I had bowed out of this discussion because it was senseless to continue with an individual that decided to ignore (or seriously misconstrue) the historical facts. Our recent exchange in a different (but topically connected) thread caused me to return here and now address these inaccuracies. (see
viewtopic.php?f=56&t=228974&start=15)
The historical record is never complete. Historical research requires the researcher to review what is available and then validate what he/she thinks happened through further research. The record should be treated as correct/accurate until the researcher can demonstrate otherwise. The absence of information can never validate or invalidate a theory. It can suggest a theory/scenario that then needs to be validated.
Just because an account doesn’t support one’s theory doesn’t mean that source should be ignored. Just because part of an account is shown to be invalid doesn’t mean the entire account is invalid. Each ‘fact’ must be checked individually and then accepted/rejected based on the research.
I will use Mark’s comments to demonstrate what I have discussed above.
The English version of the Greek Official History can be both a help and a hinderance. The more carefully you read the book, the more you appreciate how unreliable it is. Unfortunately for you, you've chosen to pick pages which are a hinderance.
1) Page 183 - entry for XVIII Division.
In the first paragraph it says XVIII has seven (7) infantry battalions. In the following detail of their location, it only mentions five (5). Has the book managed to deny two battalions their history, simply forgotten about them, decided to exclude them for justifiable reasons or ????? Or was there only 5 and the mention of seven is a misprint of two too many?
Hardly the most reliable presentation of 'facts' when the information contradicts itself immediately.
Mark is incorrect in his statement. All seven battalions are accounted for in the Greek Abridged OH. One needs to understand how forces are organized and how to read the military data presented in this volume. You can see the referenced pages from the Greek Abridged OH on page 13 of this thread.
-Five battalion are specifically listed.
-The sixth battalion has been broken up and assigned to the three sectors (where did Mark think those ‘plus one company’(s) came from?).
-The seventh battalion has been pulled from the XVIII Division and assigned as the Division Group Reserve (once again, where did Mark believe this reserve battalion came from?).
All seven battalion are clearly and accurately presented in this account.
His next comment.
2) Page 184 - entry for XII Division.
It states that the division consisted of 4 regiments each of two battalions and a recce group. That makes a total of 8 infantry battalions and the recce groups. This contradicts contemporary evidence. On 4 March Papagos clearly stated it consisted of 6 battalions only. Documents in the various Australian unit war diaries state there were only 6 battalions. In one document I have dated 7 April and referring to discussions and agreements of 5 April, they are identified as I/82, II/82, I/86, II/86, I/87 and II/87. Several documents note one or two of the battalions and they are always from that list of six. No other.
So, is the book in error or did the Greeks manage to have 2 additional battalions in the line with XII Division that neither Papagos nor the Australians knew about?
Unless one can clearly demonstrate otherwise, all the accounts (the Greek, NZ, and Aust. OHs and Papagos’s book) should be considered accurate (re; my opening comments). The question is how can the accounts be reconciled if all correct? Part of the reconciliation process is to determine if any account is inaccurate. Anyone attempting to discover the truth of this event would recognize the following facts from reading Mark’s problem:
1. ‘An Abridged History of the Greek Italian and Greek-German War’ is just that, an abridged version of a seven volume series with over 2,300 pages, ~140 maps, and many annexes and charts. The two volumes covering the events from 6 April 41 to the conquest of the mainland are ~766 pages. The abridged English translation covers the entire war and is only 354 pages. It is clear that it will not contain all the details found in the original work. The abridged version is focused on the main narrative of the war and the information provided supports that narrative. While the information might not be complete for the less important data presented, it doesn’t mean that the information is inaccurate.
2. The NZ and Aust. OHs are histories of those armies, not of the Greek army. They present information on the Greeks only to set the situation/conditions for their own narrative. These histories don’t address the events of the Greek army before or after their intersection with the NZ and/or Aust. narrative.
3. Papagos's memoir is not a complete history of the Greek War. He provides the information to support his narrative which is discussing the higher-level events of the war.
4. The time of the various statements of the strength of the XII Division don’t align. The military experiences daily changes during active combat operations. To say that a statement on 3 March reflects what the NZ/Aust. forces saw on 6 April is folly. For Mark’s concern to be valid, the strength of the division would need to be the same from 3 March to 6 April. Furthermore I have not found any statement by Papagos stating 6 battalions. I did find his statement of 8 battalions “…towards the end of March the strength…” (‘Battle for Greece’ page 334) stating “The strength of this division [XII] consisted of 8 infantry battalions and 3 batteries.” (page 335). It is possible that Mark has a different source, but again it doesn’t provide any help in exploring this issue. Hence Papagos's comment on 3 March isn't material to answering this question.
Mark has not provided evidence that any of the these accounts are incorrect. He has presented us with an issue that requires further research. Why has Mark claimed that one (or more) of these accounts are wrong? Is there a possible scenario that can tie these accounts together such that none are contradicted?
