Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

[ClintHardware]

Whilst looking at 4th Armd Bde's war diary I found the following Section 3 from the 4th Armoured Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 9 based on information received up to 1200 hrs 2nd July 1941, - two weeks after the end of Battleaxe. The numbers seem too high especially two weeks later when more information could have been shared and cross-checked between and within units. I forget what the number of written off panzers by the Germans was but it was something like a tenth of the numbers below. The words "knocked out" in quotes is original to the document.

4th Armoured Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 9

3. ENEMY LOSSES – 15 TO 17 JUNE
It is not possible to give exact figures for enemy losses as many of his damaged vehicles will no doubt be repaied, but tanks knocked out by 4 Armd Bde amount to 55, 7 Armd Bde claim 36 definitely and the Norfolk Yeomany A/Tk claim 22 at CAPUZZO.
Even if he gets many of these “knocked out” tanks going again, it is obvious that he suffered a very severe set back. (WO 169/1281)

[Urmel]

I think you're looking at the old lingo again. Knocked out is not the same as destroyed. I have no doubt that a large number of German tanks were indeed knocked out, but they kept the battlefield and they had five months to repair them before CRUSADER rolled on.

[MarkN]

Whilst looking at 4th Armd Bde's war diary I found the following Section 3 from the 4th Armoured Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 9 based on information received up to 1200 hrs 2nd July 1941, - two weeks after the end of Battleaxe. The numbers seem too high especially two weeks later when more information could have been shared and cross-checked between and within units. I forget what the number of written off panzers by the Germans was but it was something like a tenth of the numbers below. The words "knocked out" in quotes is original to the document.

4th Armoured Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 9

3. ENEMY LOSSES – 15 TO 17 JUNE
It is not possible to give exact figures for enemy losses as many of his damaged vehicles will no doubt be repaied, but tanks knocked out by 4 Armd Bde amount to 55, 7 Armd Bde claim 36 definitely and the Norfolk Yeomany A/Tk claim 22 at CAPUZZO.
Even if he gets many of these “knocked out” tanks going again, it is obvious that he suffered a very severe set back. (WO 169/1281)

Jentz has already written up about this in great detail reproducing the statistics and entries of WD of both sides.

As you note, the Int Summary excerpt you reproduce is 2 weeks after the event. It's scale of inaccuracy merely highlights the scale of systemic delusion prevalent within the British officer/command ranks.

Losses of the Germans 15-17 June 1941 are written up in DAK KTB Ia No.1 page 147 (also reproduced in Jentz).
5.leichte lost 4 tanks: 2 off PzI and 2 off PzII.
15.Pz lost 8 tanks: 3 off PzII, 4 off PzIII and 1 off PzIV.
The same KTB update also provides the "Einsatzbereite Panzer" for 20 June 1941. That is also in Jentz and can be found in threads on this forum.

The British were once again chased off the battlefield which meant they could only guess what damage they had done to the enemy whilst knowing their own losses. Their guess was based upon 'claims' not realities. You can "share and cross-check between and within units" until the cows come home, but it won't make much of a difference if you've been chased off the battlefield and thus have no hulks to count.

[ClintHardware]

I think you're looking at the old lingo again. Knocked out is not the same as destroyed. I have no doubt that a large number of German tanks were indeed knocked out, but they kept the battlefield and they had five months to repair them before CRUSADER rolled on.

I completely agree Urmel. My interest is in the numbers, the damage caused, the extent of it and by what and at what range.

Mark, you assume delusion - you might be right - but the history is in why.

[MarkN]

I think you're looking at the old lingo again. Knocked out is not the same as destroyed. I have no doubt that a large number of German tanks were indeed knocked out, but they kept the battlefield and they had five months to repair them before CRUSADER rolled on.

I completely agree Urmel. My interest is in the numbers, the damage caused, the extent of it and by what and at what range.

Mark, you assume delusion - you might be right - but the history is in why.

Why were the delusional? Probably because of their education and societal upbringing.

There may have been some contemporary pointers that they misread too. A lack of intellectual/mental capacity often leads to poor reasoning, conclusions and thus delusion.

