defeat arrangement. The Greek Army preferred to surrender intact and wholesale to Germans if that meant keeping the integrity of the land. Germany had no designs for Greece. Italy and Bulgaria had. Italy wanted to annex the Ionian islands, and propagandized (already pre-war mind you) for giving part of Greek Epirus to Albania (Tsamouria) and creating a Vlach independent state (the Pindos Principality).
This is a post-war - with hindsight - excuse to 'justify' their choices at the time. Moreover, it is a fear predicated upon an assumption that the Axis will win the war and it would be better to be a client state of, or occupied province of, Nazi Germany than the other suggestions your propose. Do you have evidence to show this was their thinking at the time when they were making their strategic choices?

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#122

Post by MarkN » 26 Feb 2016, 15:12

Some background to what the Greeks were thinking, assuming and intending. Note the position the Greeks were taking with regards to German possible mediation and desired war objectives.

Unashamedly lifted from: Iastrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947, p.273 and p.274.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#123

Post by xristar » 27 Feb 2016, 05:18

MarkN wrote: However, by early/mid December, it became apparent to the Greek leaders that a decisive outcome was not going to happen. The Italians had not folded and fled despite their tactical set backs. And Greece simply did not have the resources in manpower, military materiel nor the combat power to overcome that resistance. Where Greece was already at 'full-throttle', Italy had barely scratched the surface of its military potential and had plenty more divisions and resources to throw at the battle if needed. The long term outlook was not good. Before December was out, the Greeks leadership called a halt to their strategic offensive and went onto a more tactically focussed effort to shorten their lines and dig in for the winter. There was no attempt, nor intent, to renew the strategic effort in 1941.
Mark, the Greek offensive petered out due to extremely bad weather and not due to Italian resistance. The Italians remained at a numerical disadvandage by the start of 1941, as far as I know. Perhaps Jeff has more information.
At any rate, Greece continued to breach the Italian "walls" as they called their defensive lines.
As far as the military potential goes, I am of the oppinion that, while there is no doubt about the vastly greater general potential of Italy compared to Greece, the present infrastructure in Albania placed very finite limitations on how many forces Italy could field in Albabia.
MarkN wrote: They, the Yugoslavs, certainly did not consider attacking Albania in January. If the Greek leadership thought it possible at the time, it was erroneous wishful thinking. It looks more like a post war - with hindsight - manipulation of the discussions to justify the strategic choices they made at the time.
I find the possibility of fighting a simoultaneous operation with the Yugoslavs in Albania clearly mentioned in the report given by the Greek General Staff to the Greek government on 11 January, found in the appendix of one of the volumes of the Greek official histories. I cannot undestand what you are thinking when you say it is "a post war - with hindsight - manipulation of the discussions".
MarkN wrote:The lines held in Albania and Macedonia had NOTHING to do with, "taking around practical factors. Defensive lines, terrain, supply routes, balance of forces etc". The lines held were where they stood. Where they stood was where they had managed to advance to or managed to hold. Over two thirds of the Greek Army were dug into untenable positions at the end of horrendous logistic routes through foreign lands. Those lines had nothing to do with pragmatic and rational military thought.
The Greek Army was attacking in Albania. The lines that the Greek Army was "holding" in Albania were the product of offensive operations that the Greek Army intented to resume.
The Greek line in Macedonia was the product of pre-war examination. Not only was the line Beles-Nestos (the erroneously called "Metaxas" line) the best from a terrain point of view, but it covered the main supply route into Albania, which went through Thessaloniki. The Greek forces in Albania were mostly supplied through Florina and the logistics center established there at the railhead. The rail line from Athens reached until Florina through Central Macedonia, with a junction just west of Thessaloniki.
MarkN wrote:Moreover, it is a fear predicated upon an assumption that the Axis will win the war and it would be better to be a client state of, or occupied province of, Nazi Germany than the other suggestions your propose. Do you have evidence to show this was their thinking at the time when they were making their strategic choices?
When I speak of defeat, I don't necessarily mean ultimate defeat of the Allies, but an immediate defeat of Greece. Based on the evidence I have the Greek government and Papagos himself, seemed to believe in an ultimate British victory. However, the correspodence exchanged during the days leading to the armistice among the senior leadership of the army speak of immediate prospects. The Greek commanders wanted to avoid allowing the Italians to enter Greek soil. How much that affected strategic choices I am not sure. Strategy was determined by the government and the general staff. The government's and Papagos' official stance was to support the British to the end. However, in discussions, Papagos disagreed with the British decision to not deploy on the Beles-Nestos line, and later, by the time that Greek defeat was obvious, Papagos said off the record that the generals should take thing in their hands. Mind you, as far as I know, Papagos has in his book about the war, said that allowing British forces in Greece was a mistake.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#124

Post by jwsleser » 27 Feb 2016, 05:30

I have read Mark’s comments to xristar. I assume that what he wrote is all opinion as nothing is cited and his statement/comments don’t match the historical record.

