Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

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MarkN
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#211

Post by MarkN » 19 Sep 2016, 17:09

Tom from Cornwall wrote:I thought this might be of interest:

From WO201/14 - Strategic Importance of Salonika
1A

Telegram from Sir M Palairet, Athens
No 220 to Mr Eden, Foreign Office
R T Rptd Angora No 52 – Cairo for Mice
dated 13th February
despd 14th February (0030)
recd 14th February (1030)
decd 14th February (1300)

IMPORTANT

My telegram No 199.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has said that Salonica is of vital interest to Turkey. Moreover from our own point of view, if Germans are allowed to establish themselves in Salonica, (?would) they not be able to threaten our bases in Turkey and our lines of communication to that country?

2. Owing to the greater speed with which Germans can act there seem to be only two ways of preventing them reaching Salonica, if they strike soon and Yugoslavia does not fight: (1) a forward move by Turkish Army into Bulgaria directly formed bodies of German troops entered that country; (2) the despatch at that moment of sufficient Turkish forces to Macedonia in support of three Greek Divisions. If Turkish Government are not prepared for the first alternative, could we not press them to make all preparations at once for second? Unfortunately Greek public opinion is becoming increasingly apprehensive of Greeks being left in the lurch by Turkey. Some public statement by the latter to the opposite effect is therefore more necessary than ever to maintain Greek morale.
It would be interesting to see a Turkish source that confirms there appreciation that "Salonica was of vital importance"!

Regards

Tom
Hi Tom,

Sorry, have no Turkish documentation at all.

However, interesting to note how it records that on the one hand the Turks state "Salonica is of vital interest to Turkey" but the Greek public seems to doubt their sincerity. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs never got close to clarifying their position and yet the Greek leadership, Papagos in particular, pursued a strategy that assumed Yugoslavia would forsake its neutrality, give up half its country and go to war with the Axis on Greece's behalf for the sake of Salonika.

Strange that!

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#212

Post by MarkN » 19 Sep 2016, 17:38

jwsleser wrote:Mark

I am not attempting to discuss anything with you Mark.
So be it.

Nevetheless, that does not preclude me from responding to your posts.
jwsleser wrote:
Or have I misunderstood where your argument is going now and that, rather than looking for evidence that Papagos and the Greeks were on the right track strategically, all we're doing now is trying to do is ascertain whether Yugoslavia was interested in Salonika or not. Two different things.
The importance of Thessaloniki to Yugoslavia is discussed in several books (which will likely not be read as part of this discussion, but I can provide the cites), but Woodhouse above and the article linked below highlight that the port was critical to Yugoslavia.
The quote of your words, the second, is the paragraph that leads me to believe you've changed the direction of the discussion. You mention references to Salonika and its "importance" to Yugoslavia, and omit the relevance of that to Greek (Papagos) thinking and strategy.

Nobody here has questionned the claim, the truth, that Salonika was indeed very important to Yugoslavia. That is abundantly clear from a reading of literature and documents. But being important, "critical" or vital is not the key point. It is the red herring in the matter. The Greeks, ie Papagos, needed Yugoslavia to act in a specific manner; they needed the Yugoslavs to pursue solutions that accorded with Greek interests. It is no good to Greece, if the Yugoslav solution to their critical interest was to go to war with Greece!

I have tracked down both and English and a Serbo-croat version of Hoptner. They will be with me later, but it will take some time. Similarly, Littlefield.

Ristic has already arrived. So far all I have done is page hop the indexed pointers to Salonika. Speed reading, I see nothing that would have given Papagos and the Greeks any belief that Yugoslav was going to act in the way they required. The book does, however, offer insights into how the Yugoslavs were acting against Greece's interest. The evidence from this book points to Papagos getting strategy horribly wrong. Just like the paper by Bakic, they both point to Salonika's importance but describe Yugoslavia taking planning and taking measures wholly AGAINST Greece's interest!

