Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

Discussions on WW2 in Africa & the Mediterranean. Hosted by Andy H
Post Reply
MarkN
Member
Posts: 2623
Joined: 12 Jan 2015, 14:34
Location: On the continent

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#61

Post by MarkN » 28 Sep 2016, 19:01

ClintHardware wrote: Because of the lack of German detailed evidence the behavioural evidence and consequences become more important.
Really? Wow!
ClintHardware wrote: Your last point supports my reasons for comparing because purely mechanical problems are usually easier to evacuate and repair. Your last point adds weight to the doubt that can be cast upon the repeated assumptions made about Battleaxe outcomes during the last 75 years - thank you.
Really?

My last paragraph showed that the British system took 8.5 weeks to overhaul a Light tank and 14 weeks a Cruiser tank. It provides no indication of whether the work being done was routine, repairing battle damage or mechanical failure. It was a simple timeframe for 'turn-round'. How does that support your notion that "purely mechanical problems are usually easier to evacuate and repair"?

It also pointed to a contempory quote by a German Panzertruppe about how long he had to wait for recovery for a mechanical problem. How does that "add weight to the doubt that can be cast upon the repeated assumptions made about Battleaxe outcomes during the last 75 years"?

Here ...
ClintHardware wrote:In respect of the high Battleaxe British figures a view/comparison can be made with the attack at Tobruk 30th April,1st and 2nd May. Prior to that attack 161 panzers had been landed and received by Panzer Regiment 5 up to the 29th April, but for that very important attack only 81 could be fielded. There had been 21 written off/left out of reach during previous fighting and (IIRC) two had gone to the frontier, so 57 were not available for the strongest contested next battle even though there had been two weeks for repairs and for some of the lightly wounded to return to duty.
... you seem to be arguing that the number of tanks and the timeframe in workshop is an indicator of the type of problem that has put them into the workshop. Your theory being that: many tanks + long stay = lots of battle damage.
Here ...
ClintHardware wrote: ... because purely mechanical problems are usually easier to evacuate and repair.
... you say it clearly.

This is completely absurd!

Evidence 1:
The image posted in the other thread of a 1RTR A9 Cruiser Tank abandoned on the escarpment out of Derna. Probably been there for 5 weeks or so. Mechanical breakdown as it was being evacuted back to Tobruk then Egypt. So, if "purely mechanical problems are usually easier to evacuate and repair", somebody forgot to tell the British! 5 weeks and it hasn't even made it to the workshop = definite combat damage!

Evidence 2:
There were 135 Cruiser tanks (just considering Cruiser tanks here to keep the calculation and presentation manageable) allocated to 7th Armd Div on 6 December 1940 for the start of Op Compass. Of those, 41 were in RAOC workshop. 41 out of 135??? Them Italians must have been giving Tommy a real pasteing since June!!!! Clever Tommy fooled all them historians for 75 years by only writing one off the books!

Evidence 3:
Op Compass begins. Many of the 41 in RAOC workshop are sent forward over the coming days and weeks to add to the 94 which started off. Nevertheless, by the time Beda Fomm is over at the beginning of February, there are only a handful left standing.

Now, wind the clock forward to the Census data dated 1 March 1941. Extract from that data the 123 cruisers that arrived with 2nd Armd Div, and you see that the total surviving tanks from 7th Armd Div is 133 - if you believe the numbers! (I also subtracted 2 that previously were held by RAC School). Only two losses the whole campaign! Wow! Tommy really is clever at fooling the historians. But where are they all? Extrapolating from the 12 April data supplied by O'Moore Creagh, 82 are in RAOC workshop and 51 are allegedly serviceable with units. But they're not. 11 are with 1RTR, the rest are missing!

So we have, from 133 tanks of 7th Armd Div:
- 78 in workshop u/s,
- 15 serviceable (4 at RAOC and 11 with 1 RTR) and
- 40 off with the fairies.

78 in workshop after 8 weeks must mean that the Italians really, really, REALLY gave the Tommy a pounding during Op Compass. If we add the missing 40, thus 118 out of 133 not fit, Op Compass must be reclassified as a complete and utter DISASTER!

