Questions about Gazala

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wallet
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Questions about Gazala

#1

Post by wallet » 18 Mar 2016, 09:48

I have a few questions about the Battle of Gazala that I am unable to figure out through my own research:

1. The battle is frequent cited as an example of Rommel's brilliance, British incompetence or both, but I'm not really seeing it. Rommel's battle plan wasn't very exotic, just fake an attack in the center and then flank the British line. How is that any different from what the US/UK did to Iraq in the first Gulf War? I mean, obviously the Germans executed it really well but I don't see any brilliance.

2. As for the subject of British incompetence, they didn't do anything wrong, operationally speaking, did they? They just got beat. The line held and they counter attacked. The counter attack failed not because there was anything wrong with the British strategy or command and control but because they hadn't yet learned how to deal with German anti tank defenses. What were the British "supposed" to have done that would have got them a better result beyond knowing how to neutralize anti tank screens?

3. This is a little different than the other questions but was the Battle of Gazala the most equal battle in terms of troops, equipment, air power and organization of the war? In 1940 France, the allies were disorganized and the Luftwaffe had air superiority and after after Gazala the Allies always had numerical and material superiority over the Germans. It seems like in Gazala there was real parity between the sides which would seem to give evidence that the Wehrmacht was just straight up better than the British in the field with the Allies not really learning how to properly execute tank warfare until late 42. This is an interesting subject because while there is no question the Wehrmacht was superior to the Soviets all the way through the war, ultimately losing only because they were overwhelmed*, I am skeptical that the Germans were in any way superior to the US/UK armies after the allies learned how to fight with tanks.


*What I mean is, everybody knows 1 Israeli division has more combat power than an equally equipped Egyptian division, but 2 Egyptian divisions would be able to overwhelm an Israeli division.

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jwsleser
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Re: Questions about Gazala

#2

Post by jwsleser » 01 Apr 2016, 00:59

To answer your question.

1. The original plan was pretty much predicable (and was predicted). The brilliance part is more seen as Rommel's ability to improvise once his original plan goes off track. He did a much better job of reading the changes in the battle and making the quick decisions needed to salvage the situation. He decided to transition to the tactical defense in the middle of his offense to create a situation that would allow him to regain the initiative. That is something few generals in history were able to successfully pull off.

2. The UK leadership responded slowly to the changing situation. Once they identified the decisive Axis maneuver (the southern hook), they didn't focus overwhelming combat power against it. The result was the piecemeal commitment of forces that were forced to either attack or defend in isolation. The actions against the 'Cauldron' were a series of unsupported attacks going in at different times and places. Too many UK units were left in place to fight a fixed battle rather than reacting to the Axis moves.

3. This has been discussed in various forums over the years. I know that some (including me) would disagree about the Soviets in 44 and 45, who truly demonstrated a high level of operational excellence in those years. The debate of which armies were tactically better over the years will always be a 'hot topic'. :wink:

Pista! Jeff
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Aber
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Re: Questions about Gazala

#3

Post by Aber » 01 Apr 2016, 08:31

wallet wrote:
2. As for the subject of British incompetence, they didn't do anything wrong, operationally speaking, did they?
Any battle where the HQ of an armoured division fails to respond to recce reports and the division commander gets captured has to rate fairly highly for incompetence.

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Attrition
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Re: Questions about Gazala

#4

Post by Attrition » 18 Apr 2016, 14:58

The side which took the initiative won, same as in Crusader, they're mirrors of each other. Until Operation Aberdeen, the Italo-Germans were beaten, which is why the British put more effort into planning the pursuit than finishing the Axis off.

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ClintHardware
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Re: Questions about Gazala

#5

Post by ClintHardware » 05 May 2016, 19:08

Gazala is supposed to have been a disaster but a measure of Axis success is to what extent they managed to eliminate the British and Commonwealth force in the sense of leaving them in a combat state where they could not move back out of harms way, reform and continue fighting. In addition the loss of Tobruk is given as a great success but the underlying intention weeks before was not to hold it, but that changed with Churchill's intervention that was based on political logic not military logic. Yes it was a mess with some significant losses but war winning crisis ? Really ?

Was Churchill playing with Roosevelt to get more kit? If so he did very well. Were they both playing to the cameras in order to mislead? If so they did well.

Tobruk in Axis hands became a great place to locate Axis shipping in the same way that the 11th Hussars found Fort Capuzzo a place where they stated that they knew they could reliably find Axis units who felt they had to be there. The 11th Hussars found that amusing. Why install yourself inside Capuzzo instead of overlooking it? What would Sun Tzu make of that?

If Tobruk was so valuable to Commonwealth forces why was a St Nazaire attack not launched upon it?