Additionally, one paragraph pops out and is endnote 1 to chapter 6 (page 153). It states that Major Perisic, the Yugoslav staff officer sent to Athens incognito in early March, "His mission was, however, to evaluate the chances of success for the Anglo-Greek forces - not to make plans for common operations". This accords with what I have read in Serbo-croat literature, give or take, but is the first time (I'm sure I read it previously, but...) I've seen it in English. Given the book was published in the US in 1966, it is thus a surprise that Hancock & Stockings should, over 4 decades later, be using that trip as their sole evidence pointing to Yugoslavia providing the support necessary to justify Papagos' strategy.

More later....


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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#213

Post by jwsleser » 26 Jul 2017, 17:15

I had bowed out of this discussion because it was senseless to continue with an individual that decided to ignore (or seriously misconstrue) the historical facts. Our recent exchange in a different (but topically connected) thread caused me to return here and now address these inaccuracies. (see viewtopic.php?f=56&t=228974&start=15)

The historical record is never complete. Historical research requires the researcher to review what is available and then validate what he/she thinks happened through further research. The record should be treated as correct/accurate until the researcher can demonstrate otherwise. The absence of information can never validate or invalidate a theory. It can suggest a theory/scenario that then needs to be validated.

Just because an account doesn’t support one’s theory doesn’t mean that source should be ignored. Just because part of an account is shown to be invalid doesn’t mean the entire account is invalid. Each ‘fact’ must be checked individually and then accepted/rejected based on the research.

I will use Mark’s comments to demonstrate what I have discussed above.
The English version of the Greek Official History can be both a help and a hinderance. The more carefully you read the book, the more you appreciate how unreliable it is. Unfortunately for you, you've chosen to pick pages which are a hinderance.

1) Page 183 - entry for XVIII Division.
In the first paragraph it says XVIII has seven (7) infantry battalions. In the following detail of their location, it only mentions five (5). Has the book managed to deny two battalions their history, simply forgotten about them, decided to exclude them for justifiable reasons or ????? Or was there only 5 and the mention of seven is a misprint of two too many?

Hardly the most reliable presentation of 'facts' when the information contradicts itself immediately.
Mark is incorrect in his statement. All seven battalions are accounted for in the Greek Abridged OH. One needs to understand how forces are organized and how to read the military data presented in this volume. You can see the referenced pages from the Greek Abridged OH on page 13 of this thread.

-Five battalion are specifically listed.
-The sixth battalion has been broken up and assigned to the three sectors (where did Mark think those ‘plus one company’(s) came from?).
-The seventh battalion has been pulled from the XVIII Division and assigned as the Division Group Reserve (once again, where did Mark believe this reserve battalion came from?).

All seven battalion are clearly and accurately presented in this account.

His next comment.
2) Page 184 - entry for XII Division.
It states that the division consisted of 4 regiments each of two battalions and a recce group. That makes a total of 8 infantry battalions and the recce groups. This contradicts contemporary evidence. On 4 March Papagos clearly stated it consisted of 6 battalions only. Documents in the various Australian unit war diaries state there were only 6 battalions. In one document I have dated 7 April and referring to discussions and agreements of 5 April, they are identified as I/82, II/82, I/86, II/86, I/87 and II/87. Several documents note one or two of the battalions and they are always from that list of six. No other.

So, is the book in error or did the Greeks manage to have 2 additional battalions in the line with XII Division that neither Papagos nor the Australians knew about?
Unless one can clearly demonstrate otherwise, all the accounts (the Greek, NZ, and Aust. OHs and Papagos’s book) should be considered accurate (re; my opening comments). The question is how can the accounts be reconciled if all correct? Part of the reconciliation process is to determine if any account is inaccurate. Anyone attempting to discover the truth of this event would recognize the following facts from reading Mark’s problem:

