Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

[MarkN]

Tom,

More meat to add to your bones.

Re Greek and British understanding of Yugoslavian plans and how this knowledge affected their plans, I found the following account of Anglo-Greek discussions the day after their meeting with the Yugoslavs on the border (WO201/52):

Telegram report from Wilson to Wavell regarding that meeting...



And a map of the Yugolsav proposal to counter-attack both the Italians and the Germans.




Adding a wee correction to an earlier post of mine. It was the Germans who offered Salonika and much of Macedonia to the Yugoslavs as a reward for coming onto their side. This was confirmed in one of the two 'secret' annexes to the protocols and Tripartite Accord signed on 25 March. The British, on the otherhand, offered to campaign post war for the whole of Istria to be granted to Yugoslavia. Apart from Trieste, this did indeed occur.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Mark,

Thanks, they are both interesting.

I found this article [it's available to all!] on line which may be of interest: Britain and the Belgrade Coup of 27 March 1941 Revisited - SUE ONSLOW, Electronic Journal of International History (2005), University of London. I haven't read it all but was struck in particular by the details following page 11 where the author suggests that "The War Office and Southern Department [of Foreign Office I guess?] were well aware of the deficiencies of the Yugoslav forces...principal need was for anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank weapons and tanks."

She points out that the British knew of these limitations but that in February - March 1941 they seem to have been completely lost sight of what they meant for the military contribution that could be expected from Yugoslavia. Very strange! Certainly shows in British intelligence appreciations in both Cairo and London - it's just that they were ignored.

Jeff,

I'm not sure if you've read van Creveld's 'Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue'? Page 132 - 134 make clear the attempts by the Greeks in March 1941 to avoid German intervention - I would especially note Ribbentrop's comment that:

[the Greek government] seems to harbour illusions concerning the price it would have to pay for such a termination [of the conflict in Albania].

Could Metaxas have taken the Greeks into a peace deal that was acceptable to Mussolini by making concessions in the NW whilst also surrendering Salonika and the Aegean coast to the Germans?

Regards

Tom

[jwsleser]

Mark

Looking at your post, it seems Papagos in particular was quite ignorant of the threat against Yugolsavia.

It seems Papagos was trying to use perceived Yugoslav unhelpfulness to distract him from making sensible and necessary adjustments in his own forces.

Both of these statements are a disservice to Gen Pagagos. He was quite aware of the Yugoslavian position. He was a military realist and recognized that the Yugoslavian position was untenable if the Yugoslavia Army attempted to defend the entire country.

Gen Pagagos wrote two documents in March 1940 (reprinted in full in his book’s document section). The first titled “Views on the General lines of handling operations in the event of an extension of the War to the Balkans” is a short five page overview. The second, “General Survey of Operations in the Balkans in the event of an extension of the war” is a detailed, 55 page appreciation of the military situation in the Balkans.

Chapter I - General Potentialities of the Balkan States.
Chapter II – Broad Outline of the General Allied Plan of Campaign in the Balkans.
Chapter III – Operations against Bulgaria.
Chapter IV – Operations in Yugoslavia.
Chapter V – Operations in Romania.
Chapter VI – Operations against Bulgaria.

He devotes nine pages to a military/geographical analysis of the defense of Yugoslavia. Pagagos discusses the area to be defended and the inadequacies of the forces available. Assuming a combined Italian/German/Bulgarian offensive, he identifies that a western thrust by Bulgaria into Yugoslavia must be defeated, as failure to do so would cut Yugoslavia off from any Allied support. Given the Axis LOOs from the west, north and east, northern Yugoslavia likely can’t defend until Allied help is available. So defense of the south is critical for any sustained Yugoslavian resistance.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the Yugoslavian Army could look forward to securing only the line of the rivers Danube-Sava-Drin on which it would be advisable to rest its bulk, and in front of which it should carry out a retreating maneuver with comparatively weak forces. (page 202)

I point out this 1940 document to indicate that Pagagos’ position as reflected in Document 9A that Tom posted wasn’t based on his need “from making sensible and necessary adjustments” but from a detail study of this exact military problem. Nor were his statements in his book ‘post war rationalization’ designed to justify his position using historical outcome. He states his position at the 3-4 April meeting that (after a review of the situation) …

It is obvious that under such conditions the Yugoslavia Army could not possibly hope to defend the whole of the national territory successfully. Any such attempts would entail a dispersal of forces which would render effective defense of any one point impossible.” (page 329)

He then follows with his recommendations.

I would add that Pagagos wasn't asking for something he hadn't already offered; abandonment up to 1/3 of mainland Greece at the 21 February meeting to create a viable defense.

Having read extensively on what Britain was doing in Belgrade at the time, Papagos is not up to date and 'reaching'.

I am not sure I understand this comment. Nothing I read in Tom’s excerpt of the ‘Papagos and Wilson (aka Mr. Watt!) on 24 March 1941 re the Coup in Belgrade are interesting for where the "blame" lies (WO201/52)” indicates that Pagagos was ‘reaching’. The fact that the coup happened on 27 March demonstrates that his assessment was correct.

Am I missing something or misunderstanding your comments?

And this paragraph…

But Papagos was not without his own contacts. I would argue that the reason that Yugoslavia picked sides as late as they did, was not due to British representations, but Greek ones. He had had a British public school upbringing and was thought to be one of 'us'. Not so. Prince Paul admired Hitler and wanted to side with him. We thought we could play on the old boy network, he was godfather to one of our Princes etc etc, but were deluded. Prince Paul's wife was the daughter of the Greek King. He, the King, and she understood that siding with Germany was throwing Greece under the bus. His hesitation was almost entirely due to knowing it would create a problem with his wife.

I assume that the ‘He’ in the third sentence is Prince Paul. I also assume that the Greek representations is ‘Princess Olga’, not the Greek government. So I am unclear of what this is mean to inform.

Tom

Higham is OK for a narrative of events,

Agreed, the timeline is all I was interested in, not his opinions of the events themselves.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

Tom

I'm not sure if you've read van Creveld's 'Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue'?

