Mark
I will stop at this point. While I am prepared to continue this discussion, it will be pointless unless you accept the political realities that shaped the military decisions. We are discussing strategic decisions that will inform the operational-level actions. We can’t have any meaningful discussion without understanding the parameters set at the strategic level.
Greece clearly identified success as acting in cooperation with Yugoslavia. Any other option was sub-optimal in terms of national strategy. This, more than anything else, informed the operational actions.
If you wish to present support that Papagos' decisions during this period were based on his 'desire to save all of Greece', please do. I feel I have firmly and convincingly demonstrated that is not the case. I have no doubt that such a desire was present, but it was never the major factor in his decisions.
To all.
I am more than happy to answer questions or discuss other factors.
Pista! Jeff
Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Hello Jeff,
Nevertheless, I will thank you for taking the time to post up all that you have done in the past couple of days. That certainly forms the basis for further honest discussion.
I have not "positioned myself as the expert" as you claim, I am offering my opinion and my analysis which I recognise is different in many respects to that of others and established written history. I do not claim to be right, nor am I trying to convince you of anything. In fact, I'm positioning myself contrary to established 'expert' opinion. To me established written history is flawed. I merely wish to engage in discussion to learn more about others' opinions and, in particular, how and why they hold these opinions. The least I can do is offer mine in exchange.
Regrettably, again I have only limited time today, so I will respond to the discussion about Yugoslavia and its strategic political position and its intentions and actions at a later date. For now, I will just say that I have a somewhat different view to yours.
8-22 February 1941
Thus, today I will continue with part 2 of my understanding of the higher command military decision-making by the Greeks.
In my last post, I considered the inconsistency and incoherence in those higher command military decisions. On 8 February, the Greeks themsleves had produced what I believe was reasonably sound (with a major caveat I will shortly address) analysis of their predicament and solid military recommendations how to deal with each of the three possibilities they identified. This was not followed. I have yet come across a satisfactory explanation why. In fact, how many historians and analyists even consider it? There has been much written about the "misundersting" of 22 February, but scarce to non-existant is the discussion about Greece's failure to follow its own analysis and recommendations. What does Papagos himself say about it in "The Battle of Greece 1940-1941, Athens 1949"?
To recapitulate, the Greeks had identified three possible scenarios based upon their correct recognition that their defence strategy was entirely tied into the 'position' of the Yugoslavs. These were:-
Greece had three fronts to consider: the 'western' front which faced Albania and was threatened by the Italians, the 'eastern' front facing Bulgaria (and Turkey) threatened by the Germans massing in Bulgaria and the 'northern' front facing Yugoslavia which may or may not be threatened depending upon whether the Germans in Bulgaria came that way. The 'northern' front was, due to geography, topography and relative position, the key. It's importance over the other two cannot be stressed enough. If the Germans came through the Monastir Gap (and down the Vardar Valley), both the western and eastern fronts are out flanked, out manouvered and game over. The only way to stand any chance against such an advance was/is to amass one's forces on a much shorter defensive line that effectively combines all fronts into one single curved front around the fringes of Epirus and (Greek) Western Macedonia. This line equates to the line in Option C determined by the Greek military. Any Greek forces in Albania and points east of the Vermion Line would innevitably be outflanked and made inconsequential in quick order.
Now, the Greek analysis seemed to equate Yugoslav diplomatic position to military capability. Thus, if the Yugoslavs are on 'our' side, the Germans can't come through South Serbia and thus our 'northern' front is secure. This leads to Option A and the recommendation that the Metaxas Line can be held as there is not threat to their left flank. This is flawed as proven by history. Option B is a bit confusing. If Germans have no access to South Serbia, again there is no threat to the left flank of the Metaxas Line. Here I don't see their logic. And considering option 1 and 2 together, I summise the Greeks have concluded Yugoslav being an ally will mean Yugoslav troops will be available to strengthen the Metaxas Line itself. Nevertheless, the recommendation in Option B is to have the Kaimaktalan-Vermio-Aliakmonas Line as the primary defensive line in order to ensure that troops east of the Vardar are not cut off from an outflanking movement. Moreover, it provides a further delaying line to allow time for a withdrawal from Albania should it prove necessary. Finally, Option C is premised around the assumption, and correct recognition, that they will need all their forces sitting ready and prepared (in advance) on a shortened line if they are to stand any chance of repelling an attack from South Serbia.
Where the political/diplomatic position of Yugoslavia is disconnected to the practical military situation, and thus causes some questionning of the Greek military analysis, can be highlighted by these two realities. First, on 25 March, Yugoslavia became an ally of Germany and Italy. However, they did so in a way that meant the Germans would respect their territorial integrity and not transgress their border to get at Greece. In effect, the Greek's northern front was now secured. This was the best possible scenario for the Greeks. They could leave this front undefended whilst concentrating forces in Albania and on the Metaxas Line. Second, on 27 March, Yugoslavia became an ally. But, as we know, their military was not up to defending their territory and the Germans were through South Serbia like a hot knife through butter.
In effect, two things can be concluded from this reality. First, Yugoslavia perceived as an ally, with the decisions made by the Greeks based upon what they perceived the ally could do for them, actually was their downfall; it would have been better for Yugoslavia to be a foe(on paper). Second, the Greeks do not seem to have been able to separate understanding of political/diplomatic position from military capability.
In amongst your recent posts Jeff, you raised two points:-
- a "early decision on the actual defense"; and,
- the question of hindsight.
To the first, I argue an "early" decision was not not desireable, but imperative. I also suggest a decision based upon 'planning for the worst and hoping for the best' would be more prudent than the idealistic assumption that everything will turn out optimal.
To the second, hindsight provides us with answers as to what didn't happen and didn't work - ie. what decisions were imprudent and/or plain disasterous. Or vice versa. It also allows us to assess whether the decision-making process was sound or not. In effect, the people making the decisions at the time couldn't know the result, but we do. Hindsight does not prevent, it allows, us to assess those decisions with far greater understanding.
22 February - 4 March 1941
So far, I have demonstrated what I believe was unsound decision-making to remain on the Metaxas Line and forward in Albania, based upon their own analysis (albeit not perfect) and own recommendations as to the threat to their northern front. This, effectively covers the period 8-22 February. On that date, 22 February, they had outside input as to their (strategic) defensive position, and had the opportunity to revise their decisions based upon that input. The Greeks now have a second opportunity to decide whether to make a timely and prudent withdrawal or not. They have the opportunity to test their own assumptions against those of the British. The key assumptions being: the Yugoslav political position, the Yugoslav military capabilities (and intentions) and the positons, intentions and capabilities of the Germans.
The minutes of the 22 February meetings are found in TNA FO371/29782. Regrettably the notes I made from this file over 15 years ago a buried in storage in another country on the opposite side of the continent. I am relying on memory of the key points alongside the details written in "Swastika over the Acropolis, Craig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock, 2013". To summarise briefly the following key points (among others) were brought up and discussed.
- Papagos laid out his plan to remain in Albania and stand on the Metaxas Line.
- That Yugoslavia's position (not military capability) was crucial to Greece's strategic defensive posture.
- That standing on the Metaxas Line was intended to both protect Salonika AND provide a delaying feature in order to withdraw units from Albania.
- That without Yugoslavia, they would stand on the Vermion Line.
- That forces in Albania were at major risk if not withdrawn.
- That the British considered a stand on the Metaxas Line unsound with less than 9 divisions, and refused to move their contribution that far forward.
You will note, that the risk to the forces in Albania, and discussion about their withdrawal was indeed very much under consideration. I believe you have commented that published history does not seem to record this or plays down its significance. It pays to make ones own analysis as well as relying on the anaysis of published authors.
Moreover, if my memory serves me well, Papagos speaks of withdrawing to (not from) the Metaxas Line. The implication being that he (and Greece) is willing to concede Thrace and most of Greek Eastern Macedonia. An imperative presumed in the very siting of the main Metaxas Line defenses. Again, if my memory serves me well, Koryzis (and the King) during these meetings accepted the ceding of territory from a political standpoint too. In effect, Greek defence policy and strategy embodied trading territory for better defensive success. It was just a matter of where that line should be. Highlighted and reified by their 8 February assessment.
And, crucially, it reiterates that Yugoslav efforts determine their strategic defensive posture.
The question now is, did Papagos and the Greeks apply this analysis (and grasp the consequences of what they were discussing) soundly and coherently?
In addition to the key points above, some details are also divulged in the discussion that help us to develop an argument.
- a redeployment of the divisions and non-fortress troops from Thrace and Eastern Macedonia to the Vermion Line required at least 20 days.
- there would then be 35 battalion on the line AND 2 divisions in reserve (the implication being that some units must come from Albania).
- this line was merely a delaying stand to allow for the remaining units in Albania to withdraw which would take 20-25 days.
But, of all the things to come out of these various discussions 21-23 February, the key point relates to Yugoslavia. Whilst almost everybody wants to focus on this point whilst arguing over who misunderstood whom about whether the withdraw was going to start immediatly or not, they lose sight of the fact that this point demonstrates that the Greeks did NOT have a firm grasp of what the Yugoslavs could do for them and thus they were still choosing to base their main defensive posture on an assumption that a perfect scenario would materialise rather than prudently planning for a less optimal scenario. It seems the British hesitation to move to the Metaxas Line themselves, and their inability to define the Yugoslav situation as ideal, failed to impress upon the Greeks (Papagos) the lack of wisdom in standing on the Metaxas and not giving up an inch of Albania. The information was there, it was not accepted by Papagos.
In my opinion, the Greeks lost another opportunity. They still had more than 20 days available. They chose to stand on the Metaxas Line and in Albania when the evidence available to them (not in hindsight) suggested the prudent response was to redeploy. The military had political backing for this. This suggests that it was Papagos himself, or the military leadership collectively, that were stubbornly refusing to countenance a move. For reasons that remain cloudy.
4 -25 March 1941
Then we move forward to the next round of meetings at the beginning of March. Again, published narratives concentrate on the misunderstanding and try to apportion blame where apprpriate. Whilst focussing on a single tree, they completely ignore the wood.
The first thing that strikes me is that the Greeks, instead of understanding that the British shock at their non-withdrawal was based upon the British belief that the Metaxas Line was completely untenable, not because they were playing diplomatic games. Again, the Greeks failed to grasp that evidence and considered military opinion extent at the time was set against standing on the Metaxas Line unless it could be guaranteed that the Yugoslavs could do their bit. Remember my caveat regarding practical help rather than diplomatic noises? The Metaxas Line defences needed South Serbia to be denied to the Germans AND major increase in military forces from either (a) Greek forces pulled from Albania, (b) Empire forces, or (c) Yugoslav forces. The first they themselves chose not to commit, the second was denied and the third was an idealistic fantasy (apologies for the hindsight hyperbole).
The Greeks lost yet another opportunity. They STILL had 20 days available. And the evidence exists that Papagos and the Greeks were more than forewarned and advised of the realities.
Remember, Papagos’ excuse that no withdrawal had started was that he still had no definite knowledge of what part the Yugoslav’s would play. At this point in time, He should be stood on the Vermion Line pondering whether to move forward, not on the Metaxas Line looking for excuses not to move back.
From the NZ official history: General Papagos, however, had understood that he could wait until a reply was received from Yugoslavia. He had done so but it was now too late. For should he order a withdrawal there would be despair among the Greek people of Macedonia and every chance of his troops being caught during the withdrawal. He therefore proposed to hold the Metaxas line and not to withdraw any of his divisions from Albania.
Notice the question of his forces in Albania was considered again. It is wrong to infer from the poor coverage in published material that somehow the topic was not considered and discussed at regular intervals. It was, and on each occasion, it was Greek (Papagos) decision to do nothing. In the footnotes of the NZ history to that quote, it references de Guingand who was present at the meeting that the decision not to withdraw from either front “… said change of plan was due not to any obscure political reasons, but to the delay in receiving an answer from the Yugoslav Government clarifying their intentions.” In effect, the ‘plan’ agreed on 22 February was to take up the Vermion Line, the timing of that move misunderstood. Papagos had, it seems, chosen to ignore that plan despite the evidence as well as political and military advice at hand. Not in hindsight, but at hand.
Moreover, he now ‘demanded’ the British move up to the Metaxas Line. From the NZ Official History again…
He therefore proposed to hold the Metaxas line and not to withdraw any of his divisions from Albania. The British on their arrival would have to move up piecemeal to the Macedonian front. This was so entirely different from the original plan, and strategically so unsound, that Sir John Dill would not accept it. General Wavell was called over from Egypt and a series of anxious discussions then took place.
To General Dill it appeared hopeless for the Greeks to attempt to hold the Metaxas line with three divisions when they knew that it would require nine. Nor was he any more confident when Papagos thought that four divisions might be found for the task. The transportation of British troops to Salonika would be too dangerous; the three or four Greek divisions would be overwhelmed before the British arrived; and even if they did get there in time resistance would be hopeless. So, while admitting the difficulty of the situation and praising Greek valour in Albania, he stated, very firmly, that he was not going to throw away the only British reserves in the Middle East.
This passage, following the decisions made on 8 February and 22 February, suggests to me that the Greeks (Papagos) never had any intention of vacating anything east of the Vardar nor withdrawing anything from Albania. Moreover, it suggests to me that the Greeks were deliberately trying to deceive the Empire into getting them to commit where the Greeks wanted them to: Eastern Macedonia.