The obvious scenario is that the accounts reflect the different points each narrative is addressing. The Greek account is only telling the reader what forces the Greeks allocated for the defense. The Greeks assigned the XII Division with 8 battalions to the CMFAS. This allocation was made in March and doesn't address the tactical organization/employment of those forces. The NZ and Aust. accounts are addressing the tactical employment of those Greek forces at a specific time during the defense. The XII Division only employed 6 battalions during its operations as observed by the C/W leaders.
The research question is: Did the Greeks reassign 2 battalions from the XII Division prior to 6 April and did the details of that reassignment invalidate the Greek statement that the division had 8 battalions?
Lets look at
Το Τέλος μιας Εποποιίας, Απρίλιος 1941 (The End of an Epic Struggle, April 1941) in section ΣΥΓΚΡΟΤΗΣΙ ΣΜΟΝΑΔΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΑ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΑ (Organization of Units and Significant Events).
1. On page 345 (entry for the XII Division), the division had 3 regiments on 8 February 1941 (84th, 86th, and 87th).
2. On page 418 (entry for the 82nd Regiment), the regiment was assigned to the XII Division on 8 March 1941.
The XII had 8 battalions in March when it was assigned to the CMFAS.
Then:
1. On page 421 and map 3 we find that the 1/87 Infantry Regiment (XII Division) was attached to the 20th Division on 7 April.
2. On map 3 and page 17, we find that that the 2/82 Infantry Regiment was under the operational control of the 19th Australian Brigade until they were relieved on 7 April. The 2/82nd then moved into division reserve which then became the Greek group reserve. In effect, the XII Division only had 6 battalions (1/82, 1,2/84, 1, 2/86, and 2/87) under its effective command until 14 April when the 1/87 returned to the division.
So the NZ and Aust. accounts are confirmed by the Greek official. The Greek Abridged account is also correct as the division had 8 battalions and the 2 'missing' battalions were attached and detached within the CMFAS. If those battalions had been assigned to the EFAS or EMFAS, then the Abridged account would be invalid as those 2 battalions were removed from the XII Division.
The accounts make sense and can be reconciled together without any of them being incorrect. The XII Division had 8 battalion available in the order of battle for the W Force (Papagos and the Greek Abridged OH). The tactical commanders detached 2 battalions for various missions that were not under the control of XII Division. In terms of what the XII Division commander could deploy was 6 battalions, which was what truly impacted the NZ and Aust. forces and so reported in their accounts.
Finally:
3) Page 183-4 - entry for Nestos Brigade.
The text suggests the five battalions and HQ of the Nestos Brigade are all located west of the Nestos River. Now go to page 314 of the same book (see below). According to that entry, the HQ of the Nestos Brigade was still in Xanthi when the Germans first attacked and only set up shop elsewhere on 7 April. Moreover, look at sketch map 20 rather than 22 which you posted ... it places the Nestos Brigade HQ at Xanthi too. Moreover, look carefully at sketch map 22 that you posted ... notice the battalion AO boundaries marked east of the river.
If you consult other sources, more detail is presented (see image below). Looking very closely, one can identify that within the Nestos Brigade AO, there were 3 battalions of the 37th Regiment, 2 battalions of the 93rd Regiment and the 14th Border Battalion - a total of 6, not 5, battalions. All three battalions of the 37th Regiment were west of the river, but one of them, II/37 was outside the main defensive line along with a cavalry company.
So, is the official history in error or just worded in a misleading way to catch out the less knowledgeable and experienced? It seems to have caught out the authors of Swastika over Acropolis too as they claim that XVIII only had 5 battalions. Has it caught you out?
This discussion lacks any understanding of military planning and operations offered by someone who claims to understand the military art. There are so many errors here that this one issue finally convinced me to leave the discussion. Why respond when Mark will refuse to listen. Where to start and how much do I need to explain? This is military planning/execution 101.
Note: the other source Mark refers to is
Η Γερμανικη Εισβολη Στην Ελλαδα Απριλιοσ 1941]ανικη Εισβολη Στην Ελλαδα Απριλιοσ 1941 . For this part of my discussion, I will parse his statements into bite-size pieces.
“The text suggests the five battalions and HQ of the Nestos Brigade are all located west of the Nestos River”.
The text suggests no such thing. What the text does state is:
1. that the Nestor Bde was defending the west bank of the identified river line and had 5 battalions, one reconnaissance team and the Echinos Fort in which to preform that mission.
2. The statement doesn’t try to address how the Bde Cdr executed that task. More on this point below.
3. To take this statement literally as the actual deployment of the sub-elements of the brigade would require
moving the Echinos Fort to the west side of the river.
The text only offers a statement of the brigade’s task and resources, not a detailed scheme of maneuver. Nothing more.