Yes I have (awhile ago). I will check the copy at CARL to refresh my memory once it is available again (it is checked out).

Could Metaxas have taken the Greeks into a peace deal that was acceptable to Mussolini by making concessions in the NW whilst also surrendering Salonika and the Aegean coast to the Germans?

I don't know. My point is has been that Metaxas could force/carry issues no other Greek leader could. He could:

-order the withdrawal from Albania over the objections of the generals.

-initiate serious negotiations with Germany. Problem I see is that Greece kept asking what Germany wanted rather than trying to diplomatically maneuver Germany into a deal (passive rather than aggressive).

Note that in general I agree with Mark. The only option I see that might offer hope is a unilateral withdrawal from Albania in Jan-Feb. to jump-start negotiations. If that doesn't work, then the Greeks can go full speed into full military cooperation with the Allies.

Yugoslavia is a major problem. Greece can't abandon the country if they decide to fight because that sets-up defeat in detail. if Yugoslavia remains neutral or supports the Axis, then abandonment of national territory is Greece's only option.

What Metaxas offered in this situation is military knowledge linked to a political leader. He could have 'cut' the Gordian Knot by making a firm decision in this period of Yugoslavian uncertainty. Whether he would have made a decision or whether it would have been the right decision is unknown. He was Greece's Churchill. When he died, the government sank into indecisiveness and left the military to make these difficult decisions. Pagagos remained a military leader and didn't step up into the role of generalissimo. The decision to withdrawal/abandon Greek territory before any military action forcing it was a political decision, one that Pagagos rightly didn't make.

Pista! Jeff

[MarkN]

Hi Jeff,

Looking at your (Tom from Cornwall) post, it seems Papagos in particular was quite ignorant of the threat against Yugolsavia.

It seems Papagos was trying to use perceived Yugoslav unhelpfulness to distract him from making sensible and necessary adjustments in his own forces.

Both of these statements are a disservice to Gen Pagagos. He was quite aware of the Yugoslavian position. He was a military realist and recognized that the Yugoslavian position was untenable if the Yugoslavia Army attempted to defend the entire country.

I don't believe I'm doing Papagos a disservice at all.

Although it is true that the Yugoslav's did not have the resources to defend all of their territory, the very same can be said of Greece. So, given that Papagos was determined to defend all of Greece and the Albanian territory he held, I find it somewhat hilarious that he considers the Yugoslavs should give up their territory and position their forces in a manner that best suits Greece! Moreover, while he excuses his non redeploymemt of his divisions based upon the time factor and threat from the enemy, he seems to believe that the Yugoslavs can accomplish their moves unhindered in lightning quick time.

That's why I make the comments I do: Papagos is naive or deluded or deliberately deceitful in thinking that the Yugoslavs can, and are in a position to, do all the things that he has done so much to resist himself.

It's just my opinion based upon what I have read and with the added bonus of hindsight. Others may well reach completely different interpretations of the documents and written histories.

[xristar]

I cannot follow your logic.
Papagos intent was to build a viable common front with the Yugoslavs. His proposals went to this direction. That would require the Greeks holding the right wing of the common front, as well as the elimination of the Italians in Albania, in the rear of this front. Papagos' proposal for the Yugoslavs to withdraw below the Sava-Danube line is in the same vein, the aim of a viable front.

[MarkN]

I cannot follow your logic.
Papagos intent was to build a viable common front with the Yugoslavs. His proposals went to this direction. That would require the Greeks holding the right wing of the common front, as well as the elimination of the Italians in Albania, in the rear of this front. Papagos' proposal for the Yugoslavs to withdraw below the Sava-Danube line is in the same vein, the aim of a viable front.

Your "common front" equates to Yugoslavia giving up almost everything in order to defend all of Greece and only a bit of their own country. Very magnanimous!

And that is based upon Papagos' unsound belief...

21. General Papagos thought that a German offensive in the direction of NISH would be more dangerous, but there were no German concentrations in that area. He asked whether there was any change of getting some troops released in view of the successes in ABYSSINIA.

The 1st Panzer Army followed exactly that route, "direction of NISH", and hit Belgrade from the south. The Danube-Sava line was an irrelevancy.

Yugoslavia had far greater internal political problems and divisions than Greece. They were not going to sacrifice themselves for Greece.

Document 9A is an interesting account of Papagos showing his determination to defend all of Greece with other peoples' troops rather than recognising the military sense of shortening his lines to defend as much of Greece as possible. At no point is there any mention of a single redeployment of troops from Albania. On the otherhand, he is looking for (a) Yugolsavia to give up territory to free up troops to protect his (Greek) left flank at Stumica and further north, (b) Britain to send more troops from North or East Africa to defend the Metaxas Line, and (c) to move his own force from the Aliakmon - and the British forces - forward to the Axios or further. These are the words of political Papagos not military Papagos.

[xristar]

I cannot follow your logic.
Papagos intent was to build a viable common front with the Yugoslavs. His proposals went to this direction. That would require the Greeks holding the right wing of the common front, as well as the elimination of the Italians in Albania, in the rear of this front. Papagos' proposal for the Yugoslavs to withdraw below the Sava-Danube line is in the same vein, the aim of a viable front.

Your "common front" equates to Yugoslavia giving up almost everything in order to defend all of Greece and only a bit of their own country. Very magnanimous!

I continue to be unable to see any logic in your statements. The defense of Greece was first and foremost prerequisite for a defense of Yugoslavia to even exist. If Greece abandoned the defenses of East Macedonia or its positions in Albania (particularly in the SE), the fight for Yugoslavia woulde be over before it had begun. The whole objective of the planning was to ensure contact between the Anglo-Greek forces and the Yugoslav. The general line Drina-Sava-Danube was proposed by Papagos as an actually defensible line, while the forces in the north would fight a delaying campaign. These rivers were exactly where the old Serbian border was and where the Serbs had been fighting the Austro-Hungarians in WW1. The "bit of their own country" (in your words) that the Yugoslavs would defend would be Serbia and Montenegro, plus the strategically essential Yugoslav "Macedonia". That may be only about half the country, but it is the half that had at least some chance of holding, plus it is the most reliable part.