Given my earlier analysis regarding the Greek expectations of the Yugoslavs, and now the attempts to manouver the British, you may now grasp why I previously wrote that it is my opinion that Papagos (that’s where the evidence trail leads) was looking for other nations’ forces to defend Greece rather than take the decision, which was already politically approved and assumed in policy, to trade territory for better defensive position.
Although the Germans were now forming up in Bulgaria, they’d only be at it for a couple of days. Time still existed (20 days) for a withdrawal to be effected without German interference. Although, I concede that a pessimistic observer may challenge that. Papagos’ decision-making suggests he was an idealist.
Further evidence of excuses and determination not to comply with the agreed ‘plan’ and sound military advice, as well as poor grasp of what help the Yugoslavs could offer, found in his the exchange of words posted by Tom earlier in the thread.
25 -27 March 1941
Prince Paul sides with the Germans. Papagos has his answer. Finally he grasps the need to fall back not advance forward and agrees, on the 26th, to start moving his divisions back. This process would be speeded up by the British providing motor transport.
However, before the day is up, Papagos (see Swastika over the Acropolis and NZ Official History) is agitating for that same transport to move the 12th and 20th Divisions from the Vermion Line forward. The next day, he compels Wilson to free up the 19th Division to go forward. Why? He’s heard that the Yugoslav military are going to rebel – and no doubt - that they are favourable to an alliance with Greece and the British.
The Greek King was brought in to overrule British objections.
27 March to 3 April 1941
Papagos now looks (in hindsight) to have been a bit of a sage. His insistence and determination to sit on the Metaxas Line now seems to have been proven fortuitous. But, given the contrary nature of my mind, I see it wholly in a different light.
Earlier, I explained how, in my opinion, the credibility of the Metaxas Line rested on Yugoslavia’s ability to deny the Germans access to the Vardar and Monastir Gaps. Their political and diplomatic words and stated intentions were an irrelevancy if they couldn’t back up these with practical military effect.
As you pointed out Jeff, in his book, Papagos writes of the symbiotic relationship between Greece and Serbia/Yugoslavia and details and uses his military knowledge and experience to lay out how Yugoslavia should defend itself from attack. His expert analysis, although sound in limited military terms, was completely irrelevant to April 1941 for political and logistical reasons. Again, Papagos seems to have based his decisions on the ideal situation that alliance with Yugoslavia offered and assumed his ‘expert’ military analysis and recommendations would be followed by the Yugoslavs. They didn’t. They couldn’t.
Although the former would be impossible to determine at the time, the latter should have been abundantly clear to Papagos. For example, if he considers it impossible for Greeks in Thrace to give up their homes and defend the Vermion Line, why does he assume that Slovenes and Croats will give up their land and defend Southern Serbia or Greek Eastern Macedonia? If Papagos considers it impossible to move his forces from the Metaxas to the Vermion in less than 20 days, and feels it unwise to do so because they may get caught by the Germans during the move, how does he expect the Yugoslavs to move twice as far, and unhindered by the same Germans, in less time? There is a clear disconnect here in Papagos' thinking and logic.
In effect, Papagos’ understanding of what the Yugoslavs could bring to the table was fundamentally flawed. It was his belief that his knowledge of their situation and capabilities that let him down. His opinion was outdated, over optimistic and unrealistic. Greece suffered because of this hubris.
3-6 April 1941
Even if Papagos was convinced his understanding of the Yugoslav capabilities went unchallenged to that point, after his meeting with General Jankovic, he should have been under no illusions. As posted by Tom, the next day he even complained that the Yugoslavs were not positioning their forces where he felt they should and in far from ideal numbers. Admittedly, it was now too late to make any effective adjustments. But he didn’t even try. He was still determined to stand on the Metaxas Line irrespective of the realities confronting him.
And finally, despite the common belief that the redeployment of forces in Albania was not discussed and presumed to be fixed (I think I’ve demonstrated that is not the case and that their fixture was very much a repeated choice by the Greeks (Papagos)), even after the Germans had completely outflanked the East, driven into Salonika and obtained the surrender of all Greek forces east of the Vardar, AND German forces were about to shake hands with the Italians on the Albanian border, it took another 3 days for Papagos to agree to a withdrawal from Albania. Incredible!
I do not believe I am doing Papagos a disservice. The Greeks (and the evidence seems to lead to Papagos himself) were caught between a rock and a very hard place and chose to follow a strategy that he (Papagos) had convinced himself was sound and coherent. In hindsight, we can see it was a disaster and, instead of being the only plan that offered hope, was in fact the key plan that ensured disaster. Over the last 2 posts, I’ve tried to lay out, step by step, where he and the Greeks made decisions that could, at that time, be reasonably considered as incoherent and imprudent. I have shown that they repeatedly ignored military advice (their own and the British), completely failed to grasp the significance of warnings and completely overestimated what the Yugoslavs could do. They don’t ever seem to have balanced the risks of their choices. There even seems to have been a deliberate policy of deceiving allies as to their true intentions.
All this is my own personal opinion. It contradicts much of what has been published to date. That doesn’t make it wrong, it makes in contrary. What has been published is merely other peoples’ opinions. I make no effort to change yours; it is for you to decide what you want to believe and what not to. I simply ask that you continue with posting your own opinions and thought from which I can learn and develop my own thoughts.
I am already running way behind and must go..... Sorry.
I am disappointed that you persist with the notion that your understanding is 'the truth' and 'only truth' and that we can only have a reasonable discussion if I first accept that you are 'right' and I am 'wrong'.jwsleser wrote: I will stop at this point. While I am prepared to continue this discussion, it will be pointless unless you accept the political realities that shaped the military decisions. We are discussing strategic decisions that will inform the operational-level actions. We can’t have any meaningful discussion without understanding the parameters set at the strategic level.
Precisely. And my opinion runs counter to published thinking which I believe is both incomplete and flawed.jwsleser wrote:Most of history is determining 'why the results happened'. There is importance in the details.
Nevertheless, I will thank you for taking the time to post up all that you have done in the past couple of days. That certainly forms the basis for further honest discussion.
I have not "positioned myself as the expert" as you claim, I am offering my opinion and my analysis which I recognise is different in many respects to that of others and established written history. I do not claim to be right, nor am I trying to convince you of anything. In fact, I'm positioning myself contrary to established 'expert' opinion. To me established written history is flawed. I merely wish to engage in discussion to learn more about others' opinions and, in particular, how and why they hold these opinions. The least I can do is offer mine in exchange.
Regrettably, again I have only limited time today, so I will respond to the discussion about Yugoslavia and its strategic political position and its intentions and actions at a later date. For now, I will just say that I have a somewhat different view to yours.
8-22 February 1941
Thus, today I will continue with part 2 of my understanding of the higher command military decision-making by the Greeks.
In my last post, I considered the inconsistency and incoherence in those higher command military decisions. On 8 February, the Greeks themsleves had produced what I believe was reasonably sound (with a major caveat I will shortly address) analysis of their predicament and solid military recommendations how to deal with each of the three possibilities they identified. This was not followed. I have yet come across a satisfactory explanation why. In fact, how many historians and analyists even consider it? There has been much written about the "misundersting" of 22 February, but scarce to non-existant is the discussion about Greece's failure to follow its own analysis and recommendations. What does Papagos himself say about it in "The Battle of Greece 1940-1941, Athens 1949"?
To recapitulate, the Greeks had identified three possible scenarios based upon their correct recognition that their defence strategy was entirely tied into the 'position' of the Yugoslavs. These were:-
There is one major flaw in this analysis. Namely, it was not the political or diplomatic 'position' that Yugoslavia took that was significant, it was the ability of the Germans to cross South Serbia (what is now Macedonia) and threaten Greece directly from the north. Let me explain my thoughts.jwsleser wrote: The official history lays out the three possibilities on page 172 (assessment as of 8 Feb).
A) Yugoslavia as an ally: The Metaxas Line would be held. This position covers the southern flank of Yugoslavia.
B) Yugoslavia neutral/no passage of Axis forces: Defend the Kaimaktalan-Vermio-Aliakmonas line. The forts would be manned but only to delay the enemy advance. No attempt to hold the ground between forts. This moves the defense into better defensive terrain and requires less forces.
C) Yugoslavia joins Axis/or allows passage: Withdrawal to the Greek-Albanian border - Smolikas Mountains - Orliakas Mountains - Aliakmonas River - Olympus Mountains. This basically gives up most of northern Greece.
Greece had three fronts to consider: the 'western' front which faced Albania and was threatened by the Italians, the 'eastern' front facing Bulgaria (and Turkey) threatened by the Germans massing in Bulgaria and the 'northern' front facing Yugoslavia which may or may not be threatened depending upon whether the Germans in Bulgaria came that way. The 'northern' front was, due to geography, topography and relative position, the key. It's importance over the other two cannot be stressed enough. If the Germans came through the Monastir Gap (and down the Vardar Valley), both the western and eastern fronts are out flanked, out manouvered and game over. The only way to stand any chance against such an advance was/is to amass one's forces on a much shorter defensive line that effectively combines all fronts into one single curved front around the fringes of Epirus and (Greek) Western Macedonia. This line equates to the line in Option C determined by the Greek military. Any Greek forces in Albania and points east of the Vermion Line would innevitably be outflanked and made inconsequential in quick order.
Now, the Greek analysis seemed to equate Yugoslav diplomatic position to military capability. Thus, if the Yugoslavs are on 'our' side, the Germans can't come through South Serbia and thus our 'northern' front is secure. This leads to Option A and the recommendation that the Metaxas Line can be held as there is not threat to their left flank. This is flawed as proven by history. Option B is a bit confusing. If Germans have no access to South Serbia, again there is no threat to the left flank of the Metaxas Line. Here I don't see their logic. And considering option 1 and 2 together, I summise the Greeks have concluded Yugoslav being an ally will mean Yugoslav troops will be available to strengthen the Metaxas Line itself. Nevertheless, the recommendation in Option B is to have the Kaimaktalan-Vermio-Aliakmonas Line as the primary defensive line in order to ensure that troops east of the Vardar are not cut off from an outflanking movement. Moreover, it provides a further delaying line to allow time for a withdrawal from Albania should it prove necessary. Finally, Option C is premised around the assumption, and correct recognition, that they will need all their forces sitting ready and prepared (in advance) on a shortened line if they are to stand any chance of repelling an attack from South Serbia.
Where the political/diplomatic position of Yugoslavia is disconnected to the practical military situation, and thus causes some questionning of the Greek military analysis, can be highlighted by these two realities. First, on 25 March, Yugoslavia became an ally of Germany and Italy. However, they did so in a way that meant the Germans would respect their territorial integrity and not transgress their border to get at Greece. In effect, the Greek's northern front was now secured. This was the best possible scenario for the Greeks. They could leave this front undefended whilst concentrating forces in Albania and on the Metaxas Line. Second, on 27 March, Yugoslavia became an ally. But, as we know, their military was not up to defending their territory and the Germans were through South Serbia like a hot knife through butter.
In effect, two things can be concluded from this reality. First, Yugoslavia perceived as an ally, with the decisions made by the Greeks based upon what they perceived the ally could do for them, actually was their downfall; it would have been better for Yugoslavia to be a foe(on paper). Second, the Greeks do not seem to have been able to separate understanding of political/diplomatic position from military capability.
In amongst your recent posts Jeff, you raised two points:-
- a "early decision on the actual defense"; and,
- the question of hindsight.
To the first, I argue an "early" decision was not not desireable, but imperative. I also suggest a decision based upon 'planning for the worst and hoping for the best' would be more prudent than the idealistic assumption that everything will turn out optimal.
To the second, hindsight provides us with answers as to what didn't happen and didn't work - ie. what decisions were imprudent and/or plain disasterous. Or vice versa. It also allows us to assess whether the decision-making process was sound or not. In effect, the people making the decisions at the time couldn't know the result, but we do. Hindsight does not prevent, it allows, us to assess those decisions with far greater understanding.
22 February - 4 March 1941
So far, I have demonstrated what I believe was unsound decision-making to remain on the Metaxas Line and forward in Albania, based upon their own analysis (albeit not perfect) and own recommendations as to the threat to their northern front. This, effectively covers the period 8-22 February. On that date, 22 February, they had outside input as to their (strategic) defensive position, and had the opportunity to revise their decisions based upon that input. The Greeks now have a second opportunity to decide whether to make a timely and prudent withdrawal or not. They have the opportunity to test their own assumptions against those of the British. The key assumptions being: the Yugoslav political position, the Yugoslav military capabilities (and intentions) and the positons, intentions and capabilities of the Germans.
The minutes of the 22 February meetings are found in TNA FO371/29782. Regrettably the notes I made from this file over 15 years ago a buried in storage in another country on the opposite side of the continent. I am relying on memory of the key points alongside the details written in "Swastika over the Acropolis, Craig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock, 2013". To summarise briefly the following key points (among others) were brought up and discussed.
- Papagos laid out his plan to remain in Albania and stand on the Metaxas Line.
- That Yugoslavia's position (not military capability) was crucial to Greece's strategic defensive posture.
- That standing on the Metaxas Line was intended to both protect Salonika AND provide a delaying feature in order to withdraw units from Albania.
- That without Yugoslavia, they would stand on the Vermion Line.
- That forces in Albania were at major risk if not withdrawn.
- That the British considered a stand on the Metaxas Line unsound with less than 9 divisions, and refused to move their contribution that far forward.
You will note, that the risk to the forces in Albania, and discussion about their withdrawal was indeed very much under consideration. I believe you have commented that published history does not seem to record this or plays down its significance. It pays to make ones own analysis as well as relying on the anaysis of published authors.