I will first address this opinion: “However, by early/mid December, it became apparent to the Greek leaders that a decisive outcome was not going to happen…. There was no attempt, nor intent, to renew the strategic effort in 1941.”

This doesn’t match the historical record. I will note here that Mark’s writing is quite interesting. The first sentence is a pretty much a complete misstatement of the reality. The second part is completely false. I will note that throughout his post, nothing is cited to support his contentions.

The “General Survey of Operations in the Balkans in the event of an extension of the war” March 1940 is reprinted in full in Papagos (pages 160-214). This document is important as it guides Greek operations throughout the war. The opening statement in Chapter VI is (page 208-209): “1. The general objective assigned to operations in Albania, (in the general plan of an extension of the war to the Balkans), as outlined in the second chapter of this survey, is the destruction of the Italian forces in Albania within as short a time as possible.” I can provide a large number of other quotes from this document which state or describe the same thing.

The plan outlined in this survey is what was followed. Mark has already stated that the Greeks were trying to defeat the Italians, so I will not elaborate more on this point. As we need to look for the point where the Greeks recognized that their efforts were futile and they…

went onto a more tactically focussed effort to shorten their lines and dig in for the winter. There was no attempt, nor intent, to renew the strategic effort in 1941.

The first sentence is only partially true but is completely separate from the second sentence. The Greeks did focus to some extent on improving their lines (not shortening as an end into itself), and this effort was completely offensive. This was done due to weather and logistics, both of which were seen as temporary by the Greeks. The Greeks had no plans to suspend offensive operations in Albania until the Germans forced such a decision. This understanding is captured in the Tatoi Agreement of 22 February and demonstrated in the information below.

Okay, what were the Greeks actually doing? Large units refer to divisions. All bold is mine unless stated otherwise.

Greek Operational orders.
(Page 92-93, 20 November 1940 see page 83 for date). Since it became evident that the offensive action of the Greek troops was developing favorably in Epirus as well as in the sector of Koritsa, the General Headquarters began to consider the issue of the further continuation of the operations….On the basis of the abovementioned facts, the General Headquarters decided to focus its main effort along the axis Ioannina-Avlonas, without ruling out the additional possibility of exploitation deep inside the northern sector of Koritsa….In the letters of instruction of the Commander in Chief, there was no final definition of the objectives so that the commands may display their initiative, in order to take advantage of their successes until the time limit imposed by the onset of winter, when operations would essentially come to an end.

I posted this piece for several reasons:
-Mark states that during this time the Greek’s were trying to destroy the Italian forces. The orders given to the units were not ‘sweep the Italians out of Albania’ but were operational orders that moved the army in phases.
-That an operational pause would happen due to the winter.
-That the operation wasn’t limited by geographical objectives.

(Page 114) During these meetings [Papgos had toured the Large Units between 2-10 December 1940], the Commander in Chief presented his new intentions and gave instructions with regard to the conduct of further operations. The instructions of the Commander in Chief were formulated in a directive of the General Headquarters, on 12 December, and assigned the following missions:
-The ‘A’ Army Corps was to operate, in order to seize and secure the junction of Tepeleni, seeking, furthermore, to break through the valley of the river Siousitsa [this is the Lumi-Shushices River on modern maps].
-The ‘B’ Army Corps was to operate, in order to seize the junction of Klissoura-Tepeleni as well as the mountains bulks north of Klissoura-Tepeleni.
-The WMFAS was to operate on the basis of the above instructions. Furthermore, it was to consolidate the liaison with the ‘B’ Army Corps and to cover the left flank of the latter from the directions of the valleys of Devolis and Tomoritsa rivers.


The offensive is continued. The Siousitsa River valley is the open terrain that leads to Valona. That would set-up the next phase of the Greek offensive.

(Page 122) According to the General Headquarters instructions and after securing widely the high plateau of Koritsa, the WMFAS would become the powerful pivot around which the ‘A’ and ‘B’ Army Corps would conduct their manoeuuvres in order to seize Avlonas [Valona]. Thus, due to the extreme severity of that winter, as of December 13, the operations of the WMFAS were gradually limited to actions of local significance, which mainly sought to improve the occupied positions and to foothold the enemy forces.
(Page 123) The Greek General Headquarters was facing very serious problems during the same period. The extremely serve weather together with the transportation problems that had arisen, had in many cases created unsurpassable difficulties in resupply and evacuations. Furthermore, there was great need to supplement the shortages that had been created after the two-month expedition, in personnel, pack animals, armament and other war supplies.
Under these circumstances, the General Headquarters decided, at the end of December, to suspend the larger scale offensive operations. However, it did not abandon the local offensive actions, in particular those of the ‘B’ Army Corps, in order to create favorable conditions for the future operations towards Avlonas [Valona].
The above decision of the General Headquarters was disseminated to the Large Units along with instructions, issued on January 6, 1941.
(Page 125-126) The operations of the Large Units until January 6, 1941, were conducted, s already mentioned, in accordance with the General Headquarters instructions of December 12, 1940.
The operations were conducted under adverse conditions, such as severe weather, difficulties in the re-supply and evacuations and great losses due to frostbite which exceeded the casualties of battle. Furthermore, there was a necessity to supplement the shortages, that had arisen after the two-month expedition, in personnel, pack animals, automatic weapons, and supplies – materials of all kinds. The above conditions forced the High Command to suspend, as previously mentioned, the large scale operations.
This decision, which was initially taken on December 28, was later implemented with the general instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, which were issued on January 6, 1941. Through these instructions, it was determined that until the improvement of weather conditions, the large units would take measures to organize the defensive dispositions of their forces to secure the occupied positions and would conduct local operations and preserve the aggressive sprit of their troops.

