Much ado has been made about Clark's insistence on capturing Rome rather than pushing towards Valmotone, thereby cutting route 6 and the escape of German 10th army.
My question is did the Allies have the strength to make this move?
Would it have really cut off 10th army?
US VI Corp pushes to route 6
US VI Corp pushes to route 6
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb
~Babylonian Proverb
Re: US VI Corp pushes to route 6
The verdict of other allied and axis commanders was - 'Yes, it would have been better for the allies to concentrate on destroying the German 10th army than occupying Rome.'
Whether the allies had the expertise to close the pocket is a different matter. The allies were not very good at this part of the pursuit and the Germans had become experts at evading capture. Indeed the operations in June 1944 south of Rome are exhibit #1 for this case.
Whether the allies had the expertise to close the pocket is a different matter. The allies were not very good at this part of the pursuit and the Germans had become experts at evading capture. Indeed the operations in June 1944 south of Rome are exhibit #1 for this case.
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Carl Schwamberger
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Re: US VI Corp pushes to route 6
The problem here is closing route 6 does not create pocket. At Frosione a second highway diverges directly north & runs through Subiaco & then to Arsoli where it connects to the east west Route 5. This was the primary retreat route of the XIV Pz Corps.
Further east Route 82 leads north from Sara to Avezzano & connects to Route 5. The LI Mountain Corpsused that road as its reatreat avenue.
North from Frosinone a rugged spur of mountains seperates the valley route 6 lay in from the valley the road was in. Yet another higher range seperated that from Rout 82. neither of those ranges had any paved roads connecting through them & little in the way of unpaved roads. To cut all three routes the US VI Corps alone would have to cross two rugged massifs covering over fifty kilometers with no paved roads along the route of advance. Meanwhile the six divisions of VI Corps must cover eighty kilometers on each flank extending back to its supply base on the coast. Or 160 kilometers of frontage. The '5th Army' is not rellevant at this date as US II Corps, the French Expeditionary Corps, and the British 8th Army were still fussing with German rear guards in the Arrunci Mountains, the Liri Valley, & the mountains NE of the Liri Valley.
The divisions of the 10th Army that used Route 6 had already passed 40 to 50% of their total strength & most of their support units to the Caesar Line. & as the VI Corps came into artillery range of Route 6 a portion of the remainder was diverted at Frosione to the central alternate route. Cutting Route 6 would have at best inconvienced a quarter of the 10th Army & delayed their retreat a few days while they redircted.
Jacksons Battle for Italy has a good illustration (41) of the units, positions and routes. he also has in the text a useful account of the German retreat & the daily positions of some key units. Atkinson In the Battle for Italy addresses the frustraton of Truscotts staff, but it also indicates how little of the 10th Army that actually was endangered when the decision was made.
One of the other factors here is Kesselring had anticipated the need to retreat as early as March & prepared. that included withdrawing any support units practical during April and May, before the Allied offensive threatened the German position. 10th Armys retreat was underway long before the Allied attack started.
Further east Route 82 leads north from Sara to Avezzano & connects to Route 5. The LI Mountain Corpsused that road as its reatreat avenue.
North from Frosinone a rugged spur of mountains seperates the valley route 6 lay in from the valley the road was in. Yet another higher range seperated that from Rout 82. neither of those ranges had any paved roads connecting through them & little in the way of unpaved roads. To cut all three routes the US VI Corps alone would have to cross two rugged massifs covering over fifty kilometers with no paved roads along the route of advance. Meanwhile the six divisions of VI Corps must cover eighty kilometers on each flank extending back to its supply base on the coast. Or 160 kilometers of frontage. The '5th Army' is not rellevant at this date as US II Corps, the French Expeditionary Corps, and the British 8th Army were still fussing with German rear guards in the Arrunci Mountains, the Liri Valley, & the mountains NE of the Liri Valley.
The divisions of the 10th Army that used Route 6 had already passed 40 to 50% of their total strength & most of their support units to the Caesar Line. & as the VI Corps came into artillery range of Route 6 a portion of the remainder was diverted at Frosione to the central alternate route. Cutting Route 6 would have at best inconvienced a quarter of the 10th Army & delayed their retreat a few days while they redircted.
Jacksons Battle for Italy has a good illustration (41) of the units, positions and routes. he also has in the text a useful account of the German retreat & the daily positions of some key units. Atkinson In the Battle for Italy addresses the frustraton of Truscotts staff, but it also indicates how little of the 10th Army that actually was endangered when the decision was made.
One of the other factors here is Kesselring had anticipated the need to retreat as early as March & prepared. that included withdrawing any support units practical during April and May, before the Allied offensive threatened the German position. 10th Armys retreat was underway long before the Allied attack started.
Re: US VI Corp pushes to route 6
The key issue was one of mentality. Clark wanted to capture Rome and then worry about destroying the rest of the Germans. Alexander wanted the Germans destroyed first.