Moreover, if my memory serves me well, Papagos speaks of withdrawing to (not from) the Metaxas Line. The implication being that he (and Greece) is willing to concede Thrace and most of Greek Eastern Macedonia. An imperative presumed in the very siting of the main Metaxas Line defenses. Again, if my memory serves me well, Koryzis (and the King) during these meetings accepted the ceding of territory from a political standpoint too. In effect, Greek defence policy and strategy embodied trading territory for better defensive success. It was just a matter of where that line should be. Highlighted and reified by their 8 February assessment.
And, crucially, it reiterates that Yugoslav efforts determine their strategic defensive posture.
The question now is, did Papagos and the Greeks apply this analysis (and grasp the consequences of what they were discussing) soundly and coherently?
In addition to the key points above, some details are also divulged in the discussion that help us to develop an argument.
- a redeployment of the divisions and non-fortress troops from Thrace and Eastern Macedonia to the Vermion Line required at least 20 days.
- there would then be 35 battalion on the line AND 2 divisions in reserve (the implication being that some units must come from Albania).
- this line was merely a delaying stand to allow for the remaining units in Albania to withdraw which would take 20-25 days.
But, of all the things to come out of these various discussions 21-23 February, the key point relates to Yugoslavia. Whilst almost everybody wants to focus on this point whilst arguing over who misunderstood whom about whether the withdraw was going to start immediatly or not, they lose sight of the fact that this point demonstrates that the Greeks did NOT have a firm grasp of what the Yugoslavs could do for them and thus they were still choosing to base their main defensive posture on an assumption that a perfect scenario would materialise rather than prudently planning for a less optimal scenario. It seems the British hesitation to move to the Metaxas Line themselves, and their inability to define the Yugoslav situation as ideal, failed to impress upon the Greeks (Papagos) the lack of wisdom in standing on the Metaxas and not giving up an inch of Albania. The information was there, it was not accepted by Papagos.
In my opinion, the Greeks lost another opportunity. They still had more than 20 days available. They chose to stand on the Metaxas Line and in Albania when the evidence available to them (not in hindsight) suggested the prudent response was to redeploy. The military had political backing for this. This suggests that it was Papagos himself, or the military leadership collectively, that were stubbornly refusing to countenance a move. For reasons that remain cloudy.
4 -25 March 1941
Then we move forward to the next round of meetings at the beginning of March. Again, published narratives concentrate on the misunderstanding and try to apportion blame where apprpriate. Whilst focussing on a single tree, they completely ignore the wood.
The first thing that strikes me is that the Greeks, instead of understanding that the British shock at their non-withdrawal was based upon the British belief that the Metaxas Line was completely untenable, not because they were playing diplomatic games. Again, the Greeks failed to grasp that evidence and considered military opinion extent at the time was set against standing on the Metaxas Line unless it could be guaranteed that the Yugoslavs could do their bit. Remember my caveat regarding practical help rather than diplomatic noises? The Metaxas Line defences needed South Serbia to be denied to the Germans AND major increase in military forces from either (a) Greek forces pulled from Albania, (b) Empire forces, or (c) Yugoslav forces. The first they themselves chose not to commit, the second was denied and the third was an idealistic fantasy (apologies for the hindsight hyperbole).
The Greeks lost yet another opportunity. They STILL had 20 days available. And the evidence exists that Papagos and the Greeks were more than forewarned and advised of the realities.
Remember, Papagos’ excuse that no withdrawal had started was that he still had no definite knowledge of what part the Yugoslav’s would play. At this point in time, He should be stood on the Vermion Line pondering whether to move forward, not on the Metaxas Line looking for excuses not to move back.
From the NZ official history: General Papagos, however, had understood that he could wait until a reply was received from Yugoslavia. He had done so but it was now too late. For should he order a withdrawal there would be despair among the Greek people of Macedonia and every chance of his troops being caught during the withdrawal. He therefore proposed to hold the Metaxas line and not to withdraw any of his divisions from Albania.
Notice the question of his forces in Albania was considered again. It is wrong to infer from the poor coverage in published material that somehow the topic was not considered and discussed at regular intervals. It was, and on each occasion, it was Greek (Papagos) decision to do nothing. In the footnotes of the NZ history to that quote, it references de Guingand who was present at the meeting that the decision not to withdraw from either front “… said change of plan was due not to any obscure political reasons, but to the delay in receiving an answer from the Yugoslav Government clarifying their intentions.” In effect, the ‘plan’ agreed on 22 February was to take up the Vermion Line, the timing of that move misunderstood. Papagos had, it seems, chosen to ignore that plan despite the evidence as well as political and military advice at hand. Not in hindsight, but at hand.
Moreover, he now ‘demanded’ the British move up to the Metaxas Line. From the NZ Official History again…
He therefore proposed to hold the Metaxas line and not to withdraw any of his divisions from Albania. The British on their arrival would have to move up piecemeal to the Macedonian front. This was so entirely different from the original plan, and strategically so unsound, that Sir John Dill would not accept it. General Wavell was called over from Egypt and a series of anxious discussions then took place.
To General Dill it appeared hopeless for the Greeks to attempt to hold the Metaxas line with three divisions when they knew that it would require nine. Nor was he any more confident when Papagos thought that four divisions might be found for the task. The transportation of British troops to Salonika would be too dangerous; the three or four Greek divisions would be overwhelmed before the British arrived; and even if they did get there in time resistance would be hopeless. So, while admitting the difficulty of the situation and praising Greek valour in Albania, he stated, very firmly, that he was not going to throw away the only British reserves in the Middle East.
This passage, following the decisions made on 8 February and 22 February, suggests to me that the Greeks (Papagos) never had any intention of vacating anything east of the Vardar nor withdrawing anything from Albania. Moreover, it suggests to me that the Greeks were deliberately trying to deceive the Empire into getting them to commit where the Greeks wanted them to: Eastern Macedonia.
Given my earlier analysis regarding the Greek expectations of the Yugoslavs, and now the attempts to manouver the British, you may now grasp why I previously wrote that it is my opinion that Papagos (that’s where the evidence trail leads) was looking for other nations’ forces to defend Greece rather than take the decision, which was already politically approved and assumed in policy, to trade territory for better defensive position.
Although the Germans were now forming up in Bulgaria, they’d only be at it for a couple of days. Time still existed (20 days) for a withdrawal to be effected without German interference. Although, I concede that a pessimistic observer may challenge that. Papagos’ decision-making suggests he was an idealist.
Further evidence of excuses and determination not to comply with the agreed ‘plan’ and sound military advice, as well as poor grasp of what help the Yugoslavs could offer, found in his the exchange of words posted by Tom earlier in the thread.
25 -27 March 1941
Prince Paul sides with the Germans. Papagos has his answer. Finally he grasps the need to fall back not advance forward and agrees, on the 26th, to start moving his divisions back. This process would be speeded up by the British providing motor transport.
However, before the day is up, Papagos (see Swastika over the Acropolis and NZ Official History) is agitating for that same transport to move the 12th and 20th Divisions from the Vermion Line forward. The next day, he compels Wilson to free up the 19th Division to go forward. Why? He’s heard that the Yugoslav military are going to rebel – and no doubt - that they are favourable to an alliance with Greece and the British.
The Greek King was brought in to overrule British objections.
27 March to 3 April 1941
Papagos now looks (in hindsight) to have been a bit of a sage. His insistence and determination to sit on the Metaxas Line now seems to have been proven fortuitous. But, given the contrary nature of my mind, I see it wholly in a different light.
Earlier, I explained how, in my opinion, the credibility of the Metaxas Line rested on Yugoslavia’s ability to deny the Germans access to the Vardar and Monastir Gaps. Their political and diplomatic words and stated intentions were an irrelevancy if they couldn’t back up these with practical military effect.
As you pointed out Jeff, in his book, Papagos writes of the symbiotic relationship between Greece and Serbia/Yugoslavia and details and uses his military knowledge and experience to lay out how Yugoslavia should defend itself from attack. His expert analysis, although sound in limited military terms, was completely irrelevant to April 1941 for political and logistical reasons. Again, Papagos seems to have based his decisions on the ideal situation that alliance with Yugoslavia offered and assumed his ‘expert’ military analysis and recommendations would be followed by the Yugoslavs. They didn’t. They couldn’t.
Although the former would be impossible to determine at the time, the latter should have been abundantly clear to Papagos. For example, if he considers it impossible for Greeks in Thrace to give up their homes and defend the Vermion Line, why does he assume that Slovenes and Croats will give up their land and defend Southern Serbia or Greek Eastern Macedonia? If Papagos considers it impossible to move his forces from the Metaxas to the Vermion in less than 20 days, and feels it unwise to do so because they may get caught by the Germans during the move, how does he expect the Yugoslavs to move twice as far, and unhindered by the same Germans, in less time? There is a clear disconnect here in Papagos' thinking and logic.
In effect, Papagos’ understanding of what the Yugoslavs could bring to the table was fundamentally flawed. It was his belief that his knowledge of their situation and capabilities that let him down. His opinion was outdated, over optimistic and unrealistic. Greece suffered because of this hubris.
3-6 April 1941
Even if Papagos was convinced his understanding of the Yugoslav capabilities went unchallenged to that point, after his meeting with General Jankovic, he should have been under no illusions. As posted by Tom, the next day he even complained that the Yugoslavs were not positioning their forces where he felt they should and in far from ideal numbers. Admittedly, it was now too late to make any effective adjustments. But he didn’t even try. He was still determined to stand on the Metaxas Line irrespective of the realities confronting him.
And finally, despite the common belief that the redeployment of forces in Albania was not discussed and presumed to be fixed (I think I’ve demonstrated that is not the case and that their fixture was very much a repeated choice by the Greeks (Papagos)), even after the Germans had completely outflanked the East, driven into Salonika and obtained the surrender of all Greek forces east of the Vardar, AND German forces were about to shake hands with the Italians on the Albanian border, it took another 3 days for Papagos to agree to a withdrawal from Albania. Incredible!
I do not believe I am doing Papagos a disservice. The Greeks (and the evidence seems to lead to Papagos himself) were caught between a rock and a very hard place and chose to follow a strategy that he (Papagos) had convinced himself was sound and coherent. In hindsight, we can see it was a disaster and, instead of being the only plan that offered hope, was in fact the key plan that ensured disaster. Over the last 2 posts, I’ve tried to lay out, step by step, where he and the Greeks made decisions that could, at that time, be reasonably considered as incoherent and imprudent. I have shown that they repeatedly ignored military advice (their own and the British), completely failed to grasp the significance of warnings and completely overestimated what the Yugoslavs could do. They don’t ever seem to have balanced the risks of their choices. There even seems to have been a deliberate policy of deceiving allies as to their true intentions.
All this is my own personal opinion. It contradicts much of what has been published to date. That doesn’t make it wrong, it makes in contrary. What has been published is merely other peoples’ opinions. I make no effort to change yours; it is for you to decide what you want to believe and what not to. I simply ask that you continue with posting your own opinions and thought from which I can learn and develop my own thoughts.
I am already running way behind and must go..... Sorry.
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
To all, but Jeff in particular ... Hi!
Today I have had the chance to reread my last two posts and I am a bit embarrassed by the words presented. With no prior planning or preparation, and haste being the order of the day, the lack of coherence to my words simply does not do justice the arguments and points being made. I would like to edit and rewrite them, but I am unable to do so. Thus, I am taking this opportunity to recapitulate and represent the argument in a manner which I feel is coherent and far clearer to interpret. Apologies for the repetition, but the argument deserves an proper airing.
Certain realities are indisputable: events that occurred, choices that were made and the lie of the land. The Italians attacked, the Greeks held them off, the Germans attacked, game over! The Greeks decided to disperse their meagre and inadequate resources across three separate lines with no mutual support. Forces held east of the Vardar (and to a lesser extent in Albania) were desperately vulnerable to an outflanking manoeuvre from the direction of Yugoslavia.
My arguments are not designed to apportion blame, but to understand how it all went so horribly wrong. I believe the end result was inevitable due to the mismatch in military capabilities. I do not believe the manner of the result was inevitable and, instead of a humiliating rout of the Greek Army in effectively three days with minimal damage imposed upon the Germans, I believe the Greek Army could have inflicted significant damage on the Germans whilst holding the Italians. Greece has several natural features that offer significant advantages to the defender. This advantage was not exploited by the Greeks at all. In fact, they chose, effectively, to ignore them.
What flows from this argument is a different understanding of events that occurred and thus questions the assumptions that were made by the decision-makers. For example, some argue that standing on the Metaxas Line offered the best prospect for defence and lengthy hold-out. I would argue that standing on the Metaxas Line guaranteed rapid collapse and defeat. The former belief is based upon the false premise that the Yugoslavs had the motivation and military capacity to deny an attacker access to the Vardar valley to prevent an outflanking movement. In broader terms, it assumed the Yugoslavs will be in close military alliance with Greece and also engage in joint operations in Albania. History proves the former flawed thinking and the latter correct. What misleads some, perhaps, is that history also shows that the Yugoslavs did indeed try to defend the Vardar and also attempted to upset the Italian rear in Albania. However, the timing and scale were completely ineffective. Greek reliance on Yugoslavia was misguided. Greek decision-making based upon that reliance was inopportune and disastrous.
To me, it is unsound and foolish to have significant forces east of the Vardar unless one can be assured the Metaxas Line will be outflanked. Moreover, it seems unhelpful to have 2/3rds of your Army tied down facing a lesser opponent in foreign land whilst the greater opponent is given an almost free ride across your own territory.