Here we see that the effect of winter, not the desire of the Greek headquarters, slowed down the Greek offensive. Note these orders were issued in January, nearly a month after Mark stated that the Greek abandoned the offensive because “that a decisive outcome was not going to happen”.

Remember I stated that Mark’s writing is tricky? It is true that a decisive outcome wasn’t going to happen, but that was because of winter, not as Mark states “There was no attempt, nor intent, to renew the strategic effort in 1941.” These passages clearly state that future operation were planned.

But there is more…

[from above in continuation] …the large units would take measures to organize the defensive dispositions of their forces to secure the occupied positions and would conduct local operations and preserve the aggressive sprit of their troops.

In general, the missions of the large units were the following:
-The ‘A’ Army Corps, in the valley of river Zagorias was to limit its activity in pushing the enemy north of Aoos river, in order to safeguard the junction of Klissoura. In the valley of the river Drinos, it was to limit its activity to small scale local operations in order to repulse the enemy towards Aoos and safely block off the valley of Drinos from that direction.
-The ‘B’ Army Corps was to conduct offensive operations in order to seize the junction of Klissoura, to block off the defile of Klissoura from the west and seize the general line Podgorani-Souka-Mali Garonin.
-The WMFAS was to limit its activity to securing the high plateau of Koritsa. Furthermore it was obligated to secure th eliasion witth the ‘B’ Army Corps in the valley of Tomoritsa river and to conduct limited, local operations as appropriate in order to improve positions.


If one looks at the maps, these were al forward movements to secure better terrain for both offensive and defensive purposes.

(page 134) On January 18, the ‘A’ Army Corps submitted its proposal to the General Headquarters, regarding the continuation of the operations towards Avlonas without the support of the V Division, provided that the ‘B’ Army Corps would first seize and hold the area of Glava as far as the river Aoos. The General Headquarters deemed the assumption of offensive operations by the ‘A’ Army Corps was not possible in the immediate future and placed, as mentioned, the V Division at the disposal of the ’B’ Army Corps.

I provide this to again show that future offenses were anticipated. Mark will try to state that this supports his argument, but only if one ignores all the references to weather and not the strategic situation, caused the pause in Greek operations.

I have already discussed the following, but here is the quote:

The General Headquarters, by its orders of February 12, assigned the EFAS with the co-ordination of the operations of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ Army Corps for the seizure of Avlonas. The missions of the Army Corps…

Here we find the Greek Army directing a major offensive effort two months after Mark stated that the Greeks had given up offensive operations. The order is also 4 days after the ‘supposedly’ new assessment’ done by the Greek Army on 8 Feb (more on this comment later).

The Greek Army had plans to continued offensive operations to achieve the objective laid forth in the 1940 Survey. The Greeks understood that complete defeat of the Italian force was the best way to resolve their strategic situation. The Greek had not abandon such designs in early to mid December, but continued to pursue this aim.

Whether or not this was the best decision is not what I am arguing. Mark’s opinion is based on the belief that the Greeks themselves felt that abandoning the offense against Italy was the best course of action. As I have shown here, that is not a true statement.

Pista! Jeff
Last edited by jwsleser on 27 Feb 2016, 05:59, edited 6 times in total.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#125

Post by jwsleser » 27 Feb 2016, 05:52

I stated I would come back to this.

I was not surprised when Mark trotted this argument out once again.
“Recognising that nobody was coming to their assistance (Yugoslavia refusing and British help being rejected), the military quite sensible looked at the various defensive postures available to them. Their recommendations were made on 8 February. Those recommendations were not followed. Instead of withdrawing to a sensible line that offered the best prospect of success with limited resources, the Greek Army remained dangerously over extended and mutually unsupportive. The lines held in Albania and Macedonia had NOTHING to do with, "taking around practical factors. Defensive lines, terrain, supply routes, balance of forces etc". The lines held were where they stood. Where they stood was where they had managed to advance to or managed to hold. Over two thirds of the Greek Army were dug into untenable positions at the end of horrendous logistic routes through foreign lands. Those lines had nothing to do with pragmatic and rational military thought.”
I will again point him to the jwsleser » 21 Feb 2016 12:46 post. He has yet to provide evidence that 1) the courses of action were present on 8 February; 2) that the COAs reflect Greek Army COAs without any outside assistance.