1. ‘An Abridged History of the Greek Italian and Greek-German War’ is just that, an abridged version of a seven volume series with over 2,300 pages, ~140 maps, and many annexes and charts. The two volumes covering the events from 6 April 41 to the conquest of the mainland are ~766 pages. The abridged English translation covers the entire war and is only 354 pages. It is clear that it will not contain all the details found in the original work. The abridged version is focused on the main narrative of the war and the information provided supports that narrative. While the information might not be complete for the less important data presented, it doesn’t mean that the information is inaccurate.
2. The NZ and Aust. OHs are histories of those armies, not of the Greek army. They present information on the Greeks only to set the situation/conditions for their own narrative. These histories don’t address the events of the Greek army before or after their intersection with the NZ and/or Aust. narrative.
3. Papagos's memoir is not a complete history of the Greek War. He provides the information to support his narrative which is discussing the higher-level events of the war.
4. The time of the various statements of the strength of the XII Division don’t align. The military experiences daily changes during active combat operations. To say that a statement on 3 March reflects what the NZ/Aust. forces saw on 6 April is folly. For Mark’s concern to be valid, the strength of the division would need to be the same from 3 March to 6 April. Furthermore I have not found any statement by Papagos stating 6 battalions. I did find his statement of 8 battalions “…towards the end of March the strength…” (‘Battle for Greece’ page 334) stating “The strength of this division [XII] consisted of 8 infantry battalions and 3 batteries.” (page 335). It is possible that Mark has a different source, but again it doesn’t provide any help in exploring this issue. Hence Papagos's comment on 3 March isn't material to answering this question.

Mark has not provided evidence that any of the these accounts are incorrect. He has presented us with an issue that requires further research. Why has Mark claimed that one (or more) of these accounts are wrong? Is there a possible scenario that can tie these accounts together such that none are contradicted?

The obvious scenario is that the accounts reflect the different points each narrative is addressing. The Greek account is only telling the reader what forces the Greeks allocated for the defense. The Greeks assigned the XII Division with 8 battalions to the CMFAS. This allocation was made in March and doesn't address the tactical organization/employment of those forces. The NZ and Aust. accounts are addressing the tactical employment of those Greek forces at a specific time during the defense. The XII Division only employed 6 battalions during its operations as observed by the C/W leaders.

The research question is: Did the Greeks reassign 2 battalions from the XII Division prior to 6 April and did the details of that reassignment invalidate the Greek statement that the division had 8 battalions?

Lets look at Το Τέλος μιας Εποποιίας, Απρίλιος 1941 (The End of an Epic Struggle, April 1941) in section ΣΥΓΚΡΟΤΗΣΙ ΣΜΟΝΑΔΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΑ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΑ (Organization of Units and Significant Events).
1. On page 345 (entry for the XII Division), the division had 3 regiments on 8 February 1941 (84th, 86th, and 87th).
2. On page 418 (entry for the 82nd Regiment), the regiment was assigned to the XII Division on 8 March 1941.

The XII had 8 battalions in March when it was assigned to the CMFAS.

Then:
1. On page 421 and map 3 we find that the 1/87 Infantry Regiment (XII Division) was attached to the 20th Division on 7 April.
2. On map 3 and page 17, we find that that the 2/82 Infantry Regiment was under the operational control of the 19th Australian Brigade until they were relieved on 7 April. The 2/82nd then moved into division reserve which then became the Greek group reserve. In effect, the XII Division only had 6 battalions (1/82, 1,2/84, 1, 2/86, and 2/87) under its effective command until 14 April when the 1/87 returned to the division.

So the NZ and Aust. accounts are confirmed by the Greek official. The Greek Abridged account is also correct as the division had 8 battalions and the 2 'missing' battalions were attached and detached within the CMFAS. If those battalions had been assigned to the EFAS or EMFAS, then the Abridged account would be invalid as those 2 battalions were removed from the XII Division.

The accounts make sense and can be reconciled together without any of them being incorrect. The XII Division had 8 battalion available in the order of battle for the W Force (Papagos and the Greek Abridged OH). The tactical commanders detached 2 battalions for various missions that were not under the control of XII Division. In terms of what the XII Division commander could deploy was 6 battalions, which was what truly impacted the NZ and Aust. forces and so reported in their accounts.

Finally:
3) Page 183-4 - entry for Nestos Brigade.
The text suggests the five battalions and HQ of the Nestos Brigade are all located west of the Nestos River. Now go to page 314 of the same book (see below). According to that entry, the HQ of the Nestos Brigade was still in Xanthi when the Germans first attacked and only set up shop elsewhere on 7 April. Moreover, look at sketch map 20 rather than 22 which you posted ... it places the Nestos Brigade HQ at Xanthi too. Moreover, look carefully at sketch map 22 that you posted ... notice the battalion AO boundaries marked east of the river.