That is what your thought process is coming to.
- Many tanks + long stay = lots of battle damage
- 57 out of 161 + 2 weeks = British inflicted massive damage on Pz.Regt.5 - hidden from history for 75 years!
- 118 out of 133 + 8 weeks = military disaster for 7th Armoured Division - hidden from history for 75 years!

Do you want to rewrite the history of the Op Compass campaign too?

There is more and more evidence I can produce to show you that the British had more tanks in workshop and for longer periods of time than the Germans - and those visits were down purely to mechanical failure having not even gone into battle. But, according to your 'theory', that number and timeframe is an indicator of significant battle damage.

User avatar
ClintHardware
Member
Posts: 816
Joined: 21 Jan 2011, 13:17

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#62

Post by ClintHardware » 29 Sep 2016, 08:07

MarkN wrote:Really? Wow!
Your British info is interesting. My interest is in the German figures.

We all know that when an AFV has had suspension and running gear stripped by shot blast and fragments its harder to evacuate than one with an engine problem. When a panzer has been penetrated then internal equipment may need to be replaced, the same may be true of internal damage from spall when partially penetrated. These problems may need other AFVs to be cannibalised.

The LAD and ROAC would leave AFVs where they were until ready to collect and repair or salvage. So long as they could reach them they did not need to move them until ready to work on them or cannibalise them. They would also repair the most valuable/most wanted ahead of worn and less battleworthy AFVs. Don't get excited about worn out A9s left beside roads and tracks - its just a means of storage. The ROAC did what they needed to do with the equipment and working hours they had available.

The same is probably true of how werkstatt kompanien worked. I would love to know what the werkstatt did with the panzer that had its turret shot off on the 12th May 1941 by a troop of the 4th RHA. The British watched ten panzers being recovered from that firefight the following day.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !


User avatar
Urmel
Member
Posts: 4896
Joined: 25 Aug 2008, 10:34
Location: The late JBond

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#63

Post by Urmel » 29 Sep 2016, 10:52

Sorry.

1) We all know no such thing.

2) Your logic is only correct if there isn't a risk that spares maybe missing. This is a high risk on the Axis side, where spares maybe lost in transit and generally take a long time to arrive, so stocks maybe used up especially for high-wear items. They didn't have a Kanban system working.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 3726
Joined: 28 Apr 2013, 18:14
Location: London
Contact:

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#64

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Sep 2016, 11:05

The British did not have an adequate battlefield recovery capability in 1941. Many vehicle that broke down that could have been repaired were abandoned because the British lacked tank transporters or a dedicated recovery organisation. LASD and RAOC could repair vehicles, but not under fire or in no mans land where these valuable technicians might be captured .

This lead to the formation of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in 1942. Army Training Memorandum circulated in late 1942 and early 1943 included case studies of the new corps of recovering tanks on the battlefield in North Africa.

User avatar
ClintHardware
Member
Posts: 816
Joined: 21 Jan 2011, 13:17

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#65

Post by ClintHardware » 29 Sep 2016, 11:46

Urmel wrote:Sorry.

1) We all know no such thing.

2) Your logic is only correct if there isn't a risk that spares maybe missing. This is a high risk on the Axis side, where spares maybe lost in transit and generally take a long time to arrive, so stocks maybe used up especially for high-wear items. They didn't have a Kanban system working.
I am sorry I do not understand your 1). Can you please explain.

In respect of 2) I can't imagine Rommel not demanding every panzer being repaired with anything that might be taken from another awaiting repairs if there were no appropriate spares to hand.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !

MarkN
Member
Posts: 2623
Joined: 12 Jan 2015, 14:34
Location: On the continent

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#66

Post by MarkN » 29 Sep 2016, 12:09

ClintHardware wrote: My interest is in the German figures.
That is self-evident. It is also the root cause of the problem. The problem in your understanding of history, and the problem that you are having with me and others on this forum. You are not interested in understanding history, you are attempting to rewrite one side of it, and one side only.
ClintHardware wrote: Don't get excited about worn out A9s left beside roads and tracks - its just a means of storage.
There is no excitement for me in a broken tank at the side of the road 75 years ago.

