Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

[jwsleser]

I see, you're back to the ad hominem attacks again.

No, stating facts and quoting you.

Do you have any document or written source from a participant at the time that identifies precisely what the Greek war aim/strategic objective was when they commenced their offensive in November 1940?

Since I have stated that several times before that I don't, why are you asking the question?

If not, on this point, you have no more than I.

As I am not trying to prove anything, I made my point. You don't have anything.

So why the need for the hissy fit and ad hominem approach?

Hissy fits. Cute. Are you here all week?

RE: Strategic goals. I stated that Mark doesn’t understand strategic goals. Here is the Full Text of Marita.http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Do ... /FD_20.htm

Note there is little difference between this and what I quoted from the Memorandum/Survey. Oh by the way, Hitler had to issue another directive to deal with Crete. Maybe his first directive was too restrictive?

But let’s look at a strategic mission that isn’t from Hitler, a dictator that was a micromanager. Here is the instruction given to Eisenhower by the United Nations.

Page 53 (page 78 using the .pdf sliding tab) http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/ ... ub_7-1.pdf

Pretty general.

Then there is this comment of Mark’s.

What was the strategic object/war aim that the Greeks expected to achieve by reaching Valona and Elbasan? In reaching Valona and Elbasan they have not prevented from reinforcing, nor decisively destroyed/destructed, nor pushed into the sea the Italians. It is a long way short of the desired end state depicted in the March 1940 study.

Two comments to make on this.

1. I had remarked on several occasions that one must read Mark’s statements carefully because he likes to change things. Here is another. Papagos stated Valona and Durazzo. I posted Valona and Durazzo. He didn’t say Elbasan. I didn't post Elbasan.

2. Valona and Durazzo are the two ports capable in supporting a large military force. In fact, Durazzo by itself lacks the capacity to maintain a large force. Anyone that has studied this campaign (or the WW1 campaign that was mentioned early in this discussion) knows this. Italy can’t reinforce or supply their forces without these ports.

But Mark makes a point that the value of capturing these two ports is unknown. So that means either:

1. Mark has no idea of the military significant of the ports (and military operations in general).

2. Mark is playing the game of ‘if the Greeks didn’t say it directly, it doesn’t count'.

Did I mention we don't have the Greek orders and plans?

Here is the disconnect. Mark can state that Papagos was incompetent, irrational, deceitful, etc. without a single piece of evidence, but he can infer all day from actions and third party comments. I present actual documents that clearly indicate his thinking, but they are discarded because they were used as a basis for Balkan talks and Papagos didn't state why capturing the two ports was important, etc.

RE: Carr. Carr states he doesn’t know. If you had actually read Carr, he would know that he doesn’t discuss the Greek planning to any degree. No discussion of their prewar planning, no detail discussion of the discussions with the Balkan states. Nothing.

Yet he states the ‘vital port of Vlore’. Why is it vital?

To end this post, I will state again that I am not trying to prove anything. All I am doing is pointing out that all Mark has is attempting to reinterpret know facts without anything that allows him to do so. I certainly feel that March 1941 is worth investigating. Before then, we need a lot more data.

[MarkN]

What was the strategic object/war aim that the Greeks expected to achieve by reaching Valona and Elbasan? In reaching Valona and Elbasan they have not prevented from reinforcing, nor decisively destroyed/destructed, nor pushed into the sea the Italians. It is a long way short of the desired end state depicted in the March 1940 study.

Two comments to make on this.

1. I had remarked on several occasions that one must read Mark’s statements carefully because he likes to change things. Here is another. Papagos stated Valona and Durazzo. I posted Valona and Durazzo. He didn’t say Elbasan. I didn't post Elbasan.

One must read Jeff’s statements carefully because he likes to change things.

What you post is not relevent. Papagos certainly does mention Valona and Elbasan as the limit of their intended offensive (Part 2, Chapter II).

2. Valona and Durazzo are the two ports capable in supporting a large military force. In fact, Durazzo by itself lacks the capacity to maintain a large force. Anyone that has studied this campaign (or the WW1 campaign that was mentioned early in this discussion) knows this. Italy can’t reinforce or supply their forces without these ports.

And yet Papagos explicitly states that Durres will remain in Italian hands - making no comment about its capacity - and also notes that the port of Shengjin will also be available to the Italians noting however that that port has very poor capacity (Part 2, Chapter II).

Please free to do some real research for a change.

RE: Carr. Carr states he doesn’t know. If you had actually read Carr, he would know that he doesn’t discuss the Greek planning to any degree. No discussion of their prewar planning, no detail discussion of the discussions with the Balkan states. Nothing.

And why was that? And why did you propose I read it if it is such little help?

To end this post, I will state again that I am not trying to prove anything. All I am doing is pointing out that all Mark has is attempting to reinterpret know facts without anything that allows him to do so. I certainly feel that March 1941 is worth investigating. Before then, we need a lot more data.

To end this post, I will state again that I am not trying to prove anything. All I am doing is pointing out that Jeff has misinterpreted known facts as written up by Papagos and deliberately misrepresented those facts and documents for reasons unknown to me.

[MarkN]

From Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War, p.238

[jwsleser]

I see the Mark and Honesty have parted ways.

First I will preserve Mark’s post. I don’t want it to disappear. I will support my statement in my next post.

What was the strategic object/war aim that the Greeks expected to achieve by reaching Valona and Elbasan? In reaching Valona and Elbasan they have not prevented from reinforcing, nor decisively destroyed/destructed, nor pushed into the sea the Italians. It is a long way short of the desired end state depicted in the March 1940 study.

Two comments to make on this.

1. I had remarked on several occasions that one must read Mark’s statements carefully because he likes to change things. Here is another. Papagos stated Valona and Durazzo. I posted Valona and Durazzo. He didn’t say Elbasan. I didn't post Elbasan.

One must read Jeff’s statements carefully because he likes to change things.

What you post is not relevent. Papagos certainly does mention Valona and Elbasan as the limit of their intended offensive (Part 2, Chapter II).

2. Valona and Durazzo are the two ports capable in supporting a large military force. In fact, Durazzo by itself lacks the capacity to maintain a large force. Anyone that has studied this campaign (or the WW1 campaign that was mentioned early in this discussion) knows this. Italy can’t reinforce or supply their forces without these ports.

And yet Papagos explicitly states that Durres will remain in Italian hands - making no comment about its capacity - and also notes that the port of Shengjin will also be available to the Italians noting however that that port has very poor capacity (Part 2, Chapter II).

Please free to do some real research for a change.

RE: Carr. Carr states he doesn’t know. If you had actually read Carr, he would know that he doesn’t discuss the Greek planning to any degree. No discussion of their prewar planning, no detail discussion of the discussions with the Balkan states. Nothing.

And why was that? And why did you propose I read it if it is such little help?

To end this post, I will state again that I am not trying to prove anything. All I am doing is pointing out that all Mark has is attempting to reinterpret know facts without anything that allows him to do so. I certainly feel that March 1941 is worth investigating. Before then, we need a lot more data.

To end this post, I will state again that I am not trying to prove anything. All I am doing is pointing out that Jeff has misinterpreted known facts as written up by Papagos and deliberately misrepresented those facts and documents for reasons unknown to me.

[jwsleser]

As I previously stated, Mark and Honesty have parted ways.

I have repeatedly pointed out that Mark likes to take statements out of context and he likes to ignore statements/facts that disagree with his.