And that is based upon Papagos' unsound belief...

21. General Papagos thought that a German offensive in the direction of NISH would be more dangerous, but there were no German concentrations in that area. He asked whether there was any change of getting some troops released in view of the successes in ABYSSINIA.

The 1st Panzer Army followed exactly that route, "direction of NISH", and hit Belgrade from the south. The Danube-Sava line was an irrelevancy.

What other option than the Danube-Sava line was there? Abandoning the whole of Yugoslavia? I thought it was you that said that the Yugoslavs shouldn't/wouldn't abandon their country.

Yugoslavia had far greater internal political problems and divisions than Greece. They were not going to sacrifice themselves for Greece.

You use that claim -"for Greece"- a lot. So Yugoslavia actually holding a defensive line means for you sacrificing themselves for Greece? :roll:

Document 9A is an interesting account of Papagos showing his determination to defend all of Greece with other peoples' troops rather than recognising the military sense of shortening his lines to defend as much of Greece as possible. At no point is there any mention of a single redeployment of troops from Albania.

You missed Jeff's point that non-cooperation with the Yugoslavs would result in defeat in detail. First the Yugoslavs, then the Greeks.
Also, again, you repeat the unbelievable notion that Papagos intented to defend Greece "with other peoples' troops". "Other peoples" don't have their own land to protect?:roll:

On the otherhand, he is looking for (a) Yugolsavia to give up territory to free up troops to protect his (Greek) left flank at Stumica and further north, (b) Britain to send more troops from North or East Africa to defend the Metaxas Line, and (c) to move his own force from the Aliakmon - and the British forces - forward to the Axios or further. These are the words of political Papagos not military Papagos.

The "(Greek) left flank at Strumica" is the (Yugoslav) right flank at Strumica, and the epicenter of the campaign.

[MarkN]

I continue to be unable to see any logic in your statements. The defense of Greece was first and foremost prerequisite for a defense of Yugoslavia to even exist.

I am not surprised that you do not see the logic in my posts, your understanding of the context is completely different to mine. And here is a the most fundamental of differences. I would argue that, "the defense of Greece was first and foremost prerequisite for a defense of Yugoslavia to even exist" is a historical fallacy. It is your belief in that context which leads you to see Papagos' analysis and demands as being sound, coherent and logical. Since I believe it is a historical fallacy, I see Papagos in a completely different light.

Yugoslavia in 1941 was not the same as Serbia in 1914/5. Yugoslavia's independence residened in the hands of the Germans and its own internal divisions. Greece was essentially irrelevant to this issue. However, once Italy brought war to the Balkans, and against Greece in particular, Greece effectively became the focal point that destroyed Yugoslavia's hopes of independance rather than being its saviour.

You missed Jeff's point that non-cooperation with the Yugoslavs would result in defeat in detail. First the Yugoslavs, then the Greeks.

I have argued that defeat in detail was inevitable, and the only chance of, perhaps, delaying that inevitability was for the defensive line to be shortened significantly. The military logic in that is without question. Trying to defend the entire frontier and the gains in Albania doomed Greece to a sudden end.

Also, again, you repeat the unbelievable notion that Papagos intented to defend Greece "with other peoples' troops". "Other peoples" don't have their own land to protect?

It was Papagos, not I, that was enquiring about (1) how many and when more Empire troops would be freed up from East Africa (Indian or South African I presume) to come to Greece's defence, (2) the 9th Australian Division from Cyrenaica and (3) was trying to tell the Yugoslavs how to organise their defence in Greece's favour.

Remember, Greece had 14 divisions in Albania 'defending' their gains against the Italians whilst leaving about half that force in Greece to defend a longer border against the Germans (and possibly the Bulgarians too). That seems a little unbalanced to me. It also seemed unbalanced to Papagos too who seemed to think he could get 6 or 7 divisions from the Empire to fill the gaps rather than readjust his own forces and hold a militarily sound defensive line.

The "(Greek) left flank at Strumica" is the (Yugoslav) right flank at Strumica, and the epicenter of the campaign.

It became the "epicenter" because Papagos was determined to defend the frontier despite not having anywhere near enough troops to do so. Had the main defensive line in the east been Olympus-Edessa, then Strumica would be an irrelevancy.

I understand why Greece decided to defend all its territory. I'm not saying it was the wrong decision from a political point of view. But from a military standpoint, it hastened the end and meant the Germans were able to get through and out of Greece in double quick order with minimal losses.

[jwsleser]

I have argued that defeat in detail was inevitable, and the only chance of, perhaps, delaying that inevitability was for the defensive line to be
shortened significantly.

Yes you have. While I agree it was likely, it wasn't inevitable. More important, it wasn't seen as enviable by the soldiers on the ground. It is the
rapid collapse of Yugoslavia that makes it near 100%.

Note that an argument that 'defeat is enviable' is different from an argument that 'defeat is enviable due to Papagos'. You have tried to prove
the former by arguing the latter. Sorry, the facts aren't there.

xristar wrote:I cannot follow your logic.

I agree. I can't follow Mark's logic at all. The only way it makes sense is to:

-Disregard the need to cooperate with Yugoslavia.

-To declare Papagos' military thinking unsound.

-To ignore geography, time/distance, and force ratios.

To support my points.

Your "common front" equates to Yugoslavia giving up almost everything in order to defend all of Greece and only a bit of their own country. Very magnanimous!

You need to look at a map. It is clear you are using hyperbole rather than facts to make such statements. You are ignoring the military realities of
the two countries. A point of reality:

-Yugoslavia cannot resist the Axis without Greece.

-Greece can resist the Axis without Yugoslavia.

Papagos is hardly asking the Yugoslavians to give up almost everything. See below re: Danube-Sava line.

I find it puzzling that you are damning Greece for its better geographical situation.

And that is based upon Papagos' unsound belief...

Sorry your statement doesn't make this fact. Why don't you demonstrate it was unsound rather than a hand wave? See my opening points above.