As for the rest of his statement, it is merely his opinion. That fact the he continues to repeat points that have been disproved in support his argument demonstrates the flaws in his opinion.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#126

Post by jwsleser » 27 Feb 2016, 17:18

Up to this point in the discussion, I have been mainly responding to Mark’s argument, pointing out the flaws and inconsistencies. I will now offer a few of my own thoughts about the nature of this argument.

The issue appears to be ‘did Papagos focus too much on defeating the Italians or should he have refocused on the German threat?’ A secondary issue appears to be ‘what role did protecting all the Greek homeland play in the decisions of the time?’ The latter question is in response to Mark’s ‘wishful thinking’ comments as he sees that motivation at the root of Papagos’ decision-making. You can’t answer the second until you answer the first. The first is an action, the second is a motive.

I approached this question with the following rule: All the arguments expressed by the participants at the time for and against are valid. The question is not whether one was right or wrong but which was better/more important/greater impact. I refuse to judge whether the military experts of the time were correct in their thinking unless a ‘smoking gun’ can be presented. For example, issue of the morale of the Greek Army. I have no doubt that this was a valid concern. Whether the issue of morale was more important than withdrawing the army can certainly be discussed, but the issue of morale itself can’t simply be dismissed.

To answer these two questions one must make an assumption by answering another question: Can the Allies defeat the Axis? Defeat here is defined as retaining part of Greece that can be sustained for an extended period of time. This is not the same as retaining part of Greece for a limited period of time to increase Axis causalities. That is defeat.

This is am important question to answer as the military actions needed to defeat the enemy could be different from those actions designed to prolong the fight to cause greater Axis inconvenience (they might not be different under some conditions/assumptions). Mark has made his position on this question quite clear, Papagos and the UK clearly believed differently. As the historical decisions were made under a different understanding of the situation than what Mark believes, you can’t say that that Papagos was irrational, delusional, or guilty of wishful thinking by stating his decisions were wrong based on Mark’s understanding.

This is why Mark has spent so much time offering rationalizations with very few facts. He needs to demonstrate that Papagos had the opportunity to recognize that Mark’s understanding is valid and thereby placing any of Papagos’ decisions after that point as irrational. This he has failed to do.

Without a common understanding of how to approach the issues and agreeing on the assumptions upfront, further discussion is meaningless.

For me, Papagos’ actions/decisions between 28 October 1940- 2 March 1941 are sound, rational, and quite consistent. He was fully aware of the geo-political and military situation in both Greece and the Balkans. He wasn’t guilty of wishing thinking, being delusional, etc. While I am still undecided, I see issues with the UK's understanding of the situation in the Balkans, and therefore their analysis/recommended actions.

It is the period 2-4 March that is of greater interest. I see this as a change where Mark wishes to see it as merely a continuation. Why did Papagos decide not to occupy the Alaikmonas Line? Why did the UK compromise instead of forcing the issue? Why did the UK government agree to continue its military support?

We can’t discuss these issues because of the inconsistencies in Mark’s position. Why is it okay for the UK to commit military forces to a risky venture (support to Greece) but it is not okay for Papagos to commit military forces to a risky venture (support to Yugoslavia)? This question is directly tied to the question of whether Greece can win. The answer can be seen as rational or irrational depending on that answer. Since Mark rejects the possibility of Yugoslavia (despite the historical record by using hindsight and his opinion), there is no ability to discuss the decisions.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#127

Post by MarkN » 29 Feb 2016, 17:11

Hello xristar,
xristar wrote:Mark, the Greek offensive petered out due to extremely bad weather and not due to Italian resistance. The Italians remained at a numerical disadvandage by the start of 1941, as far as I know. Perhaps Jeff has more information.
At any rate, Greece continued to breach the Italian "walls" as they called their defensive lines.
As far as the military potential goes, I am of the oppinion that, while there is no doubt about the vastly greater general potential of Italy compared to Greece, the present infrastructure in Albania placed very finite limitations on how many forces Italy could field in Albabia.
Strategic success, ie defeating the Italians completely or achieving a lasting peace in Greece's favour, had been lost before the decision was made on 28 December. The weather sealed the actual timing, but it did not seal the outcome. Tactical advances continued without pause somewhere along the front. The weather did not prevent an offensive, it slowed everything down and made it so much more difficult. As of 28 December, the strategic offensive was over. The attempt to win the war was over. That didn't stop further tactical offensives.
xristar wrote:I find the possibility of fighting a simoultaneous operation with the Yugoslavs in Albania clearly mentioned in the report given by the Greek General Staff to the Greek government on 11 January, found in the appendix of one of the volumes of the Greek official histories. I cannot undestand what you are thinking when you say it is "a post war - with hindsight - manipulation of the discussions".
The Greeks certainly brought up this suggestion in January 1941. It was flatly rejected by the Yugoslavs. It was based upon previous Triple-Entente military discussions. Since it was completely rejected by Yugoslavia, and that was never going to change with Prince Paul in charge - known at the time, it is irrational to make any plans or defensive assumptions on the expectation that Yugoslavia might change its mind.