One contemporary pointer could be their knowledge about how poor/slow their own forces could return a battle damaged or broken tank to front-line use. The poor reasoning comes if they simply assume the Germans had the very same issue. Then delusion sets in that the Germans are short of operational tanks.

[ClintHardware]

I think you're looking at the old lingo again. Knocked out is not the same as destroyed. I have no doubt that a large number of German tanks were indeed knocked out, but they kept the battlefield and they had five months to repair them before CRUSADER rolled on.

I completely agree Urmel. My interest is in the numbers, the damage caused, the extent of it and by what and at what range.

Mark, you assume delusion - you might be right - but the history is in why.

Why were the delusional? Probably because of their education and societal upbringing.

There may have been some contemporary pointers that they misread too. A lack of intellectual/mental capacity often leads to poor reasoning, conclusions and thus delusion.

One contemporary pointer could be their knowledge about how poor/slow their own forces could return a battle damaged or broken tank to front-line use. The poor reasoning comes if they simply assume the Germans had the very same issue. Then delusion sets in that the Germans are short of operational tanks.

You have assumed too much to be fully credible. There is another problem for your theory though, and that is the total of 113 eye witnessed incidents of panzers knocked out according to 4th Armd Bde in the quote I gave. 113 in a state of delusion is unlikely.

I do fully trust the German written off figures.

The following months of inaction also indicates that the extent of the panzers damaged made the drive to Cairo not that possible despite British losses in Battleaxe. What held them back?

Just been reading the Tobruk actions supporting Operation Brevity 15th - 17th May which Tobruk began from the 9th May onwards - panzers seen in action count at Tobruk to counter their actions is only about five or perhaps nine, and it may be possible that some them were not necessarily German AFVs. So those visibly operational with Hohmann on the 15th May plus those visibly operational at Tobruk gives us something like 35 operational. This figure is after the ten knocked out on the 12th May by the two 3rd and 4th RHA Troops in the frontier area.

I am pleased that the Brexit vote and then the Trident vote brings us turning back towards Imperialism and Re-armament.

[MarkN]

You have assumed too much to be fully credible.

And you have assumed 113 times that what you are reading holds water.

... that is the total of 113 eye witnessed incidents of panzers knocked out according to 4th Armd Bde in the quote I gave. 113 in a state of delusion is unlikely.

No, you do not have 113 eye witness accounts of panzers knocked out, you have 113 unverified claims. Unverified since, having been chased off the battlefield, they had no hulks to count or anything else to support the claims.

The following months of inaction also indicates that the extent of the panzers damaged made the drive to Cairo not that possible despite British losses in Battleaxe. What held them back?

If the number of panzers knocked out truely was as claimed, why did Op Battleaxe fail and the British get chased off the battlefield with their tail between their legs?


7RTR arrived in Egypt in September 1940 with 50 infantry tanks. The fought through Op Compass and 'lost' 5 (FIVE). The remaining 45 were withdrawn from Cyrenaica and the Western Desert for maintenance, refit and repair. It seems not a single one of those 45 took part in Op Brevity, Op Skorpion or Op Battleaxe. Why? Is there any evidence that those 45 ever returned to operational service?

2RTR arrived in Egypt in September 1940 with 18 A13 cruiser tanks. They 'lost' 2 (TWO) in the Battle of Beda Fomm. Of the remaining 16, 1 was evacuated only as far as Tobruk and was brought back into service circa July/August 1941 and the other 15 were evacuated to the Delta. Of those 15, 7 were reissued to 2RTR in April for Op Brevity. The other 8 never returned to operational use. Why?

The 'einsatzbereite' for in the evening of 18 June was: Pz.Regt.5 15/6/23/9, and Pz.Regt.8 -/20/28/12.
The 'einsatzbereite' for in the evening of 20 June was: Pz.Regt.5 19/8/33/9, and Pz.Regt.8 -/28/26/13.

In the 48 hours immediately following Op Battleaxe, the Germans increased their 'fit' state by 4/10/8/1.

How many of the British X, Y and Z casualties were returned to 'fit' status during the same period?

Compare and contrast.

Conclusion?