21. General Papagos thought that a German offensive in the direction of NISH would be more dangerous, but there were no German concentrations in that area. He asked whether there was any change of getting some troops released in view of the successes in ABYSSINIA.

The 1st Panzer Army followed exactly that route, "direction of NISH", and hit Belgrade from the south. The Danube-Sava line was an irrelevancy.

This statement indicates you have no idea of what Papagos proposed and no idea of military operations.

First, the quote of the lack of a German concentration reflects what Papagos knew at the time. No one corrected him at the time, so that implies that they agreed with his comment. The fact that using hindsight tells us it was incorrect doesn't mean Papagos is incompetent (which is what you are trying to imply), just lacking information. So you trying to alter what this document actually tells us.

Second, it is clear that you have no clue as to what the Danube-Sava line represented. If you thought that was meant to be 'the' defense of Yugoslavia, you are wrong. By defending the Danube-Sava line, the Yugoslavian Army has less territory to cover/defend. All of Yugoslavia south of that line would be defended. The fact that the Germans broke through the Nish front area and attacked Belgrade from the south only means that the Yugoslavian's lacked the forces to properly defend that area. If they had followed Pagagos concept, they could have had greater forces in that area. Papagos had identified the Nish area as the critical area for any defense of Yugoslavia (also stated within the quote above). The Germans demonstrated that he was correct. The fact that the German forces that unhinged the Greco-ANZAC defense originated from that attacking force (see Germany and the Second World War maps III.iii.1, III.iii.2 and the accompanying text) and not the forces attacking the Metaxas Line also demonstrates that Papagos wasn't guilty of 'unsound' thinking.

Document 9A is an interesting account of Papagos showing his determination to defend all of Greece with other peoples' troops rather than recognising the military sense of shortening his lines to defend as much of Greece as possible. At no point is there any mention of a single redeployment of troops from Albania. On the otherhand, he is looking for (a) Yugolsavia to give up territory to free up troops to protect his (Greek) left flank at Stumica and further north, (b) Britain to send more troops from North or East Africa to defend the Metaxas Line, and (c) to move his own force from the Aliakmon - and the British forces - forward to the Axios or further. These are the words of political Papagos not military Papagos

.

Why do you elect to disregard Papagos main issue/point that is threaded throughout the document - cooperation with Yugoslavia? The entire text of Document 9A is all about coordinating a common defense. To do that meant that the Greek forces had to be forward. Have you ever looked on a map to see where the Aliakmon Line and Strum Lines are in relationship to the Yugoslavian defenses? It is clear you have not. Occupying the Aliakmon Line means leaving the Yugo defense 'in the air'. Leaving the Yugo flank in the air allows the historical situation to again happen but from a different LOO. See my withdraw comments below.

I am not surprised that you do not see the logic in my posts, your understanding of the context is completely different to mine. And here is a the most fundamental of differences. I would argue that, "the defense of Greece was first and foremost prerequisite for a defense of Yugoslavia to even exist" is a historical fallacy. It is your belief in that context which leads you to see Papagos' analysis and demands as being sound, coherent and logical. Since I believe it is a historical fallacy, I see Papagos in a completely different light.

Again hand waving with no facts. The defense of Greece is simpler with the assistance of Yugoslavia. The defense of Yugoslavia is impossible without Greece.

I have argued that defeat in detail was inevitable, and the only chance of, perhaps, delaying that inevitability was for the defensive line to be
shortened significantly.

Defeat in detail was only enviable if Greece abandons Yugoslavia before the first shot.

The military logic in that is without question. Trying to defend the entire frontier and the gains in Albania doomed Greece to a sudden end.

You have not studied the military problem. There is no 'shorter line' on the Epirus Front or eastern front unless you abandon Yugoslavia.

The Epirus Front:

1 The best solution to Greece's problem is to eliminate the Italian forces in Albania. Greece lacks the military strength to achieve this alone so not
an option.

2 Staying in place offers good defensible terrain and provides defensive depth. Affecting minor adjustments to rationalize the defense can gain some reduction in strength for use elsewhere (note not much, these units under strength).

3 Withdrawal back to Greece. Depending to where you withdraw doesn't reduce the length of the front.

-To the border. This doesn't reduce the front and requires that Yugoslavia hold its territory. It also makes the Koritsa-Vatohri LOO into central and
eastern Greece vulnerable (no depth of defense).

-To the Smokikas-Orliakas-Aliakmonas-Olympus Line. This increases the front as such a withdrawal breaks the connection between the Greek defense and Yugoslavian territory, opening the Koritsa-Vatohri LOO to the Axis. This LOO adds ~180K more in front line that would need to be defended. This is fine if you are only thinking about Greece, but it completely abandon's Yugoslavia to its fate.

The Italians were increasing the size of their forces in Albania. Taking up the southernmost line means an increased front with the fewer Greek troops, while the Italian's can leverage that increase.

The collapse of the defense was caused by the advance of the German XXXX Motorized Corps from Yugoslavia territory. The speed of the German advance put pressure on the Allied timeline with ANZAC units still arriving. The Greek forces in Albania won't have changed that dynamic if cooperation with Yugoslavia was part of the plan. Only by abandoning Yugoslavia prior to any attack would have given the Greco-ANZAC force a chance to defeat such an attack.

So no, there are many sound military reasons for the defense as it took place. Only by deciding upfront to abandon Yugoslavia does a different
defense become possible. Better resistance by the Yugoslavian Army also changes the outcome.

I will end with...

It was Papagos, not I, that was enquiring about (1) how many and when more Empire troops would be freed up from East Africa (Indian or South African I presume) to come to Greece's defence, (2) the 9th Australian Division from Cyrenaica and (3) was trying to tell the Yugoslavs how to organise their defence in Greece's favour.

The fact that Papagos was making critical decisions about the defense of his country and he was asking detailed questions about support from a country that had offered that support in an indication of? That he was trying to create a common defense with Yugoslavia which makes perfect military sense?

Seriously?