However, with this sentence you have perfectly demonstrated that you share a similar level of delusion and incomptence to the British staff officers working the case. Given the task of identifying what assets they had to prevent a German march on Cairo, the Delta and the Suez, they included in their "serviceable with units" statistic tanks which were non-existant, already written off or parked derelict on the wrong side of the battle line! On the other hand, your delusion or incompetence just puts them in "storage". I'm sure that would be of great comfort to the tankie in the Western Desert sitting on the ground wondering why he doesn't have the protection of armour around him whilst those REMFs horde their tanks in "storage".
ClintHardware wrote: I can't imagine Rommel not demanding every panzer being repaired with anything that might be taken from another awaiting repairs if there were no appropriate spares to hand.
Perhaps your posts would be more credible if they were backed by evidence and/or solid reasoning rather than your imagination run wild. A lack of spare parts affect all tanks in workshop, not just battle damaged ones.

User avatar
ClintHardware
Member
Posts: 816
Joined: 21 Jan 2011, 13:17

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#67

Post by ClintHardware » 30 Sep 2016, 08:50

MarkN wrote: perfectly demonstrated
I understand from your statements that you have a problem with looking at the available data from various angles in case it challenges your needs.

So far I standby my statements in this topic but I am open to German evidence with the references they are filed under in today's archives.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !

MarkN
Member
Posts: 2623
Joined: 12 Jan 2015, 14:34
Location: On the continent

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#68

Post by MarkN » 01 Oct 2016, 16:44

ClintHardware wrote: In respect of the high Battleaxe British figures a view/comparison can be made with the attack at Tobruk 30th April,1st and 2nd May.
I have previously demonstarted the flaw in your 'test': namely, many tanks + long stay DOES NOT = lots of battle damage. Additionally, I mentionned the self-licking lollipop evidence loop. Maybe you have not grasped the reality that you have built another 'test' that uses the evidence of British claims to evidence that those very same British claims are valid. Ie. your result is that the existance of those is good enough for you be proof of their veracity. Good one!

Now let's look a bit closer at how you have constructed these 'tests'. In his report, O'Moore Creagh decided to try an identify the location of his tanks. Any that he couldn't place, were then left hanging in the 'serviceable with units' row. Exactly what he didn't want to do. You have built and conducted exactly the same calculation.
ClintHardware wrote:Prior to that attack 161 panzers had been landed and received by Panzer Regiment 5 up to the 29th April, but for that very important attack only 81 could be fielded. There had been 21 written off/left out of reach during previous fighting and (IIRC) two had gone to the frontier, so 57 were not available for the strongest contested next battle even though there had been two weeks for repairs and for some of the lightly wounded to return to duty.
1) Any tanks that you cannot locate with your lax effort, you assume to be in workshop. They could be in many places. Just because you are unable to place them, doesn't mean they are unfit and parked in workshop.
2) You also assume that they've been there for the full 2 weeks. It's obvious why you want to believe that to be so, but it has no founding in historical fact.

The II.Pz.Regt.5 WD indicates that 1 Pz.I broke down between the 29th and the attack. On the 29th they had 82 tanks, the attack started with 81. The numbers tie in perfectly except for that 1 tank. How many other panters suffered mechanical failure during those 2 weeks? British pantsers seemd to fall out about every 5 miles of desert covered. The WD also notes a zug of Pz.IV being attached to Gp Schwerin - more tanks not part of the 81 but perfectly fit. In NO document does it state that ALL of I.Pz.Regt.5 pantsers were attached to Gp Hohmann, just that Gp Hohmann was an amalgamation of the two. Whilst I cannot evidence that I.Pz.Regt.5 was operating independently of Gp Hohmann, it is not beyond the realm of possibility. And finally, why do you assume the very recently arrived 13 replacement tanks are with Gp Hohmann and used in the battle?

In just 1 paragraph, I have effectively identified 18 tanks out of your 'missing' 57 that are not unfit due to battle damage.