Greek territory east of the Vardar is supremely vulnerable. No depth of defence is afforded, and any forces there can easily be outflanked irrespective of how well they fight. To have significant forces anywhere east of the Vardar, the commander has to be supremely confident that no outflanking manoeuvre will occur. That manoeuvre can be prevented by either the Yugoslavs denying passage diplomatically or militarily. Alternatively, the Greeks can defend it themselves with their own, or allied, forces.
With meagre resources, standing on the Metaxas Line held two risks: the loss of the outflanked forces east of the Vardar, and the lack of resources to hold the Vermion line to prevent the forces in Albania being outflanked.
The Greeks seem to have adopted a position of supreme confidence in the Yugoslavs. A confidence that clearly (we have hindsight) was not merited. A confidence that was not shared by the British at the time and the warnings they proffered, repeatedly, were ignored. In the absence of evidence that the Greeks were misled by others into this false confidence, the error was all of their own making. I understand that it could have been a political decision and the likely consequences accepted. Does Papagos say the military was compelled by its political masters to remain on the Metaxas line throughout? Remember, they may have had that order when it became too late to move, but the error was made, and repeated, from at least the 8 of February.
On 8 February, the Greek’s own military advice was NOT to stand on the Metaxas Line, but to concentrate further west. That advice was predicted on the ability of the Germans to pass through South Serbia (now Macedonia) and was to the extent that it even included a recommendation to withdraw their troops from Albania and reposition them on the frontier. The choice made was to stand on the Metaxas Line. Where is the evidence to suggest that they could be assured of no risk of being outflanked?
On 22 February, the Greeks in discussion with the British agreed to vacate the Metaxas Line and stand on the Vermion Line. Understanding of this reality has been lost as people argue and counter-argue over who understood the timing of that withdrawal correctly. But the key is not in the timing but the reality that a withdrawal had been agreed and accepted – militarily and politically – by the Greeks. The Greeks had heard and accepted as sound the British fears of the military sense in standing on the Metaxas Line. Somebody chose to ignore that agreement and remain rooted to the Metaxas Line. Where is the evidence to suggest that they could be assured of no risk of being outflanked thus justifying this decision?
On 3 or 4 March, the British expressed horror that Greeks had not moved an inch. The Greek explanation for this was that they were waiting for information from Yugoslavia as to their intentions. This excuse, in itself, demonstrates the Greeks could have no confidence in Yugoslavia to prevent an outflanking of the Metaxas Line. This excuse, in itself, demonstrates the foolishness in standing on the Metaxas Line at that time. This excuse suggests that the Greeks had no, and never had any, intention of budging – and thus their earlier agreement to do so was deliberately deceptive. It suggests that the Greeks had opted to assume that, when the time came, the Yugoslavs and/or the Empire would act in Greece’s best interests and not their own.
At each of these three points in time, the Greeks had an opportunity to rebalance their forces and redeploy. More than 20 days existed, and could reasonably be judged to exist, for that redeployment to take place securely.
Even after the round of meetings 3-5 March, NOTHING was done. Without word from Belgrade, no confidence can be expected in their part in protecting the Vardar valley – let alone the Monastir Gap. The continued determination to stand on the Metaxas Line becomes ever more deluded and inappropriate as each day passes.
I have seen evidence that the decision to stay on the Metaxas Line was made at the political level from 27 March onwards. Nothing earlier.
I have seen evidence that subordinate operation military commanders were against withdrawal from Albania in April. Nothing earlier.
So who was making the decision up till then? The evidence is not conclusive, but leads towards Papagos.
Whether it was Papagos alone, in concert with others, or made by others for which he had little control, the choices made doomed the Greek Army and the country to rapid and complete collapse. Imagine how quick the Germans would have been in Athens if the two Empire divisions were not there! This seems quite remarkable when there was ample time available, and more than sufficient forewarning, to make defensive adjustments and put up a far more credible fight. The evidence points towards there never being any intention to budge an inch from either Albania or east of the Vardar. It suggests that the Greeks were even deceitful to their allies about the true intentions.
History, as of 27 March, throws the Greek decision a life-line. Because the Yugoslav military coup seems to have delivered all that Greece needed to implement the defensive posture it was so determined to pursue. However, the credibility of this is predicated upon a number of things. One of which is foreknowledge of Yugoslav cooperation and another the ability of the Yugoslavs to affect the military effect that the Greek plans required. The two, when one looks at the detail, contradict one another. If the Greeks knew from personal contact with the coup plotters that they would finally come on board, they would also know form those same coup plotter that when in power they would not set in motion the defensive measures (and could not) required by the Greeks. Yes, they did a bit in that direction, but they were never in the position to do enough. Where Papagos or the Greeks may be able to crow about correctly predicting the Yugoslav position in the final reckoning, they singularly fail to understand the political and military position Yugoslavia was in. Positions that meant Greece should not count on Yugoslavia.
Now, I understand the argument being made that any chance of success had to flow from Greek-Yugoslav intimate cooperation. A level of cooperation that required Yugoslavia to effectively surrender half its territory in order to be able to concentrate military forces in the south to (a) jointly defend the Bulgarian border and (b) jointly strike the Italians in Albania. This, I believe is the scenario presented by Papagos in his writing. It is a scenario that is predicated in its entirety on the Yugoslavs considering access to Salonika being the sole imperative - political and military - for the Yugoslavs. It was/is flawed. It was/is wrong. History has proven that. It may have seemed credible then, it certainly doesn’t now. For a country to be so beholden to the political and military choices of another seems inappropriate. For a state to not grasp the scale of domestic divisions in a neighbour, is troublesome. For a state to assume that a neighbour could overcome those divisions, for the defence of another state is bizarre. Papagos’ written analysis and theory on how the Balkans could be defended by joint Yugoslav and Greek effort was predicated on Slovene, Croat and Bosnian personnel in the Royal Yugoslav Army giving up their homes and families, conceding their land to a potential invader, and taking up positions to defend the homes of their ‘hated’ Serbian neighbours. How he assumes this was possible when he couldn’t even convince Greeks in Eastern Macedonia to redeploy to Central and Western Macedonia is, to me, incredible. If Greek confidence that their forces were secure from outflanking on the Metaxas Line was based upon Papagos analysis of the Yugoslavs, then..... Evidence of Yugoslav military cooperation with Greece to support Papagos' analysis is a misdirect as the crucial aspect is whether they could do enough at the right time, not whether they had a history of minor assistance. In October 1940, the Yugoslav Royal Council discussed the possibility of attacking Greece itself to secure Salonika for themselves and deny it to the Italians! It was shelved based upon two elements: the Prince Regent was not in favour of invading his wife's homeland and his closest advisors, mostly pro-German, felt that it would not be perceived well in Berlin if they appeared to take sides against Italy! That shows how far Greece could count on Yugoslavia!
We have the benefit of hindsight. The Greeks made poor choices that guaranteed rapid military collapse of their own forces whilst inflicting minimal damage on the (German) invader. My arguments are that there was more than sufficient evidence and forewarning for the Greeks to have seen that coming at the time. It thus follows, in my opinion, that excuses and theories which present the Greek decision-making as sound, but unfortunately unsuccessful, are completely flawed. I further believe that the majority of published material on this subject is unhelpful in truly understanding what happened. The English language narratives being the most unhelpful.
Today I have had the chance to reread my last two posts and I am a bit embarrassed by the words presented. With no prior planning or preparation, and haste being the order of the day, the lack of coherence to my words simply does not do justice the arguments and points being made. I would like to edit and rewrite them, but I am unable to do so. Thus, I am taking this opportunity to recapitulate and represent the argument in a manner which I feel is coherent and far clearer to interpret. Apologies for the repetition, but the argument deserves an proper airing.
Certain realities are indisputable: events that occurred, choices that were made and the lie of the land. The Italians attacked, the Greeks held them off, the Germans attacked, game over! The Greeks decided to disperse their meagre and inadequate resources across three separate lines with no mutual support. Forces held east of the Vardar (and to a lesser extent in Albania) were desperately vulnerable to an outflanking manoeuvre from the direction of Yugoslavia.
My arguments are not designed to apportion blame, but to understand how it all went so horribly wrong. I believe the end result was inevitable due to the mismatch in military capabilities. I do not believe the manner of the result was inevitable and, instead of a humiliating rout of the Greek Army in effectively three days with minimal damage imposed upon the Germans, I believe the Greek Army could have inflicted significant damage on the Germans whilst holding the Italians. Greece has several natural features that offer significant advantages to the defender. This advantage was not exploited by the Greeks at all. In fact, they chose, effectively, to ignore them.
What flows from this argument is a different understanding of events that occurred and thus questions the assumptions that were made by the decision-makers. For example, some argue that standing on the Metaxas Line offered the best prospect for defence and lengthy hold-out. I would argue that standing on the Metaxas Line guaranteed rapid collapse and defeat. The former belief is based upon the false premise that the Yugoslavs had the motivation and military capacity to deny an attacker access to the Vardar valley to prevent an outflanking movement. In broader terms, it assumed the Yugoslavs will be in close military alliance with Greece and also engage in joint operations in Albania. History proves the former flawed thinking and the latter correct. What misleads some, perhaps, is that history also shows that the Yugoslavs did indeed try to defend the Vardar and also attempted to upset the Italian rear in Albania. However, the timing and scale were completely ineffective. Greek reliance on Yugoslavia was misguided. Greek decision-making based upon that reliance was inopportune and disastrous.
To me, it is unsound and foolish to have significant forces east of the Vardar unless one can be assured the Metaxas Line will be outflanked. Moreover, it seems unhelpful to have 2/3rds of your Army tied down facing a lesser opponent in foreign land whilst the greater opponent is given an almost free ride across your own territory.
Greek territory east of the Vardar is supremely vulnerable. No depth of defence is afforded, and any forces there can easily be outflanked irrespective of how well they fight. To have significant forces anywhere east of the Vardar, the commander has to be supremely confident that no outflanking manoeuvre will occur. That manoeuvre can be prevented by either the Yugoslavs denying passage diplomatically or militarily. Alternatively, the Greeks can defend it themselves with their own, or allied, forces.
With meagre resources, standing on the Metaxas Line held two risks: the loss of the outflanked forces east of the Vardar, and the lack of resources to hold the Vermion line to prevent the forces in Albania being outflanked.
The Greeks seem to have adopted a position of supreme confidence in the Yugoslavs. A confidence that clearly (we have hindsight) was not merited. A confidence that was not shared by the British at the time and the warnings they proffered, repeatedly, were ignored. In the absence of evidence that the Greeks were misled by others into this false confidence, the error was all of their own making. I understand that it could have been a political decision and the likely consequences accepted. Does Papagos say the military was compelled by its political masters to remain on the Metaxas line throughout? Remember, they may have had that order when it became too late to move, but the error was made, and repeated, from at least the 8 of February.
On 8 February, the Greek’s own military advice was NOT to stand on the Metaxas Line, but to concentrate further west. That advice was predicted on the ability of the Germans to pass through South Serbia (now Macedonia) and was to the extent that it even included a recommendation to withdraw their troops from Albania and reposition them on the frontier. The choice made was to stand on the Metaxas Line. Where is the evidence to suggest that they could be assured of no risk of being outflanked?
On 22 February, the Greeks in discussion with the British agreed to vacate the Metaxas Line and stand on the Vermion Line. Understanding of this reality has been lost as people argue and counter-argue over who understood the timing of that withdrawal correctly. But the key is not in the timing but the reality that a withdrawal had been agreed and accepted – militarily and politically – by the Greeks. The Greeks had heard and accepted as sound the British fears of the military sense in standing on the Metaxas Line. Somebody chose to ignore that agreement and remain rooted to the Metaxas Line. Where is the evidence to suggest that they could be assured of no risk of being outflanked thus justifying this decision?
On 3 or 4 March, the British expressed horror that Greeks had not moved an inch. The Greek explanation for this was that they were waiting for information from Yugoslavia as to their intentions. This excuse, in itself, demonstrates the Greeks could have no confidence in Yugoslavia to prevent an outflanking of the Metaxas Line. This excuse, in itself, demonstrates the foolishness in standing on the Metaxas Line at that time. This excuse suggests that the Greeks had no, and never had any, intention of budging – and thus their earlier agreement to do so was deliberately deceptive. It suggests that the Greeks had opted to assume that, when the time came, the Yugoslavs and/or the Empire would act in Greece’s best interests and not their own.
At each of these three points in time, the Greeks had an opportunity to rebalance their forces and redeploy. More than 20 days existed, and could reasonably be judged to exist, for that redeployment to take place securely.
Even after the round of meetings 3-5 March, NOTHING was done. Without word from Belgrade, no confidence can be expected in their part in protecting the Vardar valley – let alone the Monastir Gap. The continued determination to stand on the Metaxas Line becomes ever more deluded and inappropriate as each day passes.
I have seen evidence that the decision to stay on the Metaxas Line was made at the political level from 27 March onwards. Nothing earlier.
I have seen evidence that subordinate operation military commanders were against withdrawal from Albania in April. Nothing earlier.
So who was making the decision up till then? The evidence is not conclusive, but leads towards Papagos.
Whether it was Papagos alone, in concert with others, or made by others for which he had little control, the choices made doomed the Greek Army and the country to rapid and complete collapse. Imagine how quick the Germans would have been in Athens if the two Empire divisions were not there! This seems quite remarkable when there was ample time available, and more than sufficient forewarning, to make defensive adjustments and put up a far more credible fight. The evidence points towards there never being any intention to budge an inch from either Albania or east of the Vardar. It suggests that the Greeks were even deceitful to their allies about the true intentions.