Pista! Jeff

[MarkN]

Hello Jeff,

Indeed! Seriously????

Although we share the same understanding of the main historical events, as in what happened in general terms, I have a rather different understanding to you and xristar of the context of those events and the decisions/choices that were made. To me, this is a golden opportunity for a interesting discussion where we can lay out out thoughts and opinions for others to consider. A discussion that may or may not change others' opinions, but will certainly arouse interest, increase knowledge and awareness and aid learning.

Unfortunately, you have decided to climb on your high horse and use personal insults to try and establish some sort of intellectual superiority. Why?

You should check your facts before posting....
You need to look at a map. It is clear you are using hyperbole rather than facts to make such statements. You are ignoring the military realities of
the two countries....
Why don't you demonstrate it was unsound rather than a hand wave? See my opening points above....
This statement indicates you ... have no idea of military operations....
Second, it is clear that you have no clue ...
Again hand waving ...
You have not studied the military problem....

Do you wish to trade insults or engage in an honest discussion where disagreements are respected and not pronounced as a lack of intelligence and/or knowledge?

In the hope that you are willing to engage in the latter, I shall offer a little more of my thought process as background to my understanding. At the risk of further accusations of "hand waving", I will not post a 100,000 word thesis, nor will I attempt even to cover all of the various points so far generated. Due to time, I will limit myself here to just one single argument that, although on scratching the surface of the whole, covers all 3 of the areas of greatest contention:
1) the impact of Yugoslavia on Greek defence and security,
2) the impact of Greece on Yugoslav defence and security,
3) the decisionmaking and choices taken by Papagos as professional head of the Greek military.

At some future date we can, perhaps, conduct a map review to see who has the better grasp of geography, get into more detail on the political and military situation in Yugoslavia, their military plan(s) and their actual military effort, and so on and on. Step by step, so to speak.

Earlier in this thread, you kindly posted the following:-

The official history lays out the three possibilities on page 172 (assessment as of 8 Feb).

A. Yugoslavia as an ally: The Metaxas Line would be held. This position covers the southern flank of Yugoslavia.
B. Yugoslavia neutral/no passage of Axis forces: Defend the Kaimaktalan-Vermio-Aliakmonas line. The forts would be manned but only to delay the enemy advance. No attempt to hold the ground between forts. This moves the defense into better defensive terrain and requires less forces.
C. Yugoslavia joins Axis/or allows passage: Withdrawal to the Greek-Albanian border - Smolikas Mountains - Orliakas Mountains - Aliakmonas River - Olympus Mountains. This basically gives up most of northern Greece.

I question the soundness, coherence and credibility of this. Completely. It is part of a post war narrative that represents the pre-Marita analysis of the Greek military (Papagos alone or collectively?) and their intentions in each scenario.

First, I will compare this to the actual reality of the events that actually occured. To me it stands out quite clearly that their thinking and analysis is muddled, incoherent and leads them to rather strange decisions.

Point 1.
As of 8 Feb, Yugoslavia was not ally; it was at that time neutral but heading towards joining the Axis. If the Greek military was following its own planning assumptions based upon the realities occuring, they should have been implementing option B, but they weren't.

Point 2.
As time progressed, the Yugoslavs grew closer and closer to the Axis and made the decision on 20 or 21st March to formally enter into the Tripartite Pact. This was signed on 25th March. Although the devil is always in the detail, on the face of this reality, option C is now effective. Looking at the actual detail, in effect, option B was still the more representative.

Point 3.
The military coup occured in Belgrade on 27 March and everything changed. The new government spent the next 10-12 days trying to pursuade Hitler that they were still friends and wished to remain neutral and free from German attack. All to no avail of course. At the same time, they were in military discussions with Britain and Greece on how they could 'co-operate' for mutual benefit. They did not, at any time enter into a formal defensive pact nor even offer any assurances that they would act in consort. Perhaps that may have come in time. But, historically, it did not happen. All that really occured was some enquiries about how the Empire could help the Yugoslavs, and when they realised that the response was effectively 'nothing', they went their own way.

From these three points I extract the following. But before that, I will remind you of the following that you kindly posted:

FM Papagos discusses the 22 February meeting on pages 322-325 in the English translation of his book (The Battle of Greece 1940-1941 Athens 1949). Here he states:
Further I stated that the removal of the war material and supplies for Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, together with the transfer of the Greek forces there to the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus line, pending the arrival of the British troops, would take at least 20 days. Consequently the movement of material and men would have to be carried out in good time, so as to avoid the danger of the enemy attack finding us still engaged in this operation.

a) If the Greek military collectively accepted that a move would take 20 days to complete as describer by Papagos, why did they not implement their own conclusions drawn from their own analysis of 8 February?

xristar wrote:

I don't know if Papagos ever intented to withdraw the three divisions (besides the two that he withdrew, namely the 12th and 20th), but in my opinion it wouldn't make sense.

You wrote:

So the forces were inadequate to hold the Metaxas Line as a defensive position, but sufficient to hold the individual forts as impediments to an Axis advance (as what historically happened). So presumably up to 3 divisions and 2 brigades could have been withdrawn.

We, the Greek military, you and I, all seem to agree (except xristar) that, militarily, it would have been sound for the Greek forces to have been concentrated on the Kaimaktalan-Vermio-Aliakmonas line or further SW. Remember, you wrote:

To ignore geography, time/distance, and force ratios.

Until 21st (formally 25th) March, option B was in play. For the next 2 days, option C was nominally in play, but in reality, still option B. Option A only came to the front of the line, based upon a poor understanding of what Yugoslavia brought to the table, on 27 March.

If the Greek military followed its own analysis, the bulk of their forces should have been at least on the Kaimaktalan-Vermio-Aliakmonas line and in discussions whether a move back to the Metaxas Line was prudent starting for the 27th. Given the nature of Prince Paul's long courtship with the Germans, option C would be the prudent choice.