Let us examine his first statement here:

Mark: What was the strategic object/war aim that the Greeks expected to achieve by reaching Valona and Elbasan? In reaching Valona and Elbasan they have not prevented from reinforcing, nor decisively destroyed/destructed, nor pushed into the sea the Italians. It is a long way short of the desired end state depicted in the March 1940 study.

Jwsleser: 1. I had remarked on several occasions that one must read Mark’s statements carefully because he likes to change things. Here is another. Papagos stated Valona and Durazzo. I posted Valona and Durazzo. He didn’t say Elbasan. I didn't post Elbasan.

One must read Jeff’s statements carefully because he likes to change things.

What you post is not relevent. Papagos certainly does mention Valona and Elbasan as the limit of their intended offensive (Part 2, Chapter II).

Note he opens with the “strategic objective/war aim”. One of the main points of contention between us is whether the objectives stated Papagos in Part 2 Chapter II are in fact the strategic goals. As Mark has included what needs to be proven as part of the premise, he is ‘begging the question’, a logical fallacy. That it is intentional is evident.

Mark and I have disagreed on whether limited objectives can form the basis of an operation order. Mark has argued that the order must contain the objectives that satisfy the strategic goals. I have argued that operation orders can reflect phases that move the theater to successful achievement of strategic goals. I previously posted a link to the strategic instructions given to Eisenhower for the defeat of Germany. Here is the operation order for Overlord. http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/ ... l8/id/1216

Note the order doesn’t contain the mission to enter into the German heartland and destroy the German forces. This is merely the first operational order designed to move the Allied forces towards the strategic goal. I can provide many other operation orders that don’t include the strategic endstate as an operational objective. The fact the Papagos’ orders referred to above, BY ITSELF, doesn’t mean that was the final objective that satisfied the Greek strategic goals (although capturing Valona is part of the goals stated in the March 40 documents, so the answer is apparent) . I have repeatedly stated that we don’t have the actual orders so we will not be able to resolve this issue. This doesn’t mean either Mark or myself is wrong, just that we lack the data to resolve the problem.

Yet this is the basis for Mark stating “One must read Jeff’s statements carefully because he likes to change things.” Whether or not it is relevant in Mark’s eyes doesn’t mean it is not relevant in mine. If there was any confusion in what I believe, it was made very clear in my ‘jwsleser 27 Feb 2016, 05:30’ post found on page 9 of the thread. Here I listed the Greek offensives through February 1941. I concluded with The Greek Army had plans to continued offensive operations to achieve the objective laid forth in the 1940 Survey. The Greeks understood that complete defeat of the Italian force was the best way to resolve their strategic situation. The Greek had not abandon such designs in early to mid December, but continued to pursue this aim. Pretty clear that the point of strategic goals was in contention.

So I have not changed anything. Mark and I have disagreed on whether Papapgos’ limits stated in the Greek offensive (Part 2, Chapter II) were set as THE strategic goal. As this has not been resolved, how could I be changing anything? I haven’t ignored it, just incorporated it unchanged in my argument.

We have the same situation in the following comment:

jwsleser wrote:2. Valona and Durazzo are the two ports capable in supporting a large military force. In fact, Durazzo by itself lacks the capacity to maintain a large force. Anyone that has studied this campaign (or the WW1 campaign that was mentioned early in this discussion) knows this. Italy can’t reinforce or supply their forces without these ports.

And yet Papagos explicitly states that Durres will remain in Italian hands - making no comment about its capacity - and also notes that the port of Shengjin will also be available to the Italians noting however that that port has very poor capacity (Part 2, Chapter II).

This again takes us back to the same point I discussed above: whether the objectives stated in Chapter II are the strategic endstate or only the first phase of extended operations to destroy the Italian forces. Same rebuttal as above.

Let me go back to this comment to highlight the real issue:

Mark: What was the strategic object/war aim that the Greeks expected to achieve by reaching Valona and Elbasan? In reaching Valona and Elbasan they have not prevented from reinforcing, nor decisively destroyed/destructed, nor pushed into the sea the Italians. It is a long way short of the desired end state depicted in the March 1940 study.

jwsleser: 1. I had remarked on several occasions that one must read Mark’s statements carefully because he likes to change things. Here is another. Papagos stated Valona and Durazzo. I posted Valona and Durazzo. He didn’t say Elbasan. I didn't post Elbasan.

Mark’s statement contains two different elements from two different sources. The first is the strategic goal that I stated was establish in the 1940 papers (by capturing Valona and Durazzo, the Greeks would cut off any Italian reinforcements and supplies). The second is Papagos objectives stated in Part II Chapter II. Clearly the two don’t go together and I never put them together. I never stated or implied that the capture of Valona and Elbasan would prevent the Italians from receiving reinforcements and supplies. I never stated that Valona and Elbasan were the objectives that met the Greek strategic goal. I have never put these two elements together in any of my posts.

So this a deliberate falsehood on Mark’s part; a lie.

As reinforcements and supplies was the important issue and the one I had actually addressed in any of my posts, I responded by addressing that point.

Mark has intentionally lied to present something that isn’t true/factual. I noticed that he didn’t quote any of my posts, just wrote statements. Note that when I challenge a specific point, I normally post Mark’s actual quote.

Next is:

jwsleser wrote:RE: Carr. Carr states he doesn’t know. If you had actually read Carr, he would know that he doesn’t discuss the Greek planning to any degree. No discussion of their prewar planning, no detail discussion of the discussions with the Balkan states. Nothing.

And why was that? And why did you propose I read it if it is such little help?

I have previously accused Mark of taking statements out of context. Such is the case here. I was listing Mark’s previous comments throughout this discussion. It was general recap of Mark’s lack of sources and his views on rejecting sources. I never stated the Carr would be of use on this one specific point. Mark is so focused on arguing that he doesn’t read the posts with care.

To end this post, I will address this comment:

To end this post, I will state again that I am not trying to prove anything. All I am doing is pointing out that Jeff has misinterpreted known facts as written up by Papagos and deliberately misrepresented those facts and documents for reasons unknown to me.

This has been addressed above. I have been clear about my viewpoint about what Papagos stated in his book. We disagree on our interpretations of the data, but I have not distorted Mark’s comments to fit my own needs. I have not modified/changed what Mark has written in an attempt to provide my point. That is the issue here; this is what Mark has done and is doing. This is a poor attempt of Mark’s to create misdirection.

[MarkN]

Back with the straw men again....

Definition 1:
A straw man is a common form of argument and is an informal fallacy based on giving the impression of refuting an opponent's argument, while actually refuting an argument that was not advanced by that opponent.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man

Definition 2:
The Straw Man fallacy is committed when a person simply ignores a person's actual position and substitutes a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version of that position.
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/straw-man.html

Mark and I have disagreed on whether limited objectives can form the basis of an operation order. Mark has argued that the order must contain the objectives that satisfy the strategic goals. I have argued that operation orders can reflect phases that move the theater to successful achievement of strategic goals.

I have never argued that. Straw man.

I can provide many other operation orders that don’t include the strategic endstate as an operational objective.

Please don't. You've already wasted far too much effort on your straw men.

The fact the Papagos’ orders referred to above, BY ITSELF, doesn’t mean that was the final objective that satisfied the Greek strategic goals ...