If you consult other sources, more detail is presented (see image below). Looking very closely, one can identify that within the Nestos Brigade AO, there were 3 battalions of the 37th Regiment, 2 battalions of the 93rd Regiment and the 14th Border Battalion - a total of 6, not 5, battalions. All three battalions of the 37th Regiment were west of the river, but one of them, II/37 was outside the main defensive line along with a cavalry company.

So, is the official history in error or just worded in a misleading way to catch out the less knowledgeable and experienced? It seems to have caught out the authors of Swastika over Acropolis too as they claim that XVIII only had 5 battalions. Has it caught you out?
This discussion lacks any understanding of military planning and operations offered by someone who claims to understand the military art. There are so many errors here that this one issue finally convinced me to leave the discussion. Why respond when Mark will refuse to listen. Where to start and how much do I need to explain? This is military planning/execution 101.

Note: the other source Mark refers to is Η Γερμανικη Εισβολη Στην Ελλαδα Απριλιοσ 1941]ανικη Εισβολη Στην Ελλαδα Απριλιοσ 1941 . For this part of my discussion, I will parse his statements into bite-size pieces.
“The text suggests the five battalions and HQ of the Nestos Brigade are all located west of the Nestos River”.


The text suggests no such thing. What the text does state is:
1. that the Nestor Bde was defending the west bank of the identified river line and had 5 battalions, one reconnaissance team and the Echinos Fort in which to preform that mission.
2. The statement doesn’t try to address how the Bde Cdr executed that task. More on this point below.
3. To take this statement literally as the actual deployment of the sub-elements of the brigade would require moving the Echinos Fort to the west side of the river.

The text only offers a statement of the brigade’s task and resources, not a detailed scheme of maneuver. Nothing more.
“…HQ of the Nestos Brigade was still in Xanthi…”
Yes the Bde HQ was at Xanthi on 6 April for a very simple and sound military reason…. COMMUNICATIONS. Throughout all the accounts of April 1941 (Greek and UK) runs a thread of how HQs would set up in towns to leverage the local phone system. The Greek eastern forces had been stripped of a significant amount of material to support the fight against the Italians. Using the existing infrastructure not only helped reduce the impact of these shortages, but also provided a secure means of communications. The UK units in Greece did the same thing. As soon as the Germans began their invasion, the HQ moved to the west side of the river. Up until then, the need for reliable and secure communications was more important than setting up west of the river. Also note that ‘HQs' in WW2 are not the 200-500 man organizations they are today but merely 20-40 personnel and a handful of vehicles. Pretty simple to move, especially as the new (jump) location was already prepared.
“…notice the battalion AO boundaries marked east of the river. …"
Here begins the lesson on military planning and graphics. Zones of attack and sectors of defense boundaries are control measures that define which HQs is responsible for controlling/approving fires and movement. Any indirect fire from inside/outside the boundaries must be approved/cleared by the responsible HQs. At times, any direct fire from its outside the boundaries must be approved by the responsible HQs (if directed in the order). Movements and positions by any unit inside the boundaries (even if the unit doesn’t belong to the HQs) must be approved by the responsible HQs.

These boundaries don’t:
-indicate to which HQs the unit is assigned (a good example are corps and higher artillery units positioned within a unit’s zone/sector but not controlled by the unit);
-the tactical scheme of maneuver the HQs will employ to defeat the enemy (there are other graphics that do that).

Why, in this case, are unit boundaries marked on the east side of the river? Because the Nestor Bde has responsibility for that terrain. Even though that area is not part of the Main Line of Defensive (MLD) or the Main Line of Resistance (MLR)(depending in what terms you prefer), it is part of the defense. Just because you are prepared to give-up the terrain east of the river doesn’t mean it can’t use that terrain as part of your scheme of maneuver. That is proper/correct military planning. Until the German invasion, this terrain was still Greek. Any movement and indirect fires (think covering forces and shaping fires) will be controlled by the brigade in those forward areas. The boundary graphics do not indicate that that terrain will be held, but which HQs is in control.