History, as of 27 March, throws the Greek decision a life-line. Because the Yugoslav military coup seems to have delivered all that Greece needed to implement the defensive posture it was so determined to pursue. However, the credibility of this is predicated upon a number of things. One of which is foreknowledge of Yugoslav cooperation and another the ability of the Yugoslavs to affect the military effect that the Greek plans required. The two, when one looks at the detail, contradict one another. If the Greeks knew from personal contact with the coup plotters that they would finally come on board, they would also know form those same coup plotter that when in power they would not set in motion the defensive measures (and could not) required by the Greeks. Yes, they did a bit in that direction, but they were never in the position to do enough. Where Papagos or the Greeks may be able to crow about correctly predicting the Yugoslav position in the final reckoning, they singularly fail to understand the political and military position Yugoslavia was in. Positions that meant Greece should not count on Yugoslavia.
Now, I understand the argument being made that any chance of success had to flow from Greek-Yugoslav intimate cooperation. A level of cooperation that required Yugoslavia to effectively surrender half its territory in order to be able to concentrate military forces in the south to (a) jointly defend the Bulgarian border and (b) jointly strike the Italians in Albania. This, I believe is the scenario presented by Papagos in his writing. It is a scenario that is predicated in its entirety on the Yugoslavs considering access to Salonika being the sole imperative - political and military - for the Yugoslavs. It was/is flawed. It was/is wrong. History has proven that. It may have seemed credible then, it certainly doesn’t now. For a country to be so beholden to the political and military choices of another seems inappropriate. For a state to not grasp the scale of domestic divisions in a neighbour, is troublesome. For a state to assume that a neighbour could overcome those divisions, for the defence of another state is bizarre. Papagos’ written analysis and theory on how the Balkans could be defended by joint Yugoslav and Greek effort was predicated on Slovene, Croat and Bosnian personnel in the Royal Yugoslav Army giving up their homes and families, conceding their land to a potential invader, and taking up positions to defend the homes of their ‘hated’ Serbian neighbours. How he assumes this was possible when he couldn’t even convince Greeks in Eastern Macedonia to redeploy to Central and Western Macedonia is, to me, incredible. If Greek confidence that their forces were secure from outflanking on the Metaxas Line was based upon Papagos analysis of the Yugoslavs, then..... Evidence of Yugoslav military cooperation with Greece to support Papagos' analysis is a misdirect as the crucial aspect is whether they could do enough at the right time, not whether they had a history of minor assistance. In October 1940, the Yugoslav Royal Council discussed the possibility of attacking Greece itself to secure Salonika for themselves and deny it to the Italians! It was shelved based upon two elements: the Prince Regent was not in favour of invading his wife's homeland and his closest advisors, mostly pro-German, felt that it would not be perceived well in Berlin if they appeared to take sides against Italy! That shows how far Greece could count on Yugoslavia!
We have the benefit of hindsight. The Greeks made poor choices that guaranteed rapid military collapse of their own forces whilst inflicting minimal damage on the (German) invader. My arguments are that there was more than sufficient evidence and forewarning for the Greeks to have seen that coming at the time. It thus follows, in my opinion, that excuses and theories which present the Greek decision-making as sound, but unfortunately unsuccessful, are completely flawed. I further believe that the majority of published material on this subject is unhelpful in truly understanding what happened. The English language narratives being the most unhelpful.
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Good day Mark
Well your last post has certainly changed my response (had to rework it).
We would agree on many things based on hindsight.
I feel your analysis doesn't account for all the facts bearing on this issue, specifically Yugoslavia (and therefore the issue of Thessaloniki). Regardless of what hindsight tells us, the facts clearly demonstrate that the position of Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the decisions and that the decision makers of the time felt that Yugoslavia could make a significant military contribution. I would agree that there were some signs indicating problems, but I will point out none of them were conclusive. What is clear is that Yugoslavian involvement was seen as a positive and their actions were guided by this understanding.
Everything below is either a direct quote from a primary source, or a quote/statement that is directly citing a primary source.
On doing everything possible to ensuring the participation of Yugoslavia. (Playfair I 381, II pg. 70-71)
[17 March] Eden missive via Mr. Shone to Prince Paul ask him to stand firm (Playfair II pg 73)
[18 March] Eden telling Turks to tell Belgrade that an attack on Salonika would be a casus belli for Turkey. (Playfair II Pg 72)
[22 March] PM pushing Yugoslavia to stand firm and how a Greek/Yugoslavian/Turkey combination might politically stop Germany, and the impact of a Yugoslavian offensive into Albania. (Playfair II pg 73).
Strengthening Salonika defense after 27 March (Playfair II pg 74).
A thread throughout these cites is why would the danger to Salonika be an issue if the Allies had already decided to abandon Salonika? What is either inferred or stated in these and other sources is the possible impact of abandoning Thessaloniki prior to any Yugoslavian decision.
This list (and I have more) demonstrates that Yugoslavia was fully 'in play' during this period and its status had not be finalized. To abandon Thessaloniki before such time it was clear on its position was to remove options. The political impact on any Yugoslavian decision of abandoning Thessaloniki is stated above.
The UK wasn't ready to 'throw in the hat' to gaining Yugoslavia as part of the Allies. While the prudent military decision 'might' have been to withdraw, such a move virtually abandon's the goals of the UK policy before events had indicated they had failed. Such a move dooms Greece to the Axis.
Viewpoint of Yugoslavian Military. The Allies made a great effort to gain Yugoslavian military support. To say that it was obvious to the leaders of
the time that the Yugoslavian military was completely ineffective ignores all the attempts to gain the use of that military.
Everyone looked at the Serbian performance in 1914-1918 as a positive indicator. While there were some concerns, none of them reached the level that the Yugoslavian military was ineffective.
To clear up one point.
raised that point. The withdrawal mentioned in all the sources is if the defense in the east can't be maintained (i.e. the risk). The withdrawal was
not seen as providing substantial forces to the east which was your position. In the first two COAs (Metaxas Line and Aliakmon Line), the need
to withdraw in Albania is never addressed as part of those options; only the concern if the Axis can gain a position to cut off those units.
IBWs, none of the COAs were dependent on a decision to withdraw the Greeks from Albania. Any decision to withdraw from Albania was dependent on the COA selected for the east.
And a final point. On the news that Yugoslavia had joined the Axis, Papagos immediately began to coordinating the withdrawal of the units from the Metaxas Line. This action was stopped when the news broke about the coup. This demonstrates that Papagos was prepared to abandon parts of Greece once Yugoslavia's positon was fully clarified. (To Greece pg 115 fn 1)
I don't feel they made bad choices. They were dealt a very poor hand and they played it it to win. They understood there wouldn't be another round of cards dealt. To say the Greeks made poor choices is refusing to recognize the nature of their decisions.
Pista! Jeff
Well your last post has certainly changed my response (had to rework it).
We would agree on many things based on hindsight.
I feel your analysis doesn't account for all the facts bearing on this issue, specifically Yugoslavia (and therefore the issue of Thessaloniki). Regardless of what hindsight tells us, the facts clearly demonstrate that the position of Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the decisions and that the decision makers of the time felt that Yugoslavia could make a significant military contribution. I would agree that there were some signs indicating problems, but I will point out none of them were conclusive. What is clear is that Yugoslavian involvement was seen as a positive and their actions were guided by this understanding.
Everything below is either a direct quote from a primary source, or a quote/statement that is directly citing a primary source.
[12 Feb] Eden wanting to get Yugoslavia committed to the Allies (Playfair I 374).[14-15 January mtg. w/ Metaxas] The most important step, in the President's opinion, was to clear up the situation in Albania; this would release large forces for the Bulgarian front. As soon as these were available he would welcome British assistance. The best plan therefore was to make all possible secret preparations for landing a British expedition at Salonika and the neighboring ports, but to send no troops at all until they could arrive in sufficient numbers to act offensively as well as defensively. (Playfair I pg. 341).
[17 Feb] Eden's desire to encourage Yugoslavia to declare war (Playfair I pg 377)[17 Feb Wavell] "If we can put a sufficient force into Macedonia to ensure the safety of the port of Salonika and to hold the principled passes from Bulgaria, we shall fulfill our object. Unfortunately our forces available are very limited and it is doubtful whether they can arrive in time." (Greece, Crete and Syria page 8, quote in original).
Eden and Dill arrived in Cairo on the 19th [Feb], having been delayed by bad weather. At a meeting on the 20th Wavell described the force he could make available. And (in spite of his doubt that an adequate force should be got there in time) advised proposing to the Greeks that an attempt should be made to defend Salonika. (Greece, Crete and Syria pg 9).
[22 Feb mtg.] Dill and Wavell considered that this Greek forces - comprising, after certain new formations had been raised, five or six divisions, together with the four (or their equivalent) from Egypt, -- "appeared to offer a reasonable prospect of establishing an effective defence against German aggression in the north-east of Greece". It was decided that Eden should send a telegram to Prince Paul of Yugoslavia seeking his views on the threat to Salonika, and it was agreed that "preparations should once be made and put into execution to withdraw the Greek forces advanced in Thrace and Macedonia" to the Vermion-Olympus line. (Greece, Crete and Syria pg 11, quotes in the original).
[22 Feb mtg.] Staff talks had been taking place during the past three weeks to investigate the possible composition of a British force to be sent in that event, and M. Koryzis now suggested that this matter should be settled in order to determine whether the British and Greek forces together would be sufficient to check the German attack and encourage Yugoslavia and Turkey to take part in the struggle. (Playfair I pg 347)
[22 Feb mtg.] On the first point it was decided that Mr. Eden should make an approach to the Regent of Yugoslavia, drawing his attention to the danger to Salonika presented by the current German activities in the Balkans and asking for Prince Paul's views on the subject. (Playfair I 379).
[22 Feb mtg.] The question then arose as to when the Greeks in Thrace and easternMacedonia should be recalled to the Aliakmon line. From a military point of view their immediate withdrawal was the only answer. On the other hand, it might be a political error to abandon Macedonia because all contact would be lost with the Turks and Salonika would be left undefended. (To Greece pg. 102)
[after 4 March] Vulnerability of Vermion line from Yugoslavia (Playfair I page 379, II pg 70)[2 March] There Mr. Ronald Campbell, the British Minister at Belgrade, informed Mr. Eden that the Yugoslav Government was frightened of Germany, but there was a chance that that "if the they knew of our plans for aiding Greece they might be ready to help". (ibid page 12, quotes in the original).
On doing everything possible to ensuring the participation of Yugoslavia. (Playfair I 381, II pg. 70-71)
Meeting with Yugoslavs on 8 March and the Yugoslavs asking about use of Salonika, advantages of common attack in Albania, and other military considerations (Playfair II pg 71).[5 or 6 March?] Eden to Campbell "He [Campbell] was to emphasis that the defence of Salonika, the one port through which Yugoslavia could maintain communications with Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, must be depend to a large extent upon the resistance put up by the Yugoslavs themselves." (Playfair II pg. 71)
[17 March] Eden missive via Mr. Shone to Prince Paul ask him to stand firm (Playfair II pg 73)
[18 March] Eden telling Turks to tell Belgrade that an attack on Salonika would be a casus belli for Turkey. (Playfair II Pg 72)
[22 March] PM pushing Yugoslavia to stand firm and how a Greek/Yugoslavian/Turkey combination might politically stop Germany, and the impact of a Yugoslavian offensive into Albania. (Playfair II pg 73).
Strengthening Salonika defense after 27 March (Playfair II pg 74).
A thread throughout these cites is why would the danger to Salonika be an issue if the Allies had already decided to abandon Salonika? What is either inferred or stated in these and other sources is the possible impact of abandoning Thessaloniki prior to any Yugoslavian decision.
This list (and I have more) demonstrates that Yugoslavia was fully 'in play' during this period and its status had not be finalized. To abandon Thessaloniki before such time it was clear on its position was to remove options. The political impact on any Yugoslavian decision of abandoning Thessaloniki is stated above.
The UK wasn't ready to 'throw in the hat' to gaining Yugoslavia as part of the Allies. While the prudent military decision 'might' have been to withdraw, such a move virtually abandon's the goals of the UK policy before events had indicated they had failed. Such a move dooms Greece to the Axis.
Viewpoint of Yugoslavian Military. The Allies made a great effort to gain Yugoslavian military support. To say that it was obvious to the leaders of
the time that the Yugoslavian military was completely ineffective ignores all the attempts to gain the use of that military.
Note that the Aliakmon Line required Yugoslavia to successfully defend its territory.In that case the best policy for the Allies was to hold the Aliakmon line, which lay to the west of Salonika along the mountain barrier of Mount
Olympus - Veroia - Edhessa - Kaimakchalan. The main danger would be the exposure of the left flank should the Germans invade Yugoslavia and approach the Monastir Gap, a natural avenue into northern Greece. There was every chance, however, that Yugoslavia would resist such violation of her neutrality so the military experts, remembering Serbian resistance in 1914-18 and the mountainous nature of the country, decided that the flank was reasonably safe. If the Germans did break through there would always be time to establish a line from Mount Olympus through Servia to the Greek positions in the west. (To Greece Page 101, my bold)
Everyone looked at the Serbian performance in 1914-1918 as a positive indicator. While there were some concerns, none of them reached the level that the Yugoslavian military was ineffective.
Again I will note that within all my posts I have cited primary sources, not conclusions. My analysis/opinion accounts for all these facts. I don't try to minimize them or ignore them.All this is my own personal opinion. It contradicts much of what has been published to date. That doesn't make it wrong, it makes in contrary. What has been published is merely other peoples' opinions. I make no effort to change yours; it is for you to decide what you want to believe and what not to. I simply ask that you continue with posting your own opinions and thought from which I can learn and develop my own thoughts.