Agreed which is PRECISELY why I suggested we establish what the strategic objective/war aim was. The one thing that I have learned from your posts of the past few days is that you don't know what it was and like me can only speculate.

... (although capturing Valona is part of the goals stated in the March 40 documents, so the answer is apparent).

No, it is NOT apparent.

I have repeatedly stated that we don’t have the actual orders so we will not be able to resolve this issue. This doesn’t mean either Mark or myself is wrong, just that we lack the data to resolve the problem.

Correct. So why are you still arguing irrelevant straw men?

However, I would also suggest that the reason we are lacking the data could well be because the Greeks hadn't really got their war aim nailed down when the launched their offensive. If they haven't really got a credible one, it would explain why nobody has found it or written about/detailed it.

Yet this is the basis for Mark stating “One must read Jeff’s statements carefully because he likes to change things.” Whether or not it is relevant in Mark’s eyes doesn’t mean it is not relevant in mine. If there was any confusion in what I believe, it was made very clear in my ‘jwsleser 27 Feb 2016, 05:30’ post found on page 9 of the thread. ... Blah blah snipped ...

Straw man.

You wrote in very clear words: "Papagos stated Valona and Durazzo. I posted Valona and Durazzo. He didn’t say Elbasan. I didn't post Elbasan."

In reality, Papagos did indeed write Elbasan. That is why I hit you back with your own words, “One must read Jeff’s statements carefully because he likes to change things.”

Remember, in Part 2 Chapter 3, quote from your edition page 261, the offensive commenced in November was according to the appraisal of September 1940 ie Elbasan NOT the study of March 1940 not Durres.

I am sure there was a jolly good reason why the September 1940 appraisal only goes as far as Elbason and not all the way to Durres as in the March 1940. I mean, it would be very easy for Papagos to have written Durres again, but he didn't, did he? It would also have been easy for him on page 261 of your edition to refer back to the March 1940 study, but he didn't, did he? Now why was that?

Here I listed the Greek offensives through February 1941. I concluded with The Greek Army had plans to continued offensive operations to achieve the objective laid forth in the 1940 Survey.

Indeed, you concluded. Trouble is, it doesn't tally with what Papagos wrote.

The Greeks understood that complete defeat of the Italian force was the best way to resolve their strategic situation. The Greek had not abandon such designs in early to mid December, but continued to pursue this aim.

And yet the objectives (tactical of course) for 8-28 December were only as far as Klisura and Tepelene (Papagos: Part 2 Chapter 4). Objectives that they did not achieve within the planned timeframe.

Now, if the strategic goal/war aim was the "complete defeat of the Italian force" (as per the March 1940 study), then how do you reconcile the reality that their tactical objectives were somewhat limited when the March 1940 clearly required, "the destruction of the Italian forces in Albania within as short a time as possible".

Clearly, they were not even planning for the complete defeat of the Italian force in a timeframe that would prevented the Italians from being able to reinforce.

I would argue the reasons why the September 1940 appraisal differed from the March 1940 study was because the Greek High Command had recognised that they did not have the resources to achieve the goal of complete defeat of the Italian force. The offensive of November 1940 was according to the limited expectations evidenced in September 1940.

So I have not changed anything. Mark and I have disagreed on whether Papapgos’ limits stated in the Greek offensive (Part 2, Chapter II) were set as THE strategic goal. As this has not been resolved, how could I be changing anything? I haven’t ignored it, just incorporated it unchanged in my argument.

Straw man.

You clearly stated that Papagos did not mention Elbasan when he did. It's that simple!

We have the same situation in the following comment:

No we don't.

Let me go back to this comment to highlight the real issue:

Mark: What was the strategic object/war aim that the Greeks expected to achieve by reaching Valona and Elbasan? In reaching Valona and Elbasan they have not prevented from reinforcing, nor decisively destroyed/destructed, nor pushed into the sea the Italians. It is a long way short of the desired end state depicted in the March 1940 study.

jwsleser: 1. I had remarked on several occasions that one must read Mark’s statements carefully because he likes to change things. Here is another. Papagos stated Valona and Durazzo. I posted Valona and Durazzo. He didn’t say Elbasan. I didn't post Elbasan.

Mark’s statement contains two different elements from two different sources. The first is the strategic goal that I stated was establish in the 1940 papers (by capturing Valona and Durazzo, the Greeks would cut off any Italian reinforcements and supplies). The second is Papagos objectives stated in Part II Chapter II. Clearly the two don’t go together ....

Exactly the point I am making, two don’t go together

... and I never put them together.

But that is EXACTLY what you are doing everytime
- you come out with you straw men arguments that operation orders do not need to contain the strategic objective/war aim,
- you connect the November offensive to the March 1940 study when Papagos wrote the September appraisal,
- you mention Durres as the objective when Papagos wrote Elbasan,
- and when you infer that the September 1940 appraisal was merely one step towards fulfilling the March 1940 study.

Remember, you keep returning back to the March 1940 study, and the war aims it describes, as being the document that was guiding the November 1940 offensive. That's why you wrote Durres not Elbasan. That's why you are sure the war aim was complete defeat of the Italian force. That's why you misprepresented it as a directive.

I never stated or implied that the capture of Valona and Elbasan would prevent the Italians from receiving reinforcements and supplies. I never stated that Valona and Elbasan were the objectives that met the Greek strategic goal. I have never put these two elements together in any of my posts.

Never claimed you did.

I have brought up the Valona - Elbasan (not Durres) connection because that's what the Greeks were working too in November 1940. At least, that's what Papagos wrote.

I brought it up because when you grasp that reality, the reality that the evidence points to the Greeks NOT trying for the war aims described in the March 1940 study, then we can get to grips with a discussion as to whether what they were actually doing in Albania was logical, coherent, sound and rational.

There is no indipsutable evidence as to what their war aims were when they started the November 1940 offensive. Authors, in all languages, simply ignore the point (as in Papagos' case) or point out it was undefined (as in Carr's case). To me, this speaks volumes.

Mark has intentionally lied to present something that isn’t true/factual.

Stop posting nonsense.

I have previously accused Mark of taking statements out of context. Such is the case here. I was listing Mark’s previous comments throughout this discussion. It was general recap of Mark’s lack of sources and his views on rejecting sources. I never stated the Carr would be of use on this one specific point. Mark is so focused on arguing that he doesn’t read the posts with care.

Stop posting nonsense.

[MarkN]

Deliberately separating this for the wider audiance.

The March 1940 study and September 1940 reappraisal are pretty bare bones in respect of specific information on timelines, scale of forces etc etc. This lack of information provides for great scope in speculation and what ifs. I don't want to go there myself. However, some key elements can be extracted.

The March 1940 study clearly states, twice in short order, that (my paraphrasing) the war aim is to comprehensively defeat the Italians by taking the whole of Albania in the fastest time possible. It has to be done quickly so as to prevent the Italians from reinforcing. What happens next is not mentionned. Do they hand the country over to the Albanians? Do they annex all or part of Albania for themselves? Do they leave an occupying army there for the duration of WW2? Etc etc... It's a military study not political policy document, so that is not that surprising.

The key take away points are that all of Albania is to be conquored and in as quick a time as possible.

The September 1940 reappraisal states no war aim and merely provides information on routes and the extent of the planned advance/offensive. This equates to less than one third of Albania. There is no reference to the speed that the offensive has to be undertaken.