Now let's return to your 2 weeks of inactivity theme. What occured 2 weeks earlier? The 14 April attack of course. How many pantsers started that attack? 38. And 17 were lost according to Olbricht. Thus, 21 managed to get out. Remember, for once 'we', namely the Australians, claimed the battleground. The 21 no doubt were damaged to varying degrees, but they got out. Whilst some may well still be in workshop, one cannot fail to see that they were still, at the very minimum, runners. So, not necessarily the long term casualty that you wish to assume. And rather negates your daft attempt here...
ClintHardware wrote: We all know that when an AFV has had suspension and running gear stripped by shot blast and fragments its harder to evacuate than one with an engine problem.
What is it we're all supposed to know??? How does it evidence the state of any of the 57 you have failed to locate?

And, whilst you choose to dismiss it because it doesn't suit your narrative, the werkstatt report that appears in several books and archives demonstrates that the greatest concern for the workshop at the time was the amount of work flowing from mechanical failure from desert bashing.

I have no doubt that a good number were in workshops. I have no doubt this consisted of tanks undergoing routine maintenance, light repair work as well as major repair work. Some of that work is undoubtably due to battle damage.

The evidence is out there. It does not support your theory, nor your narrative. Your 'test' is not a test of the evidence, it is a self-licking lollipop evidence loop: to prove that British claims are valid, I give you the same British claims as evidence.

User avatar
ClintHardware
Member
Posts: 816
Joined: 21 Jan 2011, 13:17

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#69

Post by ClintHardware » 02 Oct 2016, 15:43

MarkN wrote:self-licking lollipop
I do not have a theory. I am looking at data and noticing the panzers missing from important actions, and also subsequent inaction.

The data I gave for the 1st May is from various pages within Jentz's TCinNA and Panzertruppen Volume 1.

I standby my previous statements including those referring to the limitations of the werkstatt report data.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !

MarkN
Member
Posts: 2623
Joined: 12 Jan 2015, 14:34
Location: On the continent

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#70

Post by MarkN » 03 Oct 2016, 14:22

ClintHardware wrote: The data I gave for the 1st May is from various pages within Jentz's TCinNA and Panzertruppen Volume 1.
How very strange!!!

You keep posting that your are "testing and retesting data". Now you're saying that all you're doing is lifting data from Jentz - and then adding your imagination. What's strangest of all is that Jentz seems to be the main target of your claims that "history has been deliberately hidden and misrepresented for 75 years." Telling us your your imagination is not testing data.
ClintHardware wrote: I standby my previous statements including those referring to the limitations of the werkstatt report data.
And your statements seem to be at odds with the evidence and established historical facts.

Direct and indirect evidence points to the desert taking a major toll on the serviceability of the German pantsers. Just like it did the British and the Italian pantsers too. Prior to the 1 May attack on Tobruk, the the single major engagement by Pz.Regt.5 was the previous 14 April attack. An attack where 17 pantsers were lost and the remaining 21 engaged all managed to extract themselves under their own power. Beyond your imagination, what is there to evidence that the greater part of your 'missing' 57 pantsers (in reality less than 40) were in Pz.Regt.5 workshop long term due to major battle damage?

User avatar
ClintHardware
Member
Posts: 816
Joined: 21 Jan 2011, 13:17

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#71

Post by ClintHardware » 03 Oct 2016, 15:57

MarkN wrote:Direct and indirect evidence points to the desert taking a major toll on the serviceability of the German pantsers
Maybe. I say maybe because with the numbers repaired by the 5th May as mentioned in the Werkstatt report are impressive (even if it is written in a way that allows the question of whether or not some of the panzers went through the Werkstatt more than once) so why were most of the rest not repaired too.

Mark I used the figures we have of the 1st May attack to then look comparatively at the 4th Armd Bde and 7th RTR data from Battleaxe to raise questions if not produce answers.

I do not have time today to look at the 14th April figures with you but surely the 1st May gives us a much better view because of the two weeks to make repairs. The 14th was only three days after the 11th attack and perhaps more panzers had yet to arrive from the desert - I don't have the figures of those still in the desert on the 11th or 14th. But I would expect German efficiency to do something radical by the 1st May if possible.

I will look later this week if I can and post again. I did get a copy of the Repairing the Panzers book as advised by Michael and will have a good look at it while I am away.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !

MarkN
Member
Posts: 2623
Joined: 12 Jan 2015, 14:34
Location: On the continent

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#72

Post by MarkN » 03 Oct 2016, 18:07

Oh dear!!!!!
ClintHardware wrote: Maybe. I say maybe because with the numbers repaired by the 5th May as mentioned in the Werkstatt report are impressive (even if it is written in a way that allows the question of whether or not some of the panzers went through the Werkstatt more than once) so why were most of the rest not repaired too.
The 5 May werkstatt report does NOT, I repeat NOT, state how many were repaired by 5 May and returned to operational status. The report is dated 5 May. Really ClintHardware, your attention to detail when reading documentation is appalling. Or do you deliberately misread what's in front of you when it is unhelpful to your narrative?

The report states that 83 tanks were brought into workshop due to 700km of desert bashing prior to arrival outside Tobruk (ie 1-11 April). It then gives further details of the problems encountered on those 83 tanks. It does say that 58 engines were changed (past tense), but given all the other issues too, there is no certainty (from this document) that any were released. No doubt some were. Pz.III seems to have been worst affected.

It does not say how many were brought into workshop subsequently, nor does it say how many were signed off and returned to units. It is merely stressing the workload due to one march through the desert.
ClintHardware wrote: Mark I used the figures we have of the 1st May attack to then look comparatively at the 4th Armd Bde and 7th RTR data from Battleaxe to raise questions if not produce answers.
Not true. You made the comparison to reify your narrative when chellenged by my posts. You ended the comparison with the conclusion: "The above comparison leaves me currently unable to accept Mark's delusional theory." http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p2040189
Nothing to do with "raising questions", everything to do with stubbornly refusing to accept reality.
ClintHardware wrote: I do not have time today to look at the 14th April figures with you but surely the 1st May gives us a much better view because of the two weeks to make repairs.
Only in your imagination to suit your narrative. How many tanks went into workshop during those 2 weeks? How many came out?
Your commentary is based on the bizarre belief that ...
a) pantsers only go into workshop after battle!!!!
b) mechanical problems are turned round lightning quick!!!!
ClintHardware wrote: The 14th was only three days after the 11th attack and perhaps more panzers had yet to arrive from the desert - I don't have the figures of those still in the desert on the 11th or 14th. But I would expect German efficiency to do something radical by the 1st May if possible.
No, you don't have the figures. But you're happy to imagine what they were un order to support your narrative.

14 April: Start with 38 - 4/15/9/9 and 1 BefWg. Lose 17 (not sure of breakdown but 5 Pz.IV confirmed).

User avatar
ClintHardware
Member
Posts: 816
Joined: 21 Jan 2011, 13:17

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#73

Post by ClintHardware » 04 Oct 2016, 07:12

MarkN wrote:Oh dear!!!!!
I have made no such assumptions.

The missing panzers (those not seen in important actions) are not necessarily destroyed and maybe awaiting repair. The German figures show increasing operational numbers at later dates - Appendix 3 in CAB 146/10 provides such a list and dates.
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !

nmao
Member
Posts: 142
Joined: 24 Mar 2005, 17:42
Location: Portugal

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#74

Post by nmao » 09 Nov 2016, 16:04

MarkN wrote: 7RTR arrived in Egypt in September 1940 with 50 infantry tanks. The fought through Op Compass and 'lost' 5 (FIVE). The remaining 45 were withdrawn from Cyrenaica and the Western Desert for maintenance, refit and repair. It seems not a single one of those 45 took part in Op Brevity, Op Skorpion or Op Battleaxe. Why? Is there any evidence that those 45 ever returned to operational service?
Hello.
Coming very late to this thread, i noticed you say 5 infantry tanks lost in Op Compass.
In Jentz's "Tank Combat in NA" he only mentions 1 lost...
Do you have a source and further info on the tanks lost by 7 RTR?

thanks.

-Nuno

Michael Kenny
Member
Posts: 8251
Joined: 07 May 2002, 20:40
Location: Teesside

Re: Knocked Out Panzers: 4th Armd Bde Assessment

#75

Post by Michael Kenny » 13 Nov 2016, 19:12

On a tangent the recent Plowman book on tanks in Greece must have a photo of nearly every tank lost there!

https://www.amazon.com/Camouflage-Marki ... 836067227X

Post Reply

Return to “WW2 in Africa & the Mediterranean”