This is NOT what happened. They ignored their own analysis. Why?

b) Reviewing what I have just written, one could argue that Papagos was actually a bit of a sage in the sense that the deployment of his forces at the time of the German attack seemed to correspond with the analysis made on 8 February. However, I think that would just be silly based on the thought process shown in my words above. The key point being that, contrary to Papagos' thinking, Yugoslavia was not a 'ally' in the sense he requires for option A to be valid and become sound policy; they were only an ally in these sense of both now facing a German onslaught. Yugoslavia did not provide, and was NEVER in a position to provide, the forces required to allow the Greeks to sit comfortably on the Metaxas Line.

c) You wrote:

Greece can resist the Axis without Yugoslavia.

But you also wrote:

It is the rapid collapse of Yugoslavia that makes it [the inevitability fo Greek military collapse]near 100%.

These seem to be rather muddled and contradictory. If "Greece can resist the Axis without Yugoslavia", it was prudent to base a military strategy around that belief rather than pursuing a military strategy that assumed Yugoslavia would be an proactive ally and could stand firm. Following the latter was the wishful thinking that lead to the rapid defeat of the Greeks.

The "rapid collapse of Yugoslavia that makes it near 100%" is a valid comment, but only comes into play because the Greeks chose to rely on the Yugoslavs to be an proactive ally and be able to stand firm. Greek mistake.

d) Given what I have written above, I conclude
- there was abysmally poor decision-making by the Greeks (Papagos alone and in concert with others) which is demonstrated by their inability to follow their own analysis and conclusions;
- that Papagos was either abysmally informed, or opted to believe the ideal situation, regarding Yugoslav capabilities and intentions;
- that Papagos was either abysmally informed, or naive as to German capabilities and intention;
- the current historical narrative of the various and complex interplays is flawed.

And finally, regarding the point concerning the 'inevitability' of Greece being overrun by the Axis powers'.
This is, of course, an opinion I have which has been derived from the advantageous position of hindsight. The individuals at the time did not have that advantage.

The first point considers the capabilities of the German military relative to the Yugoslavs, the Greeks, and the meagre Empire forces present. Perhaps we understand better now the scale of the mismatch. However, there is plenty of evidence available to decision-makers in 1941 to recognise that the Wehrmacht sitting in Bulgaria presented a set of challenges far beyond that of anything the Greeks had previously fought or based their defensive assumptions on. When I look at Greek decision-making, I see them basing their defence on a repeat of 1915!

Secondly, the sovereign independence of Yugoslavia and Greece lay entirely in the hands of the Germans. The mismatch in military capabilities makes that a reality. One could argue, that the Germans could have been dissuaded diplomatically. I think we have already covered this, so I shall not regurgitate. A second argument, and the only one that I things has real credability, is that the Greeks and the Empire, (I consider the Yugoslavs were beyond help post 27 March) chose a military strategy that managed to inflict so much damage to the German assaulting forces that Germans were forced into making a decision whether to continue or call a halt. We know that the Germans had sufficient combat power to overrun Greece; they had only a small fragment of the Wehrmacht assigned to Marita. However, Marita was a bit of a sideshow to the main performance called Barbarrossa. If the Empire and Greek force could have inflicted major attritional damage to personel and equipment, and significantly increased the time it was taking to bring about an end, perhaps the Germans would have changed tack.

I remain quite unconvinced that that could have been achieved. But its only chance of success relied on massing all available troops on the strongest defensive lines with opportunities for multiple delaying operations and depth. Not only did the Metaxas Line not offer that, but the decision to retain that as the main defensive line drained the manpower such that it became the only defensive line.

So, from that, if we are to consider any possibility that 'inevitability' could be avoided, and that the contemporary decision-makers wished to avoid the inevitable, then the Greeks should rightly and prudently have adopted option C of their 8 February analysis. Historical fact demonstrates that option A was a deluded and unsound strategy.

[jwsleser]

Mark

Thank you for the direct and honest post. Let us clear the air.

Although we share the same understanding of the main historical events, as in what happened in general terms, I have a rather different understanding to you and xristar of the context of those events and the decisions/choices that were made. To me, this is a golden opportunity for a interesting discussion where we can lay out out thoughts and opinions for others to consider. A discussion that may or may not change others' opinions, but will certainly arouse interest, increase knowledge and awareness and aid learning.

Unfortunately, you have decided to climb on your high horse and use personal insults to try and establish some sort of intellectual superiority. Why?

Do you wish to trade insults or engage in an honest discussion where disagreements are respected and not pronounced as a lack of intelligence
and/or knowledge?

No I don't wish to trade insults and I would like to exchange knowledge. I carefully reviewed the entire thread before I posted my last message. I have problems with many of your statements that were unsupported by any sources/cites:

MarkN » 13 Jan 2016 06:39 Interestingly, Papagos writes post war that it would take 20 days to move these troops to new positions. That, to me, sounds like more historical revisionism which appears prolific in his and others' writings on the matter. Nevertheless, it was not an overnight task and needed a fair amount of time to effect satisfactorily. Something they never started. In fact, the sent an additional division to strengthen the East Macedonian army!

While that is a possibility, you have yet to demonstrate that is the case. It might be a very good record. I will note that everything else in Papagos' book agrees with the UK record except the point that started this discussion. It is clear from you later responses that that you have rejected Papagos as a valid source in this discussion. That is not 'exchanging knowledge', that is saying one is wrong without providing any recourse.

Mark N > 15 Jan 2016 07:34 I undestand the political and troop morale arguments why withdrawing from Albania was not effected until it was too late.

However, with the wonderful tool which is hindsight, it's difficult to defend the decision to have 14 divisions in Albania at a stand still with nothing left to defend the rest of Greece other than the fortress troops. Remember, which of the 6 divisions and 2 brigades in the Central and East Macedonian Armies existed prior to Feb 1941 when the Germans were building their forces in the Balkans? At some point, the Greek command ought to have shifted focus from west to east rather than just creating makeshift units at the last moment.

If the Epirius and West Macedonian Armies were knocking the Italians out of Albania, it may have made sense.

There is a difference between 'was a decision logical at the time' and the results of that decision as assessed "with the wonderful tool which is hindsight".