The November/December 1940 offensive had initial objectives (8-28 December 1940 timeframe) of conquoring territory equivalent to half of that described in the September 1940 reappraisal. ie, about 1/6th of Albania. The February 1941 offensive was to continue the advance in the south up to the limits specified in September 1940 reappraisal. There is no information on how far the advance in the north would aim for.


Given that the March 1940 study's strategic objective was predicated on success as fast as possible, the November/December 1940 offensive can hardly be seen as even attempting to follow the March 1940 study's aims, intent, expectations or plan.

I would suggest that the the September 1940 reappraisal (which the November/December 1940 offensive was following) was generated specifically because the Greek High Command recognised that the March 1940 planning assumptions were invalid, unobtainable and therefore unworkeable. I would further suggest that the limits of the advance specified in the September 1940 reappraisal was what the Greek High Command thought was the limit of what they could achieve. In reality, they managed to get half way and were unlikely to get much further given the imbalance in resources and reserves.

[jwsleser]

For the wider audience.

The Greek prewar assessments of the possible threats identified Bulgaria and Albania. The main thrust of the discussions and planning was in case of simultaneous operations against both of those nations. The coordination/talks between Greece and other nations were along the lines of the needs to support a two-front war.

There was discussion of unilateral operations against Albania by Greece. In the 13 September 1939 Memorandum to the President, General Papagos (paragraph III/6) writes “If we manage to secure superiority in numbers over the Italians in Albania and to prevent, or at least seriously to hamper, the dispatch of Italian reinforcements, we might be able to undertake offensive operations intended to throw the Italians out of Albania.” I will note that in this memorandum, the Greeks are identified by the use of personal pronouns (we, us) and the Allies as identified by that term. The memorandum then discusses the possible initial operations.

In IV/1 (Operations against Bulgaria), Papgos states “We shall be unable to undertake powerful actions on two fronts, against Albania and Bulgaria. We have in mind: a) to put forward our biggest effort on the Albania front, and b) merely to cover our territory on the Bulgarian side".

This memorandum establishes that 1) the Greeks saw that offensive operations against Italy were the better solution under certain conditions; that a unilateral Greek offensive could happen; and that the Albania front was identified as the place for the greater Greek effort.

We see this same focus on offensive action in the 14 February 1940 memorandum to the President in preparation for the meetings with the Balkan countries. Paragraph 4 he writes “More importantly, in dealing with Italy as a potential adversary, it would be necessary for us to take steps to put Albania out of action as soon as Italy made suspicious moves, …. “

This leads us into the 13 March 1940 memorandum and its attached papers (Views and Survey). In the Views paper in paragraph B Albania, Papagos writes “If Italy were one of our opponents, the occupation of Albania would seem necessary because: …” followed by his reasoning. This understanding/need is greatly reinforced in the Survey paper were offensive action against Albania is strongly reinforced. The Survey also states that such an operation would begin with a defensive Phase, followed and an offensive Phase.

The idea/desire of eliminating the Italian forces in Albania is firmly established as a goal. There are references to unilateral Greek action in this respect. What is at question is whether the resources would be available to execute such an option.

In September 1940 there is a major reassessment of the situation. Bulgaria wasn’t seen as a participant, the state of Greek preparations (fortifications, supplies, improving LOCs, etc.) was higher than previously assumed under the plan, and a greater part of the Army was already mobilized. This placed Greece in a significantly stronger position than when the plans were first developed. In all, these changes provided the resources necessary to execute an offense in Albania. Based on this assessment, the Greeks decided to prepare for an offensive operation a month before the outbreak of the war.

There is nothing that prevents Greece from having a stated strategic goal of eliminating Italy for Albania, yet wage a defensive war until the time that conditions were favorable for offense action. The fact that the Greeks historically executed offensives with limited objectives doesn’t state or even imply that their strategic goal was limited to the lower third of Albania, but merely reflected the operational situation at that time.

There is one statement that indicates that the elimination of the Italian forces was the goal during the war. In the 14-15 January meetings with the UK representatives lead by Wavell, Metaxas stated 'The most important step, in the President's opinion, was to clear up the situation in Albania; this would release large forces for the Bulgarian front. As soon as these were available he would welcome British assistance. The best plan therefore was to make all possible secret preparations for landing a British expedition at Salonika and the neighboring ports, but to send no troops at all until they could arrive in sufficient numbers to act offensively as well as defensively'.

This statement specifically states that eliminating the Italian threat is the priority, not a limited objective of lower Albania. The acceptance of UK assistance was based on the Greeks accomplishing that task which reinforces the idea that a wide offensive was desired/planned. The operation was a unilateral act on the part of Greece, not part of a larger coalition. This statement doesn’t fit at all into a narrative that has the Greek offensive ’limited in scope’ and its timing in the middle of January demonstrates that the Greeks hadn't abandoned their strategic goal.

As has been stated, we lack the documents to answer what was the Greek strategic goal. The lack of readily available documentation in English has no meaning beyond the fact that interest in this specific issue is non-existent. As Greece was attacked, and then repelled the Italians before falling victim to Germany, the focus or research has been on other issues than the Greek war aims.

The Greeks were prepared for change because their strategic goal already identified the need to secure Albania. Only the needed conditions were lacking. The September decision demonstrated that Greeks perceived that the situation had changed for the better and adjusted to prepare for it. Rather than the need for an extended defensive fight, they now saw that they could transition to the offensive earlier than they had anticipated. The actual Italian invasion positively changed the conditions once again in favor of the Greeks. In the end, we know that the Greeks failed to achieve that greater endstate, but their offensive into Albania wasn’t some rash, spur of the moment decision for some nationalistic gain, but reflected several years of analysis and study. The prewar thinking had already placed this as the desired option and gave the Greeks the operational flexibility to execute this change.

[MarkN]

The idea/desire of eliminating the Italian forces in Albania is firmly established as a goal. There are references to unilateral Greek action in this respect. What is at question is whether the resources would be available to execute such an option.

And herein lies the essence of the issue: did the Greeks have the resources to achieve their war aim?

Having an idea/desire is not a goal, an objective or an aim in itself. At least, it is not a sensible, credible, sound or rational END until credible WAYS and sufficient MEANS are assured. In the absence of credible ways and sufficent means, an idea/desire is no more than wishful thinking.

In September 1940 there is a major reassessment of the situation. Bulgaria wasn’t seen as a participant, the state of Greek preparations (fortifications, supplies, improving LOCs, etc.) was higher than previously assumed under the plan, and a greater part of the Army was already mobilized. This placed Greece in a significantly stronger position than when the plans were first developed. In all, these changes provided the resources necessary to execute an offense in Albania. Based on this assessment, the Greeks decided to prepare for an offensive operation a month before the outbreak of the war.

Your analysis (underlined) contradicts Papagos.

In respect of an offensive against the Italians in Albania, the March 1940 study describes that the Yugoslavs would provide half the military effort and conquor half of Albania. The Greeks would (only) advance as far as Valona from Epirus and as far as Durres from Western Macedonia with Yugoslav help. As far as the Greek effort is concerned, the September 1940 reappraisal only differs in that the Western Macedonian advance only goes as far as Elbasan. In effect, as far as the Greek effort is concerned, there is little difference. In respect of the ability to achieve the strategic objective (destroying the Italian forces in Albania) the Greeks are now at a significant disadvantage.