[Urmel]

Mark

7 RTR provided the I-tanks for Crete, and the first lot for Tobruk in April. So that accounts for over 20 of the 45.

[MarkN]

Mark

7 RTR provided the I-tanks for Crete, and the first lot for Tobruk in April. So that accounts for over 20 of the 45.

Bugger. Having a doff moment.

The first 4 IT into Tobruk early April were the 4 reinforcements received in March and manned by 4RTR who were in Egypt with no tanks of their own.

I forgot about the next installment of 12 that went in with 7RTR mid April. Must have been from the original batch of 50.

The 7 sent to Crete in May are a bit more troublesome. Were they from the original batch of 50 that came out with 7RTR, from the 16 of B/4RTR that had been to East Africa and landed in Egypt in April or some of the more recent 4RTR arrivals from the UK?

I concede that it looks likely (at least) 19 of the 45 did get another run out.

I think what threw me was a document I read a wee while ago that said the 7RTR tanks had been sitting in Abassia for over 2 months with no work being done on them due to not having the suitably qualified personnel.

Still, you have to admire how they managed to muster barely 100 ITs for Op Battleaxe when, from 239 landed in Egypt by that time, the only ones truely NOT available were those 16 in Tobruk, the 7 lost on Crete, the 5 lost during Op Compass and the handful (doing this from memory not notes) written off during Op Brevity and Skorpion. I understand the reasons why it is so. My comment, for what it's worth, is that they were not doing a very good job of it when compared to the German system.

[ClintHardware]

Mark your figures are fine - the einsatzbereite are low for two panzer regiments and seem to tie in with 4th Armd Bde's statement. Of the 18th June einsatzbereite numbers some panzers could have been repaired during the 15th - 18th one or more times. I have no problem with that.

The term "knocked out" when unable to reach and verify the state of an AFV refers to an AFV seen by one or more tank or gun crews as no longer taking part in the immediate combat after being hit by one or more projectiles no matter what extent of damage is seen.

So long as a panzer is removed from battle the job is done. How temporarily the job remains done is determined by extent of damage and the spares available and also replacing crews wounded and killed behind their armour.

[Urmel]

My comment, for what it's worth, is that they were not doing a very good job of it when compared to the German system.

Hence my sig. Given the superiority of the British base in the Delta it is indeed shocking that they struggled so much with this.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Urmel,

I was wondering if the relatively poor availability of RAF aircraft in the Middle East may also be pertinent here - were these symptoms of British pre-war thinking about the relative pace of operations when compared with German doctrine?

I'm thinking of the organisation of German air fleets into self-contained mini-air forces with their own fighters, recce, bombers, transport, etc which enabled the LW to operate much more effectively during mobile operations (for which I think the Greek operation offers a good example).

This is similarly revealed in the extent to which British ground formations used cable rather than wireless for intercommunication - I've been looking at Medium Regt and Battery RA war diaries for the Greek campaign in 1941 and there is much discussion on the cutting of cables between Gun Positions and OPs, but also some talk of the prohibition of the use of wireless, which seems a bit of an overreaction to the speed with which German DF would result in shelling of HQs and other wireless users.

In the same way, I suspect, the need to rapidly recover "knocked out" or "broken down" (especially in Greece) British AFV's was simply underestimated before the 1940 campaign in NW Europe and that in Cyrenaica in 1940-41. Given this underestimate and the loss of transporters in France, were any actually available in the ME in early 1941?

Regards

Tom

[MarkN]

Mark your figures are fine - the einsatzbereite are low for two panzer regiments and seem to tie in with 4th Armd Bde's statement.

Do they?

Of the 18th June einsatzbereite numbers some panzers could have been repaired during the 15th - 18th one or more times. I have no problem with that.

Correct. So too the British tanks. Not so? But who got chased off the battlefield? Who started the fight and was it successful or not? Why?

The term "knocked out" when unable to reach and verify the state of an AFV refers to an AFV seen by one or more tank or gun crews as no longer taking part in the immediate combat after being hit by one or more projectiles no matter what extent of damage is seen.

I am perfectly aware of how the term "knocked out" was being used at the time.