The Royal Artillery's Commemoration Book has a very good account of the development of Knightsbridge and then the fighting around it as far as could be seen from that position. The Scots Guards regimental history ties in with that account and is excellent for more detail and take on events from before Brevity - Gazala. The South African Armoured Corps book and both Agar-Hamilton's books are really useful too with combat details not included in so many bland summary accounts.

I don't mind being wrong on any of the above. Go ahead...correct my day.
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Re: Questions about Gazala

#6

Post by Dili » 06 May 2016, 02:40

ClintHardware wrote:Gazala is supposed to have been a disaster but a measure of Axis success is to what extent they managed to eliminate the British and Commonwealth force in the sense of leaving them in a combat state where they could not move back out of harms way, reform and continue fighting. In addition the loss of Tobruk is given as a great success but the underlying intention weeks before was not to hold it, but that changed with Churchill's intervention that was based on political logic not military logic. Yes it was a mess with some significant losses but war winning crisis ? Really ?

Was Churchill playing with Roosevelt to get more kit? If so he did very well. Were they both playing to the cameras in order to mislead? If so they did well.

Tobruk in Axis hands became a great place to locate Axis shipping in the same way that the 11th Hussars found Fort Capuzzo a place where they stated that they knew they could reliably find Axis units who felt they had to be there. The 11th Hussars found that amusing. Why install yourself inside Capuzzo instead of overlooking it? What would Sun Tzu make of that?

If Tobruk was so valuable to Commonwealth forces why was a St Nazaire attack not launched upon it?

The Royal Artillery's Commemoration Book has a very good account of the development of Knightsbridge and then the fighting around it as far as could be seen from that position. The Scots Guards regimental history ties in with that account and is excellent for more detail and take on events from before Brevity - Gazala. The South African Armoured Corps book and both Agar-Hamilton's books are really useful too with combat details not included in so many bland summary accounts.

I don't mind being wrong on any of the above. Go ahead...correct my day.
Operation Agreement?

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Attrition
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Re: Questions about Gazala

#7

Post by Attrition » 06 May 2016, 07:35

My view about Gazala is that the Axis won because they took the initiative, just as the 8th Army won Crusader. Both winning sides almost failed but didn't. In the end, where the front line lay didn't matter much to the armies, only the air forces and navies, if the front line was between El Alamein and El Agheila. That's why reinforcements poured into Egypt after Gazala and into the Maghreb after Alamein.

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Re: Questions about Gazala

#8

Post by ClintHardware » 06 May 2016, 14:18

Dili wrote:
ClintHardware wrote:Gazala is supposed to have been a disaster but a measure of Axis success is to what extent they managed to eliminate the British and Commonwealth force in the sense of leaving them in a combat state where they could not move back out of harms way, reform and continue fighting. In addition the loss of Tobruk is given as a great success but the underlying intention weeks before was not to hold it, but that changed with Churchill's intervention that was based on political logic not military logic. Yes it was a mess with some significant losses but war winning crisis ? Really ?

Was Churchill playing with Roosevelt to get more kit? If so he did very well. Were they both playing to the cameras in order to mislead? If so they did well.

Tobruk in Axis hands became a great place to locate Axis shipping in the same way that the 11th Hussars found Fort Capuzzo a place where they stated that they knew they could reliably find Axis units who felt they had to be there. The 11th Hussars found that amusing. Why install yourself inside Capuzzo instead of overlooking it? What would Sun Tzu make of that?

If Tobruk was so valuable to Commonwealth forces why was a St Nazaire attack not launched upon it?

The Royal Artillery's Commemoration Book has a very good account of the development of Knightsbridge and then the fighting around it as far as could be seen from that position. The Scots Guards regimental history ties in with that account and is excellent for more detail and take on events from before Brevity - Gazala. The South African Armoured Corps book and both Agar-Hamilton's books are really useful too with combat details not included in so many bland summary accounts.

I don't mind being wrong on any of the above. Go ahead...correct my day.
Operation Agreement?
You're right I had forgotten about that. However, I was thinking of something more permanent and straight forward such as the proposed HMS Centurion attack on Tripoli which if it could have been pulled off at Tobruk instead would have blocked the harbour remarkably well. What did Agreement aim at in terms of longevity of effect and was it a practice/test for something else?
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Dili
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Re: Questions about Gazala

#9

Post by Dili » 07 May 2016, 03:47

I don't know the information that British had on Tobruk, but they tried to land more than 1000 men.

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Re: Questions about Gazala

#10

Post by Urmel » 07 May 2016, 14:55

It was meant to be a raid, not a permanent occupation, to interrupt Axis supplies. See Roskill.

Or here for the Italian speakers.

http://www.marina.difesa.it/conosciamoc ... 81_143.pdf
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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