Note that the Nestor Bde was ordered to defend the Nestor River line. How that line was to be defended is a tactical decision made by the Bde Commander. Common defensive doctrine states you have a MLD (the river in this case) and in front of that are screening forces, security forces, and delaying positions. There is nothing doctrinal or in actual practice that precludes the deployment displayed on the map; in fact it reflects sound military practices. The 93rd is deployed forward as a cover forces (note the company size elements positioned over a wide front). That is not a serious defense but a classic cover force deployment.
“… 14th Border Battalion - a total of 6, not 5, battalions.”
The XIV is not a Border battalion as Mark stated and I assumed. It is a Reconnaissance Group (XIV Ομάς Αναγνωρίσες)(Αγώνες εις την Ανατολικήν Μακεδονίαν και Δυτικήν Θράκην, 1941 page 280, Ομάδα translates as team or group). This unit is listed in the Greek Abridged OH as part of the Nestor Bde forces. So the Nestor Bde has 5 battalions and 1 Reconnaissance Team (Group).
“…II/37 was outside the main defensive line along with a cavalry company.” and other placement issues.
Note my comment about the 93rd above. If you look closely at the map from Η ΓΡΜΑΝΙΚΗ ΕΙΣΒΟΛΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ you will see that both of these units are west of the river, covering the southern part of the defensive line. Like the units forward of the main line, they are there to challenge the German advance but will withdraw back to the main position as required. In this case, the better defensive line in this part of the sector was in the higher ground west of the river.

The actual execution of the defense by the Nestor Bde supports my comments. The units forward of the MLD retreated when pressured and took up positions on the MLD. The III/37 fell back into the MLD and the 93rd move into preset positions on the right of the 37th (Αγώνες εις την Ανατολικήν Μακεδονίαν και Δυτικήν Θράκην, 1941, map 13 and discussion on pages 154-155). The 14th Border Battalion didn't withdraw into the the bde’s MLD but executed its separate orders.

In summation:

In toto, there is no basis to believe that the Greek OH is unreliable based on Mark's comments. All that is required is a clear understanding of military operations, combined with a desire to seek the truth rather than prove a specific point. If you let the evidence take you where it will and do the extra research, the reality of the situation will be discovered. This is not to say that sources can’t be wrong; as previous stated, demonstrating that something is wrong is part of the process. All it takes is a willingness to be proven wrong and to go the extra mile to validate the information.

I have written five pages to address Mark’s points. None of this should have been required. Points 1 and 3 were self-explanatory for anyone with an understanding of military operations/execution and didn’t require any additional research. It only required an honest approach to the material already available.

Point 2 was a question that required additional research (I knew the likely answer but needed to prove it) but lacks any material benefit to addressing the focus of this thread.

I will let this post sit a bit before I address the next post.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#214

Post by jwsleser » 01 Aug 2017, 18:20

I will address the issue of Yugoslavia.
Speed reading, I see nothing that would have given Papagos and the Greeks any belief that Yugoslav was going to act in the way they required.
Yet the reality was that…

Yugoslavia mobilized against Germany, launched an offensive against the Italians in Albania, and tried to stop the German advance in southern Yugoslavia. It doesn’t matter what Mark thinks he didn't see because history demonstrated that Papagos did correctly understand what he was observing.
Ristic has already arrived….The book does, however, offer insights into how the Yugoslavs were acting against Greece's interest. The evidence from this book points to Papagos getting strategy horribly wrong. Just like the paper by Bakic, they both point to Salonika's importance but describe Yugoslavia taking planning and taking measures wholly AGAINST Greece's interest!
Note that Mark makes a declarative statement but doesn’t offer any cites, quotes, or anything to support his contentions. I have reviewed both Bakić’s ‘The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy’ and Ristić’s Yugoslavia’s Revolution in 1941 and have not found any decisions/actions that go against Greece’s interests. Even the decision to join the Axis (made not by choice but forced by the Germans) saw the Yugoslav Government negotiating a clause that released Yugoslavia from participating in any Axis military actions (protecting Greece). And that agreement was nullified three days later.

The real point to examine is Mark’s characterization that Greece wanted Yugoslavia to support Greek interests. This is another misrepresentation of the historical record. No participant in these events, not even Pagagos, ever stated that Yugoslavia should act based on Greek interests. What everyone discussed and presented was that Yugoslavia should act in its own best interests. It just happened to be that both nations shared common interests:

1. Both wanted to remain neutral.
2. Both wanted to avoid any agreements with the Axis powers as they both understood that to do so would end their independence.
3. Both agreed that Salonika should remain a free port under Greek control.