In order to make your argument that, "this placed Greece in a significantly stronger position than when the plans were first developed", you have to evidence that the actual balance of forces (Italian v Greek) were far, far greater in Greece's favour than they were in the assumptions of the March 1940 study since Greece now has to fight alone and the Italians can concentrate their forces on a single narrow front.

Remember, Papagos wrote as one of the planning assumptions to the April 1939 operational plan that the Greeks could not expect any support from the Yugoslavs (see Part 2, Chapter 1, (c)). This, in effect, highlights the almost complete irrelevance of the March 1940 study. A study that was predicated on Yugoslavia providing half the military effort and conquoring half of Albania. The March 1940 study is of little use in informing us now, or the Greek High Command then, what was realistic, coherent, sound and rational - unless the Yugoslavs volunteered to come in.

So, did the Greeks have sufficient MEANS and credible WAYS to achieve their "idea/desire"?


Moving on...

There is no Memorandum to the President dated 13 September 1939 in my edition. However, the words you post appear in a Memorandum to the President dated 2 September 1939. A typo perhaps.

If we manage to secure superiority in numbers over the Italians in Albania and to prevent, or at least seriously to hamper, the dispatch of Italian reinforcements, we might be able to undertake offensive operations intended to throw the Italians out of Albania.

Note in the strategic imperative of preventing an Italian reinforcement. Something that can only realistically be achieved through a rapid conquest of the entire country or somehow bring them to the negotiating table whilst significantly weakened.

More importantly, in dealing with Italy as a potential adversary, it would be necessary for us to take steps to put Albania out of action as soon as Italy made suspicious moves, ….

This suggests the offensive into Albania should be pre-emptive. A good solution if seeking a rapid result.

This leads us into the 13 March 1940 memorandum and its attached papers (Views and Survey). In the Views paper in paragraph B Albania, Papagos writes “If Italy were one of our opponents, the occupation of Albania would seem necessary because: …” followed by his reasoning. This understanding/need is greatly reinforced in the Survey paper were offensive action against Albania is strongly reinforced. The Survey also states that such an operation would begin with a defensive Phase, followed and an offensive Phase.

The March 1940 study has a section on defence and a section on offence. The two are discrete. There is no presumption that an offensive will only follow a defence.

There is nothing that prevents Greece from having a stated strategic goal of eliminating Italy for Albania, ...

Of course there isn't.

The fact that the Greeks historically executed offensives with limited objectives doesn’t state or even imply that their strategic goal was limited to the lower third of Albania, but merely reflected the operational situation at that time.

As we have already discussed, we don't know what the strategic goal was of the November 1940 offensive, we only know the tactical approach lines and expected furthest advance.

However, we need to return to the WAYS in which ENDS are expected: by pushing the Italians completely out of Albania as quickly as possible.

The Greeks were working to an operational scheme 8-28 December that only saw the tactical advance as far as Tepelene, Klisura and so on (Part 2, Chapter 4). This does NOT accord with the WAYS outlined in achieving the ENDS desired in all of the pre-conflict studies and memorandum. The WAYS that they were employing were based upon their limited MEANS. And it's worth remembering, that those limited MEANS were effectively a maximum effort. Thus,
(1) either the Greeks were working to a different END, an END more limited in scope and expectation or of a different nature (hope to bring Italy to the negotiation table perhaps),
(2) or if they were still working to the same END but their efforts were incoherent, unsound and unrealistic.
(3) Or, of course, they were wishfully thinking that they could achieve the same ENDS by plodding through Albania and without preventing the Italians from reinforcing.

There is one statement that indicates that the elimination of the Italian forces was the goal during the war. In the 14-15 January meetings with the UK representatives lead by Wavell, Metaxas stated 'The most important step, in the President's opinion, was to clear up the situation in Albania...'.

This statement specifically states that eliminating the Italian threat is the priority, not a limited objective of lower Albania.

A priority which they were not going to achieve if the WAYS to achieve that END were by by pushing the Italians completely out of Albania as quickly as possible. The scheme of operations for 8-28 December 1940 ran counter to that and went uncompleted. The Greek High Command had already recognised when they set that scheme of operations that, pushing the Italians completely out of Albania as quickly as possible was not going to happen.

Thus, by January, we have a major problem in the coherence, credibity, soundness and rationality of the decisions by the Greek leadership. All the time that the only (real) threat was from the Italians, they could muddle along desiring to beat the Italians hoping that the Italians wouldn't send too many troops as reinforcement to make their efforts pointless. Why was January crucial, because that was the month that a number of key events occured that changed the context of Greece's plight.

First, a German attack from Bulgaria was now expected; it was assumed to be a matter of when not if. Yes, the Greek's tried to prevent this diplomatically, but the words spoken at the time were of a more realistic nature and an expectation of that eventuality. All of the memorandum, studies and plans written up to this point are now irrelevant since they are all predicated on a Bulgarian threat from Bulgaria, not a German threat from Bulgaria.

Second, the British although willing to help, were nowhere close to being able to provide the 10-15 divisions that may have made a positive difference.

Third, in an attempt to breathe life into their March 1940 study, they officially approached the Yugoslavs to come in and attack the Italians from the north and east. They were rebuffed. They knew this option was unobtainable.

How could they reasonably expect to push the Italians completely out of Albania as quickly as possible when they had already failed to achieve their limited tactical objectives (with the balance of forces that had been in their favour during December) and knew the Italians had reinforced their position significantly. They had, "managed to secure superiority in numbers over the Italians in Albania" but yet failed, "to prevent, or at least seriously to hamper, the dispatch of Italian reinforcements", thus their, "intent to throw the Italians out of Albania" was no longer a coherent, credible, sound and rational END (remember the 2 September 1939 Memorandum?).

Fourth, points 1, 2 and 3 were recognised by the Greek (military) High Command and they initiated a study as to what defensive postures were to be recommended in the new circumstances. That study and the recommendations are the 8 February 1941 recommendations that we have discussed already.

January was the month that key strategic decisions had to be made. The evidence was there at the time to inform the Greeks of what was likely to happen and what was realistic in outcome. Many, many moons ago in this thread, you posted:

The ‘elephant in the room’ was Greece’s inability to bring the Italo-Greek War to an end.

Now, I do not believe it was THE elephant, but I wholly concur that Greece was unable to bring the Italo-Greek War to an end. The couldn't do it militarily and chose not to diplomatically.

And yet since then, we have post after post, claiming that the Greeks were still fighting to a strategic objective of pushing the Italians completely out of Albania as quickly as possible. Does that makes sense when they didn;t have the ability to do it?

You also posted many, many moons ago:

The only option I see that might offer hope is a unilateral withdrawal from Albania in Jan-Feb. to jump-start negotiations. If that doesn't work, then the Greeks can go full speed into full military cooperation with the Allies.

I would suggest that, "a unilateral withdrawal from Albania in Jan" was a strategic imperative, not just an attempt, "to jump-start negotiations".

The Greeks were prepared for change because their strategic goal already identified the need to secure Albania.

An desired END that was recognised as beyond their WAYS and MEANS at least as early as the beginning of December 1940 if not recognised in the September 1940 reappraisal.

Only the needed conditions were lacking.

And since they were lacking, does it makes sense to work to the same END?

The September decision demonstrated that Greeks perceived that the situation had changed for the better and adjusted to prepare for it.

Discussed above. I believe you have misinterpreted this completely.

Rather than the need for an extended defensive fight, they now saw that they could transition to the offensive earlier than they had anticipated.