What I am also considering, and you appear to be deliberately ignoring, is what effect that phraseology may have in informing errors of analysis. The root of self-delusion.

"Knocked out", by definition, could be destroyed or it could be chipping the paint - but causing the panzer driver to kak himself and stall the engine. Commmander and gunner leap out thinking the end is nigh, and 5 mins later clambor back aboard when the driver restarts the engine. A hypothetical witness recording this "knock out" may have his attention diverted and not realise the tank is back as good as new.

However, "knocked out", is more likely to give the impression to the listener or reader of "destroyed" than "scratched". Large claims of "knocked out" tanks will lead to self delusion of far greater success than likely achieved. This feeds into intelligence reports and future operational planning. The British consistently underestimated the enemy strength and, no surprise, that often lead to being chased off the battlefield.

Do you see the dots I'm joining?

So long as a panzer is removed from battle the job is done. How temporarily the job remains done is determined by extent of damage and the spares available and also replacing crews wounded and killed behind their armour.

I understand you are trying to dive deeper into truth behind the actual damage caused. Very admirable. But to what end? Are you trying to generate numbers that suit a preconceived opinion that the British did far better than historical reality?

Op Battleaxe was conceived as a major push to break the siege of Tobruk. Not only did they not get anywhere near to operational success, they got pushed off the battlefield by an inferior in numbers tank force. Even though that inferior number was significantly greater than the number the British expected. There is a commen thread in there. I can see it. History itself demonstrates that thread exists. You appear to be trying to rewrite reality. You seem to be trying to find evidence which supports that the British delusion was an accurate assessment. History demonstrates the scale of delusion.

***

You mentionned that the "einsatzbereite" for 18/20 June was pretty low. I agree. The Germans had a pretty small pool of tanks in North Africa and the desert had taken a major toll on their vehicles just like it did on everyone's. Nevertheless, they still had quite a few more ready to do battle on the 18th and 20th than the British - despite starting the battle with signifacantly less.

[ClintHardware]

Mark your figures are fine - the einsatzbereite are low for two panzer regiments and seem to tie in with 4th Armd Bde's statement.

Do they?

Of the 18th June einsatzbereite numbers some panzers could have been repaired during the 15th - 18th one or more times. I have no problem with that.

Correct. So too the British tanks. Not so? But who got chased off the battlefield? Who started the fight and was it successful or not? Why?

The term "knocked out" when unable to reach and verify the state of an AFV refers to an AFV seen by one or more tank or gun crews as no longer taking part in the immediate combat after being hit by one or more projectiles no matter what extent of damage is seen.

I am perfectly aware of how the term "knocked out" was being used at the time.

What I am also considering, and you appear to be deliberately ignoring, is what effect that phraseology may have in informing errors of analysis. The root of self-delusion.

"Knocked out", by definition, could be destroyed or it could be chipping the paint - but causing the panzer driver to kak himself and stall the engine. Commmander and gunner leap out thinking the end is nigh, and 5 mins later clambor back aboard when the driver restarts the engine. A hypothetical witness recording this "knock out" may have his attention diverted and not realise the tank is back as good as new.

However, "knocked out", is more likely to give the impression to the listener or reader of "destroyed" than "scratched". Large claims of "knocked out" tanks will lead to self delusion of far greater success than likely achieved. This feeds into intelligence reports and future operational planning. The British consistently underestimated the enemy strength and, no surprise, that often lead to being chased off the battlefield.

Do you see the dots I'm joining?

So long as a panzer is removed from battle the job is done. How temporarily the job remains done is determined by extent of damage and the spares available and also replacing crews wounded and killed behind their armour.

I understand you are trying to dive deeper into truth behind the actual damage caused. Very admirable. But to what end? Are you trying to generate numbers that suit a preconceived opinion that the British did far better than historical reality?

Op Battleaxe was conceived as a major push to break the siege of Tobruk. Not only did they not get anywhere near to operational success, they got pushed off the battlefield by an inferior in numbers tank force. Even though that inferior number was significantly greater than the number the British expected. There is a commen thread in there. I can see it. History itself demonstrates that thread exists. You appear to be trying to rewrite reality. You seem to be trying to find evidence which supports that the British delusion was an accurate assessment. History demonstrates the scale of delusion.