None of the actual participants, not even Papagos, ever stated that Yugoslavia should act in Greece’s interest. This bit of misdirection implies that Yugoslav interests were not affected by the events unfolding in the Balkans (why should Yugoslavia act merely to help Greece?). Yugoslavia did act and it did so for its own self-interest.

So what does Ristić actually say in his book?
Page 31-32 The Prince Regent [talking to Sir Neville Henderson] hereupon said that we did not in England seem to understand that that for Yugoslavia, Italy, since the occupation of Albania, was by far the greater danger:…At about the same time, on May 3, 1939, a few weeks after the Italian occupation of Albania, General Dušan Simivoić, the Yugoslavian Chief of Staff, had spoken with the Greek military attaché and suggested that the two general staffs make plans to counter any Italian attack against Greece and Yugoslavia.
Page 43 [at Yugoslav meeting held on 31 Oct-1 Nov 1940] A partial mobilization was considered, but opinions differed; everyone agreed, however, that the Italians could not be allowed to occupy Salonika.
Page 44 [I won’t type the entire page, here are the high points] General Nedić (CoS) recommends that Yugoslavia join Axis and seize Salonika. Prince Paul rejects that recommendation and Nedić resigns/is fired.
Page 44-45 Paul rejects deal with Italy.
Page 45 Danilo Gregorić, an unofficial agent of the Prime Minister, spoke with German Minister Heeren on 3 Nov 1940.
“But as Gregorić “hinted again and again, the question of Salonika becomes very large. An Italian Salonika is a rope around the neck of Yugoslavia: that is his position.”
I can post more from Ristić book. These statements show a strong desire to maintain the status quo that is clearly supportive of Yugoslav interests.

Bakić…well there are multiple reasons why Mark didn’t offer any quotes.

Page 204-205 [19 Jan 1939: Yugoslav reply to Italian offer to support Yugoslav claim to Salonica if Yugoslav supports Italian efforts in Albania]
The taking of Salonica from the Greeks would not constitute any sort of assuagement in the eyes of the Yugoslav public opinion for the undertaking of the proposed operation in Albania. On the contrary, Greece is an ally of Yugoslavia, Serbo-Greek friendship was proven by the blood shedding on the battlefields in the Balkan Wars as well as WW1. In the area [stretching] from Ghevheli to Salonica, Greek governments settled pure Greek elements, the refugees from Asia Minor…In the port of Salonica there is a free Yugoslav customs zone which functions well…All this speaks against the idea regarding Salonica.
[New paragraph] According to Stojadinović, the Yugoslav military was of the opinion that no effort should be spared to prevent Italy from subduing Greece; if however, a war became inevitable and a victorious Italy got hold of Salonica, it was necessary to prevent her, “either by means of an agreement or at the cost of war”, from maintaining control of the port for such contingency would amount to “the collapse of the economic lung through which Yugoslavia breathes i.e., a free sea route.”
There are many more quotes/cites I can present [many previously provided in the 13 pages of this discussion].

The reader sees confirmation of the Yugoslav position that only Greece should control Salonica. This is a main issue for the country until the German invasion. Yugoslav action against Salonica is only considered in the situation that the Greeks would lose control of the vital port. Under no other conditions does Yugoslavia consider action against the Greeks.

So why does Mark continue to claim “Yugoslavia taking planning and taking measures wholly AGAINST Greece's interest!” Maybe footnote 49 in Bakić’s paper will shed some light [28-29 Oct 40 discussing the mobilization of Yugoslav troops to seize Salonica to prevent the Italians from doing so]

[Page 207 fn]
49. Aprilski rat 1941, vol I, doc 293. It should be noted that the editor has commended (n. 8), in blatant disregard for the content of this document, not to mention the wider context of Yugoslavia’s situation, but typical of the biased view of communist Yugoslav historiography, that Prince Paul decided to “traitorously attack Salonica justifying such an action by the alleged interests of the country”.
[Aprilski was published during the communist regime [vol I 1969 vol II 1987].