Now, your wrote, "However, already in January, there was the prospect of Yugoslavia joining the offensive in Albania." There was no prospect at all. It was flatly rejected. It is manipulation of the nature of the discussions to change propose-reject into prospect.
xristar wrote:The Greek Army was attacking in Albania. The lines that the Greek Army was "holding" in Albania were the product of offensive operations that the Greek Army intented to resume.
That may well be true. However, please take into consideration your own words, "everything kept changing". The defensive posture adopted in January, or February or March had to suit the context at that time.

In February/March, it is irrational to hold a defensive posture based upon the wishful thinking that Yugoslavia may change its mind and attack the Italians in Albania.

In February/March, it is irrational to hold a defensive posture based upon the one's own offensive plans of 4-5 months earlier that one has already brought to a halt.

The lines held in Albania were not rational or sound militarily given the context of an expected German attack from Bulgaria. The lines were held primarily because...
Papagos wrote:It was a question of honour for the Greeks; [ I ] would rather be stabbed in the back by Germans than pushed in front by the Italians.
xristar wrote:The Greek line in Macedonia was the product of pre-war examination. Not only was the line Beles-Nestos (the erroneously called "Metaxas" line) the best from a terrain point of view, but it covered the main supply route into Albania, which went through Thessaloniki. The Greek forces in Albania were mostly supplied through Florina and the logistics center established there at the railhead. The rail line from Athens reached until Florina through Central Macedonia, with a junction just west of Thessaloniki.
Please remember your own words, "everything kept changing."

The defensive line in Macedonia was designed to keep out the Bulgarian Army. It was predicated upon an attacker not being able to come down the Vardar Valley from Gevgelija.

In 1941, the threat was not from a Bulgarian Army with practically no air power nor land mobility, it was from the Wehrmacht wth an abudance of both.

The vulnerabilty of the rail line to Florina having to pass east of the Vermian Mountains before doubling back at Edessa, should have been a key motivator to shorten the logistic lines to and in Albania. ie. Draw the forces back towards better logistic routes, known infrastructure and depots. This was not recognised, or if it was, it was ignored because standing on the new Greek border including Northen Epirus became the imperative for reasons of national pride.
xristar wrote:When I speak of defeat, I don't necessarily mean ultimate defeat of the Allies, but an immediate defeat of Greece. Based on the evidence I have the Greek government and Papagos himself, seemed to believe in an ultimate British victory. However, the correspodence exchanged during the days leading to the armistice among the senior leadership of the army speak of immediate prospects. The Greek commanders wanted to avoid allowing the Italians to enter Greek soil. How much that affected strategic choices I am not sure.
Remember?
Papagos wrote:It was a question of honour for the Greeks; [ I ] would rather be stabbed in the back by Germans than pushed in front by the Italians.
Also, remember that if an Allied victory is to occur (as it did) any Bulgarian or Italian division of Greece would be overturned. The fear of a permanent division of Greece is associated with an assumption that the Axis will be victorious.
xristar wrote: Strategy was determined by the government and the general staff. The government's and Papagos' official stance was to support the British to the end. However, in discussions, Papagos disagreed with the British decision to not deploy on the Beles-Nestos line, and later, by the time that Greek defeat was obvious, Papagos said off the record that the generals should take thing in their hands. Mind you, as far as I know, Papagos has in his book about the war, said that allowing British forces in Greece was a mistake.
More post-war waffle to explain away the decisions made at the time.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#128

Post by MarkN » 02 Mar 2016, 14:44

When analysing the Greek offensive into Albania, it is always a jolly good idea to understand why they were there in the first place.

So,
... what were Greece's strategic goals/war aims when they went onto the offensive in November 1940? and,
... how were they planning to achieve them?

What does Papagos have to say about this in his book? (And no, this has not already been posted in this thread.)

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#129

Post by jwsleser » 03 Mar 2016, 02:59

When analysing the Greek offensive into Albania, it is always a jolly good idea to understand why they were there in the first place.

So,
... what were Greece's strategic goals/war aims when they went onto the offensive in November 1940? and,
... how were they planning to achieve them?

What does Papagos have to say about this in his book? (And no, this has not already been posted in this thread.)
I will answer this in a day or two in order to prepare a comprehensive response. I won't limit myself to Papagos' book.

And yes, it has been answered. You just didn't like the answer. :wink:

And no, there will not be a comprehensive, detail plan on what the entire operation was to look like. Strategic planning doesn't work that way.

BTW, please review the definitions and use of the terms strategic and operational.

There no such thing as a strategic offensive. The Greek strategic goal to defeat the Italian forces. The Greek means of measurement to determine whether they had succeeded is to push the Italians out of Albania. To do so they would use the operational offense to achieve that goal. Note that if they decided that means of measurement for success was preventing occupation of any part of Greece, they would have adopted the operational defense with tactical attacks.

Historically they started on the operational defense and then transitioned to the operational offensive once they had taken the initiative from the Italians. Weather and losses forced an operational pause combined with tactical attacks. The Greeks went onto the operational defense when the Italians launched their Primavera offensive to regain the initiative. The Greeks then attempted to return to the operational offensive, but the German offensive put the Greeks back on the operational and tactical defense.

