Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

[Don Juan]

Mark - my interpretation of the "burnt out" tanks at Naples was that only the engines were burnt out, not the entire tanks.

My speculative guess is that the Germans were doing the same as what the British were doing when loading tanks at the docks - driving them without water in the radiators.

As for the mileage limit, I don't know if the Germans had a set expiry limit or overhaul life (or not). What I am suggesting is that they discovered what it was the same way the British did - through the practical experience of continuous driving. So the practical overhaul limit of the Panzer III, as revealed by their first major advance, was in the region of 1800 km, as by this distance they had lost over 2/3 of their tanks.

Now, I would suspect that the Germans would have done what the British did with the A13 and A15 and then set a mileage limit, and discussed means of improving or otherwise enhancing it (through the increased use of transporters for example). If the Germans were being professional, I would presume that the 5 Panzer Regt. Workshop report wasn't just glanced over and then filed. I would think that it would have provoked vigorous discussion and action.

[Urmel]

The tanks were burnt completely in a hold fire

[Don Juan]

Fair 'nuff.

[MarkN]

As for the mileage limit, I don't know if the Germans had a set expiry limit or overhaul life (or not). What I am suggesting is that they discovered what it was the same way the British did - through the practical experience of continuous driving. So the practical overhaul limit of the Panzer III, as revealed by their first major advance, was in the region of 1800 km, as by this distance they had lost over 2/3 of their tanks.

Extract from the Schorm captured diary...

Now, I would suspect that the Germans would have done what the British did with the A13 and A15 and then set a mileage limit, and discussed means of improving or otherwise enhancing it (through the increased use of transporters for example).

Where and when did the British continuously drive their tanks to determine the miliage limit? When they landed in France, the majority of cruisers fell out before they'd done 60 miles!

If the Germans were being professional, I would presume that the 5 Panzer Regt. Workshop report wasn't just glanced over and then filed. I would think that it would have provoked vigorous discussion and action.

My interpretation of the werkstatt report - especially given the date - is that somebody in OKH pinged Rommel for an explanation why he had failed on several occasions to take Tobruk and the apparant small number of serviceable pantsers when his reports were indicating minimal losses. Cue werkstatt trying to explain the difficulties they had, and were experiencing with desert damage...

[Don Juan]

Extract from the Schorm captured diary...

Right, so 2500km = 1553 miles, which is close to the 1600 miles that the British measured on the Ausf. J., which shows that the oil bath filters fitted to that model allowed the engine to reach its (not very impressive) maximum life. As a comparison, Meteor engines were expected to achieve 5000 miles (8000 km), but that was of course a later engine.

2000 km = 1242 miles, which is A13/A15 standard. The actual achievement in the desert seems to have been 1800 km, i.e. 200 km less than the anticipated replacement distance, which seems to have been pitched at a "safety" level 500km lower than the manufacturer's figures.

Where and when did the British continuously drive their tanks to determine the miliage limit? When they landed in France, the majority of cruisers fell out before they'd done 60 miles!

I'm going by the figures for Operation Compass and Rommel's first offensive. Overhaul life is when major automotive components need replacing, not just minor repairs etc.

My interpretation of the werkstatt report - especially given the date - is that somebody in OKH pinged Rommel for an explanation why he had failed on several occasions to take Tobruk and the apparant small number of serviceable pantsers when his reports were indicating minimal losses. Cue werkstatt trying to explain the difficulties they had, and were experiencing with desert damage...

Yeah, but did OKH then reply by saying "Oh, that's just fine, then"?

Or were further questions asked about how the same issue could be avoided the next time?

Were there similar problems with Panzer III's wearing out during Rommel's second offensive and the winter battles after Crusader?

[MarkN]

Right, so 2500km = 1553 miles, which is close to the 1600 miles that the British measured on the Ausf. J., which shows that the oil bath filters fitted to that model allowed the engine to reach its (not very impressive) maximum life. As a comparison, Meteor engines were expected to achieve 5000 miles (8000 km), but that was of course a later engine.

2000 km = 1242 miles, which is A13/A15 standard. The actual achievement in the desert seems to have been 1800 km, i.e. 200 km less than the anticipated replacement distance, which seems to have been pitched at a "safety" level 500km lower than the manufacturer's figures.

I'm going by the figures for Operation Compass and Rommel's first offensive. Overhaul life is when major automotive components need replacing, not just minor repairs etc.