“…HQ of the Nestos Brigade was still in Xanthi…”
Yes the Bde HQ was at Xanthi on 6 April for a very simple and sound military reason…. COMMUNICATIONS. Throughout all the accounts of April 1941 (Greek and UK) runs a thread of how HQs would set up in towns to leverage the local phone system. The Greek eastern forces had been stripped of a significant amount of material to support the fight against the Italians. Using the existing infrastructure not only helped reduce the impact of these shortages, but also provided a secure means of communications. The UK units in Greece did the same thing. As soon as the Germans began their invasion, the HQ moved to the west side of the river. Up until then, the need for reliable and secure communications was more important than setting up west of the river. Also note that ‘HQs' in WW2 are not the 200-500 man organizations they are today but merely 20-40 personnel and a handful of vehicles. Pretty simple to move, especially as the new (jump) location was already prepared.
“…notice the battalion AO boundaries marked east of the river. …"
Here begins the lesson on military planning and graphics. Zones of attack and sectors of defense boundaries are control measures that define which HQs is responsible for controlling/approving fires and movement. Any indirect fire from inside/outside the boundaries must be approved/cleared by the responsible HQs. At times, any direct fire from its outside the boundaries must be approved by the responsible HQs (if directed in the order). Movements and positions by any unit inside the boundaries (even if the unit doesn’t belong to the HQs) must be approved by the responsible HQs.
These boundaries don’t:
-indicate to which HQs the unit is assigned (a good example are corps and higher artillery units positioned within a unit’s zone/sector but not controlled by the unit);
-the tactical scheme of maneuver the HQs will employ to defeat the enemy (there are other graphics that do that).
Why, in this case, are unit boundaries marked on the east side of the river? Because the Nestor Bde has responsibility for that terrain. Even though that area is not part of the Main Line of Defensive (MLD) or the Main Line of Resistance (MLR)(depending in what terms you prefer), it is part of the defense. Just because you are prepared to give-up the terrain east of the river doesn’t mean it can’t use that terrain as part of your scheme of maneuver. That is proper/correct military planning. Until the German invasion, this terrain was still Greek. Any movement and indirect fires (think covering forces and shaping fires) will be controlled by the brigade in those forward areas. The boundary graphics do not indicate that that terrain will be held, but which HQs is in control.
Note that the Nestor Bde was ordered to defend the Nestor River line. How that line was to be defended is a tactical decision made by the Bde Commander. Common defensive doctrine states you have a MLD (the river in this case) and in front of that are screening forces, security forces, and delaying positions. There is nothing doctrinal or in actual practice that precludes the deployment displayed on the map; in fact it reflects sound military practices. The 93rd is deployed forward as a cover forces (note the company size elements positioned over a wide front). That is not a serious defense but a classic cover force deployment.
“… 14th Border Battalion - a total of 6, not 5, battalions.”
The XIV is not a Border battalion as Mark stated and I assumed. It is a Reconnaissance Group (XIV Ομάς Αναγνωρίσες)(
Αγώνες εις την Ανατολικήν Μακεδονίαν και Δυτικήν Θράκην, 1941 page 280, Ομάδα translates as team or group). This unit is listed in the Greek Abridged OH as part of the Nestor Bde forces. So the Nestor Bde has 5 battalions and 1 Reconnaissance Team (Group).
“…II/37 was outside the main defensive line along with a cavalry company.” and other placement issues.
Note my comment about the 93rd above. If you look closely at the map from Η ΓΡΜΑΝΙΚΗ ΕΙΣΒΟΛΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ you will see that both of these units are west of the river, covering the southern part of the defensive line. Like the units forward of the main line, they are there to challenge the German advance but will withdraw back to the main position as required. In this case, the better defensive line in this part of the sector was in the higher ground west of the river.
The actual execution of the defense by the Nestor Bde supports my comments. The units forward of the MLD retreated when pressured and took up positions on the MLD. The III/37 fell back into the MLD and the 93rd move into preset positions on the right of the 37th (Αγώνες εις την Ανατολικήν Μακεδονίαν και Δυτικήν Θράκην, 1941, map 13 and discussion on pages 154-155). The 14th Border Battalion didn't withdraw into the the bde’s MLD but executed its separate orders.
In summation:
In toto, there is no basis to believe that the Greek OH is unreliable based on Mark's comments. All that is required is a clear understanding of military operations, combined with a desire to seek the truth rather than prove a specific point. If you let the evidence take you where it will and do the extra research, the reality of the situation will be discovered. This is not to say that sources can’t be wrong; as previous stated, demonstrating that something is wrong is part of the process. All it takes is a willingness to be proven wrong and to go the extra mile to validate the information.
I have written five pages to address Mark’s points. None of this should have been required. Points 1 and 3 were self-explanatory for anyone with an understanding of military operations/execution and didn’t require any additional research. It only required an honest approach to the material already available.
Point 2 was a question that required additional research (I knew the likely answer but needed to prove it) but lacks any material benefit to addressing the focus of this thread.
I will let this post sit a bit before I address the next post.