I looked through all my sources and those posted here by others and noted that the withdrawal of the Greece forces from Albania wasn't discussed as a requirement/need. The message Tom posted (message 608 dtd. 6 March 4.20am.) mentioned the hope of withdrawing some divisions from the Albanian Front, but that is not the same as a withdraw of the entire Albanian front. IBWs, the individual on the ground during these events didn't see the same options you did.

Your position also seems to ignore the planned Greco-Yugoslavian attack discussed during the April 3-4 meeting. Your own posting of the message on the same meeting provides the planning/map of these operations. This doesn't match a withdrawal from Albania.

Therefore your constant return to the issue of withdrawing the Greek forces from Albania is based on your 'professional assessment', not something that was discussed and agreed to by the actual participants. Hence, your professional opinion can be challenged. Since you didn't provide any cites
to support this assessment, and given the challenges I faced when assembling my sources on the Greek and Italian Armies during this campaign, it was clear to me that you have haven't done any real detailed analysis of the military situation during this period.

Mark N > 15 Jan 2016 07:34 Or did the Greeks think they could fight off the Germans with a handful of scratch divisions?

They most certainly didn't. What was the point of this statement? This is a meaningless, aggressive comment. No exchange of information.

Mark N 20 Jan 2016 07:15For some time the British negotiating position with the Yugolsavs was to encourage them out of neutrality and into the Allied camp. Specifically, they encouraged the Yugoslav Army to "fall on the Italian rear" in Albania. The point of this was to (a) remove Italy from the theatre and free up Greek forces for use elsewhere, and (b) allow the Yugoslav Army to massively upgrade its equipment status. The idea being that a united Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish pact could stand up to Germany if Italy had been taken out of the equation.

Deluded and wishful thinking in my opinion.

Looking at your post, it seems Papagos in particular was quite ignorant of the threat against Yugolsavia.

Are the words in bold above necessary to "engage in an honest discussion where disagreements are respected and not pronounced as a lack of
intelligence and/or knowledge?" No supporting argument, ignores Papagos', and obviously assessed "with the wonderful tool which is hindsight".

You acknowledge that it was the UK pushing for Yugoslavian involvement. Yet you accuse Papagos of 'unsound' thinking for trying to craft and
implement a plan that includes Yugoslavia involvement. I had already discussed the logic of Papagos' thinking, yet you dismiss his reasoning with
a 'wave of your hand'. And he certainly was aware of the threat against Yugoslavia, which is why he provided his assessment. You have yet to
demonstrate why his assessment was wrong/ignorant.

Mark N> 22 Jan 2016 14:55 The British had deluded themselves that they could persuade Prince Paul to, at worst, remain neutral and, at best, actively join the Allied cause. On 25th March, he sent his minions to sign the Tripartide Pact. Later that day, he sent gushing telegrams to Tokyo and Rome to say how pleased he was to join their cause.

Again the words in bold.

Mark N> 26 Jan 2016 09:10 Although it is true that the Yugoslav's did not have the resources to defend all of their territory, the very same can be said of Greece. So, given that Papagos was determined to defend all of Greece and the Albanian territory he held, I find it somewhat hilarious that he considers the Yugoslavs should give up their territory and position their forces in a manner that best suits Greece! Moreover, while he excuses his non redeploymemt of his divisions based upon the time factor and threat from the enemy, he seems to believe that the Yugoslavs can accomplish their moves unhindered in lightning quick time.

Again note the words in bold.

I have pointed out again and again using period sources that Papgaos had sound military reasoning. Yet once again the simple dismissal of his logic
with no reasoning/cites to support it.

Yugoslavia was mobilizing. Once mobilized, the Yugoslavian units could move to where they were needed. Not the same for the Greeks. 14 division are actively fighting the Italians; the others needing to know the Yugoslavia plan to determine their final placement. The army was understrength, lacking resources, and tired.

In toto:

-You continue to reject the role/impact of the Yugoslavia Army in the plans to defend Greece. Even the UK understood this.

-You continue to assess motive for Papagos' actions without any supporting sources except your assessment of the military situation.

-You have positioned yourself as the 'expert' in this discussion. I have no option but to challenge that assumption to have any hope of demonstrating my points.

I will address you series of points in a later post (hopefully tonight) because I need some of my books to cite.

I am more than happy to return this discussion to "an honest discussion where disagreements are respected and not pronounced as a lack of
intelligence and/or knowledge?" I don't need the gratuitous attacks on Papagos and others. I don't need a dismissal hand wave of my positions/arguments. Opinions are fine as long as there are cites and data provided that help understand why the opinion was formed.

Most of history is determining 'why the results happened'. There is importance in the details.

To again stress the role/impact of Yugoslavia in the decisions of this period, I will close this post with quotes from Playfair vol I page 372.

In previous examination of the Balkan problem the Chiefs of Staff had consistently maintained that our first aim should be to make certain of
Turkey, and that support to her should rank before any other commitment in the Balkans. But the question now facing the Defence Committee was how to replay to the Greek Government's request. Obviously there were many political aspects to be considered. Would Turkey regard a German invasion of Bulgaria or an ultimatum to Greece as reasons for entering the war? If the Greeks receive no help from us, would they submit to Germany's greatly superior strength - and who could blame them if they did? If this happened, Turkey could be expected to fight only in defence of her own territory; Yugoslavia would be lost; and any hope of forming a Balkan front against the Germans would vanish.

And from page 375.

.. Yugoslavia would not fight unless Turkey fought, and the converse might well be true. Hence the only chance of preventing the Balkans from being devoured piecemeal was to go to the help of Greece with everything we could. This could be risky, but not so risky as doing nothing..

My bold.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

Mark

I will open with a general statement. I sense that one of your threads is that an early decision on the actual defense, even given incomplete information, is generally better than a later decision with better information.

I generally agree with this statement. I also must recognize that at the level of these decisions under discussion, the political considerations can
easily outweigh prudent military options. I feel that is certainly the case here. Given that London was pushing the Yugoslavian connection up until the end, I can't find major fault with Papagos by trying to make the best of that.