The Greeks hadn't abandoned their strategic goal of defeating the Italians by mid February. A good question is whether, by accepting UK assistance on 22 February, did this indicate that they had now abandoned their strategic goal of defeating the Italians and transition to a strategic goal of defensively retaining part of Greece?

Their actions on 6-7 April indicate that they might not have.

Pista! Jeff
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#130

Post by jwsleser » 04 Mar 2016, 02:00

I hope this addresses your question. Please ask if it doesn't.

The General Survey of Operations in the Balkans in the event of an extension of the war (March 1940) is the Greek’s version of a ‘Führer’s Directive’. This document sets strategic goals, conditions, and resources for the Greek military. As Greece was currently neutral at the time, the document was structured to examine multiple options and provide guidance needed to develop operational plans. I provided a list of the documents chapters in an earlier post, so will not list them here. I will provide the guidance for the case that the Greeks focused on in their operational planning.

Operations against Albania:

Chap VI.1. "The general objective assigned to operations in Albania, (in the general plan of an extension of the war to the Balkans), as outlined in the second chapter of this survey, is the destruction of the Italian forces within a short a space of time as possible".

2. "Although this objective is the same as that assigned to operations in Bulgaria, nevertheless the conduct of operations against Albania is different from that affecting Bulgaria for reasons which are explained below."

Synopsis of the following paragraphs.

2.a. Commencement of operations: Where it is desirable to initiate operations against Bulgaria, the initiative must be given to Italy in Albania. IBWs, Greece would await an Italian attack. Discussion of why is included. Note Chapter 2 indicated that Greek forces wouldn’t be fully mobilized.

2.b. Forces required: Because Italian forces in Albania can be reinforced before Italy initiates operations, “...to an extent which is quite impossible to predict, thus making any present forecast practically impossible.

2.c. Question of manoeuvre: Not able to predict the force ratio at the start of the war, “Therefore in the case of Albania, it is likely that at first we should have to reckon with defensive operations to be switched subsequently to offensive action.”

3. Analysis of defensive and offensive operations is provided in the following paragraphs. “The subject of forces is not discussed because we cannot tell what the size of the Italian troops in Albania at the time is likely to be.

4. and 5. Defense. Detailed discussion of Greek minimum lines of resistance (what is called today the no-penetration line) based on five possible enemy lines of operations.

6. Offense. Two lines of Greek operations. From Epirus to capture Valona; from western Macedonia to capture Durazzo. Detail discussion of avenues of approach in each of the LOOs.

This document provides the strategic framework for operational planning. The plan that emerged from this document was the Italian-Bulgaria (IB) b plan. IB.b was a modification of the original IB plan. IB placed the main Greek defense just forward of their self-identified ‘minimum line of resistance’. IB.b moved the main line of resistance forward closer to the border. This was based on the defensive improvements accomplished since IB was written and addressed the massing of Italia forces in the Epirus sector.

From the assessment in September 1940 and the strong indicators that Bulgaria would remain neutral, the Greek High Command decided to allot the necessary forces to launch an offensive after the Greeks completed mobilization. A detailed discussion of the Greek objectives and LOOs are discussed in Papagos pages 252-255. Overall the Greeks would secure the high ground around Korista and the lateral roads, then use that area as a pivot for the left wing to advance to seize Santi Quaranta and Valona.

Papagos Page 261. “The Italian invasion didn’t alter the general aims of the Greek High Command. These remained as outlined in Chapter II, and for their execution the following measures were taken:” Detail discussion followed.

The Greeks launch their offensive on 14 November. By 8 December they had succeed in securing the Korista high ground and the lateral roads. “When it became apparent that this objective was on the point of being realized, the Greek High Command, true to its original decisions and anxious to maintain the initiative and exploit Greek successes to the utmost, assigned a new objective for the purpose of securing the Klissoura and Tepelini junctions.” This is the next series of operational objectives as part of the offensive. Detailed discussion of the LOOs.

By 28 December the usually serve weather had slowed the Greek offensive and the Greek decided to take an operational pause to improve logistics. By 1 January they were on the offensive once again. See page 292.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#131

Post by MarkN » 05 Mar 2016, 12:44

There is nothing there to inform us what the strategic objective / war aim was of the November 1940 offensive into Albania.

The March 1940 Greek internal study proposes to defeat the Italians decisively (the ENDS), by, "the destruction of the Italian forces in Albania within as short a time as possible" (the WAYS). Where "as short a time as possible" is a necessary planning assumption not a desired outcome given the need to deny Italy the opportunity to reinforce Albania. This is repeated a couple of pages later where the ways are expressed as, "...throwing [the Italians] into the sea as quickly as possible."

Part 2, Chapter I descibes the Mobilisation Plan and the Operational Plan. Note the plan is described as, "defensive on both fronts".