To clear up one point.
Please reread my posts. I was speaking in terms that a withdrawal would enhance a defense in the east. That is the context in which you initiallyYou will note, that the risk to the forces in Albania, and discussion about their withdrawal was indeed very much under consideration. I believe you have commented that published history does not seem to record this or plays down its significance. It pays to make ones own analysis as well as relying on the anaysis of published authors.
raised that point. The withdrawal mentioned in all the sources is if the defense in the east can't be maintained (i.e. the risk). The withdrawal was
not seen as providing substantial forces to the east which was your position. In the first two COAs (Metaxas Line and Aliakmon Line), the need
to withdraw in Albania is never addressed as part of those options; only the concern if the Axis can gain a position to cut off those units.
IBWs, none of the COAs were dependent on a decision to withdraw the Greeks from Albania. Any decision to withdraw from Albania was dependent on the COA selected for the east.
And a final point. On the news that Yugoslavia had joined the Axis, Papagos immediately began to coordinating the withdrawal of the units from the Metaxas Line. This action was stopped when the news broke about the coup. This demonstrates that Papagos was prepared to abandon parts of Greece once Yugoslavia's positon was fully clarified. (To Greece pg 115 fn 1)
The Greeks were making decisions to try and save their country. They were prepared to sacrifice their country if there wasn't any other option. Yugoslavia offered the chance to save their country. Not to take that chance pretty much guaranteed their sacrifice. All their decisions were taken to save the country.We have the benefit of hindsight. The Greeks made poor choices that guaranteed rapid military collapse of their own forces whilst inflicting minimal damage on the (German) invader. My arguments are that there was more than sufficient evidence and forewarning for the Greeks to have seen that coming at the time. It thus follows, in my opinion, that excuses and theories which present the Greek decision-making as sound, but unfortunately unsuccessful, are completely flawed. I further believe that the majority of published material on this subject is unhelpful in truly understanding what happened. The English language narratives being the most unhelpful.
I don't feel they made bad choices. They were dealt a very poor hand and they played it it to win. They understood there wouldn't be another round of cards dealt. To say the Greeks made poor choices is refusing to recognize the nature of their decisions.
Pista! Jeff
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Afternoon Jeff,
I will requote the passage you posted from the NZ Official History regarding the thoughts on and around 22nd February - but I will also include the paragraph immediate preceeding the one you put up (my bold).
The first sentence in bold clearly demonstrates that the British had decided that their lengthy, and ongoing, discussions with the Yugoslavs were not bearing fruit and that they should assume to plan without their support. Ask yourself this, are talks that are going nowhere, and have mot gone anywhere for several months, a positive sign for confidence or a negative sign for caution?
I guess out opinion differ at this point. Where you see evidence of ongoing discussions, you see credibility in the decision to remain on the Metaxas Line. I see endless discussions going no where and a major cause for concern.
Now, to address your point...
The Vermion Line, often named the Aliakmon Line, was vulnerable to a German advance through the Monastir Gap. But, see the second bold sentence above, the British had a ready contingency. Also, it highlights the British military appreciation that the Vardar could not be defended (by either the Yugoslavs or the Greeks). What was Greece's contingency if the Germans came down the Vardar?
And finally, I have mentionned the possibility of deliberate deceit by the Greeks in their negotiations with the British on and around 22 February. I'm sure you already know the details, so I won't post them just to clog the bandwidth. On the one hand, at the start of discussions, the PM Koryzis was/felt compelled to make a formal declaration that Greece would defend itself irrespective of the British position. The actual words are rather vague and can be interpreted in many ways. I am sure the way the British delegation interpreted the words was at complete odds to the Greek intended meaning. Then, "before the conference broke up in the early hours of 23 February, M. Koryzis, at Eden's request, stated formally that the Greek Government accepted with deep gratitude the offer of assistance made by the British Government, and that the military plan was completely acceptable" (from the NZ OH, my bold). That plan was for the 4 Greek divisions east of the Vardar to reposition to the Vermion Line. We know they avoided doing that at all costs. And I don't think they ever intended to. The initial declaration, I am sure, was the Greek way of saying we won't pull out at all. In effect, I believe, the entire negotiation was a sham to drag Empire troops into Greece to fill the positions that the Greek themselves couldn't and wouldn't.
I disagree. My analysis fully takes into account the Yugoslav position and the unfortunate reality that the Greeks in particular, but the British too, misinterpreted and misunderstood the importance of Salonika to the Yugoslavs; they overplayed its significance.jwsleser wrote: I feel your analysis doesn't account for all the facts bearing on this issue, specifically Yugoslavia (and therefore the issue of Thessaloniki).
There can be no doubt that both Greece and Britain were desperate for the Yugoslavs to come on board. But where you then see "there were some signs indicating problems, but I will point out none of them were conclusive", I would argue that the mere fact that Yugoslavia was rebuffing their approaches on a daily basis over several months is, in itself, the biggest sign possible that they could not be relied upon.jwsleser wrote:Regardless of what hindsight tells us, the facts clearly demonstrate that the position of Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the decisions and that the decision makers of the time felt that Yugoslavia could make a significant military contribution. I would agree that there were some signs indicating problems, but I will point out none of them were conclusive. What is clear is that Yugoslavian involvement was seen as a positive and their actions were guided by this understanding.
I will requote the passage you posted from the NZ Official History regarding the thoughts on and around 22nd February - but I will also include the paragraph immediate preceeding the one you put up (my bold).
To Greece wrote: The political appreciation at this stage was that Yugoslavia could not be counted on as an ally. Prince Paul had already declined a suggested visit by Mr Eden and the antagonism between Serb and Croat was such that if war was declared the latter would possibly support Germany. The only safe policy was to assume that Yugoslavia would remain neutral.
In that case the best policy for the Allies was to hold the Aliakmon line, which lay to the west of Salonika along the mountain barrier of Mount Olympus - Veroia - Edhessa - Kaimakchalan. The main danger would be the exposure of the left flank should the Germans invade Yugoslavia and approach the Monastir Gap, a natural avenue into northern Greece. There was every chance, however, that Yugoslavia would resist such violation of her neutrality so the military experts, remembering Serbian resistance in 1914–18 and the mountainous nature of the country, decided that the flank was reasonably safe. If the Germans did break through there would always be time to establish a line from Mount Olympus through Servia to the Greek positions in the west.
The first sentence in bold clearly demonstrates that the British had decided that their lengthy, and ongoing, discussions with the Yugoslavs were not bearing fruit and that they should assume to plan without their support. Ask yourself this, are talks that are going nowhere, and have mot gone anywhere for several months, a positive sign for confidence or a negative sign for caution?
I guess out opinion differ at this point. Where you see evidence of ongoing discussions, you see credibility in the decision to remain on the Metaxas Line. I see endless discussions going no where and a major cause for concern.
Now, to address your point...
jwsleser wrote:Note that the Aliakmon Line required Yugoslavia to successfully defend its territory.
The Vermion Line, often named the Aliakmon Line, was vulnerable to a German advance through the Monastir Gap. But, see the second bold sentence above, the British had a ready contingency. Also, it highlights the British military appreciation that the Vardar could not be defended (by either the Yugoslavs or the Greeks). What was Greece's contingency if the Germans came down the Vardar?
Nobody is denying it would be helpful if Salonika remained in Allied hands. But who was going to defend it? The Greeks were unwilling to relocate their own troops from Albania, the British refused point blank to do so, so the Greeks gazed wistfully to Belgrade for them to do it.jwsleser wrote: A thread throughout these cites is why would the danger to Salonika be an issue if the Allies had already decided to abandon Salonika? What is either inferred or stated in these and other sources is the possible impact of abandoning Thessaloniki prior to any Yugoslavian decision.
I disagree. I don't see how a sensible reposition to the Vermion Line removes options. I argue it provides options whereas remaining put on the Metaxas only has one possible outcome. And, the mistake made at the time, and seemingly continuing through historical narratives, is that Yugoslavia was making policy around the Salonika issue. It wasn't.jwsleser wrote: To abandon Thessaloniki before such time it was clear on its position was to remove options. The political impact on any Yugoslavian decision of abandoning Thessaloniki is stated above.
I disagree. Various reasons were presented to justify a move into Greece. One of the key ones was that moving into Greece would encourage Yugoslavia and Turkey to come onboard. What the British were refusing to do was sacrifice all its ME reserve in a half-hearted attempt to defend Salonika. The British threw their hat into helping Greece (partly in the hope it would encourage Yugolsvia to join in too), but they were not prepared to send Empire troops to their suicide in the Vardar Valley.jwsleser wrote: The UK wasn't ready to 'throw in the hat' to gaining Yugoslavia as part of the Allies. While the prudent military decision 'might' have been to withdraw, such a move virtually abandon's the goals of the UK policy before events had indicated they had failed. Such a move dooms Greece to the Axis.
The British mislead themselves as to the true capabilities of the Yugoslavs. Very true. But, they took political and military decisions that understood the risk involved and thus didn't pay the price. Remember, after 27 March, when Yugoslavia was now on side, the British still refused to move forward to, and over, the Vardar because of the potential risk. The Greeks, on the otherhand, took a different view and seem to have assumed, despite Papagos' concern that the Yugoslavs were not putting sufficient troops into the area, that the left flank of the Metaxas was secure.jwsleser wrote: Viewpoint of Yugoslavian Military. The Allies made a great effort to gain Yugoslavian military support. To say that it was obvious to the leaders of the time that the Yugoslavian military was completely ineffective ignores all the attempts to gain the use of that military.
I disagree. It was British military commanders in Greece that refused to move forward for fear the Yugoslavs were not up to the job.jwsleser wrote: Everyone looked at the Serbian performance in 1914-1918 as a positive indicator. While there were some concerns, none of them reached the level that the Yugoslavian military was ineffective.
Because we are both reading, and accepting, the historical details of what happened and when, I don't feel the need to post those details. Many of the quotes that you presented in you last post from the NZ and British Official Histories, I have copies of the original telegrams. We are not disagree in what was said, done or occured - we have a different understanding of what it meant and whether it 'justified' certain decision-making.jwsleser wrote: Again I will note that within all my posts I have cited primary sources, not conclusions. My analysis/opinion accounts for all these facts. I don't try to minimize them or ignore them.
And that is a key point of difference between you and I. In my opinion, Yugoslavia did not offer a chance to save Greece. Moreover, I see much of the argument put forward to support the view you hold is post-war narratives attempting to shift blame as much as possible: 'if only Yugoslavia had done X, Y and Z, Greece would have been saved!'. Yugoslavia is a handy scape-goat.jwsleser wrote: The Greeks were making decisions to try and save their country. They were prepared to sacrifice their country if there wasn't any other option. Yugoslavia offered the chance to save their country. Not to take that chance pretty much guaranteed their sacrifice. All their decisions were taken to save the country. (My bold)
And, from my side, they were dealt a very poor hand and irresponsibly played it in a way that guaranteed defeat in quick order - 3 days! They understood there wouldn't be another round of cards dealt, and thus didn't really make any effort to take the options that may have made a difference. To say the Greeks made poor choices is a reflection of the quality of their choices.jwsleser wrote: I don't feel they made bad choices. They were dealt a very poor hand and they played it it to win. They understood there wouldn't be another round of cards dealt. To say the Greeks made poor choices is refusing to recognize the nature of their decisions.
And finally, I have mentionned the possibility of deliberate deceit by the Greeks in their negotiations with the British on and around 22 February. I'm sure you already know the details, so I won't post them just to clog the bandwidth. On the one hand, at the start of discussions, the PM Koryzis was/felt compelled to make a formal declaration that Greece would defend itself irrespective of the British position. The actual words are rather vague and can be interpreted in many ways. I am sure the way the British delegation interpreted the words was at complete odds to the Greek intended meaning. Then, "before the conference broke up in the early hours of 23 February, M. Koryzis, at Eden's request, stated formally that the Greek Government accepted with deep gratitude the offer of assistance made by the British Government, and that the military plan was completely acceptable" (from the NZ OH, my bold). That plan was for the 4 Greek divisions east of the Vardar to reposition to the Vermion Line. We know they avoided doing that at all costs. And I don't think they ever intended to. The initial declaration, I am sure, was the Greek way of saying we won't pull out at all. In effect, I believe, the entire negotiation was a sham to drag Empire troops into Greece to fill the positions that the Greek themselves couldn't and wouldn't.
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Last one today Jeff,
I think this post sums up why I have such deep misunderstanding of the logic and credibility underpinning the Greek decision-making.
You kindly posted earlier the following...
But consider these words, "I purposed that the Yugoslav government should be informed of the decisions we were prepared to take depending on the policy they intended to adopt." In effect, he's making it known to the Yugoslavs: if you're in, we fight together at the frontier; if you're out, we look after ourselves by withdrawing to.....
Now try to put yourself into his shoes at that time. You have 60,000+ troops in positions you consider "inadviseable" and are seeking "urgent" information due to any move needing "to be carried out in good time."
How long do you wait for the Yugoslavs to answer?
How long do you wait before you grasp the reality that the Yugoslavs do not see the Salonika question as pressing or as important as you presume they do?
How long do you need to understand the risks inherent in your indecision and inaction?
Thank you Jeff for helping me understand the logic in what Papagos wrote. However, it just seems to make choices made even more unsound and even more incoherent. Or, and it's looking ever increasingly viable, Papagos was rewriting his history in a more favourable light. A flaw that seems to afflict just about every autobiographical narrative ever written.