So how many of Mark's sources are communist era? How reflect this communist party line?

Why does Mark misrepresent what Ristić wrote in his book or what Bakić stated in his article?

Why does Mark avoid providing cites and quotes to support his statements? A troubling trend.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#215

Post by jwsleser » 17 Aug 2017, 22:22

It has been a busy time and working through the Greek officials has been challenging.
…The point I wish to draw your attention to is that he has decided not to leave forces east of the Nestos river to defend Western Thrace and thus no allocation of forces for that territory is made in his calculation.

The decision to withdrawal from Western Thrace is repeated/proposed by Papagos in his discussions with the British on 22/24 February and the second round 2-4 March. It is also noted in the Greek official history (para. 241).However, in the post war narrative part of his book, he discusses the need for forces to defend Western Thrace as well and seems to indicate that the same 12 division minimum can accomplish that. This part of his narrative is effectively a (bitter) lament that the British were not willing to provide the scale of forces that he wants to defend the line he would like to defend. The fact that he has now misrepresented his own appreciation at the time (the 11 January 1941 paper) and his own contemporary proposals and decisions in negotatiations with the British is probably obscured and lost to the casual reader. 

History records that Papagos left 7 battalions east of the Nestos river in Western Thrace at the expense of defending the lines that he proposed (Vermion) and claimed a desire (Metaxas-Nestos) to hold.
Once again, completely false. I have previously addressed the mission, forces and action of the Nestor Brigade. The forces left in Western Thrace that were not part of the Nestor River defense were under the Evros Brigade. The Greek Army field units assigned to this brigade were transferred to other units:
Aπό Φεβρουαρίου συνεκροτήθη ώσαύτως ή Ταξιαρχία “Εβρογ” άποτελεσθείσα τελικϖς έκ τϖν τριϖν ταγμάτων προκαλύψεως Κομοτινής, Σουφλίου και Διδυμοτείχου και τού Οχυρού Νυμφαίας. [From February, the "Evros" Brigade was eventually reorganized which was finally accomplished with the three frontier battalions of Komotini, Soufli and Didymoteiou and of the Fortress of Nymphia.](Αγώνες εις την Ανατολικήν Μακεδονίαν και Δυτικήν Θράκην (1941) pg 76). This information is also shown in the brigade organization (ibid on pg 283).
As I have previously noted, the frontier units were to be left in place (specifically stated in the Tatoi Agreement). These forces amounted to 9 companies organized into the three battalions noted above.

I have attached a map from the same book showing the eastern part of the Beles-Nestor Line (Map 4) with the planned defensive schemes for Eastern Macedonia. Note the covering positions forward and the main defense behind (western side) of the river.
WesternThraceDefense.jpg

Map 13 (attached) show the actual defense and how it executed. Note that the 93rd Regiment takes up a position on the right flank of the 37th as it withdraws.
NestorBdeOpsApri1940.jpg
The prewar force to defend Western Thrace were three divisions (XII, XIII, and XIV)(ibid Map 1). By February 1941, the XIII had been moved to Albania, the XIV was now occupying the Rupel/Kara Dag Sector, leaving only the XII Division and the Evros Bde. Per the Tatoi agreement, the XII was moved to the Vermion Line and the Evros Bde was stripped of the field Army units and left with only the Frontier companies.

History didn’t record that Papagos left 7 battalions at the expense of the agreed-to defensive positions. He left exactly was what was agreed at Tatoi, nothing more.
Additionally, one paragraph pops out and is endnote 1 to chapter 6 (page 153)[This is from Yugoslavia’ Revolution of 1941 by Ristić]. It states that Major Perisic, the Yugoslav staff officer sent to Athens incognito in early March, "His mission was, however, to evaluate the chances of success for the Anglo-Greek forces - not to make plans for common operations” [my bold]. This accords with what I have read in Serbo-croat literature, give or take, but is the first time (I'm sure I read it previously, but...) I've seen it in English. Given the book was published in the US in 1966, it is thus a surprise that Hancock & Stockings should, over 4 decades later, be using that trip as their sole evidence pointing to Yugoslavia providing the support necessary to justify Papagos' strategy.
Mark is attempting to reduce months/years of interaction between Yugoslavia and Greece to a single event. He is also ignoring the previous ~80 pages of Hancock & Stockings book. Finally why does Papagos need justification for the only strategy that might save Greece? With Italy undefeated and the UK unable to provide the level of support required, the only option left was to provide the best opportunity to leverage Yugoslav support if it should happen. All the other options led to defeat. Insuring that Yugoslav support could be a viable and effective option was the only chance that might allow Greece to survive. Mark himself has stated that forces available to Greece and the UK were inadequate to defeat Germany regardless of the plan.
Jeff Leser