I was responding to this...

As for the mileage limit, I don't know if the Germans had a set expiry limit or overhaul life (or not). What I am suggesting is that they discovered what it was the same way the British did - through the practical experience of continuous driving.

In other words, Schorm tells us there was indeed a limit and it was a limit identified by the engine manufacturer and written in the tank's handbook.

We also know from British documents that their tanks also came with manufacturers' instructions on overhaul timeframes and predicted life limits.

Thus, neither the Germans nor the British set their limits based upon initial operational experience.

Now, I know you are keen to consider this from an operational standpoint - rather than a tactical one. And in that sense, I am in agreement with you that neither the British nor the Germans can claim complete credibility of military planning when they planned and commenced operations that they knew (or should have known) were going to exceed the expected life of their armoured vehicles. Mind you, in the case of the British in the Middle East, there seems to have been a very weak AFV branch that appears to have absolved itself from advising senior commanders of the branch's practical and technical limitations.

[Don Juan]

We also know from British documents that their tanks also came with manufacturers' instructions on overhaul timeframes and predicted life limits.

Thus, neither the Germans nor the British set their limits based upon initial operational experience.

Although I admittedly haven't gone through all my AFV handbooks and workshop manuals with a fine tooth comb, I'm pretty sure that none of them include overhaul time frames from the manufacturers, although some of them do include lifetime limits for the tracks, as specified by the Ministry of Supply.

It is one of the major faults of the British Army in the pre-war/early war period that they didn't specify a quantifiable overhaul life for their tanks, and so they had to discover what this life was the hard way. In September 1942 the War Office and Ministry of Supply set down a 3000 mile (5000 km) limit that had to be proved in an acceptance trial. However, I am really quite surprised that the Germans did know that the engine overhaul life of the Pz.III was only 1240 miles, yet considered this to be satisfactory. Especially as they were planning to invade the Soviet Union, which was not a small place.

Now, I know you are keen to consider this from an operational standpoint - rather than a tactical one. And in that sense, I am in agreement with you that neither the British nor the Germans can claim complete credibility of military planning when they planned and commenced operations that they knew (or should have known) were going to exceed the expected life of their armoured vehicles. Mind you, in the case of the British in the Middle East, there seems to have been a very weak AFV branch that appears to have absolved itself from advising senior commanders of the branch's practical and technical limitations.

I don't know enough about the ME AFV Branch during 1940-41 to fully agree with this opinion, but obviously it has some pertinence. What I am pointing out, however, is that we have no documentation from its Axis equivalent (if there even was an Axis equivalent), so this kind of criticism is always going to be somewhat one-sided.

[MarkN]

Although I admittedly haven't gone through all my AFV handbooks and workshop manuals with a fine tooth comb, I'm pretty sure that none of them include overhaul time frames from the manufacturers, although some of them do include lifetime limits for the tracks, as specified by the Ministry of Supply.

It is one of the major faults of the British Army in the pre-war/early war period that they didn't specify a quantifiable overhaul life for their tanks, and so they had to discover what this life was the hard way.

I do not possess, nor have ever read, a single AFV handbook so will not comment on what is, or is not, written therein.

However, you may recall a previous discussion we had regarding the 3rd Armoured Brigade and their mechanical state. I posted a document here or send a link to you by PM. Remember? In that document, CO 3RTR clearly refers to engine life and/or overhaul timeframes. In other documents I have, the GoC 7th Armoured Division states that his Division carefully monitored mileage (prior and during Op Compass) in order to ensure overhauls didn't all come at the same time rendering the Division unoperational.

QED, timeframes for overhauls and/or life expectancy clearly existed and was understood by some to a certain degree. Timeframes that cannot have been determined through operational experience given that these would likely have been in existance prior to the commencement of hostilities. Who proscribed these timeframes is immaterial to me. Nevertheless, since the Liberty engine of the A13 and A15 was an original aircraft engine, the concept of TBO would have been ingrained in the manufacturer from the very beginning. Perhaps Nuffield lost this... Who knows?

[Don Juan]

Well, the overhaul life of the Liberty was quoted as 3000 miles - what diminished this in the A13 and A15 was the externally mounted air cleaners, which simply weren't efficient enough. In late 1942 (iirc) an experiment was conducted on the A15 by the MEE in Abbassia, in which a concertina air cleaner was mounted in the fighting compartment, and the resulting engine life was - 3000 miles!