Part 2, Chapter II descibes the tensions between Italy and Greece between the spring of 1940 and the 28 October attack. Within this chapter is a summary of a possible counter-offensive (devised during September 1940) into Albania. It mentions lines of advance and extent of advance. It shows that the offensive is limited and explicitly states that key parts of Albania will remain in Italian hands. ie. a recognition and understanding that the Italians will not be prevented from reinforcing, nor decisively destroyed/destructed, nor pushed into the sea. The strategic objective or war aim of this (geographically) limited offensive is not defined.

Part 2, Chapter III describes the first phase of the war, the Italian advance and Greek hold. The quote on p.261 of the English edition, “The Italian invasion didn’t alter the general aims of the Greek High Command. These remained as outlined in Chapter II, and for their execution the following measures were taken:” (my bold) refers back to the September 1940 thoughts where no strategic objective or war aim was stated. It does not refer back to the March 1940 study which is found in the Appendices to Part 1 of the book.


Edited to add:
The General Survey of Operations in the Balkans in the event of an extension of the war (March 1940) is not a Greek version of a "Führer Directive". It bears no resemblance whatsoever in terms of authority or decisive intent to implement. It is merely an internal military staff study of hypothetical efforts in hypothetical future scenarios. Führer Directives came with political intent and executive power.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#132

Post by jwsleser » 06 Mar 2016, 00:55

From reading your comments, I feel we need to address this point of yours. Clearly if this is an issue, there is no sense in continuing.
The General Survey of Operations in the Balkans in the event of an extension of the war (March 1940) is not a Greek version of a "Führer Directive". It bears no resemblance whatsoever in terms of authority or decisive intent to implement. It is merely an internal military staff study of hypothetical efforts in hypothetical future scenarios. Führer Directives came with political intent and executive power.
As I stated early on in this discussion, we lack the actual Greek planning documents. What we do have are documents that were approved by Metaxas, certainly informed any planning, clearly tells us how the Greek High Command was thinking, and predicts the actual course of operations followed by the Greeks during the war. Until one of us can product the actual plans, we have what we have.

We aren’t discussing Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. Ioannis Metaxas didn’t take the portfolio of Minister of War or chair the military high command. Many of the functions under the 4th of August Regime followed democratic processes. Planning memorandums, studies, surveys, etc. would be presented and approved. We see this process in action with the documents we do have.
It is merely an internal military staff study of hypothetical efforts in hypothetical future scenarios. Führer Directives came with political intent and executive power.
Fuhrer Directives are also hypothetical efforts in hypothetical future scenarios. Felix, Attila, Isabella were all hypothetical efforts for hypothetical future scenarios. Should I mention Sea Lion? Marita was originally hypothetical. The difference is whether a directive was executed or not. It is a tool to provide guidance for planning. It is not an operation order, but allows the writing of an operation order to begin. It is the first step, not the final product. It doesn't mean the operational will happen. Countries maintain many OPLANS but how many become OPORDS?

The Survey certainly provides planning guidance. The issue is whether the Survey is the guidance that was actually carried out. If it is, then it is exactly the same as a directive.

As for the authorized/approved part, Papagos submitted the survey as part of the memorandum to the President of the Government on 13 March 1940. This memorandum was to authorize planning and coordination with the Allies. It was approved. To say that such a document would be approved which ran counter to Greek strategic thinking/planning is saying a lot that is unsupported by anything. The fact that it predicts future Greek actions speaks to the validity of the document.

If you disagree with the comparison, no issue on my part. Understand that this document (or something quite similar) guided Greek operational planning.

From Part II, Chapter 1 (page 241).
When the time came for it to be put into operation, this Plan would not be rigidly adhered to but would be put adapted to the realities of the hour. Depending on the size of the forces whom the Italians High Command might use in its attacks against us, on the Italian offensive dispositions and on the results of enemy air action, a choice would be made in the positions where the Greek forces might resist both in W. Macedonia and in Epirus and their new objectives would be defined. Depending on a clarification of the Bulgarian attitude, on the possibility of drawing forces from the Bulgarian front for the benefit of the Albanian front, on our new potentialities towards Italy, etc., the Plan of Operations, from being originally defensive, would at an opportune moment be converted into a offensive plan. The necessary conditions would then be created and the concentration of the required forces secured for this purpose.
Part II Chapter 2 (page 252). As I previously stated in my previous post above, the situation was reassessed in September 1940 and due to the strong indicators that Bulgaria would remain neutral, the Greek High Command decided to allot the necessary forces to launch an offensive after the Greeks completed mobilization. A detailed discussion of the Greek objectives and LOOs are discussed in Papagos pages 252-255. Overall the Greeks would secure the high ground around Korista and the lateral roads, then use that area as a pivot for the left wing to advance to seize Santi Quaranta and Valona.

So why would a plan be changed from basically defensive to offensive two months before the war started unless some higher strategic guidance/appreciation was in place? If the defensive plan met the Greek strategic goals, why change? We have abundant evidence that the Greeks believed that the Italians could only be counter with offensive action. We have the historical events demonstrating the Greeks executing such an offensive. The LOOs outlined in the study were the ones actually used in Nov 40-Feb 41.