***

You mentionned that the "einsatzbereite" for 18/20 June was pretty low. I agree. The Germans had a pretty small pool of tanks in North Africa and the desert had taken a major toll on their vehicles just like it did on everyone's. Nevertheless, they still had quite a few more ready to do battle on the 18th and 20th than the British - despite starting the battle with signifacantly less.

Mark
Your dots are not relevant and you are in an emotional state.

Don't forget that at combat ranges over 50 yards, paint scratches would be hard to detect so it has to be down to the behaviour of the panzer hit and perhaps its crew jumping out or failing to jump out despite being on fire or turretless or both that causes an assumption of "knocked out".

In the Regimental History of the 1st Buffs on the 15th June one of the batteries of 65h A/T Regt had a gun manned by cooks and batmen and that gun crew knocked out 4 panzers with 10 rounds. This is just four (4) behaviourist examples.

On the 16th June the Buffs' historian (Colonel C. R. B. Knight O.B.E.) states that 65th's Battery asked the I Tank crews to allow the panzers nearer this time so they could really make sure of them and during the next attack the panzers legged it out of the killing zone leaving: "six burnt out and a number more damaged". Not sure how a panzer can be more damaged than being burnt out. Internal Detonations? Turrets seen blasted away? Perhaps he just meant they were damaged and not damaged more than burnt out.

These all seem to be a tad more problematic than your theory of paint scratches. NOTE: Colonel Knight does not claim that those mentioned above on the 16th were solely knocked out by the 65th's gunners.

The odd thing about the Buff's history is that those numbers almost fit all the total written off figures and yet there were many more firefights taking place in other locations during the three days.

Every account warrants examination because they have never all been put together in one account.

I do trust the German written off figures. I don't trust unverified knocked out panzers as being anything more than behaving as though knocked out.

[MarkN]

Your dots are not relevant and you are in an emotional state.

In an emotional state???? What a truly bizarre statement to post.

Nevertheless thank you for posting yet more evidence of the unreliablility of your eyewitness statements and the manner in which your behaviourist examples tend to distort historical realities. As you note,

The odd thing about the Buff's history is that those numbers almost fit all the total written off figures and yet there were many more firefights taking place in other locations during the three days.

It's nod "odd" at all. It's a prime example of unreliable witness statements.

If their claims are wholly reliable, then every other claim by every other unit is, by definition, suspect. More likely, their claims are exaggerated to a similar degree to everybody elses. 2RTR, for example, didn't beat about the bush with their words, they use "destroyed". The Buff's "burnt out" gives the impression of destroyed - and this engenders delusion into the scale of damage unflicted upon the enemy.

These all seem to be a tad more problematic than your theory of paint scratches.

I have no "theory of paint scratches". We both agree that "knocked out" is a pretty unhelpful and meaningless term as it tells us, looking back historically, absolutely NOTHING about the scale of damage inflicted.

What we do know is that British started the battle with a superiority in tank numbers and a belief that they could lift the siege of Tobruk with an understrength infantry division and an understrength armoured division. The sizeable superiority was probably approaching 2:1 in gun tanks and probably about even in non-gun tanks. The probably assumed their superiority was even greater. After 3-4 days, the British were chased off the battlefield. On the 23rd, they reported 36 "fit" gun tanks (30 cruiser and 6 infantry). On the evening of the 18th, the Germans could muster 72 gun tanks and 81 gun tanks 48 hours later (see breakdown posted above). No doubt even more were "fit" by the 23rd, but I don't have data for that.

I do trust the German written off figures. I don't trust unverified knocked out panzers as being anything more than behaving as though knocked out.

Fine. But all that matters is how many were ready for action at a given point in time. Eyewitness claims and unreliable behaviourist examples are a hinderance not a help to the history. They may well contribute to telling a riveting tale of daring-do, but representing historical fact is troublesome. The British continually underestimated the enemy strength and much of that is due to the delusion that they had created as to the 'success' of their previous engagements. Your problem if you feel those "dots" are not worth thinking about.