But as for how the 1200 mile limit on the A13/A15 was determined, I think you're making a fair point, and I will have to research this more closely. But it is a fact that (a) no expected overhaul life was defined by the customer (i.e. the British Army), and (b) no official mileage testing (i.e. by MGO, Mechanization Board, Ministry of Supply) was undertaken to establish the overhaul limit.

[MarkN]

Going back to your earlier point about criticism being one-sided.

In the early part of the war, the British tanks do not seem to have been any less reliable than the German pantsers. However, military failure was often blamed on the state of equipment by British generalship to avoid having to look themselves in the mirror and ask how they themselves failed. The performance of the 2nd Armoured Division being a key example of this.

As time moved on, the image of British tanks being mechanically unsound stuck. When, relatively speaking, they were no worse than their German equivalent in that respect.

[Don Juan]

Going back to your earlier point about criticism being one-sided.

In the early part of the war, the British tanks do not seem to have been any less reliable than the German pantsers. However, military failure was often blamed on the state of equipment by British generalship to avoid having to look themselves in the mirror and ask how they themselves failed. The performance of the 2nd Armoured Division being a key example of this.

As time moved on, the image of British tanks being mechanically unsound stuck. When, relatively speaking, they were no worse than their German equivalent in that respect.

Pretty much, yes.

But I think that British tactical incompetence has tended to overshadow what I believe to be poor operational performance on both sides. Only the British operational performance is more well documented.

[Urmel]

On technical reliability on the battlefield, we havePR5 data for Crusader.

Starts 17 Nov with 124 tanks of all types including command tanks but no Panzer I

Tech losses/enemy loss and damage
19 Nov 1 Mk III/7 II and III
20 Nov 0/4 all types
21 Nov 1 II and 1 III/2 II and III
22 Nov 2 II, 2 III, 1 Command/5 III and IV
23 Nov 1 II and 1 III/14 all types
24 Nov 1 III/4 III 1 Command
25 Nov 1 II and 1 III/13 all types

So in one week they lost 5/35 Panzer II and 7/68 Panzer III and 1/4 Command tanks to tech damage. Total 13. That compares to 50 losses to enemy action (most of which were permanent losses because they did not hold the field). It's by no means negligible,about 20 percent.

On a sidenote, PR5 had the most clapped out tanks of the lot.

[Don Juan]

Thanks Urnel - the technical losses for Crusader seem to be much lower than for the first offensive.

Were the Panzers moving less?

I have a speculative(!) theory that one of the reasons why the Germans started to flank their tanks with AT guns was that it reduced the tanks' track mileage by reducing their need to manoeuvre in response to threats. If you've got tanks with a limited engine life, it's a good idea to keep them moving in straight lines.

[Urmel]

Thanks Urnel - the technical losses for Crusader seem to be much lower than for the first offensive.

Were the Panzers moving less?

Yes, I think so. Also, they probably had been equipped with appropriate filters. :roll:

Now, it's your lucky day. I just found a report on Italian materiel performance in CRUSADER that I forgot I had. Go figure.

On the M13/40, two things stand out:

1) Tanks that had arrived before CRUSADER were seen to be performing more reliably than later production variants.
2) The main cause for failure was the weak engine, which led to everything being overstrained, and is blamed for all the (long list of) technical issues, which are described as 'frequent'. The simple request is: 'needs changing'.

[ClintHardware]

Oh dear!!!! Still peddling your garbage...

Yes it does not deal with combat damage but it does not rule it out definitely either.

The werkstatt report was not written with the expectation that amateur historians 75 years later such as yourself would try to spin a narrative based upon what they didn't include.... :roll:

Whilst it is true that the report does not include a clause or sentence along the lines of,

'...and just to clarify for all the amateur historians in the future which wish to rewrite history, the total of 83 pantsers immobilised by the desert does not include any pantsers that had previously suffered battle damage inflicted by elements of 2nd Armoured Division.'

It is, of course, the exclusion of those words (or similar) which you claim justify your narrative that it does include battle damaged examples.

However, you will also notice that the report does not include this clause/sentence,

'...and just to clarify for all the amateur historians in the future which wish to rewrite history, the total of 83 pantsers immobilised by the desert does not include any pantsers that had previously suffered battle damage inflicted by alien death rays from the BattleStar F'rage from Planet Ukip.'

You may wish to include that possibility in your narrative too...

No there is no basis of your exclusions.