The plan was modified in September 1940 and was no longer ‘basically defensive’. This change fits neatly into the strategic appreciation/study we have been using during this discussion. That study stated that the conditions at the time would determine changes in the plan.

If the Greek plan was truly defensive only and there was a no strategic framework in place supporting such a change, the Greeks were able to put together an operational-level offensive in the matter of days. That is just as good or better than the Germans. And this was done by an outdated army supposedly fighting the last war and not capable of ‘modern’ war, led by a General who was irrational, confused, deceitful, etc.

I would rather believe that the Greeks had a strategic framework already in place as I have been presenting and all the materials we currently have available support.

Please feel free to research the Greek archives and present something different.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#133

Post by MarkN » 06 Mar 2016, 12:12

Lot's of misdirection and straw men, but still nothing on what the strategic objective/war aim of the offensive commenced in November 1940 was.

The March 1940 study cannot be equated with a directive since it relies to a large extent on the cooperation and participation of Yugoslavia and Romania over whom Greece has no authority to direct. The March 1940 study was an internal Greek military staff study of hypothetical efforts in hypothetical future scenarios.

The September 1940 thoughts on how to manouver describe staged tactical objectives that take an advance as far as Valona in the south and Elbasan in the north. So what was the purpose of these tactical manouvers? What was the strategic object/war aim that the Greeks expected to achieve by reaching Valona and Elbasan? In reaching Valona and Elbasan they have not prevented from reinforcing, nor decisively destroyed/destructed, nor pushed into the sea the Italians. It is a long way short of the desired end state depicted in the March 1940 study.
I would rather believe that the Greeks had a strategic framework already in place as I have been presenting and all the materials we currently have available support.

I'm sure you would rather believe that. Problem is, your belief is not evidenced despite your attempt to join dots together that are not there.

The March 1940 study stated the war aim clearly. The September 1940 thoughts on manouver do not state the war aim and merely present some tactical manouvers to reach defined points without defining the purpose of these manouvers. Papagos does not state that the actual November effort was intended to be in line with the March study; he wrote that it was to be in line with the September thoughts on tactical manouvers.

Please feel free to research the Greek archives and present something different.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#134

Post by jwsleser » 06 Mar 2016, 16:31

As I said, we have what we have. Since it is not good enough for you, okay.

As you have no idea what the Greeks plans were (strategic goals, operational orders, etc.), you have no idea what Papagos was thinking or doing. You have no idea what he said to the King, the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, etc.

You simply have no idea on anything.

You are trying to connect dots you don’t have….

You are the one trying to make some big pronouncement on the motivation and thinking of Alexander Papagos yet…

-You don’t have a copy of Papagos’ book that you can read

-You don’t have a copy of the Greek official history.

-You don’t any of the Greek official documents.

-You don’t have any of the Greek orders

-You don't have anything on the Italian side which might inform you of the actual state of the Italian war effort.

-You reject any/all modern scholarship so you don't have Bitze or Carr or any of the other books that address Greece's war efforts and not Germany's or the UKs.

-You have no idea how military orders are written.

You have nothing.

So how can one make some grand statement that is counter to the current scholarship about the MOTIVATION and THINKING of a man?

By saying things like...
MarkN » 13 Jan 2016 06:39 Interestingly, Papagos writes post war that it would take 20 days to move these troops to new positions. That, to me, sounds like more historical revisionism which appears prolific in his and others' writings on the matter. Nevertheless, it was not an overnight task and needed a fair amount of time to effect satisfactorily. Something they never started. In fact, the sent an additional division to strengthen the East Macedonian army!

MarkN » 29 Jan 2016 07:29 I question the soundness, coherence and credibility of this [the Greek official history] . Completely. It is part of a post war narrative that represents the pre-Marita analysis of the Greek military (Papagos alone or collectively?) and their intentions in each scenario.

There are others
If one merely dismisses what others have put forth without any serious research, anything can be true.

So who is the one here using misdirection and strawmen? All you doing is begging the question. No support/proof for your position.

I can address your other points but not worth the time.

Please free to do some real research for a change.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#135

Post by MarkN » 06 Mar 2016, 21:00

I see, you're back to the ad hominem attacks again.

Do you have any document or written source from a participant at the time that identifies precisely what the Greek war aim/strategic objective was when they commenced their offensive in November 1940?

If not, on this point, you have no more than I. So why the need for the hissy fit and ad hominem approach?

I guess you don't have anything. Hence the reason why you felt the need to (deliberately) misrepresent the purpose, authority and relevence of the March 1940 study in an attempt to satisfy your, "[belief] that the Greeks had a strategic framework already in place". Why? Could it be because that is the only document/reference you have which expresses a war aim.

Indeed, what does Carr say about Greece's war aim/strategic objective (Carr, The Defence and Fall of Greece 1940-1941, pp79-80)?

Image
Image

Hardly a resounding statement confirming what the war aims was - or that it had even been determined!!!! Not only that, but includes hints to the 'national pride' angle again.

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