I think this post sums up why I have such deep misunderstanding of the logic and credibility underpinning the Greek decision-making.
You kindly posted earlier the following...
You will notice that Papagos claims that it was his analysis (not the British) that standing on the Metaxas Line was "inadviseable" and he (not the British) who recommended that, "the rest of the Greek divisions there should be withdrawn to the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus position." He also recognises the political aspect of vacating the territory and highlights the need for that withdraw "to be carried out in good time." and impresses on the British to "send an urgent code message". I have never grasped the logic as to why he would then want to wait, indefinitely, for the Yugoslav position to be confirmed. You have put forward the argument that, if Greece withdraws west of the Vardar, it will influence the Yugoslav decision negatively. If I understand your argument correctly, what you're saying is that the Greeks chose to stay in that vulnerable position in the hope that Yugoslavia would come up with a positive response. I see the logic in that. Thank you.jwsleser wrote:FM Papagos discusses the 22 February meeting on pages 322-325 in the English translation of his book (The Battle of Greece 1940-1941 Athens 1949). Here he states:
After reviewing the available information regarding the general military situation in the Balkans, I went on to say that, on the assumption that Yugoslavia would remain neutral and would not allow the passage of German troops through her territory, I had arrived at the conclusion that, given the small means at our disposal, the defence of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace was not advisable. I added that only sufficient forces should be left there to man the fortifications, for the purpose of delaying the advance of the enemy. The rest of the Greek divisions there should be withdrawn to the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus position, not withstanding the fact that a withdrawal, to a point far removed form the Bulgarian front, of troops recruited entirely locally, so that hence to them the step entailed the abandonment of their homes to the enemy, was bound to affect the morale of the men. The British reinforcements, as they arrived in Greece, would also be moved up to positions on the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus line.
Further I stated that the removal of the war material and supplies for Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, together with the transfer of the Greek forces there to the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus line, pending the arrival of the British troops, would take at least 20 days. Consequently the movement of material and men would have to be carried out in good time, so as to avoid the danger of the enemy attack finding us still engaged in this operation.
I insisted, however, that before taking such a grave decision as would involve the evacuation of the whole region to the east of the Axios (Vardar) and the abandonment of this part of our national territory, the attitude of Yugoslavia should first be be completely clarified, and I purposed that the Yugoslav government should be informed of the decisions we were prepared to take depending on the policy they intended to adopt.
This suggestion of mine was accepted, and it was decided that the British Foreign Secretary should send an urgent code message to the British Minister in Belgrade. Depending on the nature of the reply the order for evacuation and withdrawal would be issued or not, as the case may be. This was agreed upon by all, and the next day Mr. Eden, General Dill, and General Wavell left for Ankara. They were to pass through Athens again on their way back.
During the period with intervened between the Tatoi Conference of 22nd February and the return of Mr. Eden and generals Dill and Wavell on the evening of 2nd March, I repeatedly enquired of Maj-Gen. Heywood, who was the liaison officer of the Imperial General Staff with Greek General Headquarters, whether any reply had been received for the British Minister in Belgrade to the British Foreign Secretary’s urgent cable. On each occasion I was assured by Maj-Gen. Heywood that no such reply had been received. I was thus unable to reach a conclusion for which I lacked the necessary data. I could not take such a decision nor indeed was it for me to do so when the necessary basis for taking it, which was within the sole competence of those in charge of the political side, had not been given me.
But consider these words, "I purposed that the Yugoslav government should be informed of the decisions we were prepared to take depending on the policy they intended to adopt." In effect, he's making it known to the Yugoslavs: if you're in, we fight together at the frontier; if you're out, we look after ourselves by withdrawing to.....
Now try to put yourself into his shoes at that time. You have 60,000+ troops in positions you consider "inadviseable" and are seeking "urgent" information due to any move needing "to be carried out in good time."
How long do you wait for the Yugoslavs to answer?
How long do you wait before you grasp the reality that the Yugoslavs do not see the Salonika question as pressing or as important as you presume they do?
How long do you need to understand the risks inherent in your indecision and inaction?
Thank you Jeff for helping me understand the logic in what Papagos wrote. However, it just seems to make choices made even more unsound and even more incoherent. Or, and it's looking ever increasingly viable, Papagos was rewriting his history in a more favourable light. A flaw that seems to afflict just about every autobiographical narrative ever written.
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Mark
I am glad the discussion help.
Pista! Jeff
I am glad the discussion help.
Pista! Jeff
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
-
Tom from Cornwall
- Member
- Posts: 3236
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- Location: UK
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Jeff, Mark,
I've been following your posts with interest. Thanks for raising some very good points - I'm currently transcribing the minutes from the 22 Feb meetings and will post them here when I'm done.
Jeff,
The quote from Papagos's book seems to refer to the "military" conversations, does he make that clear?
Regards
Tom
I've been following your posts with interest. Thanks for raising some very good points - I'm currently transcribing the minutes from the 22 Feb meetings and will post them here when I'm done.
Jeff,
The quote from Papagos's book seems to refer to the "military" conversations, does he make that clear?
Regards
Tom
-
Tom from Cornwall
- Member
- Posts: 3236
- Joined: 01 May 2006, 20:52
- Location: UK
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Mark, Jeff,
Just to whet your appetites though:
Tom
Just to whet your appetites though:
RegardsRecord of Meeting of the British and Greek Military Representatives, held at
Royal Palace at Tatoi, February 22, 1941
5. General Papagos realised the extreme importance of time, which made it impossible to wait for Yugoslavia and Turkey to declare themselves. He had therefore asked his Government for permission to begin the withdrawal as soon as possible, and, in any case, before a German move made the withdrawal look like a retreat. It could be made to appear that the Greek troops were being sent to reinforce the Albanian front. Troops would be withdrawn first from rear areas in Macedonia, then (if agreed with Turkey) from Thrace, and lastly from the frontier of Macedonia.
The time required to withdraw the troops from Thrace and Macedonia was 20 days.
Tom
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Hello Tom,Tom from Cornwall wrote:Mark, Jeff,
Just to whet your appetites though:
Just popped in to post some more thoughts on the meeting of the 22nd February and decided it should wait. Looking forward to the rest of your post. The last time I read the minutes was when digital cameras were just a dream and my pencil scribbled notes are buried deep in storgae elsewhere.
However, while I'm waiting, I thought these may be of interest...
I've also found a telegram from Belgrade dated 23 February that lays out exactly the military support that the Greeks want. It was so 'perfect' (in respect of the Greek requirments) and the non-official way in which it was come by, that it was rejected by the Chiefs of Staff in London as a put up job.
PS. I'm in the process of uploading a load more docs for you. Stand by for incoming email.
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Tom
Thanks for the new material. I am looking forward to seeing the other papers you have found.
Mark
Thanks you for the additional documents.
If you don’t understand what this discussion is about, why are you arguing?
I know how it horribly went wrong. Without getting a couple of breaks, it was bound to go horribly wrong. You have repeatedly stated it could ONLY go horribly wrong.
What I have been discussing is whether the Greek decisions were rooted in a realistic understanding of the situation or whether they were based on:
To recap (nothing new)
The breaks the Greeks needed to survive had nothing to do with which defensive position they occupied. The breaks the Greeks needed were the ones they played for. Their options to get out of the situation alive were:
1. Try to avoid being attacked. Everything they did was initially focused on this option. I am sorry that the Greeks were unaware that the die was cast in Nov 1940.
2. Defeat the Italians. This was the only real Greek-only military solution to the problem. If the Greeks could get the Italians out of Albania, then all that combat power would be able to face the Germans. It wasn’t until the end of the Greek February offensive that they knew they couldn’t achieve this by themselves.
3. Form a Balkans Alliance. The other military option that might get out of the situation alive. Once again an option they consistently tried to achieve. Sorry they didn’t realize that Yugoslavia would collapse in a few days.
Based on these three options, the Greeks decided:
-Only accept outside assistance if it could truly impact the outcome.
-Don’t withdraw until they had to. Withdrawing in Albania doesn’t make it easier to defeat the Italians, but makes it easier for Italy to attack Greece. Withdrawing from the eastern lands might trigger the Bulgarian/Germany attack. Withdrawing might prevent the Balkan alliance.
In all your pages of rationalization, the one fact you never mention and that the Greeks definitively knew was - The UK couldn’t offer the level of military support required to make Allied outside support a viable option.
So the only way to blame Papagos is to argue that he should have known that Yugoslavia (Balkan alliance) wasn’t a viable option. I have presented that everyone at the time saw Yugoslavia as a valid option. The UK argument for the Aliakmon Line wasn’t that the Yugoslavians were completely incompetent and shouldn’t be considered at all. No, their argument was time was against us and we need to decide. That is a completely different rational and doesn’t come anywhere close to saying Yugoslavia is out of the picture.
Hindsight is not of value in this discussion. Papagos didn't have a time machine to check his judgement. While you have stated he should have know better, I have demonstrated using primary sources that both Papagos and the British agreed that the Yugoslavian alliance was of value and was the better solution to the problem.
Pista! Jeff
P.S. I guess I need to check out the books I had already returned to the library.
Thanks for the new material. I am looking forward to seeing the other papers you have found.
Mark
Thanks you for the additional documents.
While this thread started as a fairly decent exploration of options/possibilities, after the first page it has ONLY been about blame (not by my doing to be clear). Read your paragraph above. It itself drips with blame. Not only did the Greeks choose to ignore doing the right thing, but according to you, they INTENTIONALLY chose to ignore it. They should have known better.My arguments are not designed to apportion blame, but to understand how it all went so horribly wrong. I believe the end result was inevitable due to the mismatch in military capabilities. I do not believe the manner of the result was inevitable and, instead of a humiliating rout of the Greek Army in effectively three days with minimal damage imposed upon the Germans, I believe the Greek Army could have inflicted significant damage on the Germans whilst holding the Italians. Greece has several natural features that offer significant advantages to the defender. This advantage was not exploited by the Greeks at all. In fact, they chose, effectively, to ignore them.
If you don’t understand what this discussion is about, why are you arguing?
I know how it horribly went wrong. Without getting a couple of breaks, it was bound to go horribly wrong. You have repeatedly stated it could ONLY go horribly wrong.
What I have been discussing is whether the Greek decisions were rooted in a realistic understanding of the situation or whether they were based on:
There are so many more of your statements I could copy.-That, to me, sounds like more historical revisionism which appears prolific in his [Pagaos] and others' writings on the matter.
-Deluded and wishful thinking in my opinion.
-Looking at your post, it seems Papagos in particular was quite ignorant of the threat against Yugolsavia.
-Papagos is naive or deluded or deliberately deceitful in thinking.
-based upon a poor understanding of what Yugoslavia brought to the table, on 27 March.
-Yugoslavia did not provide, and was NEVER in a position to provide, the forces required to allow the Greeks to sit comfortably on the Metaxas Line.
-The Greeks seem to have adopted a position of supreme confidence in the Yugoslavs. A confidence that clearly (we have hindsight) was not merited.
-The "rapid collapse of Yugoslavia that makes it near 100%" is a valid comment, but only comes into play because the Greeks chose to rely on the Yugoslavs to be an proactive ally and be able to stand firm. Greek mistake.
To recap (nothing new)
The breaks the Greeks needed to survive had nothing to do with which defensive position they occupied. The breaks the Greeks needed were the ones they played for. Their options to get out of the situation alive were:
1. Try to avoid being attacked. Everything they did was initially focused on this option. I am sorry that the Greeks were unaware that the die was cast in Nov 1940.
2. Defeat the Italians. This was the only real Greek-only military solution to the problem. If the Greeks could get the Italians out of Albania, then all that combat power would be able to face the Germans. It wasn’t until the end of the Greek February offensive that they knew they couldn’t achieve this by themselves.
3. Form a Balkans Alliance. The other military option that might get out of the situation alive. Once again an option they consistently tried to achieve. Sorry they didn’t realize that Yugoslavia would collapse in a few days.
Based on these three options, the Greeks decided:
-Only accept outside assistance if it could truly impact the outcome.
-Don’t withdraw until they had to. Withdrawing in Albania doesn’t make it easier to defeat the Italians, but makes it easier for Italy to attack Greece. Withdrawing from the eastern lands might trigger the Bulgarian/Germany attack. Withdrawing might prevent the Balkan alliance.
In all your pages of rationalization, the one fact you never mention and that the Greeks definitively knew was - The UK couldn’t offer the level of military support required to make Allied outside support a viable option.
So the only way to blame Papagos is to argue that he should have known that Yugoslavia (Balkan alliance) wasn’t a viable option. I have presented that everyone at the time saw Yugoslavia as a valid option. The UK argument for the Aliakmon Line wasn’t that the Yugoslavians were completely incompetent and shouldn’t be considered at all. No, their argument was time was against us and we need to decide. That is a completely different rational and doesn’t come anywhere close to saying Yugoslavia is out of the picture.
Hindsight is not of value in this discussion. Papagos didn't have a time machine to check his judgement. While you have stated he should have know better, I have demonstrated using primary sources that both Papagos and the British agreed that the Yugoslavian alliance was of value and was the better solution to the problem.
Pista! Jeff
P.S. I guess I need to check out the books I had already returned to the library.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Mark
First I didn't presume. If you have sources that challenge my cites, then challenge them. Until then, they did.
Second, the Greeks didn't contact the Yugoslavians, the British did. What did they actually communicate? Did they actually provide full discourse of the Anglo-Greek plans?