Agreed, but....

The actual Italian invasion positively changed the conditions once again in favor of the Greeks.

The particptaion of the Yugoslavs was key to operations in Albania according to Greek planning NOT the failure of the Italians to exploit their early successes.

In the end, we know that the Greeks failed to achieve that greater endstate, but their offensive into Albania wasn’t some rash, spur of the moment decision for some nationalistic gain, but reflected several years of analysis and study. The prewar thinking had already placed this as the desired option and gave the Greeks the operational flexibility to execute this change.

But, as both you and xristar have been so keen to point out, we have to consider the actions and decisions based upon the circumstances at the time. A memorandum, survey or study completed in 1939 or early 1940 is not necessarily relevant to the understanding of the actions and decisions of November 1940 through to April 1941. Circumstances change.

The "desired option" of those memoranda, surveys and studies is not a sensible, credible, sound or rational END until credible WAYS and sufficient MEANS are assured. In the absence of credible ways and sufficent means, an "idea/desire" is no more than wishful thinking.

[jwsleser]

Nothing new in what you have posted.

A typo perhaps.

Yes, thanks.

And herein lies the essence of the issue: did the Greeks have the resources to achieve their war aim?

Since that isn’t the essence of the issue, so what?

What you apparently have been arguing is “In the absence of credible ways and sufficent means, an "idea/desire" is no more than wishful thinking.”

Barbarossa was wishing full thinking because Germany chose to attack Russia.

Greece wasn’t allowed to choose. Greece was attacked and had to make ‘four of kind’ with a lousy poker hand. As you stated at the start of this thread, Greece was doomed. Period. No options. You stated Greece’s only rational choice was to surrender/accept terms. Doing anything else was ‘wishful thinking’.

So why are you trying to argue this point? Declare victory and walk away. They fought. They lost.

I have stated that Greece was in a tough spot, but like pretty much every neutral attacked by Germany, they decide to fight. Foolish, irrational, but they made the decision.

As they were going to fight, they might as well try to win. A long shot, sure. But why fight if all you plan to do is lose?

But Greece had a hot streak. The Italian attack was weaker than expected. It was poorly executed. Bulgaria was neutral. German wasn’t interviewing. Their counter attacks were finding broken Italian units with poor morale.

What is there to lose by trying to win? After all, losing is already happening. Greece’s window of opportunity will last until Germany attacks. Germany might not attack at all. Germany might wait longer to attack than expected. Something could happen somewhere else and Germany can’t attack.

It isn’t over until the Fat Lady sings.

The Greek High Command had already recognised when they set that scheme of operations that, pushing the Italians completely out of Albania as quickly as possible was not going to happen.

But why should they care? It was their only option and it was currently working.

If they stopped at the border, Italy would still be a threat and Germany will still attack. If they stop at Valona and Elbasan, Italy would still be a threat and Germany would still attack. If they retreat to pull troops from Albania to reinforce the east, Italy is still a threat and Germany still attacks.

There is no rational option if defeat is the only outcome. So you fight for the one option that, if successful, does solve the problem.

Defeat Italy. Who cares if pushing the Italians out of Albania takes a longer time than desired? As long as it is done before Germany attacks, it worked. And if there isn’t enough time and it fails, nothing has changed.

So go ahead and try to rationalize that one lousy COA is better than another lousy COA. Attacking and destroying the Italians was the only option the Greeks could exercise that might actually work.

Do I know if I am right? No, we lack the documents. You certainly haven’t proved that your scenario is correct. .

The one statement we actually have that ties directly to the issue we are addressing:

The most important step, in the President's opinion, was to clear up the situation in Albania; this would release large forces for the Bulgarian front.

Whether it would work on not doesn’t matter; its logic is based on the fact that it was the only option that could work. It was a rational decision. Would the Greeks need a lot of luck? Yes. They came closer to success than they should have. Did their failure change the outcome? No it didn’t.

[MarkN]

And yet more of your straw men...

You stated Greece’s only rational choice was to surrender/accept terms. Doing anything else was ‘wishful thinking’. So why are you trying to argue this point?

No I didn't and no I'm not. In fact, it was you who proposed the possibility of Metaxas being the only one capable of coming to some form of diplomatic agreement and avoiding complete military defeat and occupation.

I cannot decipher whether you are defending the Greek decisionmaking based upon wishful thinking or resigned to defeat being credible military and political strategy. Or perhaps you're suggesting both.

The entire post is contradictory and incoherent. It leaps from, "what is there to lose by trying to win? After all, losing is already happening" to "it isn’t over until the Fat Lady sings" then "it was their only option and it was currently working.".

It was certainly not their only option, nevertheless the attempt to defeat the Italians wasn't working and, by January, had already failed. It was known to have failed and it was known that the planning assumptions (conditions) that would give them any hope of success (numerical superiority) had been and gone. The "window of opportunity" as you call it, had closed. In the light of that known failure, was it credible, sound and rational to leave the bulk of the army stuck at the end of atrocious lines of communication trying to defend foreign land when your own country is about to be set upon by an even greater threat from another direction?

The answer to that conundrum was not found in sound military logic thought nor rational political policy. I suggest the answer was informed by irrational national pride as evidenced by Papagos' own words...

It was a question of honour for the Greeks; [ I ] would rather be stabbed in the back by Germans than pushed in front by the Italians.

Whether the pride of 'liberating' and holding North Epirus had anything to do with the decision is open to speculation. However, when the Director General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Delmouzo [sic], is already claiming victory at the end of December 1940 and suggesting that they will be dictating peace terms to the Italians which include the "manifest justice to her claims to Northern Epirius", one has to give serious thought to its likely affect. According to him, "...the nation is thinking more and more of the return of Northern Epirus...". The Greeks were no less greedy in attempting to settle their territorial claims than the Bulgarians.

And herein lies the essence of the issue: did the Greeks have the resources to achieve their war aim?

Since that isn’t the essence of the issue, so what?

Persuing a war aim for which resources do not exist to achieve that aim is quite irrational. And yet you dismiss it out of hand!

[jwsleser]

There are times I feel we could have a great discussion over a glass of wine or beer.

Then there are times like this one.

And yet more of your straw men...
jwsleser wrote:
You stated Greece’s only rational choice was to surrender/accept terms. Doing anything else was ‘wishful thinking’. So why are you trying to argue this point?

Mark: No I didn't and no I'm not.

Agreed you didn’t say it word for word but it where your argument logically goes.

MarkN » 22 Jan 2016, 14:17
It was Metaxas that chose war with Italy rather than a diplomatic resolution to Mussolini's ultimatums.

The choice presented to Metaxas was surrender or fight. As you argued throughout this thread, a diplomatic solution wasn’t possible, so negotiation wasn't in the cards.

You also argue that Greece can’t win regardless of the circumstances:

MarkN » 20 Jan 2016, 16:04
I would argue that the elephant in the room is that once Italy had decided to attack Greece in the first place, there was only ever going to be one result: Axis troops marching through Athens as victors.

Whereas you believe a political solution was possible, I disagree completely. The only deal possible with Hitler was complete subservience. The Serb military and population recognised this and took appropriate action against their own Prince Regent when he sold out to Hitler. They paid the price, but maintained their dignity.

MarkN » 22 Jan 2016, 22:31
Agreed. The fall of Greece is entirely down to Mussolini. Not failed diplomacy or failed military on the part of Greece. Once Mussolini had made his mind up, the die was cast.