Your second (and I think your main) thread is that the situation is such a mismatch that there is no way for the Allies to succeed. I have never denied that possibility. Military leaders must try to do the best they can regardless of the situation. Surrender is a political decision.

-Do I think that the Allies could have gained better results with different decisions? Quite Possibly.

-Do I feel that the Allies could have won with a different set of decisions? Don't know, but not impossible.

I have argued/defended two points in this discussion.

1. That a diplomatic solution was the better option for Greece, but Metaxas was the only one who could have tried that option. Without Metaxas, that option was gone.

2. That Papagos wasn't clueless, making unsound decisions, or sacrificing everyone else for Greece. His decisions were based on sound military
thinking that recognized the realities of the situation.

Was he 'reaching for a star' in his focus on Yugoslavia. In some ways yes, but surrender wasn't an option and Greece had a better chance with
Yugoslavia than without. I will again note that the UK was also 'reaching for the same star'.

To this I have recently added a third.

3. That a military withdrawal from Albania does little to change the military situation in the east.

Do I feel Greece was 'screwed' (meaning in a bad spot with few options)? Most certainly, but I don't blame the military leaders. Papagos was trying to figure out a way to win. It was his job. Wavell and Wilson were trying to figure out how to make London's orders work while insuring they could get out if needed.

A quick response to one of your questions.

jwsleser wrote:Greece can resist the Axis without Yugoslavia.

Not muddled at all. Greece, if provided with enough combat power, can resist without Yugoslavia. Greece has access to sea lanes to bring in reinforcements, supplies, and equipment. This is independent of what is happening in Yugoslavia. The reverse is not true. Given a modern Yugoslavia Army, without Greece the country is surround and will fall. It is not a statement that Greece could win against the Axis without help, only that Greece didn't depend on another country to gain access to that help.

When I look at Greek decision-making, I see them basing their defence on a repeat of 1915!

I am not sure I understand your point. Rather than guess, I will let you elaborate.

I plan to go through your three points and added details. IIRC, there was more exchanges with Yugoslavia than you have indicated.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

Mark

Use of Papagos' book The Battle of Greece 1940-1941 as a source.

You have made it clear that you don't see Papagos' book as a reliable source. I will point out that his book is extensively cited as a source on the topic of the Greco-Italian and Greco-German War. While this would be expected as it is a primary source on the history of that campaign, I have not read any issues about the book's reliability or that it contains factual errors.

The main issue that is mentioned when the book is cited is the understanding of the Tatoi Conference. I will remind you that in Tom's opening post, he was addressing this issue. He presented the NZ understanding of the conference and that it appears to match that of Papagos. While I am not claiming that this is conclusive, it does speak to the reliability of Papagos account.

Regardless, that fact that a significant source for the Greek POV is rather brusquely dismissed in this discussion is troubling. Most certainly it needs to checked against other accounts. I have been doing just that and it pretty much agrees with other sources.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

Mark

In this post I will focus on Yugoslavia. The Greek strategic problem was interlaced with that of Yugoslavia.

For those wishing to gain further insight into the diplomatic/political events in Yugoslavia, I recommend reading Frank Littlefield’s Germany and Yugoslavia 1933-1941. This is a compact account of the diplomatic ins and out with much material on Greco-Yugoslavia relations. I have check the information in this book against Ilija Jukić’s The fall of Yugoslavia Charles Cruickshank’s Greece 1940-1941, Donlagić, Atanacković, and Plenča’s Yugoslavia in the Second World War; and Germany and in the Second World War vol III (besides the books previously mentioned in this discussion). I have not found any incongruities between these accounts. Note that Jukić was a member of the Yugoslavia government during this time, so is a primary source.

Prince Paul was having none of this as he was intent on siding with the Germans. After the coup, the Yugoslavs came on board. Hence why there were these last minute discussions and considerations of moving from the "ALIAKMON Line" back forward to the frontier.

I feel this is a misrepresentation of the Yugoslavian position. Yugoslavia found itself in the same position as the Greece, not desiring any association with Germany but the realities of the situation were forcing some sort of accommodation. In his meeting with Hitler on 4 March, Prince Paul openly stated his sympathy for Greece and the UK (Germany page 475, to the Greeks Papagos page 327, the people Donlagić et. al. page 27 fn 26). From Littlefield, one discovers the amount of material aid Yugoslavia was providing the Greek government in its war against Italy (pages 90-91). This aid was provided by the direction of Prince Paul. Paul also recognized that the only way to militarily counter the Axis was a unified front with Greece. Many in the military were prepared to side with the Greeks. As has been point out in this discussion, Papagos had his own sources of information. The Greeks were contacted a few days prior to 25 March by the Yugoslavian military that they were willing to participate in the war on Greece’s side (Papagos page 326).

Another interesting point is that at the meetings of the Yugoslavian government on 10 and 19 March, one of the regents, Radenko Stanković recommended, given the unfavorable military situation, that the Yugoslavian Army should offer only toten resistance and then retreat to a fortified base at Thessaloniki. (Littlefield 104, 107; Jukić 53). This option was rejected but it again indicates that the Yugoslavians shared Papagos' understanding of the situation and that some recognized the need to give up territory.

The point of this is to show that Greece had access to information demonstrating that the Yugoslavian military was still in play. Critical was access to Thessaloniki. This point is clearly made by the Yugoslavian military in all the sources (Littlefield pages 99, 107, 122; Jukić 22, 53; Cruickshank 104, Papagos many times). So Papagos had plenty of reason to defend Thessaloniki (as well as my previous point about the Yugoslavian flank) until it was absolutely clear that Yugoslavia was out of the picture.

In reviewing Cruickshank, I was surprised by his account of the 22 Feb meeting at Tatoi. His discussion of the operational requirements (discussing the two defensive lines) and then transitioning into the Tatoi meeting are found on pages 101-103. Here he faults Eden for offering to consult the Yugoslavians before making a decision. So another source appears to support Papagos' version of the meeting.

Pista! Jeff