Pista! Jeff
Sadly you left off the lead in to the quote...You will notice that Papagos claims that it was his analysis (not the British) that standing on the Metaxas Line was "inadviseable" and he (not the British) who recommended that, "the rest of the Greek divisions there should be withdrawn to the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus position."
So he made the comment in relation to an assumption that had not been demonstrated as valid.After reviewing the available information regarding the general military situation in the Balkans, I went on to say that, on the assumption that Yugoslavia would remain neutral and would not allow the passage of German troops through her territory, I had arrived at the conclusion that,...
So where did the Greeks keep their time machine?Now, the Greek analysis seemed to equate Yugoslav diplomatic position to military capability. Thus, if the Yugoslavs are on 'our' side, the Germans can't come through South Serbia and thus our 'northern' front is secure. This leads to Option A and the recommendation that the Metaxas Line can be held as there is not threat to their left flank. This is flawed as proven by history.
How soon do you abandon your only real chance to survive?How long do you wait for the Yugoslavs to answer?
What a twisted question.How long do you wait before you grasp the reality that the Yugoslavs do not see the Salonika question as pressing or as important as you presume they do?
First I didn't presume. If you have sources that challenge my cites, then challenge them. Until then, they did.
Second, the Greeks didn't contact the Yugoslavians, the British did. What did they actually communicate? Did they actually provide full discourse of the Anglo-Greek plans?
How soon do you wait before you give up your last real option?How long do you need to understand the risks inherent in your indecision and inaction?
What was that you said about not trying to place blame?Thank you Jeff for helping me understand the logic in what Papagos wrote. However, it just seems to make choices made even more unsound and even more incoherent. Or, and it's looking ever increasingly viable, Papagos was rewriting his history in a more favourable light.
Pista! Jeff
Last edited by jwsleser on 07 Feb 2016, 18:53, edited 1 time in total.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
I noticed that Mark is now using 8 Feb instead of 22-23 Feb as the starting point of Greek stupidity.
P
There wasn’t a need to make a decision at that time and many reasons not to.
-Germany wasn't directly threatening Greece.
-While Yugoslavia was currently neutral, the desire was to gain her on the Allied side. To abandon Thessaloniki would negatively impact that effort.
-Didn’t want to encourage hostile Bulgarian and/or German action.
-The British wanted to use the airfields in the Thessaloniki area.
-Impact on Greek morale.
I had assumed that anyone who had studied these events would be aware of them. No reason to make the decision at that time. Do I need to post the cites?
Pista! Jeff
P
I had been meaning to come back to this point, so I will do it now.oint 1.
As of 8 Feb, Yugoslavia was not ally; it was at that time neutral but heading towards joining the Axis. If the Greek military was following its own planning assumptions based upon the realities occuring, they should have been implementing option B, but they weren't.
There wasn’t a need to make a decision at that time and many reasons not to.
-Germany wasn't directly threatening Greece.
-While Yugoslavia was currently neutral, the desire was to gain her on the Allied side. To abandon Thessaloniki would negatively impact that effort.
-Didn’t want to encourage hostile Bulgarian and/or German action.
-The British wanted to use the airfields in the Thessaloniki area.
-Impact on Greek morale.
I had assumed that anyone who had studied these events would be aware of them. No reason to make the decision at that time. Do I need to post the cites?
Pista! Jeff
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
Tom
While reviewing this thread, I came across this question.
None of my sources mentions a change by Koryzis. The diplomatic notes of 18 January and 8 February to the British government both clearly state German entry into Bulgaria. As Koryzis wasn’t appointed until 29 January, I am not sure whether he had contact with any British government representatives until the meetings that generated the 8 February note. I assume the British sources state he did.
Sorry for not answering this sooner.
Pista! Jeff
While reviewing this thread, I came across this question.
I returned the copy of Cruickshank that I had been using to the library, so I can’t check see exactly what bits he offers on this.In fact, Cruickshank (Greece 1940-1941) suggests that Metaxas had formally assured the British that if the Germans crossed the Danube he would ask for British support, whereas initially Koryzis suggested that only after the Germans had invaded Greece itself would he ask for help. Cruickshank merely says that when this discrepancy was pointed out to Papagos and Koryzis in early February they reverted to Metaxas' earlier position. His references are both British, does anyone have a Greek reference that matches this?
None of my sources mentions a change by Koryzis. The diplomatic notes of 18 January and 8 February to the British government both clearly state German entry into Bulgaria. As Koryzis wasn’t appointed until 29 January, I am not sure whether he had contact with any British government representatives until the meetings that generated the 8 February note. I assume the British sources state he did.
Sorry for not answering this sooner.
Pista! Jeff
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941
OK,
Here are the British minutes of the first meeting on 22nd Feb 41 (PREM3/294/1):
Regards
Tom
Here are the British minutes of the first meeting on 22nd Feb 41 (PREM3/294/1):
More to follow as I get them done.(Most Secret)
ANNEX 3
ANGLO-GREEK CONVERSATIONS (RECORD No. 1)
First Anglo-Greek Plenary Meeting held at 5.30 P.M., February 22, 1941, at the
Tatoi Palace.
Present:
His Majesty the King of the Hellenes. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
M. A. Koryzis, President of the Council. Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
General A. Papagos, Commander-in-Chief. Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.
M. Leon Melas, Minister Plenipotentiary, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Middle East.
M. Gaffos, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Captain Dick, representing Commander-
(for part of the discussion) in-Chief, Mediterranean.
Colonel Kitrilakis, General Staff (for part of His Majesty’s Minister at Athens.
the discussion) Major-General Heywood, who acted as
interpreter.
Mr. Pierson Dixon, Foreign Office.
The Secretary of State began by expressing the sympathy felt by himself, his colleagues present at the meeting and His Majesty’s Government in the loss Greece suffered in the death of General Metaxas. The President of the Council thanked Mr. Eden.
Situation in the Balkans and German intentions.
The Secretary of State proceeded to give an account of the situation in the Balkans as it appeared to His Majesty’s Government. Early last week the situation had been reviewed in London. In the light of the information available to us two main points emerged:
(1) The Germans had progressed far in the assembling of a striking force in Roumania. This, we believed, now consisted of at least 23 divisions, three of which were armoured and two motorised, together with from 400 to 500 aircraft.
(2) Secondly, German infiltration into Bulgaria had gone far. Technicians and others had been introduced into the country in plain clothes and the Germans were busy establishing their air organisation on Bulgarian aerodromes. Material for bridging the Danube was being rapidly assembled and, if the reports just received proved to be correct, it appeared that the Germans were likely to cross the Danube at any moment now.
The motives behind these German moves were in the first place to subdue Greece and to subject her completely to German will and authority, and in the second place to immobilise Turkey. By the extension of their power over the Balkans the Germans sought to strike a decisive blow at the British position in the Near East.
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Having occupied Bulgaria, the Germans might employ one of two methods in order to subdue Greece. They might attack directly or they might attempt to induce the Greeks to accept terms of peace with Italy. If the Greeks allowed themselves to be deluded into acceptance, a German occupation of the country on the Rumanian model would follow. The Secretary of State felt confident that the Greeks would not allow themselves to be duped by such German practices.
The President of the Council intervened to say that the second alternative was excluded, since Greece was determined not to permit the occupation of her territory by Germany without resistance.
British offer of help to Greece.
Continuing, the Secretary of State said that the Greek Government, on the 8th February, had appealed to His Majesty’s Government for help and counsel, and His Majesty’s Government had considered what they should do. The question had been examined in the War Cabinet and by the Chiefs of Staff in London, and in Cairo with the three Commanders-in-Chief. The War Cabinet had unanimously reached the conclusion, with which the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East were in full agreement, that we ought to offer the maximum possible help to Greece at the earliest possible moment.
The victories won by the three services in Africa had freed forces which were not available a little while ago. These forces would, we believed, if we could agree together with the Greeks on a good plan for their use, give us a fair chance of halting a German invasion of Greece. If this chance was to be realised there was not a day or an hour to lose. We must move with speed and in the utmost secrecy. It was the need for secrecy which had led us to ask the Greeks to receive us in this manner.
The Secretary of State proceeded to give an indication of the help we should be able to offer Greece.
Naval Support
In the first place it would be a pre-requisite that we should be certain of being able to ensure the security of our lines of communication and of the lines of supply for the Greek forces and our own. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was confident that the Royal Navy could ensure a reasonable degree of safety for the passage of convoys against attack both from surface craft and submarines and at the same time continue to protect the west coast of Greece. A heavy additional strain on the Royal Navy would be imposed, but Admiral Cunningham was confident that he could meet it.
Army Forces.
Secondly, the Secretary of State gave a summary of the Army Forces we could send. These forces would be sent in three sections:-
(i) One Division.
One Armoured Brigade Group.
Force Troops including two medium artillery regiments and some A.A. guns.
(ii) One Division.
One Polish infantry brigade group.
(iii) One Division and, if required, one armoured brigade group.
The total strength of the British forces in Greece would then be:-
100,000 men.
240 field guns.
202 anti-tank guns.
32 medium guns.
192 light and heavy anti-aircraft guns.
142 tanks.
In reply to questions by the Greek representatives, the Secretary of State said that we calculated that at worst the disembarkation in Greece on men and material contained in the first contingent would be completed by the thirtieth day after the decision to send the forces. The disembarkation of the second and third contingents would be completed at intervals of three weeks. We had already started assembling shipping and the Greek representatives were told for their confidential information that this was only made possible by holding back ships of convoys now in the Middle East and which otherwise would be returning to
22
England. It was calculated that 53 ships would be needed for the transport of the whole force.
As regards the command of the British force, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, had decided to recommend General Wilson, our Commander in the recent victories over the Italians in Libya. The Greek representative showed evident pleasure at this information.
Air Forces
Thirdly, the Secretary of State gave an account of the air situation under the headings of the existing situation and of the air forces to come.
The existing forces consisted on one Hurricane Squadron, two Gladiator Squadrons, four Blenheim Squadrons, and one night bomber squadron on a temporary basis for use during moon periods.
At the end of February and early in March we could send one Blenheim Squadron; during March we could re-equip the two Gladiator Squadrons with Hurricanes and at the end of March add two more Blenheim Squadrons, and possibly two fighter squadrons dependent on the supply of fighters and our commitments elsewhere.
Further a total of 20 night bombers could be operated from the Athens area at short notice. In addition, the Greeks were being supplied with Gladiators and Blenheim I’s, and Greek pilots were receiving instruction in Iraq.
We suggested that the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief should discuss with the Greeks the allotment of Tomahawks or Hurricanes to the Greek Air Force.
Summing up, the Secretary of State said that the foregoing represented a frank exposé of the position as we saw it; we could not look beyond a certain period; it was impossible to foretell how the general situation would develop or what our resources in the future would be. What we were offering was the limit of what we could do at present. The troops were well equipped and well trained and should acquit themselves well.
The Chief of the Imperial Staff stated that the details would, of course, have to be worked out between the two General Staffs if the Greeks accepted our offer.
Consideration in particular would have to be given to the questions of air protection and disembarkation. In the British view, all movements should be kept as secret as possible and the forces should be sent, to begin with, in small instalments, the rate to be increased later. The choice of ports of disembarkation would depend on the sectors which it was decided that the British should hold. It should be borne in mind that we had not pack animals.
Greek Point of View.
The President of the Council said that Greece was determined to defend herself against attack from all quarters. Therefore, any aid that Great Britain could give her was warmly welcomed. He must, however, draw the attention of His Majesty’s Government to the danger of precipitating a German attack. He thought it essential in the first place to consider whether the forces which Greece could make available and the forces which Great Britain could provide would, taking into account the dubious attitude of Yugoslavia and Turkey, be sufficient to provide effect assistance to Greece against German attack. M. Koryzis emphasised that he raised this point as a purely military and not as a political question, and suggested that the British and Greek military representatives should discuss the question.
The President of the Council asked for our view on the probable attitude of Yugoslavia and Turkey and of the contribution they might be expected to make towards resisting a German attack in the Balkans.
The Secretary of State agreed that the question raised by the President of the Council involved military issues which needed discussion between the two General Staffs. Political issues also were involved. The President of the Council had asked about the attitude of Yugoslavia and Turkey. Frankly, we did not know what they were likely to do. During our forthcoming visit to Angora we could hope to obtain an indication of the Turkish attitude. It would be necessary to explain to the Turks that our help to Greece would mean that we could not give Turkey the military aid for which she no doubt looked to us. We could, however, hope that Turkey would understand that the best way in which we could help Turkey was by helping Greece.
23
The Secretary of State emphasised that it was important that we and the Greeks should take our decisions independently of Turkey and Yugoslavia, since if we waited to find out what Turkey and Yugoslavia would do it might be too late to organise an effective resistance to a German attack on Greece.
The President of the Council’s statement, that action which might provoke Germany should be avoided, meant, if followed to its logical conclusion, that we must wait to send help until Greece was actually attacked. The British view was that action must be taken at once, or it would be too late to send effective assistance. He wished to obtain a decision in principle whether the British forces were to come or not, since until this decision had been taken no agreed plans could be made and with each day that passed the difficulties and dangers increased.
The President of the Council stated that his view remained that it was of importance as a preliminary to establish whether the Greek forces, in conjunction with the British forces, would be sufficient to constitute an effective resistance to a German attack. He therefore reiterated his suggestion that the military aspect of the question should be briefly discussed between the British and Greek military representatives. The British representatives agreed, and the meeting adjourned in order to enable the military representatives to discuss accordingly. (See Record No.2.)
Cairo, February 23, 1941.
Regards
Tom