Metaxas had tried to avoid war, and failed. When presented with the ultimatum, he chose to fight rather than to hand over Greece on a plate.

Now, I do not believe another option existed. I do not believe Metaxas had it within his power to find an alternative to those two options that both Hitler and Mussolini would agree to. Thus I do not see his death in January as being of a conseqence to the outcome.

It was a list to show that Metaxas was not in a position to change the inevitable. It was a list to show that he and Greece were hostages to the decisions made by bigger powers and he had effectively no influence in their decision-making. Greece was the victim of Fascist militaristic greed.

Where you see Metaxas as being the only person that could have found a third way, I suggest that an alternative simply didn't exist and point to Metaxas' failure to find a way earlier as (sort of) evidence why I don't share your appreciation of his abilities.

MarkN » 27 Jan 2016, 14:18 I have argued that defeat in detail was inevitable, and the only chance of, perhaps, delaying that inevitability was for the defensive line to be shortened significantly. The military logic in that is without question. Trying to defend the entire frontier and the gains in Albania doomed Greece to a sudden end.

MarkN » 29 Jan 2016, 15:29 Secondly, the sovereign independence of Yugoslavia and Greece lay entirely in the hands of the Germans. The mismatch in military capabilities makes that a reality. One could argue, that the Germans could have been dissuaded diplomatically. I think we have already covered this, so I shall not regurgitate.

You state that no diplomatic solution was available and that Greece can’t win militarily. As these are facts according to you, the decision to fight was irrational.

Persuing a war aim for which resources do not exist to achieve that aim is quite irrational. And yet you dismiss it out of hand!

Fighting a war that can't be won is quite irrational (your logic applied). The only rational decision was surrender. That was the option presented to Metaxas on 28 Oct. That is where your logic leads.

Not a strawman at all.

Greece decided to fight. The only way they could possibly win is to defeat Italy. All the other COAs are defeat with no hope of success. By attacking Italy, there is a chance, maybe small, but a chance.

We disagree on how the many of the known facts should be interpreted. The record is incomplete, so we will not know without access to additional Greek sources.

You might be correct; you might be wrong. I could be correct; I could be wrong. You don’t believe my position is convincing, I don’t believe yours is convincing.

[MarkN]

And the straw men march on relentlessly....

The choice presented to Metaxas was surrender or fight. As you argued throughout this thread, a diplomatic solution wasn’t possible, so negotiation wasn't in the cards.

No I haven't.

You also argue that Greece can’t win regardless of the circumstances.

With the benefit of hindsight, I do indeed believe that there was no diplomatic solution available and also that the German intent was such that a military victory for the Greeks was beyond their capability. But, for the past 6 weeks or so, the discussion has NOT been referenced to my opinions with hindsight, but referenced to what was known - or can reasonably be assumed to be known - at the time.

Are you having difficulty keeping up with the discussion?

You state that no diplomatic solution was available and that Greece can’t win militarily. As these are facts according to you, the decision to fight was irrational.

Straw man.

I have suggested the choices taken were irrational based upon what the Greeks knew and expected at the time (January 1941):
1. The likelyhood of a German attack from Bulgaria
2. Their failure to defeat the Italians in Albania in quick order
3. The scale of Italian reinforcements arriving at the Albanian front
4. The refusal by the Yugoslavs to particpate in a joint operation
5. The inability of British Empire to provide sufficient forces
6. Their own military's recommendations regarding defensive posture

Fighting a war that can't be won is quite irrational (your logic applied). The only rational decision was surrender. That was the option presented to Metaxas on 28 Oct. That is where your logic leads.

More straw men. That's not my logic or thought process at all.

Greece decided to fight. The only way they could possibly win is to defeat Italy.

That may be you opinion, but it is not a fact.

All the other COAs are defeat with no hope of success.

That may be you opinion, but it is not a fact.

Moreover, they are opinions which you have made no effort to demonstrate their validity or credibility. All you have done is merely post them dressed up as facts and assume that everybody is obliged to accept your opinions as facts. Which, in itself is a bit strange, since often your opinion and understanding differs from either/or Papagos in his book, the prime documentation held by the British Archives and other contemporary accounts such as those of Ambassador MacVeagh.

[jwsleser]

As you wish to continue this, okay by me.

Strawmen, sure. Go ahead and keep repeating it. It is clear that you wish to disregard what you yourself have posted, so strawman away.

I have suggested the choices taken were irrational based upon what the Greeks knew and expected at the time (January 1941):
1. The likelyhood of a German attack from Bulgaria
2. Their failure to defeat the Italians in Albania in quick order
3. The scale of Italian reinforcements arriving at the Albanian front
4. The refusal by the Yugoslavs to particpate in a joint operation
5. The inability of British Empire to provide sufficient forces
6. Their own military's recommendations regarding defensive posture

So how does knowing all this mean the Greeks were irrational? Go ahead, explain why all this means that the Greeks must stop pursuing the possibility of ending the war in Albania and it was better to transition to a defensive posture to await a German attack they had no hope of defeating.

-No UK support.

-No Yugoslavian support.

-Leaving Italy on the border of Greece so the Italians could built up their forces like they historically did, but now much closer and fewer defeats/broken units. Allowing them to choose the time of their next offensive.

That is irrational thinking. That is wishful thinking.

The Greeks had by 1 Jan 1941:

-successfully stopped the Italian invasion. This invasion was conducted by a nation whose military prowess and capabilities were thought to be significant. Yet a Greek army that was still mobilizing, lacking tanks and air superiority, less artillery, moving troops and equipment over some lousy terrain, and facing bad weather managed to stop a ‘supposedly’ military powerhouse.

-Successfully launched a counterattack that pushed the Italians from Greek territory under the same limitations as I listed above.

-Secured key terrain in Albania designed to support further offensives into that country.

-Seen that Greek attacks always gained ground against the Italians.

-That the Greeks executed an operational pause at the end of December due to logistical and weather issues. They didn’t see the Italians as the main reason they paused. I have previously posted cites supporting this understanding.

Pretty impressive for a small, second rate military.

Don’t forget that at the same time:

-they were reading the UK reports of the Italian collapse in North Africa. They read about Italians units surrendering, abandoning positions, all events that the Greeks themselves had witnessed during their fighting in Epirus/Albania.

-Bulgaria was still neutral.

-Germany hadn’t moved in Bulgaria.

Plenty of rational reasons to pursue defeating Italy.

Moreover, they are opinions which you have made no effort to demonstrate their validity or credibility. All you have done is merely post them dressed up as facts and assume that everybody is obliged to accept your opinions as facts. Which, in itself is a bit strange, since often your opinion and understanding differs from either/or Papagos in his book, the prime documentation held by the British Archives and other contemporary accounts such as those of Ambassador MacVeagh.

I disagree. The fact that neither of us can produce primary documentation that bears directly on this matter is your problem as well as mine. I understand that accept that. You don't.

Not supporting my position with cites? My opinions are different from Papagos? The book that you state is full of lies and postwar revisionism? Is Papagos’ book now a complete and honest record of the Greek actions and decisions? That MacVeagh was fully informed of all facets of the Greek military operations and not merely having a casual conversation with the King who likely was doing some expectation management? I have a hold on the library’s copy of MacVegh so I can read the context of that discussion. I haven’t forgotten it. I even stated that it might support your position when you first posted it. Where are the prime British documents that addressed the Greek strategic objectives in Oct-Feb 1940?