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#216

Post by jwsleser » 28 Sep 2017, 15:28

As it has been quiet in this thread, I felt this was a good time to bring up an issue that has troubled me since I began researching the Tatoi Conferences.

The British accounts stressed the need for rapid action on the (supposedly) agreed-to course of action of occupying the Aliakmon Line. All the accounts speak to General Papagos constantly asking the status of the talks with the Yugoslavs, but nary a word about the British asking the Greeks on the status of their supposed move. So the British are surprised on 2 March. Why?

I have been a military liaison officer with several foreign armies during both training exercises and active operations, so I am fairly conversant on the duties and expectations of a liaison to a foreign army. If I had been informed of an agreement that the Greeks were to immediately begin preparations and then execute the movement of forces, I would have been watching and asking for the plan and associated timeline. This information would have been critical given the simultaneous movement of UK forces into the theater while the Greeks were also continuing to supply their forces in Albania. All three movements required the use of the same road and rail network, which were inadequate for executing only one of these tasks.

Yet no account states or even indicates that the UK Military Mission ever queried the Greeks on the status of their execution of the agreement. General Heywood was part of the discussions and acted as an interpreter, so ignorance of the agreement isn’t a possible reason. Between 23 February to 2 March the UK leadership remained ignorant of the actions of the Greek army, while the Greeks were constantly asking the status of the talks per their understanding of the agreement.

This supports the Greek interpretation of the meeting and not the understanding proffered by the British. Both sides stressed the need for rapid action, yet only the Greeks apparently acted with this in mind. The lackadaisical actions of the British (not informing the Greeks of the Yugoslav response on 27 Feb, not keeping informed of Greek planning/actions, the lack of any urgency in pressing for the execution of the supposed agreed-to plan) all point to the British sharing the same understanding as stated by the Greeks: Yugoslavia was key and nothing would be done until that issue has been resolved. The final military decision hinged on the Yugoslav response and the British actions tend to support that they understood and accepted this.

I am certainly open to other thoughts/possibilities on this issue. I have thought about this for months and can’t see another reason for the lack of British action. It would be great to find any documents that either prove or disprove the lack of questioning by the UK Military Mission.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#217

Post by jwsleser » 03 Oct 2017, 18:03

In my continuing research, I discovered these minutes of the Tatoi Conference written by Pierson Dixon, Eden’s private secretary, in David Carlton’s Anthony Eden, A Biography (pages 174-75).
Dixon minutes Feb 41.jpg
The cite provided for the minutes is: Prem. 3/294/1 annex 3, record 4.

In the same book is also Eden’s cable to Churchill immediately after the 22 Feb 41 meeting (page 175-176).
Eden Cable 22 Feb 41.jpg
The cite is: Cab. 105/2 PRO.

Both documents are complete as presented in the book. Higham’s book adds another paragraph to the cable on page 123 but doesn’t include the first part:

“(d) That the movement of British troops should begin forthwith, time being the essence of the problem. The utmost secrecy to be observed and deceptive stratagem devised.”

Both of these documents indicate that the final military decision would rest on the Yugoslav response.

In the minutes, the preparation paragraph doesn’t state that units were to move. Note how the military and political considerations are separate in the withdrawal paragraph, and the final decision of the former (which line) is conditioned by the politics possibles.

In the cable, the final military decisions is again couched in terms of the Yugoslav decision. The phrase in (b) “. . . the line we should have to hold if the Yugoslavs were not willing to come in.” is pretty clear in this point.

Carlton also points out the lack of any follow-up by the UK Military Mission that would indicate a decision (page 177).
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