That you chose to ignore Metaxas' statement in January 1941 that defeating the Italians was the best course of action. Who would know better the true Greek objectives? The King talking to an ambassador or Metaxas speaking with Wavel?

Who here is ignoring the primary documentation?

What truly demonstrates your insincerity is that fact that you are arguing a position that you yourself first set in this discussion and continue to defend. I didn’t make any claims to whether the Greeks decision-making was rational or irrational until your definitive statements on the matter. I only challenged it once you stated it, yet you are acting like it is proven fact and telling me I am wrong.

Please go ahead an call this a strawman.

Please by all means continue your rant because someone actually disagrees with you and has supported his position.

I am not stating you are wrong and I am right. What I am stating is that the facts we do have better fit my position and not yours. I accept that I could be wrong.

[jwsleser]

Since we are continuing, I will address some main points. I can provide cites for my statements if needed:

1. That Papagos was incompetent, deceitful, guilty of wishful thinking, irrational decisions, whatever words have been used to use to describe Alexander Papagos.

-Simply put, everything that would support such an understanding is based on personal opinion. There is no contemporary evidence to support this contention nor any currently scholarship arguing such a position.

-All the documents, arguments, etc. we have from Papagos shown a competent, dedicated military professional.

-As a military professional and as the Greek Chief of Staff, Papagos’ job was to defend Greece. He fully support Metaxas’ efforts to remain neutral. He developed plans in case of war. He recognized that Greece would not chose war but that war would be thrust upon it. His role was to decide how to win if his government elected to fight.

-He recognized that Greece would need allies to win a two-front war. This war was anticipated as an Italo-Bulgarian war. Germany was identified as a distant threat as France and the UK still stood on the continent and Germany hadn’t moved forces into the Balkans. He identified that defeating Italy would resolve most of the military challenges facing Greece. Papagos pressed hard for political options that would create the alliance needed to win under those conditions.

-With the defeat of France and the occupation of Romania, Germany now became a near threat rather than a distant one as previously assessed. Rather than a Italo-Bulgarian war, Greece now faced a possible Italo-Bulgarian-German war. There was no way to win such a war without allies. Yugoslavia was the only country to could be a likely ally. Turkey was geographically in a poor position to help Greece. Revisions in the Balkan Treaties pushed by Bulgaria insured that attacks by Italy or Germany wouldn’t triggers those agreements. The UK couldn’t provide the needed level of assistance. Neutrality was still seen as the best option. If war came, Greece would fight a defensive campaign as the combination of the three enemies precluded any hope of a solution.

2. That Papagos was wrong to focus on Italy during the war and he ignored his own prewar planning.

-When war was thrust upon Greece, the conditions were significantly different than what he anticipated in his prewar writings. Even with the added German threat, eliminating Italy was still the best solution. Passively defending its borders would only lead to defeat. There was opportunity to eliminate Italy and that became his focus.

-Bulgaria was neutral and didn’t participant in the war. This allowed Greece to mass it military force in the Epirus.

-The Italian attack was weaker and poorly planned that gave the Greece opportunity.

-Yugoslavia was neutral and the UK could offer little support. Without Yugoslavia or the UK (preferably both), the only solution was to eliminate Italy before Germany attacked.

-During this period, the Greeks were reading about the collapse of Italian units in North Africa. The Greeks had seen many of the same events in Italian units in Albania. More indicators that the Italians could be beaten.

-Time didn’t matter as Germany would control the timing of its own offensive. Trying to defend against Germany without any allies while Italy was still a threat was sure defeat. There was no sound operational reason for Greece to shift its operational focus away from Albania. As Greece couldn’t defeat Germany by itself, nothing was lost by attacking Italy until Germany itself attacked.

3. The Greeks didn’t have a different option until late February 1941. The Tatoi Meeting (22 Feb) was the first time the strategic situation changed. The UK was willing to commit significant forces to Greece. Greece finally had an option it didn't previously possess.

-Could the UK forces arrive before the German attack?

-Was there time to reposition Greek forces?

-Would Yugoslavia change its position based on the now real UK support in the Balkans? Papagos asked for a final attempt to persuade the Yugoslavian to join, hoping that, given the now real UK support in the Balkans, that nation might finally shift. This was not a wasted effort. The larger the alliance, the better the chances for success. As a real operational decision would be made regarding Thessaloniki, this last effort was justified.

4. The operational crisis of 2 March. The missed opportunity by the UK to inform Greece of the Yugoslavian answer on 27-28 Feb resulted in the loss of two days and created the crisis on 2 March.

-If the UK would have inform Papagos of the Yugoslavian decision on 27-28 March, he could have begun executing the Tatoi agreement before the Germans entered Bulgaria. Instead, Papagos didn’t receive the answer until 2 March, the same day that the Germans entered Bulgaria.

-The operational situation on 2 March was a) No UK forces were on the ground; b) Bulgaria had mobilized; c) Germany could begin ground operations against Greece within 16 days (air could happen at any time); d) the Italians were preparing an offensive to start on 9 March; e) 20 days was needed to move units from the Metaxas Line; f) an additional 20-25 days was needed to withdraw the forces in Albania once Germany attacked; g) Yugoslavia would remain neutral but was now leaning towards Germany.

The answer wasn’t so simple as executing the Tatoi Agreement. It was no longer a solution to the problem. To say that the Tatoi Agreement was a better solution, given the real operational changes at the time that they happened, is completely unproven. Papagos recognized this.

-The available forces were inadequate to successfully defeat the Italo-German forces. The required Allied repositioning under the agreement only makes the operational situation worse as there wasn’t enough time for the changes. There was a real concern that the withdrawals could trigger an earlier German-Bulgarian attack.

-The absolute refusal of the UK to entertain defending further forward was likely a serious failure. I believe that Papagos was on firm ground in his reasoning. His compromise was a political effort to retain UK assistance. The debates in the UK over whether to continue or to end the effort to support Greece highlight this.

5. Time made the situation better but there wasn't enough time. We know the Germans didn’t attack until 6 April. But the Greeks didn’t know that on 4 March. Even with the time:

-One UK Infantry Div and the Polish Bde never arrived. A second armoured bde that might have been sent didn’t arrive. That means one-half of the promised infantry never reached Greece.

-Many of the air units and the additional material destined to equip the Greeks never arrived.

-Yugoslavia joined the Allies and changed the Allied operational situation.

6. The main argument against Papagos is based on the belief that the British were correct and the Greeks were wrong in March 1941 about which line to defend. There is no evidence that the British were right, nor does the issue with the UK address the months prior to March 1941. I plan to start a thread addressing this very issue.

7. I haven’t addressed comments about Greek pride, statements like ‘damned if we will surrender to the Italians’, what we will ask for in the peace conferences, and others similar in nature to show a rationale for decision other than what I have discussed above. I feel any well read individual on history will see the challenge in trying to use these type of statements/comments as the prime motivation for Greek decision making. Some were made during the heady days of success, the others when defeat was clear to see. Their nature and timing speak to emotion of the moment and not part of a decision-making process.

In conclusion I feel Papagos made the best military choices for Greece. Once the decision to fight was made on 28 October 1940, Papagos had to craft a military solution for victory. The government didn't instruct him to create the best conditions for surrender.